

THIRD EDITION



HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF
EGYPT

ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT JR.
ROBERT JOHNSTON

AFRICAN HISTORICAL DICTIONARIES

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DEDICATION

To the late

**Arthur E. Goldschmidt
and
Elizabeth Wickenden Goldschmidt**

and to

**William Smith Johnston
and
Shirley Groth Johnston**

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EDITOR'S FOREWORD

No country has a longer history and few a more eventful one than Egypt. It has generated extraordinary civilizations and passed through moments of exceptional glory, only to experience times of decline and rebirth. A vital passage from east to west and north to south, it has figured predominantly in world history from its origins to the present day. The emphasis here is on the present for, although less noticed than under more charismatic leaders, Egypt still plays an important role in Arab affairs, and its actions are significant for the whole region and beyond.

For these reasons, it is always worthwhile to know more about Egypt, even when it is not in the headlines. This revised *Historical Dictionary of Egypt* makes a serious contribution to such knowledge. Focusing on the modern and contemporary periods, it presents numerous notable Egyptians, not only rulers and politicians but also economists, academics, entrepreneurs, and cultural and religious figures. Other entries provide information about crucial organizations, parties, institutions, events, and aspects of the political, economic, social, cultural, and religious scenes. This dictionary is rounded out by a handy chronology and a selective bibliography that helps readers find further literature on aspects of particular interest.

This third edition was coauthored by one of our leading authorities on Egypt, Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. Professor Emeritus of Middle East History at Pennsylvania State University, Dr. Goldschmidt has written extensively on Egypt, including his books *Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State* and *A Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt*, as well as the previous edition of this book. He has visited Egypt frequently, including a stint as a visiting professor at Cairo University, and closely follows the literature in English and Arabic. His coauthor is Robert Johnston who has taught on Islamic civilization and is presently located in Egypt as associate dean of libraries and learning technologies at the American University in Cairo. Their combined experience has

certainly contributed to making this updated and expanded edition a very useful and readable guide to modern Egypt.

Jon Woronoff
Series Editor

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

“Fools rush in where angels fear to tread” should be the motto of anyone who undertakes to write a historical dictionary of Egypt. Because historians of this country classify themselves by period, these writers, as specialists in modern and contemporary history, chose 1760, the accession date for the first governor who tried to Westernize Egypt, as the starting point, although the introduction, chronology, and bibliography provide an overview of the whole span of Egypt’s history. Even with the abbreviated time period for the Dictionary, rendering the title slightly inaccurate, the book threatens to overwhelm both its readers and its writers. Writing it was a challenge, forcing the authors to read widely in aspects of Egypt’s economic, social, cultural, and intellectual history in order to provide needed depth. The initial *Historical Dictionary of Egypt*, by Joan Wucher King, has been in use for two decades; this volume cannot fully replace it.

For both writers, education is a lifelong pursuit. Arthur Goldschmidt has retired after 35 years as a teacher, only to discover in rewriting this and other books that there are many facts and concepts he still needed to learn. Robert Johnston has worked as a professional reference librarian for over 20 years and has had occasion to consult many valuable reference resources, including earlier editions of this *Historical Dictionary*. He was pleased to join Arthur Goldschmidt in coauthoring this edition, adding his own unique perspective as both a librarian and a historian to this effort.

We are grateful to our wives and sons, for encouraging us when we were most discouraged and for enduring those evenings and weekends when we were preoccupied with this project. We acknowledge the research assistance by the reference staff and by Derrick Beckner of Penn State’s Libraries and by Nermine Rifaat of the American University in Cairo Library, as well as the technical aid provided by Tom Minsker of Penn State’s Center for Academic Computing. Any errors that remain in this book are ours. In an age of word processing, it will be easy to correct for future editions any errors that reviewers and users call to our attention.

We dedicate this book to our parents: Arthur E. Goldschmidt, who read the earlier edition in manuscript and offered helpful advice and en-

couragement; Elizabeth Wickenden, whose oft-repeated insistence that historians should treat economic and social issues as well as politics, war, and diplomacy, found an echo in this book; William Smith Johnston, who kindled and fed his son's love of history; and Shirley Groth Johnston, who kindled and fed Robert and taught him the values of tenacity, patience, and empathy. We also owe to our parents our first lessons in teamwork.


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

A few conventions need to be noted. All measurements are metric except for the use of “feddans” for land measurement and “cantars” for quantities of cotton or in the rare case when English measurements were being used in a document that we paraphrased. All dates are based on the Gregorian calendar; Muslims use a 12-month lunar calendar in which the Prophet Muhammad’s *hijra* (emigration) from Mecca to Medina is the year 1, corresponding to 622 CE. Transliteration of Arabic names and terms follows the system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, which we find easier to read than that of the Library of Congress. The Arabic letter *ayn* is represented by an apostrophe when it appears in the middle or end of a word. No attempt is made to represent the glottal stop, or *hamza*. The Arabic letter *jim*, although pronounced as a hard g in the vernacular dialect of Cairo and the Egyptian Delta, is consistently rendered as a j in this work. Such prerevolutionary titles as “pasha” and “bey” have usually been omitted, as have most contemporary titles such as “Dr.” Military ranks are rendered in English only when relevant to an entry; a separate table of the old and new military ranks, adopted after the 1952 Revolution, is provided. Most organizations are given the names, whether English or Arabic, by which they are most widely known, but cross-references are provided. People are alphabetized by last names, except for Abbas Hilmi, Husayn Kamil, Muhammad Ali, and Umm Kulthum. References in the text follow Egyptian vernacular usage, in cases when first names are most common. Arabic words commonly used in English appear in roman type; italics are used for the ones that have not yet been assimilated into English.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAPSO	Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization
AID	Agency for International Development (U.S.)
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ARE	Arab Republic of Egypt
ASU	Arab Socialist Union
AUC	American University in Cairo
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization ("Baghdad Pact")
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress ("Young Turks")
DLC	Delta Land Company
EEF	Egyptian Expeditionary Force
EFU	Egyptian Feminist Union
EMNL	Egyptian Movement for National Liberation
ERSAP	Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program
EU	European Union (former European Economic Community)
GODE	Gulf Organization for the Development of Egypt
<i>HADETO</i>	<i>Al-Haraka al-Dimuqratiyya li al-Tahrir al-Watani</i>
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
£E	<i>Livre égyptienne</i> , or Egyptian pound
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCWS	National Committee of Workers and Students
NDP	National Democratic Party
NFTUE	National Federation of Trade Unions in Egypt
NPUP	National Progressive Unionist Party (<i>al-Tajammu'</i>)

NSPO	National Service Project Organization
NTSB	National Transportation Safety Board
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
SLP	Socialist Labor Party
UAR	United Arab Republic
UN	United Nations
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
YMMA	Young Men's Muslim Association (<i>Jam'iyyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin</i>)





CHRONOLOGY

- 30 BCE–642 CE** Egypt under Roman occupation.
- 639–642** Arab conquest of Egypt.
- 642–661** Rightly guided caliphs, ruling from Medina.
- 661–750** Umayyad caliphs, ruling from Syria.
- 750–868** Abbasid caliphs, ruling from Iraq.
- 868–905** Tulunid dynasty in Egypt and Syria.
- 905–934** Abbasid caliphs restored in Egypt.
- 934–969** Ikhshidid dynasty in Egypt and Syria.
- 969–1171** Fatimid caliphs in Egypt, Syria, and the Hijaz.
- 1171–1250** Ayyubid dynasty in Egypt and Syria.
- 1250–1382** Bahri Mamluks in Egypt and Syria.
- 1382–1517** Burji Mamluks in Egypt and Syria.
- 1517–1798** Ottoman sultans, ruling from Istanbul.
- 1760–1772** Ali Bey, governor.
- 1772–1775** Muhammad Bey “Abu al-Dhahab,” governor.
- 1798, 2 July** Napoléon Bonaparte’s forces take Alexandria.
- 1798, 22 July** French defeat Mamluks at Imbaba.
- 1798, 1 August** Nelson defeats French fleet at Abu-Qir.
- 1798–1801** French occupation.
- 1799, 20 March–17 May** French forces invade Syria.
- 1799, 22 August** Napoléon Bonaparte escapes to France and is succeeded by Jean-Baptiste Kléber.

- 1800, 24 January** Convention of al-Arish.
- 1800, 14 June** Kléber assassinated; Jacques “Abdallah” Menou succeeds him.
- 1801–1802** First British occupation of Egypt.
- 1801–1914** Restored Ottoman suzerainty (nominal).
- 1802–1803** Khusrev, governor (pasha) of Egypt.
- 1803–1804** Power struggle, won by Muhammad Ali.
- 1804–1805** [Ahmad] Khurshid, governor.
- 1805–1848** Muhammad Ali, governor.
- 1807, March–September** British occupy Alexandria.
- 1811, 1 March** Mamluks massacred in Cairo.
- 1811–1818** Egyptian campaign against the Wahhabis.
- 1817–1820** Excavation of Mahmudiyya Canal.
- 1820–1822** Egyptian conquest of the Sudan.
- 1822** Long-staple cotton introduced in Delta.
- 1823–1828** Egyptian forces intervene in Greece.
- 1827, 20 October** Egyptian and Ottoman fleets sunk at Navarino.
- 1830** Clot organizes first medical school.
- 1831–1840** Egyptian conquest and occupation of Syria.
- 1833, 8 April** Convention of Kütahya.
- 1839, 24 June** Ibrahim defeats Ottomans at Nazib.
- 1839, 30 June** Ottoman fleet surrenders to Muhammad Ali in Alexandria.
- 1840, July** London Convention establishes Egypt as autonomous Ottoman province.
- 1840, 3 November** British bombard Acre.
- 1841, 1 June** Sultan issues *firman* recognizing Muhammad Ali and his heirs as governors of Egypt.

- 1845** Waghorn proves benefit of overland route across Suez Isthmus.
- 1847, April** Cornerstone laid for Delta Barrage (completed in **1861**).
- 1848, July–November** Ibrahim, acting governor.
- 1848–1854** Abbas Hilmi I, governor.
- 1851** Beginning of Alexandria–Cairo railway.
- 1854–1863** Said, governor.
- 1854, 30 November** Said and Lesseps sign Suez Canal concession.
- 1854–1855** Egypt adopts Ottoman *Tanzimat* code.
- 1858** Formal establishment of Suez Canal Company.
- 1859–1869** Construction of Suez Canal.
- 1863–1879** Isma'il, governor and khedive.
- 1866, 27 May** Ottoman decree changes inheritance system for viceroys of Egypt.
- 1866, November** Isma'il convokes Assembly of Deputies.
- 1867, June** Isma'il formally recognized as khedive.
- 1867, 7 November** Decree of 10 Rajab starts state education system.
- 1869, 17 November** Formal opening of Suez Canal.
- 1871, 30 August** Isma'il approves *muqabala* law (abrogated in **1880**).
- 1872, 25 September** Ottoman decree allows Egyptian government to contract loans without prior permission.
- 1875, June** Most powers agree to Mixed Courts (which formally begin in **January 1876**).
- 1875, 26 November** Britain buys Egyptian government's Suez Canal Company shares.
- 1876, 4 April** Cave Mission submits report on Egypt's financial crisis.
- 1876, 2 May** *Caisse de la Dette Publique* established.
- 1876, October** Goschen–Joubert Mission.
- 1876, 14 November** Murder of the *Mufattish*.

1876, November–December 1878 and September 1879–September 1882 Egypt under Dual Financial Control.

1879–1892 Tawfiq, khedive.

1881, 1 February Egyptian officers rebel against Uthman Rifqi.

1881, 9 September Officers confront Khedive Tawfiq at Abdin Palace.

1881–1882 Nationalist movement led by Colonel Ahmad Urabi.

1882, 8 January Anglo–French Joint Note threatens Nationalists.

1882, 4 February Tawfiq appoints Nationalist government led by Mahmud Sami al-Barudi, with Ahmad Urabi as minister of war and marine.

1882, 17 April Alleged Turco-Circassian officers' plot foiled by Nationalists.

1882, May Tawfiq fears overthrow of khedivial family.

1882, 12 June Egyptians riot in Alexandria against Europeans.

1882, 11 July British fleet bombards Alexandria fortifications. Fire breaks out, and British troops land in Alexandria to restore order.

1882, 13 September British defeat Egyptian army.

1882, 14 September British forces occupy Cairo; Urabi surrenders.

1882–1956 Second British occupation of Egypt.

1883, 6 February Dufferin Report on Egypt's government.

1883, 1 May Organic Law established.

1883, June National Courts established.

1883–1907 Sir Evelyn Baring, Earl of Cromer, British agent.

1885, 26 January Mahdi defeats Gordon and takes Khartum.

1887, 22 May Drummond Wolff Convention announced (later rejected by the Ottoman sultan).

1888, 29 October Constantinople Treaty (Suez Canal Convention).

1892–1914 Abbas Hilmi II, khedive.

- 1893, January** Ministerial crisis between Abbas and Cromer.
- 1894, January** Frontiers Incident between Abbas and Kitchener.
- 1896–1898** Anglo–Egyptian forces reconquer Sudan.
- 1898, 19 September** British and French forces meet at Fashoda.
- 1899, 18 January** Anglo–Egyptian Sudan Convention.
- 1904, 8 April** Britain and France sign *Entente Cordiale*, ending French opposition to the British occupation of Egypt.
- 1906, 1 May** British ultimatum to Ottomans regarding Taba Incident.
- 1906, 13 June** Egyptian peasants attack British officer at Dinshaway.
- 1907, 28 June** Trial and execution of Dinshaway assailants.
- 1907–1911** Sir Eldon Gorst, British agent.
- 1907, 1 December** First National Party Congress in Cairo.
- 1908, 10 February** Death of National Party leader Mustafa Kamil.
- 1908, 21 December** Inauguration of National (Cairo) University.
- 1909, 25 March** Press Law revived.
- 1910, 20 February** Assassination of Prime Minister Butros Ghali.
- 1910, March** Egyptian General Assembly opposes extension of Suez Canal Company extension to 2008. Cabinet passes Exceptional Laws to curb National Party agitation.
- 1911–1914** Lord Kitchener, British agent.
- 1912** Five Feddan Law.
- 1913, 21 July** Egyptian government promulgates new Organic Law, creating the Legislative Assembly in place of the Legislative Council and the General Assembly.
- 1914, 19 December** British declare protectorate over Egypt, end its nominal ties to the Ottoman Empire, and depose Khedive Abbas Hilmi II, who had taken refuge in Istanbul.
- 1914–1917** Husayn Kamil, sultan.
- 1915–1916** Sir Henry MacMahon, high commissioner.

- 1916–1919** Sir Reginald Wingate, high commissioner.
- 1917–1936** [Ahmad] Fuad I, sultan and later king.
- 1918, 13 November** Sa'd Zaghlul asks Wingate for permission to send a delegation (*wafd*) to London to seek Egypt's independence.
- 1919, 9 March** British exile Zaghlul, causing riots throughout Egypt.
- 1919–1922** 1919 Revolution against British occupation.
- 1919–1925** Sir Edmund Allenby, high commissioner.
- 1919, 7 December–6 March 1920** Milner Mission, boycotted.
- 1921, 12 July–20 November** Adli–Curzon negotiations in London.
- 1921, 22 December–4 April 1923** Sa'd Zaghlul deported again.
- 1922, 28 February** British declare Egypt independent, subject to four points reserved for later negotiation.
- 1923, 19 April** Liberal constitution promulgated.
- 1923, 27 September** Wafd Party wins first elections.
- 1924, 28 January–22 November** Sa'd Zaghlul, prime minister.
- 1924, 19 November** Assassination of Lee Stack, governor of Sudan.
- 1925–1929** Lord George Lloyd, high commissioner.
- 1929–1934** Sir Percy Loraine, high commissioner.
- 1930, 1 January** Wafd Party wins election.
- 1930, 27 March–8 May** Mustafa al-Nahas and Nevile Henderson negotiate unsuccessfully on Egyptian question.
- 1930, 22 October** Royalist constitution promulgated.
- 1930–1933** Isma'il Sidqi, prime minister.
- 1934–1946** Sir Miles Lampson, later Lord Killearn, high commissioner and later ambassador.
- 1935, 13 November–2 December** Nationalist demonstrations against royalist government.
- 1936–1952** Faruq, king.

- 1936, 2 May** Wafd wins national elections.
- 1936, 27 August** Anglo–Egyptian Treaty signed.
- 1939, 3 September** Egypt declares neutrality, as World War II begins. Strong neutralist sentiment throughout the country.
- 1942, 4 February** British force Faruq to appoint Wafdist cabinet.
- 1942, August** British stop German advance at al-Alamayn.
- 1945, 22 March** Arab League formed.
- 1946, February** Widespread student and worker demonstrations.
- 1946, 15 September–25 October** Bevin–Sidqi negotiations on the Sudan held in London.
- 1947, 5–29 August** Egypt argues for control of the Sudan at United Nations Security Council.
- 1947, 21 September–31 December** Cholera epidemic.
- 1947, 29 November** UN General Assembly votes to partition Palestine, despite Arab opposition.
- 1948–1949** Egypt defeated by Israel in Palestine War.
- 1949, 24 February** Egypt and Israel sign Rhodes armistice.
- 1950, 3 January** Wafd wins elections; Mustafa al-Nahhas becomes prime minister.
- 1950, 17 June** Arab League Collective security pact signed between Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan.
- 1951, 8 October** Nahhas abrogates 1936 Treaty.
- 1951, November–January 1952** Massive demonstrations against the British occupation of the Suez Canal.
- 1952, 26 January** Central Cairo burned by angry demonstrators.
- 1952, 23 July** Egyptian Army’s Free Officers overthrow monarchy.
- 1952, 26 July** Faruq abdicates in favor of his son and leaves Egypt.
- 1952, 8 September** Muhammad Najib named prime minister.
- 1952, 9 September** Najib cabinet proposes major land reforms.

- 1952–1953** [Ahmad] Fuad II, king (nominal).
- 1953–1954** Muhammad Najib, president.
- 1953, 12 February** British and Egyptian negotiators reach accord on the Sudan.
- 1954, February–April** Power struggle between Najib and Jamal Abd al-Nasir.
- 1954, 19 October** Anglo–Egyptian Suez agreement signed.
- 1954, 26 October** Muslim Brothers attempt to assassinate Nasir.
- 1954–1970** Nasir, president.
- 1955, 28 February** Israeli raid on Gaza.
- 1955, 8–24 April** Nasir attends Bandung Conference.
- 1955, 27 September** Egypt announces Czech Arms Deal.
- 1955, 10 December** Formal Anglo–American offer to finance Aswan High Dam construction.
- 1956, 16 January** Nasir offers new constitution.
- 1956, 23 June** Egyptians accept constitution, electing Nasir president.
- 1956, 12–18 July** Nasir and Josip Broz Tito meet in Brioni; Jawaharlal Nehru joins them.
- 1956, 19 July** John Foster Dulles withdraws U.S. High Dam offer.
- 1956, 26 July** Nasir nationalizes Suez Canal Company.
- 1956, 29 October** Israel invades Sinai Peninsula.
- 1956, 31 October** Britain and France invade Suez Canal.
- 1956, 6 November** Soviet Union threatens to intervene in Suez War. Agreement to form United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).
- 1956, 7 November** UN presses Britain and France to halt advance.
- 1956, 23 December** Britain and France evacuate Suez Canal zone. Egyptian government nationalizes British and French business firms and properties in Egypt.
- 1957, 11 February** Israel agrees to leave Sinai and Gaza.

- 1957, 3 July** Elections for National Assembly; two women chosen.
- 1957, 26 December** First Afro–Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference opens.
- 1958, 1 February** Egypt and Syria form United Arab Republic (UAR).
- 1959, 9 November** UAR–Sudan agreement to share Nile River waters.
- 1960, 13 April–10 May** New York dockworkers boycott *Cleopatra*.
- 1961, 20–22 July** July Laws proclaimed, many firms nationalized.
- 1961, 1 September** First nonaligned nations conference in Belgrade.
- 1961, 28 September** Syria secedes from the UAR.
- 1962, 5–24 February** Elections for National Congress of Popular Forces.
- 1962, 21 May** Nasir presents Charter draft to National Congress.
- 1962, 5 October–September 1967** Egypt involved in Yemen Civil War.
- 1963, 7–10 April** Egypt, Syria, and Iraq discuss federation in Cairo.
- 1963, 17 April** Charter for new UAR signed.
- 1963, 22 July** Nasir rejects ties with Ba’th Party.
- 1963, 12 August** Additional industries nationalized.
- 1964, 13–17 January** Egypt hosts summit of Arab heads of state.
- 1964, 23 March** Egypt releases draft of 1964 Constitution.
- 1964, 14 May** Nasir and Nikita Khrushchev inaugurate first stage of High Dam.
- 1964, 5–11 September** Second Arab summit in Alexandria.
- 1964, 23 December** Nasir denounces U.S. interference.
- 1965, 24 August** Egypt and Saudi Arabia sign abortive Yemen pact.
- 1965, 30 August** Muslim Brothers’ plot discovered, 4,000 arrested.
- 1966, 9 April** Muslim Brothers’ trial opens in Cairo.

- 1966, 29 August** Three Brothers, including Sayyid Qutb, hanged.
- 1966, 4 November** Egypt and Syria sign joint defense agreement.
- 1967, 7 April** Tension builds up on Israel–Syrian border. Jordan’s press criticizes Egypt’s passivity.
- 1967, 15 May** Egypt places its armed forces on alert.
- 1967, 17 May** Egypt orders UNEF to leave Sinai posts.
- 1967, 22 May** Egypt declares blockade of Aqaba Gulf.
- 1967, 23 May** Israel and U.S. leaders denounce blockade.
- 1967, 30 May** Egypt and Jordan announce military alliance.
- 1967, 5 June** Israel attacks Egypt by air; invades Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula.
- 1967, 6 June** Security Council demands fighting end. Suez Canal closed.
- 1967, 8 June** Egypt accepts cease-fire.
- 1967, 9 June** Nasir resigns his presidency.
- 1967, 10 June** War ends; Nasir withdraws his resignation.
- 1967, June–July** Sporadic Egyptian–Israeli fighting across Canal.
- 1967, 31 August–1 September** Arab leaders, meeting in Khartum, oppose direct negotiations with Israel.
- 1967, 22 November** UN Security Council passes Resolution 242.
- 1968, 26 February** Student demonstrations lead to closing of universities.
- 1968, 30 March** Nasir announces political reforms.
- 1968, September–August 1970** Egyptian–Israeli War of Attrition.
- 1969, 9 March** Fighting intensifies at Suez Canal.
- 1969, 9 December** U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers speech outlines peace settlement, which Egypt initially ignored.
- 1969, 20 December** Nasir appoints Anwar al-Sadat vice president.

- 1970, 3–13 January** Air and land war intensifies near Suez Canal and Cairo.
- 1970, 23 July** Nasir accepts Rogers Plan and cease-fire with Israel. Indirect peace negotiations ensue.
- 1970, 28 September** Nasir dies, causing widespread mourning.
- 1970, 5 November** Egypt agrees to federate with Libya and Sudan.
- 1970, 26 November** Syria agrees to join proposed federation.
- 1970–1981** [Muhammad] Anwar al-Sadat, president.
- 1971, 7 March** Cease-fire with Israel ends as peacemaking fails.
- 1971, 17 April** Sadat announces federation of Syria, Libya, and Egypt.
- 1971, 14–15 May** Corrective Revolution ousts Sadat's foes from power.
- 1971, 27 May** Egypt and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics sign 15-year friendship and cooperation pact.
- 1971, 20 August** Federation of Arab Republics announced by Egypt, Libya, and Syria.
- 1971, 14 September** 1971 Constitution announced following referendum.
- 1972, 18 July** Sadat expels Soviet advisers and troops from Egypt.
- 1973, 11 September** Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian leaders meet.
- 1973, 6 October** Egyptians cross Suez Canal, breach Bar-Lev Line.
- 1973, 9 October** Israelis launch counterattack in Sinai.
- 1973, 16 October** Israeli troops cross Suez Canal.
- 1973, 22 October** UN Security Council passes Resolution 338.
- 1973, 24 October** Resolution 340 sets up emergency force.
- 1973, 28 October–29 November** Inconclusive Kilometer 101 Talks.
- 1973, 7 November** U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger meets with Sadat.
- 1973, 21–22 December** Geneva Peace Conference.

- 1974, 11–17 January** Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy.
- 1974, 18 January** Egyptian–Israeli Separation of Forces agreement.
- 1974, 17 May** Plebiscite approves Sadat's *Infitah* policies.
- 1974, 12–14 June** U.S. President Richard Nixon visits Egypt.
- 1974, 14 June** Egypt and United States sign Declaration of Cooperation and Friendship.
- 1975, February–March** Kissinger fails to broker new Egypt–Israel accord.
- 1975, 5 June** Suez Canal reopened.
- 1975, June–August** Intensive negotiations resume for interim accord.
- 1975, 4 September** Egypt and Israel sign agreement in Geneva, renouncing war and creating new buffer zone in the Sinai Peninsula.
- 1975, 13 October** U.S. and Egypt sign agreement establishing early-warning system in Sinai.
- 1976, 15 March** Egypt abrogates Soviet Friendship Treaty.
- 1976, 15 July** Egypt and Sudan sign joint defense agreement (activated in **January 1977**).
- 1976, 21 August** Gulf Organization for Development of Egypt (GODE) begins.
- 1976, 28 October** Arab Socialist Union (ASU) *minbars* vie in People's Assembly elections.
- 1976, 11 November** Sadat permits formal political parties.
- 1977, 18–21 January** Food Riots of workers and students against price hikes.
- 1977, 29 April** Egypt and France sign military cooperation agreement.
- 1977, 21–24 July** Egyptian–Libyan border war.
- 1977, 9 November** Sadat tells People's Assembly he will go to Jerusalem to seek peace.
- 1977, 15 November** Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin invites Sadat to visit Jerusalem.

- 1977, 19–21 November** Sadat flies to Jerusalem and proposes peace in Israeli Knesset.
- 1977, 14–15 December** Peace conference of Egypt, Israel, United States, and United Nations in Cairo.
- 1977, 25 December** Begin meets Sadat in Ismailia.
- 1978, 14 January** U.S. government agrees to sell large quantities of arms to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.
- 1978, 14 August** Inaugural meeting of National Democratic Party (NDP), following ASU dissolution.
- 1978, 5–17 September** Camp David talks between United States, Egypt and Israel.
- 1978, 17 September** Camp David Accords announced.
- 1978, 2–5 November** Rejectionist Arab leaders meet in Baghdad.
- 1979, January–March** Intensive U.S. mediation efforts with Egypt and Israel.
- 1979, 26 March** Egypt and Israel sign formal peace treaty.
- 1979, 27–31 March** New rejectionist meeting in Baghdad. Egypt expelled from Arab League; Arab states break diplomatic ties with Egypt.
- 1979, 25 May** Israel withdraws from coastal strip of Sinai, as Palestinian Autonomy Talks open in Beersheba.
- 1979, 25 July, 26 September, and 15 November** Additional phased Israeli withdrawals from Sinai.
- 1980, 26 January** Egyptian–Israeli border opened.
- 1980, 22 May** Plebiscite approves amendments to 1971 Constitution.
- 1980, 19 November** U.S. and Egypt stage first joint maneuvers.
- 1980–1988** Iran–Iraq War; Egypt aids Iraq.
- 1981, 17–19 June** Riots between Muslims and Copts in Zawiya al-Hamra.
- 1981, 10 July** Egypt signs agreement with Israel and the United States on international peace-keeping force in Sinai.

- 1981, 6 August** Egypt and the United States sign five-year defense agreement.
- 1981, 3 September** Sadat orders arrest of 1,600 political opponents.
- 1981, 6 October** Sadat assassinated during military parade.
- 1981, 8–13 October** Islamists attack army posts in Asyut and Cairo.
- 1981, 14 October** National plebiscite approves succession of Husni Mubarak.
- 1981–present** Mubarak, president.
- 1981, 9–24 November** U.S. and Egyptian armed forces in “Operation Bright Star” maneuvers.
- 1981, 12 December–1 March 1982** Trial of Islamists accused of killing Sadat.
- 1982, 19 January** Egypt and Israel agree on terms for Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai Peninsula.
- 1982, 25 April** Israel’s forces leave Sinai, except Taba.
- 1982, 14 June** Egypt suspends Palestinian Autonomy Talks, after Israel invades southern Lebanon.
- 1983, 20 July** Election Reform Law: parties must win 8 percent of vote in order to have representatives elected to People’s Assembly.
- 1984, 27 May** People’s Assembly elections.
- 1984, 25 September** Jordan renews diplomatic relations with Egypt.
- 1985, August** Operation Bright Star military maneuvers.
- 1985, 8–10 October** *Achille Lauro* Incident harms Egypt–U.S. ties.
- 1986, 25–28 February** Central Security Force riots in Cairo.
- 1986, 10 September** Egypt and Israel submit Taba dispute to arbitration.
- 1987, 27 September** Cairo Metro opens.
- 1987, 8–11 November** Amman summit allows other Arab states to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt.

- 1987, December–January 1988** Egyptian students demonstrate in support of Palestinian Intifada.
- 1988, 29 August** Arbiters award Tabá to Egypt (ceded **15 March 1989**).
- 1988, 13 October** Najib Mahfuz wins Nobel Prize for Literature.
- 1989, 15 February** Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and North Yemen form Arab Cooperation Council.
- 1989, 21 May** Egypt readmitted to Arab League.
- 1990, 10 September** Arab League Headquarters moved back to Cairo.
- 1990, 12 October** Islamists assassinate People's Assembly Speaker Rif'at al-Mahjub.
- 1990, August–March 1991** Gulf War. Egypt aids allied coalition against Iraq; Western countries forgive \$14 billion of Egypt's debt.
- 1991, 26 May** Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program inaugurated in Egypt, as Paris Club promises further debt forgiveness.
- 1992, 8 June** Islamists murder secularist writer Faraj Fawda.
- 1992, 12 October** Earthquake destroys large areas around Cairo.
- 1992, 17 October–6 January 1993** Islamists attack officials, Copts, and foreigners in Egypt.
- 1993, 6–14 February** Government arrests many Islamists in Cairo and Imbaba.
- 1993, 26 February–20 April** Islamic Group continues to attack officers and tourists.
- 1993, 6 November** Islamist leader Ayman al-Zawahiri reported to get asylum in Switzerland.
- 1994, 27 January–19 December 1996** Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd divorce case in courts.
- 1994, February–March** Islamic Group gunmen attack tourists.
- 1994, 14 October** Islamists attack and injure Najib Mahfuz.

- 1995, February** Mubarak meets successively in Cairo with King Husayn, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, and Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin.
- 1995, 22–26 March** Islamists clash with security forces in Minya.
- 1995, 26 June** Islamic Group tries to kill Mubarak in Addis Ababa.
- 1995, 20 September** Press reports discovery of mass grave of Egyptian captives killed by Israel in June 1967 war.
- 1995, 1 October** U.S. federal court convicts Umar Abd al-Rahman and nine other Egyptians for 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
- 1996, 13 March** Antiterrorism summit at Sharm al-Shaykh.
- 1996, 21–23 June** Arab leaders meet in Cairo to discuss dealings with Israel's newly elected Benjamin Netanyahu government.
- 1996, 12 November** Middle East North Africa economic summit in Cairo.
- 1997, 9 January** Mubarak inaugurates Toshka Project.
- 1997, 26 April** Opposition party leaders call on Mubarak to suspend Egypt's relations with Israel.
- 1997, 13 July** Imprisoned Islamist leaders call for end to violence.
- 1997, 17 November** Islamists kill 58 tourists and four Egyptians in Luxor.
- 1998, 17–22 February** Cairo University students back Iraq against U.S. invasion threats.
- 1998, 29 April** Egypt launches Nilesat.
- 1998, 31 May–October** Egypt mediates Syrian–Turkish border dispute.
- 1998, 17 December** Police bar 2,000 students from demonstrating at U.S. embassy against bombing of Iraq.
- 1999, 11 March** U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen offers Egypt \$3.4 billion arms deal.
- 1999, 2 September** Israel–PLO accord signed in Sharm al-Shaykh.

- 1999, 31 October** Egyptair Flight 990 crashes into the Atlantic off Nantucket island; 217 passengers and crew lost.
- 1999, 23 December** Egypt restores full diplomatic ties with Sudan.
- 2000, 27 January** Parliament grants women new divorce rights.
- 2000, 24 February** Pope John Paul II visits Mubarak and al-Azhar rector.
- 2000, 30 June** Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim arrested for foreign financial ties.
- 2000, 16–17 October** Mubarak and U.S. President Bill Clinton assist Arafat's meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak in Sharm al-Shaykh after Camp David summit fails.
- 2000, 21 October** Emergency Arab League summit backs Palestinians.
- 2000, October–November** NDP wins 388 seats in three-stage elections.
- 2001, 21–27 January** Egypt hosts renewed Israel–PLO talks in Taba, but no accord is reached.
- 2001, 17 February** Trial of Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim opens.
- 2001, 12 April–30 July** Nawal al-Saadawi accused of apostasy, but her case was dismissed.
- 2001, 22 May** Ibrahim is convicted of defaming Egypt and receives seven-year prison sentence.
- 2001, 19 July** Government arrests 52 men for alleged homosexual activities.
- 2001, 6 September** Mubarak orders retrial of Sharif al-Filali, who had earlier been acquitted of espionage on Israel's behalf.
- 2001, 13 September** Egyptian government backs U.S. antiterrorism campaign, following attacks against World Trade Center and Pentagon, for which *al-Qa'ida*, which includes members of Egypt's Jihad group, is held responsible.
- 2001, November–December** Court martial of 94 Islamic extremists.
- 2001, 13 December** Egypt devalues its currency by 7.8 percent in order to revitalize its flagging tourism industry.

- 2002, 5–6 February** Thirty-four donor nations and groups, meeting at Sharm al-Shaykh, offer Egypt \$10.4 billion in financial assistance to resolve its liquidity crisis.
- 2002, 7 February** Cairo appeals court orders retrial for Ibrahim.
- 2002, 22 February** Egyptian State Railways train fire kills 373.
- 2002, 1–12 April** Students demonstrate against Israel and declare boycott against U.S.-owned businesses.
- 2002, 16 June** Labor laws liberalized to allow strikes, but unions remain under government control.
- 2002, 21 June** Leaders of *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* renounce terrorism.
- 2002, 29 July** Ibrahim's sentence upheld.
- 2002, 16–18 October** Bibliotheca Alexandrina inaugurated.
- 2002, 9 December** Ibrahim released pending new trial.
- 2003, 29 January** Egyptian government decides to float its currency.
- 2003, 18 March** Ibrahim acquitted by High Court of Cassation.
- 2003, 21–22 March** Large-scale protest demonstrations in Cairo against U.S. war in Iraq.

INTRODUCTION

Egypt is the world's oldest continuous country, with a recorded past of over six thousand years. Often invaded, conquered, and occupied by foreign armies, Egypt has never lost its identity. The Egyptians of today, although they have changed their language once and their religion twice, descend mainly from the Egyptians who built the Giza Pyramids and the Temple of Karnak, who served Alexander the Great and his heirs, who submitted to Augustus Caesar and raised much of the grain that fed the Roman Empire, who started Christian monasticism and the veneration of the Virgin Mary, and who advanced and sustained Muslim learning in what is now the world's oldest functioning university. It is one of the most important countries in the world.

The Geographic Setting

Located in the northeastern corner of Africa, but with a mountainous extension across the Gulf of Suez, the Sinai Peninsula, a part of Asia, Egypt is an almost square block of mostly arid land: 1,001,450 km², to be exact. Its greatest extent is 1,024 km south to north (from 22° to 32° N) and 1,240 km west to east (from 26° to 36° E). It is bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea, on the east by Israel and the Red Sea, on the south by the Sudan, and on the west by Libya. Most of its political borders are straight lines drawn by the European colonial powers in the 20th century; all have been disputed before and since they were defined. All but 3.5 percent of its territory is marsh or desert, sparsely inhabited until recently by Christian monks or bedouin nomads. Almost all of Egypt's settled inhabitants depend for their sustenance on the Nile River, the longest river in Africa. The Nile has cut a troughlike valley, ranging from 3 to 15 km in width, through the plateau of northeast Africa; its silt has added the fan-shaped Delta, measuring 22,000 sq km. Through it flow the Nile's main distributary branches—the eastern one to Damietta, the western one to Rosetta; there used to be four or five smaller channels. Some of the northern Delta is occupied by

freshwater lakes. In southern Egypt, the Nile is broken by a series of cascades and rapids commonly called the First Cataract, historically a barrier to navigation and the border between Upper Egypt and Nubia. The Nile Valley and Delta, home to approximately 70 million Egyptians in 2003, are bounded by the First Cataract (or, since the 1960s, by the Aswan High Dam and Lake Nasir), the mountainous Arabian desert, the sandier Libyan desert, and the Mediterranean Sea. Egypt is, in short, a well-defined country.

Egypt is also a hot and dry country. Summer temperatures may reach 43° C in Cairo and 49° C in the deserts. Winter temperatures rarely fall below 0° C, except in the highest elevations of the Sinai Peninsula. Most Egyptians have never seen or felt snow. Rain occurs mainly along the Mediterranean coast, averaging 80 mm yearly, but falling sporadically in irregular amounts. Winters are mild in the daytime, cold at night. Springtime may be punctuated by hot sandstorms, called *khamisin* in Arabic, that irritate humans and animals and may endanger crops. Morning fog is common in Lower Egypt and becoming so around Lake Nasir. Although air pollution does aggravate Cairo and Alexandria, Egypt's climate is generally healthful.

From the dawn of history, human habitation hinged on the Egyptian people's ability to harness the Nile, which annually flooded its banks, depositing a fertile alluvium of silt brought down from Lakes Victoria and Albert and from the mountains of Ethiopia. The creation of a basin irrigation system to capture the silt and to store the floodwaters and of efficient devices to raise water from the channels and basins to the fields was a prerequisite for the evolution of Egyptian agriculture between six and three millennia before the birth of Jesus.

The Nile was not only the sustainer of people, their animals, and their crops; it was also the main means by which they transported themselves and their goods from one part of Egypt to another. In ancient times, Egyptians viewed the Nile Valley as a world unto itself. By the time of Jesus Christ, however, Egypt was also exporting its agricultural and manufactured products throughout the known world. Port cities on the Mediterranean and Red seas enabled Egyptians to buy and sell goods from China to Spain, and all the lands between, throughout the Christian and Muslim eras of their history. During the 19th and 20th centuries, the rapid expansion of its export trade caused Egypt to develop perennial irrigation, facilitating the storage of greater quantities of Nile water and the production of two or three annual crops from the same fields. The construction of a maritime canal across the Isthmus of

Suez enhanced Egypt's geographic and strategic location in relation to Europe, South Asia, and East Africa in the late 19th century. Now, in the 21st century, the construction of the High Dam has extended Egypt's arable land and crop yields, while the creation of the Sumed Pipeline and new aerial and maritime port facilities has reinforced its central position in world trade.

Egypt's salubrious climate, beneficent river, and strategic location have combined to make it one of the world's best-known countries, one that most aspirants to world power have tried to master. Its history, therefore, has been marked by successive subjection to a series of non-Egyptian rulers: Nubians, Assyrians, Persians, Macedonians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Turks, Circassians, French, and British. Only at rare intervals did ethnic Egyptians fight in, let alone command, their armies and navies. Seldom did any Egyptians govern Egypt as a whole or serve in its highest administrative posts. They did wield power in local government, the law courts, the schools, and specific niches of the bureaucracy (as did the Coptic Christians in government accounting), but not as a people free from foreign rule. Even many aspects of Egypt's domestic economy were controlled by foreign residents: Greeks, Italians, Armenians, Syrians, and Jews. Only in 1956 could Egyptians claim to be masters in their own house.

Early History: Ancient and Hellenistic Egypt

How and why has Egypt seen this combination of continuous existence with recurrent subjection to outsiders? Egypt's history is long in duration and rich in detail. Ancient Egypt measured its own past by dynasties, more than 30, that ruled from around 3000 BCE, when the Upper and Lower kingdoms were united, until 332 BCE, when Alexander the Great added the Nile Valley and Delta to his expanding empire. But even ancient Egypt was subjected at interludes to invasion and conquest by Hyksos, Nubians, Assyrians, and Persians.

Alexander's conquest led to the creation of Alexandria, a great port city and intellectual center that connected the Mediterranean world with the Nile Valley, and to the Ptolemies, whose line of rulers ended with the tragic Queen Cleopatra VII (r. 51–30 BCE). Hellenistic Egypt continued under the Romans, who, as Christianity spread from Egypt westward to North Africa and Europe, evolved into Byzantines. No matter whether their masters ruled from Rome or from Constantinople, Egypt's Christians, the Copts, who traced their conversion to the evan-

gelism of St. Mark in (or soon after) 40 CE, felt oppressed by high taxes and religious intolerance. Coptic Christianity broke with the Orthodox Church in 451, when its Council of Chalcedon anathematized the Monophysite doctrine, held by Copts and other Middle Eastern Christians, that Jesus Christ's nature was wholly divine. For the next two centuries Orthodox and Monophysite Christianity fought a doctrinal war in Alexandria and other early Christian centers in the Middle East, unwittingly paving the way for the rise of Islam.

Islamic Egypt: From the Arabs to the Ottomans

After another Persian interlude early in the seventh century, the Byzantines reestablished their control of Egypt until the Arab conquest of 639–642. For Egypt, the Arabs came as liberators. Early Muslim rule meant religious tolerance and lighter taxes, not forced conversion to Islam, which taught that God had spoken to a series of prophets, of whom the last was Muhammad, an unlettered Meccan merchant, to whom he had revealed the Quran (Koran), as God had earlier given the Torah to the Jews and the Gospels to the Christians. Muslims, therefore, respected Jews and Christians as peoples who had received scriptures and who could live within the lands of Islam without being molested, let alone converted. Coptic Christianity remained the country's majority religion until the tenth century. Conversions to Islam were discouraged at first because the state wanted the revenue generated by a special tax paid only by non-Muslims. From 642 to 868 Egypt was a province in an Arab empire, in which a tiny Muslim elite ruled a non-Muslim peasant majority. Even when Egypt escaped from Abbasid control, under Ahmad Ibn Tulun in 868, it was only to exchange distant caliphs in Baghdad for a dynasty of Turkic origin governing in Fustat, a garrison town near the site of modern Cairo. The next ruling family, the Ikhshidids, was equally foreign.

The Fatimid conquest in 969 was a watershed, not only because the new rulers espoused Isma'ili Shi'ism and hence challenged the legitimacy of the Sunni Abbasid caliphate, but also because they brought in bedouin Arabs who ravaged Nile Valley lands, then settled and later intermingled with the local inhabitants. As most Egyptians embraced Islam, they chose the Sunni sect of the Abbasid caliphate over the Shi'ism of their Fatimid rulers. Even the creation of al-Azhar as a mosque-university dedicated to training Shi'i propagandists aided the Fatimids more in other parts of the Muslim world than in Egypt itself.

Few Egyptians regretted their passing from power when a Kurdish officer named Salah al-Din (“Saladin” to the Europeans) took control in Cairo in 1171, founded the Ayyubid dynasty, took over Syria, and captured most of Palestine from the Crusaders. The Ayyubids fended off Crusader attacks by land and sea, patronized architects and ulama (Muslim scholars), and developed a corps of slaves, called Mamluks (from the Arabic word, *mamluk*, meaning “owned man”), as their main fighting force.

These Mamluks, who seized control of Egypt in 1250, saved the country from the Mongol invasions that destroyed so much of Central and Southwest Asia. The early Mamluks, locally called *bahri* (referring to the Nile, which Egyptians call *al-Bahr*, “the sea,” because of its size), were of Central Asian Turkic origin. Imported by Middle Eastern rulers for their skill at riding and fighting on horseback, they became a remarkable ruling caste for Egypt and Syria, continually refreshing their numbers by importing Central Asian Turkic boys and training them to become soldiers and governors. Only the ablest rose to lead the state. The Bahri Mamluk era, 1250–1382, was one of commercial prosperity and cultural flowering in Egypt. The later Mamluks, called *burji* (pertaining to the *burj*, or fortress, in which some of them lived), were mainly Circassians imported from the Caucasus Mountains east of the Black Sea. Their factional rivalries, exacerbated by the effects of the Black Plague, impoverished Egypt, and their exactions from European merchants trading with Asia led inadvertently to the Portuguese maritime explorations around the African continent and the Spanish voyages to the Americas, as Christian Europe sought ways to bypass the Muslim world.

The rise of the Ottoman state in Anatolia and the Balkans did not seem to threaten Mamluk rule in Egypt and Syria, for the Ottomans and the Mamluks were both Sunni Muslims and their natural enemies were the European Christians and the rising Safavid Shi’i state in Azerbaijan. But Ottoman Sultan Selim I (r. 1512–20), who defeated the Safavids in 1514 but could not conquer all of Persia, turned against the Mamluks, whom he suspected of aiding the Shi’ites, and defeated them at the north Syrian village of Marj Dabiq in 1516. Within a year, Egypt, along with Syria and the Hijaz, had become a part of the Ottoman Empire, the largest and longest-lasting Muslim state in history. The old image of this empire as the “Sick Man of Europe” is no longer accepted by historians, but Egypt suffered economically, especially after the sixteenth century. From 1517 to 1798, even though nominally under governors

appointed by the Ottoman sultan, the real rulers of Egypt were the Mamluks, who evolved into a hereditary caste of landowners who exploited the people. As European power began to eclipse that of the Ottomans, occasional Mamluk adventurers, such as Ali Bey and Muhammad Abu-Dhahab, defied their nominal overlords, built up strong armies, and invaded Syria and the Hijaz. They portended the Westernizing reformers of the next century.

Westernization: The French and the Muhammad Ali Dynasty

In June 1798 a French armada commanded by Napoléon Bonaparte landed at Alexandria, debouching the “Army of Egypt,” a large force of soldiers accompanied by a commission of scientists and scholars, who quickly conquered Lower Egypt from the Mamluks. For three years the French ruled in Cairo, setting in motion forces that would change Egypt and the rest of the Middle East forever. But the revolutionary forces came not from Napoléon and his savants; they were generated by Muslim military adventurers who learned from the French conquest and occupation that they must Westernize their armies and governments to survive.

The main agent of Egypt’s transformation during the 19th century was an illiterate soldier of fortune, second in command of an Albanian regiment that came to Cairo as part of the Anglo–Ottoman force to replace the French occupation in 1801. By exploiting rivalries among the Mamluks and winning the support of local ulama and mystic and artisan guilds, Muhammad Ali managed to have himself named Ottoman governor of Egypt in 1805. Gradually but inexorably, he built up a mighty army and navy, buttressed by a government that seized control of most of Egypt’s agricultural land. More than any other 19th-century Westernizing reformer, Muhammad Ali perceived the need for economic development, including cash crops that could be exported, canals to facilitate transport and irrigation, and factories to produce munitions, warships, and textiles. Although his rule was harsh and extortionate for the Egyptian people, it made Egypt a military power in its own right. Initially aiding the Ottoman Empire against Arabian and Greek rebels, Muhammad Ali later turned his army against the sultan, occupying Syria and the Hijaz in 1831. More remarkably, the soldiers who made up most of that army were Egyptian peasants, conscripted for the first time since antiquity. These peasants resisted military service, which they viewed as their death sentence, but they learned to drill and shoot

well enough to defeat the Ottoman Turks. Their victories alarmed the European powers, which feared Muhammad Ali's success would undo the peace settlement that followed the Napoleonic Wars. They insisted on restoring Ottoman rule in most of the Middle East, but did leave Muhammad Ali with a governorship—one that he could pass down to his heirs—over Egypt, the Sudan, and portions of the Hijaz. Muhammad Ali, obliged to contract his army and to admit European manufactures, relinquished the state's monopoly over Egyptian agriculture and let the factories, schools, and military academies fall into desuetude. But he did not let European troops enter Egypt, allow Westerners to build railroads or canals, or borrow money from foreign banks.

Muhammad Ali's heirs proved less capable. Under his grandson, Abbas Hilmi I (r. 1848–54), British entrepreneurs introduced the first railroad and telegraph lines into Egypt. His youngest son, Sa'id (r. 1854–63), signed a concession agreement with a French diplomat to form the company that built the maritime canal across the Isthmus of Suez, although Egyptians bitterly recall that they provided much of the money and nearly all the labor for its construction.

His energetic grandson, Isma'il (r. 1863–79), undertook a Westernization program, more ambitious in its particulars than that of Muhammad Ali himself, which aspired to make Egypt "a part of Europe." Large areas of Cairo and Alexandria were rebuilt to resemble French cities, while the Suez Canal cities of Port Said and Ismailia were European from their inception. New law courts, libraries, learned societies, museums, schools, factories, railroads, and even schemes to explore and conquer large parts of Africa all played a part in Isma'il's efforts to make Egypt seem Western. Through diplomacy and financial inducements in Istanbul, he also acquired from the Ottoman government the title of khedive ("little lord" in Persian), the right to bequeath his position to his eldest son, and the authority to contract foreign loans without Ottoman consent. This last achievement enabled Isma'il to finance his Westernization program by borrowing money from European banks, but the state debt burden soon exceeded the ability of Egyptian taxpayers to repay it. The sale of Egypt's shares in the Suez Canal Company in 1875 was followed by the acceptance of foreign debt commissioners, the *Caisse de la Dette Publique*, to supervise Egypt's receipts and disbursements and, when the economy failed to improve, the admission of British and French ministers to the Egyptian cabinet. Isma'il's intrigues to engineer their overthrow led to an abortive movement among some Egyptians to form a constitutional government and

and to successful efforts by the European creditors and their governments to press the Ottoman sultan to replace Isma'il with Tawfiq as his viceroy.

After Tawfiq's accession in 1879, the Europeans, especially Britain and France, became ever more enmeshed in Egypt's economic and political crisis. When a group of Egyptian officers protested their pay-cuts and obliged the khedive to dismiss first his war minister and then his entire cabinet, their leader, Colonel Ahmad Urabi, emerged as the first champion of Egypt's resistance to foreign control. In 1881–82 the Urabist movement competed against the Europeans for mastery in Egypt, leading to riots and a devastating fire in Alexandria. Finally, a British expeditionary force invaded the country and defeated Urabi's troops at Tel-el-Kebir, occupying Cairo on 14 September 1882.

British Rule: "The Veiled Protectorate"

Britain's military occupation of Egypt had no legal basis and was meant to last only long enough to restore order under Khedive Tawfiq. By dissolving and reorganizing the Egyptian army, Britain restored peace and order, but it also became responsible for the Sudan, where a self-proclaimed mahdi (rightly guided one) had risen in rebellion against Egyptian misrule. British and Egyptian forces lost the Sudan to the Mahdi by 1885, and many Englishmen believed that they could not leave Egypt until they had avenged that loss. More significantly, the British diplomatic representative in Cairo, Sir Evelyn Baring (who later became the Earl of Cromer), believed that his country's troops should remain long enough to enable a corps of British advisers to help the Egyptian ministers rebuild the economy, so that the debts that the government had contracted would no longer burden the peasants with high exactions in taxes and forced labor.

Building irrigation works and taking stern measures against corruption, or "water and justice," as the British described these measures, were Cromer's policy that enabled Egypt to recover from bankruptcy. In 1896–98 British and Egyptian troops retook the Sudan from the Mahdi's followers. The governments of the two countries agreed in 1899 to joint rule over the Sudan, which in practice became a British colony. France, which had once aspired to capture the Nile headwaters and drive the British from Egypt, where French cultural and economic interests had prevailed since Napoléon and Muhammad Ali, accepted an

indefinite British occupation of Egypt in the 1904 *Entente Cordiale*. British control of Egypt seemed secure.

Opposition to British rule did indeed come from France and its partisans in the early days and from the Ottoman Empire, still Egypt's nominal suzerain, with the ideological fortification of pan-Islam, the idea that all the world's Muslims should unite against foreign imperialism. As long as Tawfiq was khedive, his palace staff and his ministers did not openly oppose Britain's military occupation, which protected them against a resurgent Urabist movement. But Tawfiq died unexpectedly in 1892 and was succeeded by his eldest son, Abbas Hilmi II, who had been educated in Europe and was not yet 18 years old. Some of Abbas's European and Egyptian advisers pushed him into confronting Lord Cromer, who could easily summon more troops from London to quell any disturbances. Although Abbas eventually turned from fighting the British to making his own fortune, he spawned a new nationalist movement of lawyers and journalists demanding an end to the British occupation and the establishment of constitutional government. Its first leader, Mustafa Kamil, was able to direct his appeal simultaneously to the French, the Ottomans, and the educated Egyptian elite. The National Party that he founded became split after his early death, but the nationalist idea that Egypt should be for the Egyptians became fixed in the minds and hearts of the people.

World War I and Postwar Liberal Constitutionalism

With the outbreak of World War I, Egypt's anomalous position as a privileged Ottoman province under British military occupation, or "veiled protectorate," became untenable when the British and Turks were fighting on opposite sides. Britain pulled away the veil and proclaimed Egypt independent of Ottoman rule, with a "sultan" from the Muhammad Ali dynasty replacing Khedive Abbas, who had gone over to the Turks, and under a temporary British Protectorate. Egypt became a major base for the Allies during World War I. Although Egyptians were not asked to defend their country against the Turks and their German allies, they did suffer in other ways: rising prices for food and other necessities of life, limitations on the highly profitable cultivation of cotton, crowds of often rowdy British Empire troops in the cities, conscription for auxiliary duties when Britain's Egyptian Expeditionary Force invaded Palestine and Syria, and exactions of financial

contributions and even farm animals for the Allied military effort. Discontent arose when, after the 1918 Armistice, the British foreign office refused to discuss the Egyptian question with a delegation (Arabic: *wafd*) of nationalist leaders headed by Sa'd Zaghlul or even to receive a deputation of Egyptian ministers. A nationwide revolution broke out in March 1919, supported by Egyptians of every religion and class. Sa'd Zaghlul's Wafd was allowed to go to Paris, but was never granted a hearing at the Peace Conference.

A British commission of inquiry led by Lord Milner was equally unable to find Egyptians who would discuss the status of their country within the framework of the British Protectorate. The Egyptian public rejected negotiations with the British by anyone other than Sa'd, even by their prime minister, Adli. Finally, the British announced in 1922 that they would end the Protectorate and grant independence to Egypt, subject to four points reserved for later negotiations: imperial communications, defense of Egypt against outside aggression, protection of foreign and minority interests, and the status of the Sudan.

As the British scaled down their presence as advisers in the Egyptian ministries and other areas of government and defense, the Egyptians drew up a liberal constitution that would enable them to govern themselves as a parliamentary democracy. The 1923 Constitution provided for a bicameral legislature, to which the council of ministers would be responsible, but it also empowered Sultan (renamed King) Fuad I (r. 1917–36) to undercut the elected legislators and control the government, limited somewhat by the continuing presence of British troops with a powerful high commissioner and somewhat less by Egyptian nationalism as voiced by the press, the Wafd and other political parties, and the street demonstrators. Parliamentary democracy worked poorly, given the Egyptians' wide disparities of income and education, the pretensions of the king and the great landowners, and the lack of any tradition of popular participation in politics. Civil liberties were often violated by the king, his sycophants in the police and the army, the landowners and their agents, urban street gangs in the pay of powerful politicians, and mendacious journalists. Whenever free elections were held, the Wafd Party won the overwhelming majority of the parliamentary seats and Wafdist cabinets would be formed, but rarely did they last longer than two years, as the king had the power to dismiss them. Both Fuad I and his son Faruq (r. 1936–52) learned to govern through minority parties, factions that had broken from the Wafd Party, and antidemocratic popular movements such as *Misr al-Fatat* and the

Muslim Brothers. Yet no party except the Wafd could rally enough support to sign a treaty with Britain. It was only when the Italians invaded Ethiopia and threatened both Egypt and the Sudan that the Wafd, leading a delegation made up of nearly all Egypt's political parties, negotiated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. This pact gave Egypt the formal independence its leaders had long sought without obliging the British to withdraw their troops from the country. Egypt's government remained, until the end of the monarchy in 1952, a three-legged stool: the British, the king, and the Wafd.

Revolution under Jamal Abd al-Nasir

Increasingly, though, the loyalties of most Egyptians were alienated from all three legs and indeed from the minority parties whose politicians applied their leverage to gain power. As the country became more urbanized and industrialized and as World War II brought back many of the burdens of the British occupation that had weighed on the Egyptians during the previous war, the people flocked to other movements, either ultranationalist ones like *Misr al-Fatat* or such labor-oriented ones as *Hadeto* and the Egyptian Communist Party, but mainly to Islamist ones like the Society of Muslim Brothers. Disorders intensified after World War II, due to deteriorating economic and social conditions, the frustrating quest for control of the Sudan under the slogan of "Nile Valley unity," and Egypt's humiliating defeat by Israel in the 1948–49 Palestine War. King Faruq's own corruption and debauchery symbolized to many Egyptians the disintegration of Egypt's political system and the need for revolutionary reforms.

Egypt's salvation came on 23 July 1952 from an unexpected source: the army officer corps, hitherto assumed to be loyal to King Faruq. A secret cabal of "Free Officers," intensely patriotic, became the revolutionary reformers who seized control of the barracks and the government, deposed the king, drove out the old-style politicians, locked up the Muslim Brothers, and finally negotiated (with American help) for an end to the British occupation, even of the vital Suez Canal Zone. It gave up Egypt's claims to the Sudan, allowing that country to become fully independent in 1956. If Egypt could have avoided other foreign entanglements, its political and economic development would have been impressive. The new regime limited landholdings to 200 feddans, hoping to replace the great landowners with a middle-class yeoman peasantry. It built schools and health centers in rural areas as

well as the cities. Although it outlawed the political parties and terminated the 1923 Constitution, it remained committed to developing broader public participation in Egypt's government, first through the Liberation Rally and then the National Union. The officers did not aspire to a permanent military dictatorship or to squander Egypt's resources in an attempt to control the Arab world.

The Free Officers, renamed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) after they took power, were not initially eager to pursue a war of revenge against Israel for its earlier humiliation of Egypt. During 1953–54, they were preoccupied with securing Britain's agreement to evacuate its troops from the Suez Canal and with the power struggle between the titular leader, Muhammad Najib, who had the backing of most politically articulate civilians, and Jamal Abd al-Nasir, supported by the officer corps. These issues seemed settled in October 1954, when the Anglo–Egyptian agreement was signed and Nasir suppressed the Muslim Brothers and others who had backed Najib.

But the RCC did want to ensure that Egypt's armed forces could defend its borders, and Israel's reprisal raid in the Gaza Strip in February 1955 convinced Nasir that he needed to buy more arms. Britain, France, and the United States had an agreement not to sell weapons to the countries involved in the Arab–Israeli conflict. Although Iraq had circumvented this problem by forming an anti-Communist alliance then called the Baghdad Pact, Nasir did not want to join an alliance that could readmit Western armies into Egypt even as Britain was phasing out its 75-year occupation. While attending the Bandung Conference in April of that year, he learned that Egypt could buy from the Communist countries the weapons it needed. In September 1955 it agreed with Czechoslovakia to barter \$200 million worth of Egyptian cotton for Communist arms. Britain and the United States, hoping to counteract the Communist influence that they feared would grow in Egypt, arranged a package deal to pay for building the Aswan High Dam, a public works project that the revolutionary leaders hoped would control the Nile flood, irrigate large areas of Upper Egypt, and generate enough electric power for the country's needs.

Nasir's government, suspicious of British and American intentions, did not immediately accept the offer. Anglo–Egyptian relations worsened, as Radio Cairo attacked British efforts to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact and inspired its dismissal of the British commander of the Jordanian Arab Legion. Egypt's ties with the United States deteriorated because of raids into Israel by Egyptian-trained Palestinian *fidai-*

yin from the Gaza Strip and because of Nasir's decision to recognize China's Communist government. At the moment Egypt's ambassador in Washington was authorized to accept America's offer, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles publicly withdrew it. Angered by this rebuff, Nasir announced that Egypt was nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, a movement that electrified Egyptian and Arab opinion, for the Suez Canal had long symbolized Western imperialism. It dismayed the British and the French owners of the company, as well as the Europeans who depended on imported oil shipped through the canal itself. Diplomacy and force failed equally to dislodge the canal from Nasir's grip. The Anglo-French attack of November 1956, coordinated with Israel's Sinai Campaign in reprisal for Egypt's *fidaiyin* raids, proved to be a military defeat but a political victory for Egypt, which got the backing of almost every other country in the world, including the United States as well as the USSR. All Israel got was the right to navigate the Gulf of Aqaba, as a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) took up positions in the Sinai and the Gaza Strip between the Egyptians and the Israelis.

During the following decade Egypt was involved more in power struggles within the Arab world between conservative and radical regimes than in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It opposed the U.S. initiative, called the Eisenhower Doctrine, to line up the Middle Eastern countries against Communism. Pressured by the Syrian government, it agreed to form in February 1958 an organic union with Syria, the United Arab Republic, which all Arab states were invited to join. It backed the rebels against Lebanese President Kamil Sham'un in May and hailed the revolution of July 1958 against the Iraqi monarchy. But Iraq's new republican leaders, although they were army colonels very much like the Egyptian Free Officers, soon proved to be their rivals for influence in the Arab world; they did not join the United Arab Republic (UAR). An army coup in the Sudan also proved disappointingly resistant to Egypt's influence.

In 1962, however, a military coup in San'a overthrew the Yemeni imamate. Egypt came to the aid of the new republican regime, only to become embroiled in a protracted and bitter civil war, as the imam took to the hills, gained the support of the tribal warriors and Saudi Arabia, and kept the republican officers at bay. The Yemen Civil War became the major Arab battleground between radical republics and conservative monarchies during the 1960s, costly to both but with neither side emerging victorious.

Egypt also became a leader of the neutralist states in Asia and Africa, especially of those whose leaders were radical and charismatic, like Nasir himself, such as Sukarno of Indonesia, Nehru of India, and Nkrumah of Ghana. Egypt hosted the first Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference in 1957, joined the Casablanca group of African states in 1961, attended the summit of neutralist leaders in Belgrade in that same year, and helped to form the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Although neutralist in principle, Nasir's Egypt favored the Soviet Union, which in turn provided the capital and the engineers to build the Aswan High Dam. Egypt purchased large quantities of Soviet arms and bartered its own produce for Communist-made civilian goods, though Egypt's own Communists stayed in jail until 1964.

In domestic policy, Nasir moved toward Arab socialism, which to him meant state control of economic planning and the ownership and management of major business firms; he did not believe in class warfare, the dictatorship of the proletariat, or rejection of religion as the opiate of the masses. After nationalizing companies that belonged to foreigners, Nasir's government took control of the Egyptian ones and put severe limits on landholdings, personal incomes, and the number of boards of directors any individual might sit on. These July Laws alienated Syria's capitalists and hastened the breakup of the UAR in September 1961. Egypt's capitalists either went to work for the nationalized enterprises or went into exile.

Nasir convoked the National Congress of Popular Forces, which drafted the National Charter as a blueprint for Egypt's march toward Arab socialism. The government was to be the instrument of the people's interests, with decisions to be made by a legislature half of whose elected members would have to be either workers or peasants. All political participation would be funneled through a single-party organization, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which would convey policy commands from top to bottom and popular demands from bottom to top. The ASU would have cells in every factory, agricultural cooperative, school, government department, and place of business; these cells would become training grounds for future national leaders, who would move up to local, provincial, and national ASU councils. The government hoped also that the nationalized industries would grow according to plan and that Egypt would double its national income within 10 years and enter the ranks of the industrialized world, as the Communist countries had done.

Nasir's hopes for Egypt foundered on the Arab–Israeli conflict. During the early 1960s the rivalry between Egypt and Israel could be acted out mainly in UN debates or in their competition to aid and hence to influence the emerging African nations. But Israel's National Water Carrier Project, taking water from the Jordan River to irrigate agricultural centers in more arid regions of the country, impinged on Jordan's water supply. Other Arab states feared that Israel's development would eventually lead to the country's expansion at their expense.

Nasir convoked a summit meeting of Arab kings and presidents in Cairo, where they agreed to postpone immediate military action against Israel but to study irrigation projects that would tap the sources of the Jordan River in Syria and Lebanon. They also agreed to create the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as an umbrella group for the Palestinian refugees, hitherto treated as wards of the Arab governments. The PLO itself had more bark than bite, but some of its constituent groups, notably al-Fatah, turned to terrorism. Israel made reprisal raids against Fatah's bases on the West Bank of Jordan, but its financial support and verbal encouragement were coming from Syria, where a radical regime had taken control in January 1966. Hoping to rein in its enthusiasm, Egypt made an alliance treaty with the new regime in November of the same year. The following April border incidents between Syria and Israel escalated into an aerial dogfight, in which the Israelis shot down six Syrian fighter jets. The Soviets warned Nasir that Israel was massing troops in its northeast for an attack on Syria, Damascus asked for help under the 1966 Egyptian–Syrian treaty, and Nasir mobilized his army.

He called on the UN secretary-general to remove UNEF from Egypt's Israeli border, massed his own troops in the Sinai, blockaded the Tiran Straits against Israeli shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba, and joined in an Arab chorus of threats against Israel's very survival. In response, Israel launched a preemptive strike against the air forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, followed by an invasion of the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the Arab half of Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. After six days of fighting, Israel's forces stood on the banks of the Suez Canal, and Egypt's armed forces were in disarray. Nasir took responsibility for the defeat and tried to resign, but the Egyptian people demonstrated en masse for him to stay in office and continue the struggle.

With the Suez Canal closed and the Israelis in the Sinai, Egypt had to decide whether to continue leading the Arab–Israeli conflict or to

seek a negotiated peace. It tried to do both. At the 1967 Khartoum summit, the Arab leaders ruled out direct negotiations, recognition, or peace with the Jewish state. On the other hand, the UN Security Council propounded its Resolution 242, which essentially called for the restoration of Arab lands in exchange for recognition of Israel. Nasir's government accepted the resolution, yet it also rearmed feverishly, brought in more Soviet military advisers, and began firing on the Israelis across the Suez Canal. In 1969 Nasir dubbed the fighting that was already going on a "War of Attrition" that would not end until Israel withdrew from the Sinai and other occupied Arab lands. In reality, though, Egypt suffered greater losses than Israel, as the fighting escalated into an air war, with Soviet pilots flying Egyptian jets.

Although the oil-exporting Arab governments had agreed at Khartoum to support the economies of Egypt and other "confrontation states" against Israel, their response to Nasir's pleas at the 1969 Rabat summit disappointed him. Egypt's government, after much internal debate, agreed to a cease-fire proposed by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers, which should have led, through indirect negotiations, to Israel's withdrawal from the lands occupied since June 1967. The War of Attrition ended, but the radical Palestinians continued their struggle by hijacking civilian airliners and provoking a war with Jordan in September 1970. Nasir convoked another Arab summit, at which the leaders arranged a Palestinian-Jordanian truce, and died just after the meeting adjourned.

Sadat: The October War and the *Infatih*

Nasir's death occasioned an outpouring of popular grief in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world. He was succeeded by his vice president, Anwar al-Sadat, who seemed unlikely to survive amid the "centers of power" or cliques of Nasirists in the cabinet. But Sadat managed to secure the army's acquiescence in a purge of those powerful politicians on 15 May 1971, soon celebrated as the "Corrective Revolution." Although Sadat's government signed a friendship treaty with the USSR and promulgated a new constitution that reaffirmed Egypt's commitment to Arab socialism, he soon moved to the right. Influenced by the Saudi government, on which Egypt's economy was becoming ever more dependent, Sadat began easing out leftist politicians and journalists and restoring confiscated lands and property to Egyptians punished by Nasir. More dramatically, he burned the tapes of telephone conversations made by Nasir's secret police. When Moscow refused to sell the

offensive weapons that Sadat said Egypt needed to resume fighting Israel after the Rogers Peace Plan failed to secure Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai, Sadat asked the Soviet advisers to leave Egypt in July 1972.

Sadat and his advisers hoped for reconciliation with Washington, but decided that the U.S. government would pressure Israel to withdraw only if another Middle East crisis arose. Together with Syrian leader Hafiz al-Asad, he planned a joint attack against the Israeli troops on the Bar Lev Line facing the Suez Canal and in the Golan Heights. The coordinated attack took place on 6 October 1973, Yom Kippur for Jewish Israelis, and initially succeeded, as Egyptian troops crossed the Canal under protection from Soviet-made missiles and Syrian tanks thrust into the Golan Heights. The fighting became bitter and protracted, with both superpowers rearming their clients and maneuvering in the United Nations for a political settlement. Finally U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger flew to Moscow and negotiated with the Soviet government for a new UN resolution that called for Arab-Israeli negotiations. By this time, the Israelis had broken through the Egyptian lines and crossed the Canal, occupying its west bank as far south as Suez and cutting off Egypt's Third Army in the Sinai. As the Arab states imposed an oil embargo against countries aiding Israel, especially the United States, Kissinger began working earnestly for a peace settlement, leading to a general conference in Geneva, followed by Separation of Forces agreements, first by Egypt and Israel in January 1974, then by Syria and Israel four months later. Sadat and Kissinger formed a close working relationship, and Egypt resumed diplomatic relations with the United States. The Suez Canal was dredged out with American help and reopened in June 1975. The canal cities were rebuilt. Domestically, Sadat paid lip service to socialism but began restoring capitalism through a policy he called *infitah* (opening) aimed at Arab and Western investors. Further indirect negotiations with Israel led in September 1975 to a new agreement in which Egypt renounced war as a means to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel handed back more of the Sinai.

Sadat's policies were now diametrically opposed to those of his predecessor: capitalism took the place of socialism, creating a new Egyptian bourgeoisie; Egypt renounced its friendship pact with Moscow and began replacing its Soviet arsenal with weapons purchased from the Western countries or manufactured locally in factories financed by Arab capital; ships bearing Israeli cargos transited the Suez

Canal; and peace with Israel no longer seemed unthinkable. When a new administration in Washington tried to restart the Geneva Peace Conference, Sadat seized the initiative by going to Jerusalem to speak to the Israeli Knesset. The offer raised hopes in Israel and the United States that a general Arab–Israeli peace settlement was at hand; Egyptian and Israeli negotiators soon found, however, that the goal was harder to achieve than Sadat had imagined. President Carter invited both Sadat and Israel’s Premier Menachem Begin to come to his summer retreat in Maryland for an open-ended meeting to try to reach an agreement. The result was the Camp David Accords between Carter, Sadat, and Begin, the basis for the separate peace treaty signed by Egypt and Israel in March 1979, restoring the Sinai to Egypt in stages in return for the establishment of full diplomatic ties between the two countries.

Egypt and Israel hoped that Jordan and other Arab governments would also make peace with Israel and that all sides would negotiate in good faith for Palestinian autonomy. Instead, the other Arab states broke diplomatic relations with Sadat’s government and ended all aid and investment in Egypt because of the treaty. The U.S. government stepped up its aid program to Egypt, whose economy fortunately benefited from rising Suez Canal tolls, tourism and oil revenues, and remittances from Egyptians working in other countries.

Sadat’s Assassination and Mubarak’s Succession

Although Egypt was at peace with Israel, its people were not at peace with their regime. President Sadat increasingly stifled attacks on his policies, passing the “Law of Shame” in 1980 and jailing many political dissidents in September 1981. Opposition came increasingly from Islamists, whom Sadat himself had empowered within the universities and the press in order to weaken the Communists, and some managed to infiltrate the army officer corps. While Sadat was reviewing a military parade on 6 October 1981, the anniversary of the crossing of the Suez Canal, he was assassinated by a group of officers who later proved to be part of an Islamist group called al-Jihad. Although many world leaders came to Cairo for Sadat’s funeral, the occasion inspired none of the popular mourning that had occurred after Nasir’s death. Sadat’s vice president, Husni Mubarak, succeeded unopposed and promised to address Egypt’s economic and social problems. While

maintaining relations with Israel, he restored Egypt's ties with the Arab governments and even the PLO.

In spite of massive infusions of U.S. military and technical aid, Mubarak's Egypt has failed to solve most of the country's problems. Political opposition is permitted within narrow bounds, but the People's Assembly is dominated by the National Democratic Party (NDP), which inspires little public enthusiasm, and the election laws make it difficult for other parties to form a substantial voting bloc. Prerevolutionary movements have been revived, including the Wafd Party, the Muslim Brothers, and even *Misr al-Fatat*. Genuinely popular movements, calling for the establishment of the Islamic Shari'a as the sole basis of Egypt's laws, cannot attain power legally and were, during 1992–98, heavily restricted under the state of emergency put in effect after Sadat's assassination and never rescinded. Egypt seemed locked in a cycle of Islamist terrorism and government repression. The political atmosphere has seemed calmer since 1998.

Disparities widen between large landowners and landless peasants, between capitalists who have benefited from the *infitah* and employees of state-owned enterprises who have not, and between Egyptians who go abroad to work and those who stay at home and see their meager salaries eroded by inflation. The population continues to rise by about 2 percent annually, land reclamation has proceeded at a slower pace and a higher cost than expected, and the Aswan High Dam has created environmental problems that offset its benefits. Many Egyptians question the value of their government's dependence on the Western countries, especially the United States, and of peace with Israel. The Gulf War, in which Mubarak joined the coalition against Saddam Husayn's invasion of Kuwait, brought economic benefits to Egypt, yet the policy was assailed by some Egyptians. Privatization of Egypt's industries and economic globalization are commonly blamed for the country's problems. As of 2003, many Egyptians favor a more Islamic government and decry the repressive measures taken by the Mubarak regime, which they feel has made Egypt a U.S. client state, with no public accountability.

Nationalist, Socialist, and Islamist Views of Egypt's History

For many Egyptians, the most significant aspect of their history as a people has been their struggle for independence from foreign occupation and domination, the "national movement" led successively by

Ahmad Urabi, Mustafa Kamil and Muhammad Farid, Sa'd Zaghlul and the Wafd, and Jamal Abd al-Nasir and Anwar al-Sadat, with the ardent support of the people themselves. The foreign villains may change, and since the departure of the British, both the Soviets and the Americans have at times affronted the Egyptian people's dignity and independence. This may be called the nationalist school of Egyptian historiography.

But Egypt's story is also one of an agrarian people who had to adapt to industrialization, first by Muhammad Ali, then by the European powers that wanted Egypt to supply raw materials and markets for their manufactures, and then by Nasir, who hoped that an industrialized Egypt would lead the Arab world toward a position of power and respect. If Egypt had heroes of economic development, they would be the peasants who gave up their lives to dig the canals, the toilers who raised and ginned the long-staple cotton that Egypt exported to Europe, the founders of Bank Misr and other companies that gave Egyptians the chance to manage their country's own industries, the workers who tried to organize trade unions to protect their dignity and raise their wages, and the economists who planned the economic growth for which Nasir and his followers yearned. Many Egyptians feel that Sadat and Mubarak have betrayed Nasir's campaign to empower the people. This may be called Egypt's socialist historiography.

Other Egyptians view their country as the heartland of Islamic power and the center of Muslim learning since the 7th-century Arab conquest. Islam, now the religion of about 94 percent of all Egyptians, is more than a set of beliefs about God, worship, and the afterlife; it provides a blueprint for an ideal government and a perfect society. Egypt's story is, for them, one of efforts by countless Muslims since 640 CE to build Islamic institutions: mosques, schools, courts of law, welfare institutions, Sufi (mystic) societies, and trade guilds. Egyptians are a deeply religious people. Islam and indeed Coptic Christianity have assured them of survival through times of plagues, famines, foreign invaders, unjust rulers, and internal strife.

There were of course the Muslim rulers: Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs, Tulunid and Ikhshidid governors, Fatimid schismatics, Kurdish Ayyubids, Turkish and Circassian Mamluks, Ottoman Turks, and the viceroys descended from Muhammad Ali, who claimed an Albanian origin. But to Muslim historians, the real heroes were not the men who sat on thrones in Cairo, but rather the ulama who wrote up the Shari'a and taught it to the people of Egypt and the rest of the world. In modern

times, they included Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida, who showed how Islam could respond to the challenge of Europe. Most recently, they have been the leaders of the Society of Muslim Brothers and of the *jama'at* (Islamic groups), which have united thousands of Egyptian Muslims to protect their religiously based values against cultural and political Westernization. Radical Islamists, such as Sayyid Qutb, compare modern leaders with the despots who oppressed the early Muslims and justify all means, including violence and terrorism if need be, to replace them. To Islamists, this is Egypt's real past.

Whether the nationalists, the socialists, or the Islamists hold the key to Egypt's future, none can predict. The country's problems are daunting and the stakes are high. The Egyptian people are survivors. Whatever fate lies in store for them, however, they are confident that their country will endure.

DICTIONARY

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ABBAS BRIDGE INCIDENT (1946). Political atrocity caused by an Egyptian police decision to open a drawbridge between Giza and **Cairo** during a student demonstration, causing many participants to fall into the **Nile River**, resulting in more than 20 deaths and 84 casualties. The incident led to escalating riots and protest marches by students and workers against the Egyptian government and the **British occupation** as well as to the replacement of Premier **Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi** by **Isma'il Sidqi**.

ABBAS HILMI I (1813–54). Egypt's governor from 1848 to 1854. The son of Tusun, who predeceased his father, **Muhammad Ali** (1769–1849), Abbas was born in Jidda and reared in **Cairo**. He succeeded **Ibrahim** upon his death in November 1848. Often viewed as reactionary because he dismantled some of the Westernizing reforms instituted by his grandfather, he did indeed dismiss many of the European advisers of Muhammad Ali and Ibrahim. His motives were a combination of parsimony and paranoia, but peasant taxpayers benefited from the lower imposts and rates. During his reign an English company, headed by Robert Stephenson, received the concession to build the **railroad** between Cairo and **Alexandria**. The route from Cairo to **Suez** was also improved. Abbas sent troops to fight against **Russia** in the Crimean War (1853–56), where they suffered heavy casualties. The circumstances of his assassination in Banha in 1854 have never been satisfactorily explained.

ABBAS HILMI II (1874–1944). Egypt's **khedive** from 1892 to 1914, when **Britain** deposed him upon severing Egypt from the **Ottoman Empire**. His father, Khedive **Tawfiq**, died unexpectedly in January 1892, when Abbas was a cadet at the Theresianum in Vienna, and so

his reign began when he was barely 18 years old by the Muslim calendar. A high-spirited youth inclined to nationalism, he soon replaced some of the palace staff, then ran afoul of the British diplomatic agent, Lord **Cromer**, when he tried in January 1893 to replace his pro-British premier, **Mustafa Fahmi**, with **Husayn Fakhri** and a new **cabinet** without first securing Cromer's consent. Backed by his government, Cromer told the khedive that he must have prior British consent to change his ministers. Abbas again challenged the British, notably Sir Herbert (later Lord) **Kitchener**, the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, a year later in the **Frontiers Incident**. Unable thereafter to oppose the **British occupation** openly, Abbas formed a secret organization composed of Europeans and Egyptian nationalists, the Society for the Revival of the Nation, which became the basis for **Mustafa Kamil's National Party**. He subsidized Mustafa's anti-British propaganda in Europe and the publication of **Ali Yusuf's newspaper, al-Muayyad**.

As the Nationalists' hopes for French aid in ending the British occupation waned after the **Fashoda Incident**, Abbas made peace with Britain, partly due to his friendship with the Prince of Wales, later King Edward VII. He distanced himself from the National Party after the *Entente Cordiale*, although he was briefly reconciled with Mustafa Kamil and **Muhammad Farid** following the **Dinshaway Incident** and subsidized the publication of British and French editions of *al-Liwa*. He expressed his moral support for constitutional government, one of the National Party's desiderata, but abandoned anti-British nationalism because of Cromer's retirement and the *politique d'entente* pursued by his successor, Sir **Eldon Gorst**. To signal this new policy in 1908, he replaced the Mustafa Fahmi cabinet with a new one headed by **Butros Ghali**, who opposed the Nationalists. Abbas became increasingly repressive toward the National Party and its newspapers, approving the revival of the 1881 **Press Law**, the trials of **Abd al-Aziz Jawish**, and the promulgation of the 1910 **Exceptional Laws**, due in part to his friendship with Gorst, which he affirmed by calling on the ailing British agent shortly before his death in 1911.

When Gorst was replaced by Abbas's nemesis, Kitchener, the khedive resumed his opposition to the British, but the National Party had lost much of its influence, and its newspapers were muzzled during 1912. The elections for the new **Legislative Assembly** set up under the 1913 **Organic Law** opened new opportunities to

seek political support, but much of its leadership came from the traditionally hostile **Umma Party**, notably **Sa'd Zaghlul**. Kitchener now hoped to replace Abbas by a more pliable relative.

While Abbas was in Istanbul in July 1914, he was shot by a deranged Egyptian student thought to be an agent of the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Before he was well enough to leave, however, **World War I** broke out, and Britain's ambassador there warned him that he would not be allowed to return to Egypt until the war ended. The khedive decided to make peace with the CUP through War Minister Enver and with the exiled Egyptian Nationalists, notably Muhammad Farid and Shaykh Jawish. After the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers, he issued manifestos "dismissing" his ministers, granting a constitution to the Egyptian people, and calling on them to rebel against the British. His relations with the CUP and the Ottoman government remained troubled, however, and he left Istanbul for Vienna in December 1914. Soon afterward the British officially deposed him in favor of his uncle, **Husayn Kamil**.

The ex-khedive stayed away from Istanbul for three years, during which he intrigued with Germany to obtain funds, ostensibly to buy shares to subvert Paris newspapers (this became known as the Bolo Affair), and with Britain to obtain recognition of his son, Abd al-Mun'im, as the heir to the Egyptian throne. Discredited by the Bolo Affair and unable to settle his differences with the British, Abbas finally returned to Istanbul late in 1917 and cooperated with the Central Powers for the rest of the war. After the armistice, he moved from one European city to another, seeking until 1922 to regain control of his property in Egypt and recognition of his family's claim to its throne. He invested in real estate and various business enterprises and continued to engage in politics, notably his attempts to resolve the **Palestine** question, but never returned to Egypt. He backed the Axis Powers in **World War II** and died in Geneva in 1944. Though energetic and patriotic, he failed as khedive to use his powers to stem the entrenchment of the British occupation and to promote the nationalist movement. Memoirs purported to be his were published in **Cairo** in 1993 and later translated into English.

ABBASIYYA BARRACKS. Major military installation in northeastern **Cairo**, begun by **Abbas I** while he was governor of Egypt, then

neglected by his successors. They were occupied by the **British** army in 1882 and later expanded into a major military installation, becoming the principal staging area of the **1952 Revolution**.

ABBUD, AHMAD (1889–1963). Wealthy industrialist. Born in **Cairo**, he attended the Tawfiqiyya Secondary School and the University of Glasgow, where he was trained as a civil engineer and also met his wife, who was Scottish. He worked as an engineer for a British company, then worked on an irrigation scheme in **Iraq** and on the **Palestinian** and **Syrian** railway system. Upon returning to Egypt in 1922, he worked on the enlargement of the **Aswan Dam**, became a supply contractor for the British army in Egypt, and was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1926. Abbud became a successful entrepreneur, managed the **Khedivial Mail Line**, held a near monopoly on sugar refining in Egypt, owned paper mills and fertilizer and chemical plants, had a controlling interest in several Egyptian banks, and served on the board of the **Suez Canal Company** before it was nationalized. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** nationalized all his enterprises, valued at more than \$100 million, in July 1961. Abbud left Egypt for Switzerland in that year and continued to make money. At the time of his death in London, he was said to be one of the ten richest men in the world.

ABD AL-HADI, IBRAHIM (1898–1981). Cabinet minister, premier, and **Sa'dist Party** leader. Trained as a lawyer, he served in the Chamber of Deputies, representing al-Zarqa (Daqahliyya) in the 1929, 1936, and 1938 sessions, then became minister of state for parliamentary affairs (1939–40), minister of commerce (1940), public works (1941–42), public health (1944–46), foreign affairs (1946), **finance** twice (1946–47 and 1948–49), chief of the royal cabinet (1947–48), and prime minister and interior (1948–49). Keeping Egypt under martial law, he tried to restore order following the political crisis engendered by the 1948 **Palestine War** and the assassination of his predecessor, **Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi**. Owing to his repressive policies or, according to his indictment, for “corruption, terrorism, graft, and treason,” Abd al-Hadi was tried after the **1952 Revolution** and condemned to death, although this sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment, and all his property was confiscated. Released in 1954 because of ill-health, he played no

role in subsequent Egyptian politics. His memoirs were serialized in *al-Musawwar* in 1981–82.

ABD AL-HALIM (1830–94). Pretender to the khedivate of Egypt, generally known as Prince Halim. He was educated at the Khanqah School and then enrolled in a military school in **France**. Upon returning to Egypt, he rose through the army to the rank of lieutenant general. He became commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, director of the war department, military commander of the **Sudan**, and then member of the **Ottoman** Council of State in Istanbul. When **Khedive Isma'il** changed the succession system, Prince Halim lost his primary claim to the khedivate. Accordingly, he opposed Isma'il and his successor, **Tawfiq**, and probably backed **Ahmad Urabi's** movement in 1881–82. His son, Mehmet Said Halim, joined the CUP and became Ottoman grand vizier from 1913 to 1917, claiming Egypt's throne at the expense of deposed Khedive **Abbas Hilmi II**.

ABD AL-MAJID, [AHMAD] ISMAT (1923–). Diplomat and politician. Born in **Alexandria**, he was educated there. He received a Ph.D. in international law from the University of Paris in 1951, having joined the Egyptian foreign service in 1950. He became deputy foreign minister in 1970 and Egypt's UN representative from 1972 to 1983. He served from 1984 as foreign minister and deputy premier until May 1991, when he was elected secretary-general of the **Arab League**, serving two five-year terms. He was replaced in May 2001 by **Amr Musa**.

ABD AL-QUDDUS (KUDDOUS), IHSAN (1918–90). Journalist, novelist, and playwright. He was the son of the actress and pioneer woman journalist, **Ruz al-Yusuf**, and he began his career as a writer and editor for the popular weekly magazine that bears her name. Abd al-Quddus achieved fame early in his career by getting to know **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** before the **1952 Revolution** thus emerging as one of the journalists close to the **Revolutionary Command Council**. In 1966 he was named editor of *Akhbar al-Yawm* and later of *al-Ahram*. He wrote at least 60 novels and collections of short stories, mainly psychological studies of political and social behavior, many of which were made into films, as well as a syndicated column called "At a Cafe on Politics Street."

ABD AL-RAHMAN, UMAR (1938–). Expatriate **Islamist** leader involved in the 1993 bombings at New York's World Trade Center. Blind since infancy, Umar Abd al-Rahman was educated at **al-Azhar** and began his career as a preacher in Fayyum in 1965. His denunciations of **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** as an infidel led to his imprisonment and finally to temporary exile in **Saudi Arabia**. He took part in **al-Jihad** and other *jama'at*. Accused of conspiring against **Anwar al-Sadat**, he was imprisoned for three years and tried with **Khalid al-Islambuli**, but was acquitted. Umar later aided the Afghan *mujahidin* against the **Soviet** occupation. He left Egypt in 1990 for Saudi Arabia, **Sudan**, and, finally, the **United States**, where he was accused of inciting militant Muslims in Jersey City and the rest of greater New York. Arrested by U.S. authorities in July 1993 and convicted in 1995 of conspiracy in the World Trade Center bombing, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in a U.S. federal prison. Egypt also sentenced him *in absentia* in 1994.

ABD AL-RAZIQ, ALI (1888–1966). Religious judge, writer, and minister. He came from an Upper Egyptian landowning family and was educated at **al-Azhar** and in England. He became a **Shari'a Court** judge in Mansura. In 1925 Shaykh Ali published a controversial book, *al-Islam wa usul al-hukm*, in which he argued that the **caliphate** as a political institution was a post-Quranic innovation not essential to **Islam**. Many Egyptians objected to the book because Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) had just abolished the caliphate, because some Muslims hoped to name a new caliph in a country other than Turkey, and because King **Fuad I** was seeking the office for himself. The **ulama** of al-Azhar accused Ali Abd al-Raziq of promoting atheism, took away his title of *shaykh*, and had him removed from his judgeship. Many liberal writers, including **Taha Husayn** and **Muhammad Husayn Haykal**, backed him. He defended his ideas in articles written for *al-Siyasa al-Usubu'iyya* and in lectures delivered in **Cairo University's** Faculties of Law and of Letters. He later served as *awqaf* minister and was elected to the **Arabic Language Academy**. He published *Min athar Mustafa Abd al-Raziq*, a collection of his brother's scholarly writings.

ABD AL-WAHHAB, MUHAMMAD (1900–91). Actor, singer, and composer. Son of a muezzin and mosque preacher, Abd al-Wahhab was born in **Cairo** and was fascinated by **music** from his early

childhood. He was educated at a *kuttab* and apprenticed to a tailor, whose brother happened to be a singer in the troupe of a popular Cairo musician. Defying his parents' wishes, Abd al-Wahhab joined that troupe in 1917, soon advancing to better-known groups, including that of **Sayyid Darwish**. He learned to play the *'ud* (lute) and studied Western musical theory at Guerin Musical Academy in Cairo. In 1930 he met **Ahmad Shawqi**, who brought him into Egypt's nascent state broadcasting system, where he was promoted as "the singer for important people, kings, and princes" and gained widespread recognition. A pioneer in the development of modern Arabic music, Abd al-Wahhab sang and wrote hundreds of songs, composing for other major singers, including **Umm Kulthum**. He made seven musical films, notably *Rasasa fi al-qalb* (A Bullet in the Heart). He was awarded the title of "First Arab Musician" from the Arab Society and won a platinum disk for his record sales.

ABDIN PALACE. Official residence of Egypt's rulers from 1874 until 1952. Located in central **Cairo**, it was the site of several famous confrontations between local rulers and nationalist demonstrators, both military and civilian, and British officials, notably the **4 February Incident**. After the monarchy was overthrown in 1952, portions of Abdin were used for a time to house *Dar al-Wathaiq* and a museum, but **Anwar al-Sadat** and **Husni Mubarak** have used the building for government offices.

ABDUH, MUHAMMAD (1849–1905). Islamic reformer, author and editor, chief jurisconsult of the Maliki rite, and reformer of **al-Azhar**. Born in Shanra (Gharbiyya) to a family of Turkic origin, he grew up in Mahallat Nasr (Buhayra) and studied at the Ahmadi Mosque in **Tanta** and al-Azhar. He was attracted to philosophy and to **Sufism**. He came to know **Jamal al-Din al-Afghani** during his stay in Cairo and became his most devoted disciple. He taught for a while and worked in journalism, editing *al-Waqai' al-Misriyya* in 1880–82. He was imprisoned for three months because of his support for **Ahmad Urabi's** movement and then was exiled to **Syria**. He later went to Paris and joined Afghani in editing an influential **pan-Islamic** magazine, *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa*. After it was banned, Abduh returned to Beirut to teach and write. In 1888 he was readmitted to Egypt, where he became a judge and a chancellor in the court of appeals, and in 1899 he became the country's chief mufti

(jurisconsult). Abduh's publications include an incomplete interpretation of the Quran (Koran), *Risalat al-tawhid* (translated as *The Theology of Unity*), and *al-Radd ala al-dahriyin* (translated into French as *La Réfutation des matérialistes*). He had many disciples, both religious and secular, and the **Umma Party** is sometimes called *Hizb al-Imam* (Imam [Abduh's] Party). His work of Quranic interpretation was carried on by **Muhammad Rashid Rida**, and one of his political disciples was **Sa'd Zaghlul**. Although his efforts to reconcile Islam with modernism have not fully stood the test of time and his friendship with Lord **Cromer** rendered him suspect in the eyes of Khedive **Abbas Hilmi II** and the **National Party**, Egyptians respect him as a towering figure in their intellectual history.

ABU AL-DHAHAB, MUHAMMAD BEY (1745?–75). Mamluk successor and brother-in-law of **Ali Bey "al-Kabir"**. Originally **Circassian**, he was purchased by Ali Bey around 1760, surnamed *Abu al-Dhahab* ("father of gold") for passing out gold—instead of silver—coins among the **Cairo** multitudes upon his elevation to the rank of bey following his pilgrimage with his master to Mecca and Medina in 1764. In 1769 he undertook a punitive expedition on behalf of Ali Bey against rebellious Mamluks in Upper Egypt. The next year Ali sent him to extend his control over the **Hijaz**, while he was expanding into **Palestine** and **Syria**, and in 1771 Abu al-Dhahab led an expedition that took Damascus, but inexplicably withdrew after ten days. The two leaders became estranged during that year, not only because of Abu al-Dhahab's reluctance to remain in Syria, but also due to their rivalry for supremacy, and Ali exiled Abu al-Dhahab to Upper Egypt. There he organized his Mamluks to rebel against Ali while he was on campaign in Syria in 1772 and managed to take control of Cairo. Ali tried unsuccessfully to dislodge him in May 1773, dying soon afterward. During his short reign he continued Ali's expansion into Palestine and Syria and tried to loosen Egypt's ties with the **Ottoman Empire**. He cultivated commercial ties with the British East India Company, hoping to revive the overland **trade** between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Like his predecessor, Abu al-Dhahab pursued modernization policies that would later be developed by **Muhammad Ali**.

ABU AL-FATH, MAHMUD (1893–1958). Leading Wafdist journalist and editor of *al-Misri* from 1936 to 1954. He and his brother,

Ahmad, initially supported the **1952 Revolution** but broke with the new regime because of **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** authoritarian policies. They went into exile in 1954, settling in Tunis. They were tried and sentenced in absentia for 15 years. *Al-Misri* was closed by the government and has never been allowed to reappear. His brother published a memoir, *L'Affaire Nasser* (Paris, 1962).

ABU-GHAZALA, ABD AL-HALIM (1930–). Army officer and politician. Trained at the **Military Academy**, he then received four years' advanced training in the **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)**. He wrote several artillery training manuals and became the commander of Egypt's artillery in October 1973. He later served as Egypt's military attaché in Washington. Appointed chief of staff in 1980, he then relinquished that post to become defense minister. He was promoted to the rank of field marshal and became a deputy prime minister in 1982. Dismissed from his position in April 1989, he became a special assistant to **Husni Mubarak** and supervised, for a time, the **privatization** of state-owned **industries**.

ABU-QIR. Inlet east of **Alexandria**, commanding the main route from that city to **Rosetta** and **Cairo**. It was the site of **Horatio Nelson's** naval victory over **Napoléon Bonaparte** in August 1798, sufficient to ensure joint Anglo–**Ottoman** mastery of the eastern Mediterranean, but not to end the **French occupation**. In July 1799 the Ottomans dispatched 100 ships to Abu-Qir Bay and landed about 9 thousand men, but they were badly defeated by Napoléon. The British landed 17 thousand troops there in March 1801 and dealt a decisive defeat to the forces of **Jacques "Abdallah" Menou**, driving the French from Egypt. The British landed there in 1807 en route to their Rosetta defeat. It is now the eastern end of the Alexandria **Corniche**.

ABU-ZAYD, NASR HAMID (1943–). Egyptian professor of Islamic studies at **Cairo University**, currently living in Leiden following a 1995 court order calling on his wife to divorce him for apostasy, owing to a judgment that some of his professional writings about the Quran were anti-Islamic. The case has been widely debated by Egyptian scholars, intellectuals, and journalists.

ACHILLE LAURO INCIDENT (1985). Palestinian hijacking of an Italian cruise ship in the Mediterranean, involving the murder of a

disabled American Jew, in October 1985. Although the action was condemned by Chairman Yasir Arafat of the **Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)**, the operation was conducted by its members and masterminded by Abu al-Abbas. **Husni Mubarak** arranged for the *fidaiyin* to relinquish the vessel, in return for safe passage to Tunis, where they were to be tried by the PLO. U.S. fighter jets intercepted the plane carrying Abu al-Abbas and forced it to land in Italy, but Italian authorities set Abu al-Abbas free. The incident strained Egyptian–American relations and also aborted a **British** attempt to mediate between the PLO and **Israel**.

ADLI-CURZON NEGOTIATIONS (1921). Abortive talks between Egypt's prime minister, **Adli Yakan**, assisted by **Husayn Rushdi** and **Isma'il Sidqi**, and the British foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, on Egypt's status. The talks were thwarted by Egyptian nationalist opposition led by **Sa'd Zaghlul** and by **Britain's** insistence on keeping a garrison in Egypt to protect its imperial interests. The talks failed in November, and Adli resigned a month later.

AL-AFGHANI, JAMAL AL-DIN (1838–97). **Pan-Islamic** agitator, philosopher, teacher, and the major inspiration of **Ahmad Urabi**. Born as Muhammad ibn Safdar in As'ad Abad (Persia), he later claimed to have come from a village bearing the same name in Afghanistan and to have been educated in Kabul, probably to disguise his Shi'i origins. He also changed his name. After making the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) in 1857, he settled in Kabul and worked for Dost Muhammad Khan's government. He then went to India, stopped briefly in Egypt, and settled in Istanbul, where he joined the **education** council in 1868. Exiled two years later, he was invited to Egypt by **Mustafa Riyad**. After teaching briefly at **al-Azhar**, he set up his own meeting place nearby and began gathering disciples who shared his views on religious reform and national resistance, notably **Muhammad Abduh** and journalists Adib Ishaq, editor of *Misr*, for which Afghani sometimes wrote, and **Ya'qub Sannu'**.

Early in 1879 he helped to found a secret political society, one of whose members was Prince **Tawfiq**. But when Tawfiq became **khedive** later in that year, he had Afghani banished from Egypt. He went to India and later to Paris, where he and Muhammad Abduh published *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa*. After that magazine was banned, he

spent four years in St. Petersburg and then went to Munich, where he met Nasir al-Din Shah of Persia, who invited him there. He inspired the Persian Tobacco Strike of 1891–92 and is widely suspected of instigating the shah's subsequent assassination in 1896, but by then he had moved to Istanbul as the guest of Sultan Abdulhamid, who soon quarreled with him for receiving **Abbas Hilmi II**. His death, officially ascribed to cancer, may have been due to poison administered by the sultan's agents. His fiery speeches and **newspaper** articles were his main legacy; some have been translated into English in *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*. He was the major inspiration for the modern revival of Islamic power.

AFLATUN, INJI (1924–89). Painter, **Marxist**, and **feminist**. Born in **Cairo**, she was educated at the French *Lycée* and **Cairo University**. She began painting at an early age and studied with artist-cinematographer Hamid al-Tilmisani and the Egyptian-born Swiss painter Margot Veillon. Soon after her first exhibition in 1942, Inji joined *Iskra* and represented Egypt at the 1945 Paris meeting of the World Congress of **Women**, which was sponsored by the **Communist Democratic Federation of Women**. One of the founders of the University and Institutes Youth League, she became a member of the **National Committee of Workers and Students (NCWS)** and the National Women's Committee. Aflatun wrote an anti-imperialist and feminist manifesto, *Thamanun milyun imraa ma'ana* (Eighty Million Women Are with Us) in 1949. She joined the Movement of the Friends of Peace in 1950 and also the **Egyptian Feminist Union's (EFU)** youth group. Opposing the continued **British occupation of the Suez Canal**, she helped to organize the Women's Committee for Popular Resistance. Both before and after the **1952 Revolution**, she wrote for *al-Misri*. She also painted pictures of *fel-lahin* (peasants) and landscapes. She was arrested and imprisoned during **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** roundup of Communists in 1959; the paintings that she made during her incarceration are a visual record of al-Qanatir Women's **Prison**. Released in 1963, she then devoted her time to painting, displaying her work in Egypt and various foreign countries. In 1975 Aflatun organized a large exhibition, "Women Painters over Half a Century," and was elected vice president of the Society of Writers and Artists. Her work tried to represent Egyptian society and women's struggle for political equality.

AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLES' SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION

(AAPSO). Nongovernmental organization established at the first Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference convened in **Cairo** by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government from 26 December 1957 to 1 January 1958 and attended by over 500 delegates from 46 countries. The initial suggestion for the conference came from a leftist Asian delegation's visit to Nasir in February 1957. After struggling to maintain the momentum begun at the **Bandung Conference**, Nasir saw the AAPSO conference as an opportunity to open unofficial avenues of diplomacy on a popular level.

The organizing committee included **Anwar al-Sadat**, **Khalid Muhyi al-Din**, and **Yusuf al-Sibai**, a Nasir confidant. Sadat chaired the conference and Sibai was elected secretary-general of the Permanent Secretariat. Perceived in the West as a **Communist** front group, the largest funding country was actually Egypt, and most of the members were left-leaning nationalists. Initially strongly anti-imperialist, the organization supported liberation movements throughout the Third World. As most Afro-Asian countries attained their independence, AAPSO shifted from political to social and economic issues. AAPSO promoted these causes through conferences, seminars, and publications. Like its sister organizations, the Afro-Asian Women's Association, the **Afro-Asian Writers' Association** and the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association, its publications were issued in Arabic, English, and French. AAPSO published both bimonthly (*Solidarity*) and quarterly (*Afro-Asian Quarterly*) journals, as well as the Afro-Asian Publication Series, which currently number over 200 monographs.

Nasir's liaisons with al-Sibai and AAPSO were **Muhammad Faiq** for Africa and **Sami Sharaf** for Asia. His government encouraged the concept of Afro-Asian solidarity through the **radio** (Voice of Africa, **Voice of the Arabs**), popular mass publications (*Ruz al-Yusuf*, *Akhar Sa'ah*), and other Afro-Asian organizations.

AAPSO has continued to enjoy Egyptian government favor under both Sadat and **Husni Mubarak**. It chose to remain in Cairo after the **Camp David Accords**. Operating out of its original Roda secretariat, it focuses on globalization and **human rights** issues.

AFRO-ASIAN WRITERS' ASSOCIATION. International literary group established in Tashkent 7–13 October 1958. **Yusuf al-Siba'i** was elected its first secretary general and served until his assassina-

tion in 1978. Eight conferences have been held: Tashkent (1958), **Cairo** (1962), Beirut (1967), New Delhi (1970), Alma Ata (1973), Luanda (1979), Tashkent (1983), and Tunis (1988). The permanent secretariat was set up in Cairo, moved to Tunis in 1978 in protest against the **Camp David Accords**, and brought back to Cairo when **Lutfi al-Khuli** was elected secretary-general in 1988. During the 1990s the association's activities diminished. It has not been active since Khuli's death in 1999.

The association sought to promote the development of national cultures and literatures among the indigenous peoples of Africa and Asia, strengthen solidarity among writers, and complete the task of decolonization. Its focus on issues of liberty, independence, national sovereignty, anticolonialism, anti-imperialism, and racism, stressed its view that the destinies of nations were linked to their literatures. On a practical level, it encouraged literary exchange and translation through publications in Arabic, English, and French. Specific publications included a quarterly journal, *Lotus: Afro-Asian Writings* (1967–99?), short story and **poetry** anthologies, and the Afro-Asian Literary Series (1–4). It also established the Lotus Award made to writers annually between 1969 and 1986.

The association was one of the earliest vehicles for the promotion of postcolonial writers and their work. Such Egyptian writers as Yusuf al-Siba'i, Edwar al-Kharrat, and **Yusuf Idris** gained their first international exposure through its publication program.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID). U.S.

government organization administering economic and technical assistance to developing countries. Founded as the Technical Cooperation Administration in 1950, it was often called "Point Four" in its early days from its place in President Harry Truman's 1949 inaugural address. The first U.S.–Egyptian agreement was signed in May 1950, providing limited aid for Egypt in return for **trade** and navigation rights for the United States. Although the initial stress was on promoting trade and domestic capital formation, financial assistance later came to be viewed as a means of facilitating capital goods production and promoting political stability. In 1961 the program was incorporated into the U.S. Department of State, and its present name was adopted.

Because **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** policies stressed economic independence and often opposed Western political influence, AID's activities were limited to an agricultural cooperation

activities were limited to an agricultural cooperation program called the Egyptian American Rural Improvement Service and to the sale of surplus American grain for Egyptian pounds under Public Law 480. As U.S.–Egyptian relations cooled in the mid-1960s, these programs came under attack from anti-**Communist** and **Zionist** pressure groups. President Lyndon Johnson ended grain sales to Egypt in 1966, causing some hardship and stirring up anti-American feeling in Egypt.

The resumption of U.S. aid accompanied the reestablishment of diplomatic ties negotiated by **Anwar al-Sadat** and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, beginning with the commitment of \$8.5 million to clear the **Suez Canal**. As Egypt moved toward peace with **Israel**, the aid sums allocated increased rapidly, exceeding the ability of an initially small American staff to administer them and of Egypt's **economy** to absorb them. By 1980 the annual amount exceeded \$1 billion; in 1991 it reached \$3 billion, much of which was used not only to purchase food and capital goods from the United States but also to improve the country's infrastructure (see **Aswan High Dam**) and to aid the transition from a state-directed to a market economy. Large-scale projects included the expansion of greater **Cairo's** water and sewer system, upgrading the telephone network, school construction, the introduction of improved varieties of wheat and rice, and the extension of **family planning** services.

During the 1990s, AID's focus gradually shifted from economic assistance to **education** and promotion of foreign trade. Current projects include financing to small businesses, a lending program for **women** entrepreneurs, the construction of **Cairo's** first natural gas bus garage, the five-year Agricultural Exports and Rural Income Project, and the provision of **environmental** education materials. Current AID expenditures are about \$1 billion annually, for a cumulative total of \$24.3 billion since 1975. See also **Foreign Aid**.

AGRARIAN REFORM LAW (1952), see **LAND REFORM**.

AGRICULTURE. Egypt has had, for at least six millennia, a predominantly agrarian **economy**, one that has depended almost entirely on **irrigation** and been market oriented rather than subsistence level. In late Ottoman times, Egypt's *fellahin* raised cereal crops, especially

millet, wheat, barley, rice, and some maize (corn); various legumes including *birsim* (clover), broad beans, lentils, and chickpeas; and cash crops such as **sugar**, indigo, **tobacco**, and some short-staple **cotton**. Egypt sent wheat, rice, beans, lentils, and cooking oils as tribute to Istanbul and as a Muslim gift to Mecca and Medina. It also exported cereal grains to Europe's Mediterranean ports.

In **Muhammad Ali's** efforts to build a strong army, initially to protect his governorship of Egypt and later to extend his rule over the **Hijaz**, the **Sudan**, the eastern Mediterranean, and greater **Syria**, he put nearly all of Egypt's arable land under state control, began its conversion from **basin** to **perennial irrigation** and encouraged the expansion of long-staple, or Egyptian, cotton in part because European markets for grain were shielded by protective **tariffs**. The peasants resisted growing cotton because it required more man-hours of labor than other crops, and the government had to supervise every stage of production and punish shirkers harshly. Faced in addition with rising exactions in kind, **corvée**, and conscription for military service or work in the factories, some peasants resorted to sabotage, self-mutilation, rebellion, and flight into the desert. The resulting labor shortages limited the growth of agrarian output. Nevertheless, government profits in 1836 reached 58 million piasters from long-staple cotton, with modest additional amounts from wheat, rice, indigo, beans, and maize.

The fall of Muhammad Ali's empire after the **London Convention** undermined state control over agriculture, and **Abbas I** relieved the peasants of burdensome tax and corvée exactions. Cotton production lost ground to wheat and flax during the 1840s but rose again in the 1850s. The abolition of the British Corn Laws in 1846 stimulated purchases of Egyptian wheat and other grains, reaching a peak in 1855, but greater still was the rising demand for Egyptian cotton in the textile mills of Lancashire. The rapid growth in Anglo-Egyptian trade was further enhanced by improvements to the port of **Alexandria** and the expansion of Egypt's **railroads**.

Khedive Isma'il initially financed his reforms with earnings from a fivefold rise in cotton exports caused by the Civil War (1861–65), when **Britain's** textile mills could not import cotton from the **U.S. South**. Although Western demand for Egyptian cotton eased after 1865, exports rebounded in the 1870s. Maize and sugar gained at the expense of rice, and total cropped area

increased from 2 to 4.7 million **feddans** between 1800 and 1882, but landholdings became concentrated in the **khedivial** family and the military and bureaucratic elites (*see* **Landownership**).

The **British occupation**, because it was expected to be temporary, had little effect on agriculture at first. Rather, it reinforced existing trends, such as the extension of perennial irrigation, the concentration of landholdings, a shift from a three- to two-year crop rotation (leading to more cotton culture at the expense of such crops as beans), and the rising dependence on cotton as an export crop. Cotton yield per **feddan**, which rose during the 19th century, began to decline early in the 20th because of soil depletion, mineral deposits caused by perennial irrigation, and the spread of insect pests. Maize production rose, replacing beans (higher in protein content) as the main source of nourishment for Egypt's peasants. The British were just starting to address these problems when **World War I** broke out and their relationship to Egypt changed.

Egypt's agricultural development in 1918–52 was marked by further concentration of landholdings, the spread of perennial irrigation, more stress on cotton production for export, further adoption of two-crop rotation, improved drainage, earlier sowing and closer spacing of cotton plants, increased use of artificial fertilizer (imports rose from 57,718 metric tons in 1919 to 641,838 in 1937), and some importation of farm machinery. Cropped area rose in relation to cultivated area, meaning that the land was being increasingly used for more than one crop per year. The number of water buffaloes and cattle roughly doubled between 1919 and 1937. During **World War II** Egypt's government restricted the amount of land to be devoted to cotton at the expense of cereal grains, and yields declined due to the inability to import fertilizer. After the war cotton production returned to prewar levels; sugar, *birsim*, and fruit rose markedly; maize and millet held steady; wheat and beans declined slightly; and rice and barley dropped severely. More fertilizer was imported, more land was rented for cash, and peasant conditions worsened, causing an upsurge of revolts and crime.

The **1952 Revolution** changed Egypt's agriculture in many ways. The 1952 **land reform** and later changes reduced the number of large landholdings and increased greatly the number of small peasant proprietors. Agricultural **cooperatives** assumed control of the marketing of most crops. The government paid subsidies to peasants to grow food and supplied fertilizer as an additional

inducement to grow food crops. As a result, more land was being used for maize, vegetables, rice, *birsim*, sugar, and flax, while less was allocated to cotton and wheat. Use of pesticides rose from 1,627 metric tons in 1954 to 28,344 in 1977, nitrogenous fertilizers from 569 thousand metric tons in 1949 to 3,135 thousand in 1978, and phosphates from 79 thousand to 606 thousand in the same time span.

Water buffaloes and cattle doubled in number between 1949 and 1978. Importation and in recent years domestic production have led to a fivefold increase in the number of tractors in Egypt. About 300 thousand additional feddans were brought under cultivation between 1952 and 1976, and the ratio of cropped to cultivated land has reached 2:1. Positive results included a marked increase in crop yields per feddan cultivated and in real wages paid to rural labor. On the downside, neglect of drainage under **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** has had to be made up by his successors. The **Aswan High Dam** has introduced new **environmental** hazards along with its potential for land reclamation. Scarce farmland (about 20 thousand feddans annually) has been lost to housing and urban sprawl. Some peasants deplete their topsoil by making bricks.

Formerly a net exporter, Egypt now imports rising amounts of foreign grain to feed its burgeoning population. Yet the numbers working in agriculture are not increasing appreciably, and many peasants have been lured to other Arab countries by higher wages paid to farm workers, depressing Egypt's agricultural yields during the 1980s. Output increased in the 1990s, however, reaching 6.6 million metric tons of wheat, 6 of rice, and 5.3 of maize in 2000. Rice, grown mainly on reclaimed land in the northern Delta, is a significant exchange earner. In 2001 750 thousand metric tons were exported. Egyptian farmers also have increased production of fruits, vegetables, and cut flowers for export. *See also* **Animal Husbandry, Cotton, Irrigation, Sugar, Tobacco.**

AL-AHALI. Name of several **newspapers**, of which the most recent is the leftist weekly edited by **Khalid Muhyi al-Din**. Launched in February 1978 as the organ of the **National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP)**, its circulation rose from 50 to 135 thousand in 15 weeks, whereupon the government closed it because of its attacks on **Anwar al-Sadat** and his policies. It was allowed to reappear shortly before the 1984 election. In 1985 the paper reported a circulation of 100 thousand copies despite its poor printing quality on *al-*

Jumhuriyya's presses. Its current circulation as a weekly, although not reported, is probably lower.

AL-AHRAM. Influential daily **newspaper**, often viewed as the semi-official organ of the Egyptian government. Originally founded in 1876 in **Alexandria** by Bishara and Salim Taqla, *al-Ahram* was moved to **Cairo** in 1898. Initially the mouthpiece of the pro-French **Syrians** in Egypt, it gradually became one of the country's most influential dailies, with correspondents in foreign capitals, a variety of informational material and articles, and sophisticated printing techniques. It was the first newspaper to print a photograph (1881). It introduced the Linotype machine to Egypt in 1917. Before the **1952 Revolution**, it was independent of any political party, favored the government in power, and claimed to be Egypt's newspaper of record. It declined in the 1940s and early 1950s, as its circulation fell from 100 to 68 thousand daily copies, but revived when **Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal** became its editor. He edited *al-Ahram* from 1957 to 1974, during which time it was eagerly read or anxiously scrutinized by everyone who needed to know what the Egyptian leaders were thinking. The newspaper was moved into an ultramodern, 10-story building with state-of-the-art typesetting and printing equipment. *Al-Ahram* had a reported circulation of 133,034 in 1962. Although officially "owned" by the **National Union** from 1960 to 1962 and then by the **Arab Socialist Union (ASU)**, the paper still could chart an independent editorial course. Under **Anwar al-Sadat**, *al-Ahram* was restored to private ownership and, after Haykal ceased to be its editor, was briefly led by **Ali Amin** and by Ahmad Baha al-Din, then by Ali Hamdi al-Gammal, but it had to recover from losing its well-connected, highly articulate leader. It also publishes weekly and monthly magazines, and its Center for Strategic Studies publishes books about the Middle East. Its estimated circulation in 1982 was 400 thousand; in 1999 that figure had reached 900 thousand on weekdays and 1.1 million on Fridays.

AIDA. Opera by Italian composer Giuseppe Verdi, under a commission from **Khedive Isma'il**, ostensibly for the opening of the **Suez Canal** in 1869, but in fact first performed in the **Cairo Opera House** on 24 December 1871. It is now sometimes performed in outdoor settings, including the Temple of Karnak in **Luxor** and the Giza Pyramids.

AIDS (ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME). Like most sexually transmitted diseases, the Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Egypt remains rare, but the actual number of sufferers exceeds the 600 Egyptians who registered between 1987 and 1998 as HIV positive, often due to blood transfusions. The *CIA Fact Book* (2001) estimates that 0.02 percent of Egypt's 67 million inhabitants, or 13,400, have AIDS. The health ministry has maintained a hot line since September 1996 to answer questions on a confidential basis about sexually transmitted diseases; the hot line was reported in 1998 to receive between 30 and 120 anonymous phone calls daily, revealing some anxiety and much ignorance about sexual matters. The propensity of young male Egyptians to seek work abroad and to engage in risky sexual practices is likely to lead to a higher incidence of AIDS in the future. However, the taboo imposed by both **Islam** and **Coptic Christianity** against extramarital sex may for a time shield Egypt's people from AIDS, which has reached epidemic proportions among the populations of many other African countries. It should be noted that most reported AIDS patients in Egypt have been African immigrants, who can be sent back home.

AIN SHAMS UNIVERSITY. The third of Egypt's national secular universities, it was established by royal decree in July 1950 as Ibrahim Pasha University, after Fuad (**Cairo**) and Farouk (**Alexandria**) Universities. In February 1954 its name was changed to Heliopolis University and then later in that year to Ain Shams. Its first premises were in the Munira district, and then in 1952 it moved to Za'faran Palace in Abbasiyya where the administrative offices remain to this day. Its seven campuses house 13 faculties and over 25 research institutions. Its reported enrollment in 2003 stands at 162 thousand students, with approximately 3,700 faculty members.

AL-AKHBAR. Popular **Cairo** daily newspaper, especially widely read during **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** early presidency under the leadership of **Ali** and **Mustafa Amin**, who were removed from power in 1965 on the suspicion that they were serving as agents of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Its estimated circulation (in thousands) in 1962 was 160, in 1972 400, in 1982 700, and in 1999 780. It also publishes a weekly edition called *Akhbar al-Yawm*, with a circulation of 1.2 million in 1999.

AL-ALAMAYN, BATTLE OF (1942). Decisive defeat, by the British and their allies, of the German Afrika Korps commanded by General Rommel, some 100 km west of **Alexandria**. This large-scale tank battle was a major turning point in **World War II**.

ALEXANDRIA. Egypt's major Mediterranean port and second largest city. Its most glorious period was during the Hellenistic era (332 BC–640 CE), and it suffered a decline relative to **Cairo** and other cities during the era of Muslim rule. When **Napoléon Bonaparte** landed his troops there in 1798, its population did not exceed 8 thousand. Its revival began with the **French occupation** and the reign of **Muhammad Ali**, who ordered the construction both of the **Mahmudiyya Canal** to connect the city with the **Nile River** and of the naval arsenal. A **railroad** connecting Alexandria with Cairo was built between 1850 and 1854. **Trade** with Europe rose rapidly during the 19th century and increasingly was channeled through Alexandria. The city's rehabilitation as a port and cultural center reached a climax under **Khedive Isma'il**, when its population rose to 200 thousand, of whom a quarter were foreigners. Gas lighting was introduced in 1865. The city's physical expansion tended to be eastward and southward, with the Europeans settling in al-Manshiya and al-Raml. The foreign population, including **Syrians** as well as **Greeks, Italians**, French, and other nationalities, enjoyed a higher living standard than the native Egyptians. This disparity created social tensions, as expressed in the June 1882 riots that killed some 50 Europeans and 3 thousand Egyptians and led to the subsequent **British occupation** of Egypt.

Alexandria grew further and prospered under the British. Public utilities, including electricity, piped water, sewer lines, **tramways**, and telephones made Alexandria resemble a European city, which for many foreigners it practically was, although Lawrence Durrell's novels present a somewhat distorted picture of the city. From the early 19th century until the end of the monarchy, Alexandria also served as Egypt's summer capital. Its cosmopolitan character has dissipated since the **1952 Revolution**, especially with the departure of most Greeks and Italians, of British and French nationals, and of most **Jews** after the **Suez War**. The city still attracts Egyptians to its beaches during summers. The present government hopes to revive it as a center for **tourism**, due to its **archaeological** excavations and the opening of the **Bibliotheca Alexandrina**. Its population in 1900

was 320 thousand, in 1947 700 thousand, and at present is estimated at 4.5 million (6 million during the summer).

ALEXANDRIA PROTOCOL (1944). Official agreement by Arab heads of state, meeting in October 1944, to establish the **Arab League**. It included a resolution stating that "Palestine constitutes an important part of the Arab world and that the rights of the [Palestinian] Arabs cannot be touched without prejudice to peace and stability in the Arab world. . . ." It strongly opposed **Zionism**, which it argued would solve the problem of the European Jews at the expense of the Palestinian Arabs of various religions. This statement helped commit Egypt firmly to the Arab side of the **Palestine** question. *See also Israel, Palestine War.*

ALEXANDRIA, UNIVERSITY OF. Egypt's second national secular institution of higher learning. It began with branches of **Cairo University's** Arts and Law Faculties in 1938. Founded in 1942, with **Taha Husayn** as its first rector and much of its faculty seconded from Cairo University, it was initially called **Faruq** University and took its present name in 1953. A distinctive feature is its Oceanographic Institute. It helped found Beirut's Arab University and several of the Egyptian state universities in the Delta. It had 11 thousand students enrolled in 1962, more than 33 thousand in 1972, about 90 thousand (and 3,610 instructors) in 1992, and 144 thousand in 2003.

ALFI BEY (1751?–1807). **Mamluk** leader, originally the protégé of **Murad**, who had paid a thousand *ardabs* of wheat for him (hence his name). Alfi emerged as a leader following the **French occupation**. His zeal in collecting taxes from Upper Egyptians made him a byword for cruelty, and they were greatly relieved when **British** troops took him to England for a year to represent the Mamluks, whom the British and **Ottomans** were backing against the French. Upon his return, he began collecting taxes in the Delta. After **Muhammad Ali** and the **Cairo ulama** engineered the deposition of the Ottoman governor, **Ahmad Khurshid**, Alfi tried to make peace with Muhammad Ali, but his claims for **tax farms** exceeded what the new governor was prepared to grant, and he suspected Alfi of having British support. Soon after Alfi allegedly poisoned his rival, **Uthman al-Bardisi**, he too died, presumably of **cholera**, on 30 January 1807. Irascible and ruthless in his treatment of Egyptian **bedouin**

and peasants, he was the last obstacle to Muhammad Ali's taking full control of Egypt.

ALI BEY "AL-KABIR" (1728–73). Mamluk soldier and Egypt's de facto ruler from 1760 to 1772. Originally from the Abkhazian region of the Caucasus Mountains, Ali was brought as a slave to Egypt when he was a boy. In 1743 he was presented to Ibrahim Katkhuda, then Egypt's Mamluk leader, and given the rank of *kashif* (local governor). In 1753 or 1754 he was put in command of the official pilgrimage caravan from **Cairo** to Mecca and, for his victories over the **bedouin** tribes, earned the nicknames *Bulut Kapan* (Cloud Catcher) and *Jinn Ali* (Ali the Genie). In 1755 he became a bey, and in 1760 was named *shaykh al-balad*, or virtual leader of Egypt's Mamluks. Thereupon he admitted into his service a younger Mamluk named Muhammad, later surnamed **Abu al-Dhahab**. Muhammad Abu al-Dhahab married Ali's sister and became his trusted lieutenant in later military campaigns. Ali Bey managed to weaken the rival Mamluk factions by playing them off against one another and by poisoning or exiling their leaders.

At first he enjoyed the backing of Egypt's **Ottoman** governor, but in 1769 Ali deposed him and began building an independent Egyptian sultanate. Acting on his orders, Abu al-Dhahab occupied Mecca and Jidda in 1770. Aided by mercenary troops from the republic of Venice and the Knights of Malta, he then invaded Ottoman **Palestine** and **Syria**. Ali and Abu al-Dhahab became estranged after the latter took Damascus, only to withdraw 10 days later, hastening back to Cairo. When Ali tried to exile his brother-in-law in 1772, the latter won the support of Ali's commanding officer and most of his troops. Ali fled to Jaffa and waged an inconclusive campaign against the Ottoman Empire. When he returned in an attempt to resume control in Cairo, he was defeated by Abu al-Dhahab's superior forces. Captured, he was wounded while trying to resist and died of his wounds a week later.

Ali's reign marked a transition between medieval and modern Egypt, for he tried to strengthen his government by taking control of Egypt's **trade**, distanced himself from his fellow Mamluks, and briefly separated Egypt from the Ottoman Empire. Although his expensive military campaigns led to high taxes, which alienated the people at the time, he is now viewed as a precursor to the better-known and more successful **Muhammad Ali**.

ALI, KAMAL HASAN (1921–93). Army officer and politician. Trained at the **Military Academy** and commissioned in 1946, he commanded a battalion in the **Palestine War**, led Egypt's expeditionary force during the **Yemen Civil War**, and led an armored brigade in the **October War**. He was an assistant to Defense Minister **Jamasi** in 1976–77 and replaced him in 1978 as minister and commander-in-chief. He took part in the peace negotiations with **Israel**. He became foreign minister in 1978, deputy prime minister in 1980, and premier briefly in 1984. Ill health forced him to retire in 1985.

ALLENBY, Lord EDMUND (1861–1936). English field marshal and colonial administrator. Educated at Haileybury and Sandhurst, he saw service in South Africa, Ireland, and **France**. Because of his heroic victories against the Ottoman and German armies in **Palestine** and **Syria**, he was chosen by the British government to become **high commissioner** for Egypt and the **Sudan** after the outbreak of the **1919 Revolution**. He restored order in Egypt, in part by allowing **Sa'd Zaghlul** and his companions, who had been interned in Malta, to go to the **Paris Peace Conference** in April 1919. He later issued the unilateral declaration of Egypt's independence on 28 February 1922 and encouraged the drafting of the **1923 Constitution**, which became the basis of parliamentary government, though often honored in the breach, up to the **1952 Revolution**.

He was deeply angered by the assassination of Sir **Lee Stack**, the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, in 1924. Holding Premier Zaghlul and his cabinet responsible for the murder, he handed him an ultimatum demanding a large indemnity from the Egyptian government and imposing other penalties on the country, forcing the premier to resign. Estranged from the foreign office, Allenby resigned his post in June 1925 and retired from government service. A man of great courage and integrity, he could display a fierce temper against his British or Egyptian opponents. Some of his private papers are in St. Antony's College, Oxford.

ALPHA PLAN (1954). Anglo-American project to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict and win **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** support for U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower's efforts to organize a Middle Eastern anti-**Communist** military alliance. The plan called for (1) an end to the state of war between **Israel** and the Arabs, (2) Israel's repatriation of 75 thousand **Palestinian** refugees, (3) token Israeli conces-

sions of Negev lands to facilitate contact between the Arabs of North Africa and those of Southwest Asia, and (4) placement of Jerusalem holy sites under international supervision. The Alpha Plan failed because Israel's government would not make the stated concessions and the Eisenhower administration failed to understand why Nasir did not want foreign military alliances in the Middle East (*see* **Baghdad Pact**). Nasir was also skeptical about the American project to build an Arab highway with an overpass in the Negev Desert, lest it create new conflicts with the Israelis.

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO (AUC). Privately owned institution of higher learning, chartered in Washington, D.C., and founded in 1919, initially with a strong Christian missionary emphasis. It began in 1920 to offer classes, starting at the upper secondary level and gradually evolving into a four-year college. Although its founders had envisaged building a campus near the Giza Pyramids, it has been located in central **Cairo** since its inception. Its original building had been a palace and the first campus of the Egyptian University, which later became **Cairo University**. Other parcels of property located nearby have gradually been purchased to facilitate its physical expansion. Plans to build on Giza land purchased by the trustees for a larger campus were abandoned in 1949. At this time, AUC phased out its preparatory section, in which most of its early students were enrolled.

Several of its constituent units have played a significant role in the life of Egypt, including its Division of Public Service, School of Oriental Studies (later renamed the Center for Arabic Studies), and Social Research Center. Its pioneer programs in **education** and journalism were phased out, but in recent years AUC has developed programs in management, engineering, arid-land **agriculture**, and mass **communications**. Its degrees were recognized in 1976 by the **People's Assembly** as equivalent to those of the Egyptian national universities. It was accredited by the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools in February 1982. It has increasingly stressed research and graduate study, and in that year it opened a modern building for its library, now one of the best-equipped research libraries in Egypt. Financial support came at first from philanthropic institutions and families and of late from oil companies, the U.S. government, some Arab governments, and tuition fees.

AUC established satellite campuses in Malta in 1977–79 for management, in **Heliopolis** for the Division of Public Service (adult education), and near Sadat City for desert development. Its enrollment was 668 students in 1950, 423 in 1962, 1,474 in 1972, 2,333 in 1983, 3,682 in 1991, and 4,731 in 2001. Its extensive adult education program enrolls approximately 28 thousand students per year. In 1998 AUC announced the purchase of a 260 **feddan** plot of land in New Cairo and plans to relocate the entire campus. By 2001 the campus's prime architects, Sasaki Associates of Boston and Abdul Halim CDC of Cairo, had been hired and a master plan developed. Occupancy of the new campus is projected for fall 2007.

AMIN, AHMAD (1886–1954). Arabic scholar, teacher, and editor. Born in **Cairo** to a traditional Muslim family, he received most of his education in *kuttab*s and at **al-Azhar**. He began his career as an Arabic teacher at state primary schools in **Alexandria** and Cairo, then studied at the **Shari'a** Judges School, where he was appointed as a teaching assistant after his graduation. After a brief stint as a judge in the Kharija **Oasis**, he returned to the school as a teacher of ethics. He also began to learn English from private tutors and formed a study group with some congenial friends. One outgrowth of this group was the Committee on Authorship, Translation, and Publication, which printed hundreds of original and translated books and produced a literary magazine, *al-Thaqafa*, of which Amin was to serve as editor from 1939 to 1953. In 1918 he began his literary career by publishing a translation of an English textbook on philosophy. Because of a change in the directorship of the Shari'a Judges School, Amin was transferred back to the judiciary in 1922, serving for two years in the country and two years in Cairo.

In 1926 he became a lecturer in Arabic language and literature at **Cairo University**, where he continued to teach full-time until 1946 and part-time in 1949. Working closely with **Taha Husayn** and other humanists, Amin began writing the series of volumes on Islamic history that have won him fame in the Arab world, starting with *Fajr al-Islam* (The Dawn of Islam), then *Duha al-Islam* (The Forenoon of Islam). He helped represent Egypt at the 1946 **Palestine** Conference in London and became director of the **Arab League** Cultural Bureau. He received an honorary doctorate in 1948 and also the **Fuad I** Prize for his work, *Zuhr al-Islam* (The

Middy of Islam). Hardworking but intensely shy, Ahmad Amin was an exemplar of Arabic scholarship in a time of rapid flux in Egyptian society.

AMIN, ALI (1912–76). Journalist. He and his brother **Mustafa** founded a popular weekly, *Akhbar al-Yawm*, in 1944. Nominally independent but opposed to the **Wafd**, the magazine was popularly believed to be close to King **Faruq**. In 1952 they founded *al-Akhbar*, which became Egypt's largest daily **newspaper**, with a circulation of over 700 thousand. They also published an Arabic version of the *Reader's Digest*. Their newspapers were nationalized in 1960, but they were reappointed as editors and board chairmen in 1962. They were on poor terms with **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government. Ali went into exile in 1965, but **Anwar al-Sadat** let him return in 1974 to replace **Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal** as editor of *al-Ahram*. He later rejoined his brother at *al-Akhbar*, but they soon broke with **Sadat** and were dismissed in 1976. Ali died shortly thereafter.

AMIN, MUSTAFA (1912–97). Influential editor of *al-Akhbar*. He was editor-in-chief of *Akhir Sa'a* from 1938 to 1941 and of *al-Ithnayn* from 1941 to 1944. He and his brother **Ali** founded *Akhbar al-Yawm* as a weekly magazine in 1944 and purchased control of *Akhir Sa'a* in 1946. He and Ali were members of Parliament during the 1940s. In 1952 they founded *al-Akhbar* as a popular daily **newspaper**. Although it was placed under the control of the **National Union** in 1960, the Amin brothers continued to manage it and were reappointed as editors in 1962. When he and Ali defied efforts by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government to muzzle the **press**, he dismissed them. Mustafa was tried in 1965 for spying for the **United States**, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment. He continued writing articles in prison, succeeded in smuggling some of them out and getting them published under a pseudonym in a Beirut **newspaper**. Pardoned by **Anwar al-Sadat** in 1974 and released, Mustafa was reinstated as editor of *al-Akhbar* but was again dismissed in 1976. He then worked as a freelance journalist and published a book, *al-Kitab al-mamnu'*, on his **prison** experiences.

AMIN, QASIM (1863–1908). Lawyer, writer, and pioneer of Egyptian **feminism**. Of Kurdish origin, he was born in **Cairo** and studied law there and in Paris. He held various judicial posts, rising to the posi-

tion of chancellor of the Cairo National Court of Appeals. He wrote *Les Égyptiens*, a work defending Egypt and Islam against a critical book by a French writer, but soon came to feel that his defense of the female role in Islam was incorrect and proceeded to publish two books advocating greater rights for **women**, *Tahrir al-mara* (Women's Liberation) and *al-Mara al-jadida* (The New Woman). His views were attacked by many Muslim contemporaries, including **Tal'at Harb** and **Mustafa Kamil**, but have influenced later Egyptians, although historians now argue that others played a larger role in the establishment of Egypt's feminist movement.

AMIR, ABD AL-HAKIM (1919–67). Army officer, politician, and close friend to **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**. The son of a well-to-do village headman, Abd al-Hakim graduated from the **Military Academy** in 1938 and from the Staff College in 1948. He served in the **Palestine War**. One of the founders of the **Free Officers**, he subsequently became a member of the **Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)**, commander-in-chief of Egypt's **armed forces** in June 1953, and war minister in 1954. Promoted to the rank of field marshal in 1958, he became vice president and war minister of the **United Arab Republic (UAR)** in 1958. When opposition to Nasir grew in **Syria**, he went there as special commissioner, trying to maintain the union.

After Syria seceded from the UAR in 1961, he became Egypt's defense minister and also a member of the Presidential Council. He was appointed first vice president and supreme commander of the Egyptian armed forces under the **1964 Constitution**. Widely blamed for Egypt's defeat in the **June War**, Amir was subsequently dismissed from all his positions. Accused of plotting a military coup, he was put under house arrest in August 1967 and committed suicide the following month, although some Egyptians believe that he was poisoned by the *Mukhabarat*. Viewed as a conservative among the Free Officers, he later enriched himself from some questionable land deals and opposed the growing populism of the government and its ties to the **USSR**. Politically and personally loyal to Nasir, he never differed with him publicly.

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT (1954). Diplomatic pact that provided for the phased **evacuation**, over a 20-month period, of **British** troops from their bases in the **Suez Canal** zone. The two countries agreed that Egypt, together with British civilian techni-

cians, would maintain the bases in order that, in case of an armed attack on an **Arab League** member state or Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Britain might reoccupy them during the war and withdraw upon its termination. Egypt would also provide necessary naval and air facilities in such an eventuality. The contracting parties recognized that the Suez Canal was an integral part of Egypt but also an internationally important waterway and expressed their determination to uphold the **Constantinople Convention**. The agreement, initialed by the negotiators on 27 July 1954 and signed formally on 18 October, was to last for seven years. It was a labored compromise between British imperialism and Egyptian nationalism, not liked by either, and the result of diplomatic pressure from the United States, which hoped that Egypt might then join a regional anti-Communist defense organization. Communist, Muslim, and nationalist groups in Egypt also attacked it. Although Britain did evacuate its last troops on 18 June 1956, the **Suez War** led to Egypt's denunciation of the agreement, which became inoperative.

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN AGREEMENT (1953). Final resolution of the dispute between Egypt and **Britain** over the **Sudan**. Ruled by Egypt up to the **Mahdi's** rebellion in 1885 and reconquered by an Anglo-Egyptian force in 1896–98, the Sudan was a sticking point in negotiations between the Egyptian monarchy and successive British governments. Under **Muhammad Najib**, Egypt relinquished claims to the Sudan but still hoped to influence the state. The agreement, signed on 12 February 1953, guaranteed self-determination for the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan within a three-year transitional period. The Sudanese people could opt for either complete independence or union with Egypt. The agreement's terms provided for self-government by a democratically elected parliament within two months and self-determination with both Egyptian and British forces withdrawn. It was to be carried out under supervision by a committee whose membership included three Sudanese, one Egyptian, one Briton, one American, and one Indian. The Sudanese voters chose independence from both Egypt and Britain.

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY (1936). Diplomatic pact that defined **Britain's** military position in Egypt and created a 20-year alliance between the two countries. It officially ended the **British occupa-**

tion, provided for the exchange of ambassadors, committed Britain to support Egypt's application for League of Nations membership, created an alliance that committed the two countries not to adopt "in relation to foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance," provided for mutual consultations in case either party should have a dispute with a third state that might lead to a rupture of relations, committed each side to come to the aid of the other if it should become involved in a war, gave Britain the right in wartime to utilize facilities on Egyptian territory, allowed British troops to occupy a specified zone to guard the **Suez Canal**, provided for the withdrawal of British troops from other parts of Egypt as soon as roads and railways were improved and new barracks constructed, postponed any change in the status of the **Sudan**, renounced extra-territorial rights for British civilian subjects in Egypt, pledged Britain to work toward a prompt end to the **Capitulations** and the **Mixed Courts**, and provided for adjudication of disputes and ratification of the treaty by both sides.

Although limited to 10 thousand land forces and 400 pilots in peacetime, plus civilian support personnel, the treaty allowed Britain to enlarge its occupation army in case of war, hence the burgeoning number of British Empire troops stationed in **Cairo, Alexandria**, and the Suez Canal zone during **World War II**, an occupation many Egyptians resented. Britain felt that the Egyptians failed to see how it protected them from the Axis Powers and argued, up to the **4 February Incident**, that the Egyptian government was not fulfilling its responsibilities under the treaty. After the war, many Egyptians demanded an end to the British occupation of Egypt and the Sudan. As these demands intensified, the Egyptian government denounced the 1936 Treaty in 1951, but British troops remained in their Suez Canal base. Egyptian *fidaiyin* tried in vain to dislodge them by force, but an economic boycott did more to hamper their effectiveness. After the **1952 Revolution**, **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government negotiated a new **Anglo-Egyptian agreement** in 1954.

ANIMAL HUSBANDRY. Due to Egypt's scarce **agricultural** land, the raising of animals complements but is generally subordinated to growing cash crops. Nevertheless *fellahin* do keep some work animals, including water buffaloes (estimated at 3.1 million in 1998), donkeys (3 million), camels (135 thousand), and some animals used partly for food, including cattle (3 million), sheep (4.3 million),

goats (3.2 million), and poultry (44 million). The last category includes geese, ducks, and pigeons, as well as chickens. Rabbits are also raised for food. In earlier times horses (now 45 thousand) were more common as work animals than they are now, but are often kept for amusement, racing, and **tourism**. Camel and water buffalo meat are also eaten. There are about 29 thousand pigs in Christian areas; Muslims do not eat pork. The Egyptian **bedouin** used to raise camels, horses, sheep, and goats for barter or sale but rarely do so now.

AQABA, GULF OF. Maritime inlet from the Red Sea, fronted by Egypt, **Israel**, Jordan, and **Saudi Arabia**. Egypt contested Israel's right of access to this waterway between 1949 and 1956 and again in May 1967, creating a *casus belli* for the **June War**. Since Israel returned the **Sinai Peninsula** to Egypt, its coast has become a resort area for **tourism**.

AL-AQQAD, ABBAS MAHMUD (1889–1964). Journalist, poet, and writer. Largely self-educated, he began his career by writing cultural and literary articles for *al-Dustur* between 1907 and 1909. He became an editor for *al-Muayyad* and then for *al-Ahali* and *al-Ahram*. In 1921 he became the editor of *al-Balagh*, the **Wafd Party newspaper**. As a Wafdist he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1930, but **Isma'il Sidqi's** government imprisoned him, allegedly for his loyalty to the **1923 Constitution**. After breaking with **Mustafa al-Nahhas** in 1935, he joined the **Sa'dist Party** in 1937, was elected to the 1938 Parliament, and edited its newspaper, *al-Asas*. Anti-Fascist during **World War II**, he later became anti-Communist under **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**. He chaired the **poetry** committee of the Supreme Council for Arts, Literature, and Social Sciences, and in 1959 received a state prize for literature.

Aqqad wrote poems about nature, love, his own feelings, and children, but also memoirs about such public figures as **Sa'd Zaghlul**, who was also the subject of one of his biographies. He also wrote biographies of the Prophet Muhammad and the first four caliphs, and many brief sketches about incidents and personalities in Egypt's modern history. One of his novels, *Sara* (1938), has been translated into English, and his study of Ibn al-Rumi was translated in *Four Egyptian Literary Critics*.

ARAB CONTRACTORS. Construction firm founded in 1949 by **Uthman Ahmad Uthman**, involved in building the **Aswan High Dam** and in numerous projects in the oil-rich Arab countries. Under the **July Laws**, the government was supposed to assume control of 50 percent of its stock, but Uthman remained its chairman until 1973 and went on working for **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government. It currently employs tens of thousands of administrators, engineers, technicians, and workers. The firm has branches in **Saudi Arabia**, Kuwait, and various other Arab countries. Uthman had a high profile during **Anwar al-Sadat's** presidency, using contacts with retired Egyptian generals to siphon off cement and other scarce construction materials for his firm. **Husni Mubarak** hoped at first to curb his power by steering government contracts away from his company and by suspending some of his customary privileges. The Arab Contractors proceeded to speed up work on some long-postponed projects, Mubarak was mollified, and the company continues to prosper.

ARAB DEMOCRATIC NASIRIST PARTY. Political group founded in 1992 under the leadership of Diya al-Din Da'ud. The party calls for making **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** dream of Arab unity a reality, specifically by strengthening Egypt's unity with **Sudan** and **Libya**. The party opposes the spread of U.S. hegemony in the Middle East and normalization of Egypt's ties with **Israel**. The party has suffered some infighting between an old guard, led by Da'ud and composed of members arrested during **Anwar al-Sadat's Corrective Revolution**, and the younger followers of Hamidin Sabahi. The younger group consists mainly of Nasirite students from the early 1970s. The party's **newspaper** is *al-Arabi*.

ARAB FEDERATION PROJECTS. Independent Arab states have made many efforts to unite, ranging from the loose association of the **Arab League** to the organic union of Egypt and **Syria** as the **UAR** in 1958. Most common have been proposed federations of Arab countries. Egypt was involved in the proposed revival in 1963 of the UAR, including both Syria and **Iraq** once the Ba'th Party had taken control of those countries, and the 1971 **Federation of Arab Republics**, which would have included **Libya** (with which Egypt was to unite) and Syria. Egypt has occasionally engaged in federation talks with Syria, Iraq, and **Sudan** since that time, with no results.

ARAB LEAGUE. Political association of sovereign Arab states, founded in 1945, with its headquarters in **Cairo**. Egypt played the lead role in its establishment, and for the first 34 years of its history its secretary-general was always an Egyptian, starting with **Abd al-Rahman Azzam**, who served until 1952. The Arab League adopted a collective security pact in 1950, but it has not worked as a true military alliance in times when individual member states were at war, even with **Israel**. As a result of signing the **Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty** in 1979, Egypt was expelled from membership and the league's headquarters were moved to Tunis. In 1989, however, Egypt was readmitted to the league, and its headquarters returned to Cairo in 1990. In accordance with tradition, not written into the League Charter, the host country provides the secretary-general. For 10 years from 1991 **Ismat Abd al-Majid** served in that position; he was succeeded in May 2001 by **Amr Musa**. Current members are 21 Arabic-speaking countries and the **Palestine** Authority. The League has disappointed the hopes of many Arabs who believed that it would pave the way for a union of all Arabic-speaking countries, but it has served as a useful meeting place for otherwise disparate Arab regimes and has facilitated many economic, social, and intellectual cooperative projects.

ARAB NATIONALISM. A general term for any movement or ideology that seeks to unify all or some of the Arabic-speaking countries and that strives to ensure their independence from non-Arab control. The movement began among some of the Arabic-speaking Muslim and Christian subjects of the **Ottoman Empire** between 1880 and 1914, gaining popularity after **World War I**. Despite Egypt's preponderant size, population, and cultural leadership among the Arab countries, Arab nationalism appealed more to **Syrians**, **Palestinians**, and **Iraqis** than to most Egyptians. However, some of the first expressions of Arab nationalism occurred in **Cairo** and **Alexandria**, where Arabs were free from Ottoman **ensorship**.

Egyptians became more interested in Arab nationalism as a result of the growing struggle against **Zionism**, their disillusionment with Western liberal institutions and with **Pharaonism**, and the influence of such writers as **Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat**. The growing interdependence between Egypt and the eastern Arab countries caused by the **Middle East Supply Centre** during **World War II**, creation of the **Arab League** in 1945, and the mounting **Palestine**

problem also dramatized Egypt's identity as an Arab state. Egypt was generally regarded as the leading Arab nationalist country from 1945 until 1978. Since the **Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty**, Iraq, Syria, and **Libya** have at various times claimed leadership of Arab nationalism, which recently has been eclipsed by individual state nationalist movements and by **Islamism**.

ARAB SOCIALISM. Ideology that calls for state control over Arab economies, or at least over their major manufacturing industries, and for a more even distribution of income among the peoples of the various Arab countries. The movement was espoused by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**, especially after 1958, and was adopted by various other Arab governments. The ideology was influenced by, but not identical with, the ideas of the Ba'th Party of **Syria** and **Iraq**. It emphasized **land reform**, social insurance, nationalization of public utilities and major industries, and redistribution of wealth, but based its ideology on Islamic principles and rejected the idea of a class struggle. Its ideas are summarized in the **National Charter**. The government under **Anwar al-Sadat** and **Husni Mubarak** has moved away from Arab socialism.

ARAB SOCIALIST UNION (ASU). Egypt's sole political party from 1962 to 1977. Founded by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government to replace the **National Union** and to spread **Arab socialism**, it was meant to serve as a conduit of government directives from top to bottom and of popular needs and wishes from bottom to top. Organized into national, provincial, district, and village councils, its membership mushroomed to a reported 5 million Egyptians, most of whom joined to protect their rights and prestige or to attain higher positions within the bureaucracy, not to revolutionize Egyptian society and values. In 1964 Nasir proposed to create within the ASU a **vanguard** organization to be led by dedicated revolutionaries. He ordered the release of the **Communists** from prison, and some were given posts in the information media or in ASU branch organizations. **Ali Sabri** was given overall direction of the ASU in 1965, but his efforts to develop a vanguard founded on the lack of committed revolutionaries within Egyptian society.

After the **June War**, Egypt focused its energies on recovering from its losses, and the ASU declined as an instrument of popular mobilization. Most of **Anwar al-Sadat's** opposition came from the

ASU, and the 1971 **Corrective Revolution** stripped the organization of its most influential leaders. By 1974 Sadat was considering ways to create an opposition movement to the ASU, as a part of his *infitah* policy, and during the 1976 elections for the Popular Assembly three *manabir* (platforms) were created to permit greater diversity of opinion among the candidates. The centrist platform, which upheld the policies of Sadat's government under the leadership of Prime Minister **Mamduh Salim**, became the *Misr* Party and later the **National Democratic Party (NDP)**, replacing the ASU formally in 1977. Egyptian leaders since the **1952 Revolution** have had trouble finding ways to involve the people in the processes of political decision making, and their attempt to combine mobilization with Arab socialism has generally been viewed as a failure.

ARABIC LANGUAGE ACADEMY (1932). Scholarly society that seeks to preserve and revive the Arabic cultural heritage by publishing an academic journal, books, lexicons, and dictionaries.

ARCHAEOLOGY. Egypt has been a major area for the study of antiquity since the time of the ancient Greeks, when Herodotus and Plato pondered the meaning of the pyramids, obelisks, and inscriptions of the already ancient Egyptians. The development of Egyptology, however, did not begin until **Jean-François Champollion** deciphered the hieroglyphic script in the early 19th century. Egypt contains many of the world's main sites for archaeological study, and numerous European and North American expeditions have unearthed ancient temples, sketched or photographed monuments and artifacts, and translated inscriptions. Although early Egyptology often amounted to plundering Egypt's treasures for private collections, universities, and museums in Europe, it made the country aware of its immense heritage and created the **Egyptian Museum**, one of the world's greatest Egyptological collections. The discoveries made by Egyptologists, notably the excavation of **Tutankhamon's Tomb**, inspired **Pharaonism** as one of the elements in Egyptian nationalism. Egyptians now play a major role in excavating, deciphering, and reporting on their country's Pharaonic heritage, due in part to the Faculty of Archaeology at **Cairo University**. Other significant, if less well known, fields of archaeology in Egypt cover the Greco-Roman period (332 BC–640 CE), the early **Copts**, and the artifacts and monuments of the first centuries of **Islam**. *See also* **Museums**.

AL-ARISH, CONVENTION OF (1800). Abortive pact between **France** and **Britain**, which would have provided for the evacuation of the **French occupation** troops from Egypt, with their arms and baggage, in ships belonging to the **Ottoman Empire**. The British government, believing that the French would soon be defeated by the Turks, refused to ratify the convention, and the fighting in Egypt continued for another year.

ARMED FORCES. From **Pharaonic** times until the 19th century Egypt's defense was never entrusted to ethnic Egyptians. Under the **Ottoman Empire**, military as well as political control was held by **Mamluk** princes, who purchased slave soldiers of their own and also used **bedouins** as auxiliaries. **Napoléon Bonaparte's** invasion discredited the Mamluk system. After the Ottomans retook Egypt in 1801, neither their appointed governors nor the Mamluk survivors could control the country, and power was seized by the commander of an Albanian regiment, **Muhammad Ali**.

To remain in power and expand the lands under his control, Muhammad Ali developed a powerful army and navy, but soon realized that he could not rely on his Albanian and Turkish officers, who mutinied and almost overthrew him in 1815. He tried to recruit Sudanese soldiers from Kordofan and Sannar, but they could not withstand the rigors of Egypt's climate or his training methods. Aided by Colonel **Octave Sève**, he established the **Military Academy**, initially in **Aswan**, to train his own officers. By 1822 the government was also recruiting Egyptian peasants to serve as soldiers, despite their bitter resistance, and training them effectively, but they would not be admitted to the officer corps until **Sa'id's** time. In 1832 Egypt had about 130 thousand men under arms, a high figure in relation to the country's 4.5 million inhabitants at that time.

As a result of the 1840 **London Convention** and the 1841 Ottoman *firman*, Egypt's army was cut back to 18 thousand. It remained small until **Khedive Isma'il** sought to increase his power by rendering Egypt more independent of the Ottoman Empire and expanding Egyptian control over the **Sudan**. During his reign new military academies were set up in Abbasiyya, the various branches of the army and navy were modernized, a general staff was established under the guidance of an American officer, General Charles Stone, and the first military **newspapers** were founded. These

reforms proved too expensive for Egypt's economy to support, however, and the *Caisse de la Dette Publique* and the **Dual Control** called for military cutbacks. Their financial stringencies harmed the ethnic Egyptian officers, leading to **Ahmad Urabi's** revolutionary movement.

After **Britain's** expeditionary force under Sir **Garnet Wolseley** defeated Urabi's troops in 1882, Khedive **Tawfiq** formally dissolved the Egyptian army. A smaller force was built up under British guidance and kept strictly apolitical. Made up mainly of peasant conscripts, it performed well in retaking the Sudan in 1896–98 but played no role in the two **world wars**. Although some Egyptian individuals and units fought bravely in the 1948 **Palestine War**, the army, poorly armed and led, was defeated by **Israel**.

Only after the **1952 Revolution** did Egypt's armed forces gain some power and prestige, partly as a result of the **RCC's** quest for legitimacy in a society accustomed to condemn military officers, but especially because of the need to build up Egypt's defenses after the Israeli raid on **Gaza** in February 1955. As a result of the **Czech Arms Deal**, Egypt began to acquire large quantities of guns, tanks, airplanes, and other military equipment from Communist countries. The 1956 **Suez War** did not add to the luster of Egypt's still insufficiently trained armed forces, but **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** continued to rearm and in 1962 sent troops to fight in the **Yemen Civil War**. With its best fighting units in Yemen, the army was again shamed by Israel in 1967 in the **June War**, which led to heavy casualties and loss of matériel in the **Sinai**. Again the Communist countries re-armed Egypt, and the **USSR** adopted a more direct role in the training of Egypt's officers and soldiers. The performance of Egypt's troops against **Israel** in the **War of Attrition** remained poor, but it improved markedly under **Anwar al-Sadat** in the **October War**.

Some deterioration in the size and quality of Egypt's armed forces has occurred because of the relative decline in military expenditures since the 1979 **Egyptian–Israeli Treaty**, but the **United States** and other Western countries have sold modern weapons and helped to upgrade training, engaging in joint exercises such as **Operation Bright Star**. Egypt's army immediately after the June 1967 war was estimated at 140 thousand men, of which 30 thousand were serving in Yemen; this number had risen in 1999 to 320 thousand (plus 254 thousand reservists). Of its 12 divisions, all but one are either armored or mechanized.

Egypt's navy, although the smallest of its services, is large by Middle Eastern standards. In thousands it numbered 11 in 1967, 14 in 1972, 20 (and two more in the Coast Guard) in 1999. The air force had 15 thousand men in 1967, 25 in 1972, and 80 in 1999; its combat aircraft numbered 225 in late 1967, 523 in 1972, and more than 500 in 1989. Expenditures on foreign arms remain high; in 2001 Egypt purchased \$1.3 billion worth via the U.S. government. It is spending \$3.2 billion to acquire 24 new F-16 fighter jets with advance medium-range air-to-air missiles. It will buy new Patriot surface-to-air missiles and hopes also to purchase U.S. made rocket systems and submarines. Israel has expressed concern at Egypt's interest in acquiring "Harpoon" surface-to-surface missiles. Egypt also had 400 M1 A1 tanks in 2001 and planned to increase that number to 512. It had 32 ultra-advanced Apache attack helicopters. According to an Israeli source, Egypt has chemical warfare factories and is working with North Korea to develop ballistic missiles.

The Egyptian military has become socially isolated from most of the population and enjoys various economic and educational privileges to ensure its loyalty to the government. It is virtually autonomous in managing the **munitions industry**, which is exempt from any legislative oversight. The armed forces play a major role in large-scale **irrigation** works, including the **Toshka Project** and the development of the **Sinai Peninsula**.

ARMENIANS. Indo-European Christian people who originated in the mountains of eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus. Armenian families and individuals have come to Egypt since the era of the Fatimid caliphs, several of whose strongest viziers were of Armenian origin. During the reign of **Muhammad Ali**, some Armenians attained high positions in his government. An Armenian statesman prominent later in the 19th century was **Nubar**. In modern times, Armenians have been leaders in Egyptian **banking** and commerce and in some of the professions, living mainly in **Cairo** and **Alexandria**. They numbered about 30 thousand in 1945, approximately twice the Armenian population of Egypt before **World War I**, when many entered the country as refugees from the **Ottoman Empire**. Under **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**, discrimination in Egypt caused many of its Armenian inhabitants to emigrate to Europe or North America.

ARTS, VISUAL. Since antiquity Egypt has been renowned for its monumental architecture, sculpture, and mural painting. European architectural styles, **Pharaonism** and **Islam** have combined to influence the public architecture of modern Egypt, but popular motifs have also gained prominence through the work of **Hasan Fathi**. Painting, sculpture, and other representational arts used to be limited by the Muslim abhorrence of idolatry, but **Muhammad Abduh** issued a legal opinion that the **Shari'a** did not forbid artistic expression. The prominence of European architects, painters, sculptors, and photographers in Egypt in the late 19th and early 20th centuries also promoted the development of the visual arts. In 1908 Prince Yusuf Kamal founded Egypt's School of Fine Arts, one of whose early graduates, **Mahmud Mukhtar**, became the pioneer sculptor of the country. Noted painters include **Mahmud Sa'id**, **Jadhibiyya Sirri**, and **Muhammad Naji**.

Handicrafts have long been another outlet for artistic talent and expression, as Egyptian artisans excelled in textile design, glassblowing, jewelry, metalworking, turned-wood latticework (called *mashrabiyya* in Arabic), pottery, and leatherworking. Although European and American **tourists** displaced Egyptians as the main market for some of their products, leading to some debasement of their designs, interest in authentic Egyptian handicrafts is reviving in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world. A well-known achievement in woven textile design derives from the pioneering work of the architect/educator **Ramses Wisawasif**, who encouraged peasant children in the village of Harraniyya to undertake countless variations in hand loom weaving.

Since the **1952 Revolution**, the Egyptian culture ministry has facilitated development of the visual arts in the metropolitan and provincial capitals and encouraged preservation of handicrafts in such designated centers as *Wikalat al-Ghuri* and *Bayt al-Sinnari* in **Cairo**. Photographic journalism, **television**, **museums**, and international exhibitions, together with public **education** at all levels, have accentuated the visual arts and crafts, making them more accessible to popular demand and critical review.

ASHRAF. Descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, especially by his grandson, Hasan. Formerly, they enjoyed special privileges due to their high prestige among Muslims. The *ashraf* played a ceremonial

role on religious holidays and sometimes received gifts from other Muslims. Their high status declined during the 20th century.

ASU, *see* **ARAB SOCIALIST UNION**.

ASWAN. Main city of the Upper Egyptian governorate bearing the same name. Situated on the east bank of the **Nile River** at its first cataract, it was traditionally viewed as Egypt's southernmost city. Aswan has long been a commercial hub and a health resort; it has in recent years become a major industrial center. The city's population is currently estimated at 250 thousand; that of the province is 1.1 million.

ASWAN DAM. Large water storage dam, located 5.5 km south of **Aswan**. It was constructed by British and Egyptian engineers in 1898–1901 and enlarged in 1912 and 1933. The storage capacity of its reservoir reached 5.7 billion cubic meters. It facilitated the conversion of Middle and parts of Upper Egypt to **perennial irrigation**.

ASWAN HIGH DAM. Gigantic water storage and hydroelectric project undertaken by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government in 1955 and constructed by **Soviet** and Egyptian engineers in 1960–71. The project was first conceived by a **Greek** Egyptian engineer, Adrian Daninos, in 1948. Although skeptical engineers feared the silting up of the reservoir that the dam would create, or high rates of surface evaporation, and the downstream erosion of the **Nile River** bed, Egyptians favored the High Dam idea over the **Century Storage Scheme** as a means of enabling their country to control annual variations in the Nile flood, increase the area of irrigated land, and generate enough kilowatt-hours of electricity for domestic and industrial use.

After the **1952 Revolution**, the **RCC** took up the project as a symbol of its resolution to modernize Egypt. The public works ministry, hitherto committed to the Century Storage Scheme, was persuaded to study the project. West Germany agreed to finance and undertake a feasibility study, and a British engineering firm was hired to review the implementation of all aspects of design and specifications with the Egyptian experts. To obtain financing, Egypt approached the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, or World Bank), which made its own engineering and economic studies. After political delays due to negotiations for the

1954 **Anglo–Egyptian agreement** and the arms purchasing crisis of 1955, the IBRD recommended that the High Dam be funded. The total project cost was estimated at \$1.3 billion, of which \$400 million would be in foreign exchange. The IBRD agreed to lend \$200 million at 5.5 percent interest, while the **U.S.** government would grant \$56 million and **Britain** \$14 million for the first stage, with an understanding that the two countries would later lend a further \$130 million. Attached to the offer were several conditions: Egypt must divert one-third of its internal revenues to the project over 10 years; the IBRD would periodically review relevant aspects of Egypt's **economy**; contracts must be awarded by open bidding—except that bids from Communist countries were barred—Egypt could not assume new foreign obligations or borrow money without consulting the IBRD and it must first agree with the **Sudan** on how the Nile waters would be allocated.

The IBRD's conditions for funding the High Dam were criticized by many Egyptians. Nasir especially feared that Egypt would be pressured to make peace with **Israel** or to join a Western military alliance. He did not immediately accept these terms, hoping to gain Soviet support for the scheme instead. Western enthusiasm for the project waned in 1955–56 due to political differences between Egypt and the West, especially among supporters of Israel and Southerners within the U.S. Congress. Convinced that Washington would never approve the project, Nasir instructed his envoy to tell Secretary of State **John Foster Dulles** that Egypt would accept *all* conditions for financing the High Dam. Dulles withdrew the offer, hoping to punish the Nasir government for supporting the **Communists**. In revenge, Nasir nationalized the **Suez Canal Company**, claiming that its revenues would pay for building the High Dam, which now became a symbol of Egyptian resistance against foreign imperialism.

After much hesitation, in 1958 the **USSR** offered Egypt a 400-million-ruble (\$100 million) credit toward its construction and began making its own engineering studies. Once agreement was reached with Sudan in 1959, Soviet and Egyptian engineers began work at the dam site in January 1960. The coffer dam was completed and was formally opened by Nasir and Nikita Khrushchev in 1964. Work on the main dam took seven years, and its official completion was in January 1971, with the Soviets' President Podgorny and **Anwar al-Sadat** presiding over the ceremonies. The embankment dam was 3,600 meters long at its crest, which stood 111 meters above the

riverbed level. Its reservoir, Lake Nasir, had a total capacity of 162 billion cubic meters and was 500 km long. Its 12 turbines could generate 10 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually. It was hoped that the High Dam would enable Egypt to reclaim 1.2 million **feddans** of cultivable land and convert some 800 thousand feddans of **basin-irrigated** land in Upper Egypt to **perennial irrigation**. No longer would Egypt fear the economic losses of either too high or too low an annual Nile flood.

The Aswan High Dam is one of the largest public works projects ever built; its volume alone exceeds that of 17 pyramids. It soured Egypt's diplomatic relations with the West, but afforded no long-term political gains to the USSR. The economic benefits of the High Dam seem so far to have been offset by its drawbacks, including the loss of fertile alluvium to Egypt's farmland and the resulting greater need for chemical fertilizers, the scouring of the Nile banks, increased mineral deposits on irrigated lands, and the loss of nutrients that formerly supported Nile River fish and marine life in the eastern Mediterranean.

The costs of maintaining and repairing the dam have exceeded the government's expectations; the 12 Soviet turbines cracked and were replaced between 1985 and 1991 by the Allis Chalmers Company at a cost of \$100 million, financed by the U.S. **Agency for International Development** (AID). Lake Nasir led to the displacement of many **Nubians**, only some of whom have been resettled, and increased the humidity of Egypt's climate. Many Egyptians also feel that the dam made them more vulnerable to a foreign military attack. On the other hand, it has helped industrialize Egypt and made low-cost electric power more available. Reclamation has been started on some 900 thousand feddans of desert lands, but annual costs of reclaiming this land have exceeded revenues by at least £E10 million, and no new reclamation projects were initiated after 1972. Lake Nasir reached record highs in 1990, 1994, and 1996. Some of its waters are being used for the **Toshka Project**.

ASYUT. City and provincial capital in Upper Egypt, having an approximate population of 392,800, historically important as a **trade** entrepôt across the Sahara desert to **Libya** and **Sudan**. One of the supplementary barrages of the first **Aswan Dam** is in Asyut. It has a large **Coptic** population and became notorious for the **Islamist** riots that broke out there following **Anwar al-Sadat's** assassination in

1981 and again during the early 1990s. It is also the site of one of Egypt's national universities, founded in 1957 with a stress on scientific and technical subjects, and has a branch campus of **al-Azhar**. In an effort to weaken the Islamists, the Egyptian government has arrested and tried many of them and ousted others from teaching positions. In an effort to make the city more cosmopolitan, it opened a new **cinema** and a five-star hotel in the city and has been encouraging students from all over Egypt to enter its universities. To reduce the local unemployment rate, the government also inaugurated an industrial park in Asyut in 1996.

ATIYYA, RAWIYA (1926–97). First **woman** member of an Egyptian representative assembly. A native of Giza, she earned degrees in letters, education and psychology, journalism, and Islamic studies. She worked as a teacher and as a journalist and became the first woman to be commissioned as an officer in the Liberation Army in 1956. Elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1957, she was the first woman deputy in the Arab world but failed to win reelection two years later. She served on the boards of the Red Crescent and the **Huda Sha'rawi** Society and later chaired the Society of Families of Martyrs and Soldiers in 1973. She was elected to the **People's Assembly** in 1984 as a member of the **NDP** and led the Population and Family Council for Giza in 1993.

AL-ATRASH, FARID (1915?–74). Popular singer, actor, and composer. A descendant of Druze princes, Farid was born in the Jabal al-Duruz section of **Syria** and was brought by his mother to Egypt in 1925. He studied at the *Collège des Frères* and later learned to play the 'ud at the Institute for Arabic Music. He performed on the stage and on Egyptian State **Radio**. He and his sister Asmahan produced and costarred in a highly successful film, *Intisar al-Shabab* (The Triumph of Youth) in 1941. The songs that he wrote incorporated Western rhythms and genres while preserving their essential Arabic character. He went on to compose the **music** for and star in at least 30 Arabic films, winning acclaim throughout the Arab world for his expressive manner. Despite his early death in Beirut, his songs remain beloved by most Arabs.

AL-ATTAR, HASAN (1766–1835). Muslim scholar, reformer, and rector of **al-Azhar**. Born in Cairo to a family of North African origin,

he was educated at al-Azhar. During the **French occupation**, he observed some of the work being done by French scholars. He then went to Damascus and Albania before returning to Egypt. As a teacher at al-Azhar, he introduced new teaching methods, stressing analysis in place of rote learning. His interests were wide-ranging; his essays, *al-Rasail* (first published in 1866), covered law, logic, grammar, medicine, and other sciences. **Muhammad Ali** appointed him in 1828 the first editor of Egypt's official journal, *al-Waqai' al-Misriyya*, and in 1830 or 1831 the rector of al-Azhar. He influenced such early reformers as **al-Tahtawi**.

ATTRITION, WAR OF. Artillery and air struggle between Egypt and **Israel**, following the breakdown of Gunnar Jarring's mission to negotiate a settlement between the two countries on the basis of **Security Council Resolution 242**. In fact though not in name, it began at the **Suez Canal** in September 1968, with Egyptian artillery bombardment of Israeli positions, leading to Israeli aerial attacks against civilian targets and helicopter raids deep into Egyptian territory. Israel also strengthened its position by building the **Bar Lev Line**. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** had Egyptian civilians evacuated from the Suez Canal cities and began building, with **Soviet** assistance, an elaborate defense network to counteract Israel's control of the air.

In July 1969 he formally launched his War of Attrition against Israeli troops at the Canal. The Israelis soon extended the struggle over much of northern Egypt and the Red Sea coast, destroying Egyptian radar installations, attacking artillery and surface-to-air missile systems, and making deep-penetration bombing raids against targets in Egypt's interior. Nasir sought more Soviet aid, including personnel to operate the new air defense system and to fly newly supplied **MIG-25** fighter planes. The war ended in August 1970, when the combatants accepted a temporary cease-fire under the **Rogers Peace Plan**. Egypt's military and civilian casualties are thought to have totaled 20 thousand; 1,424 Israeli soldiers and 100 civilians died. 2,000 Israeli soldiers and 700 civilians were wounded.

AUTONOMY TALKS, PALESTINIAN. Inconclusive negotiations between Egypt and **Israel**, following their 1979 peace treaty, aimed at achieving autonomous status for **Gaza Strip** and West Bank

Palestinians. Egypt withdrew from the talks after Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982, and they were never resumed.

AVIATION, CIVIL. Egypt's first airline was founded in 1932 as **Misrair**, owned by **Bank Misr** but under British technical direction. It was the world's seventh carrier and the fourth to join the International Air Transport Association (IATA). In 1935 it carried 6,970 passengers, a number that tripled in 1936, when it added air service to Baghdad and Cyprus, in addition to lines between **Cairo** and **Alexandria**, Upper Egypt, **Port Said**, and **Palestine**. In 1950 it also had service to Beirut and Damascus, dropping service to Jerusalem, Haifa, and Tel Aviv. Its network has gradually expanded to include the rest of the Middle East, South and East Asia, Europe, and North America. Taken over by the government during **World War II**, it continued to be called Misrair but was renamed United Arab Airlines in 1960 and Egyptair in 1971. It currently flies to 95 destinations around the world, with a fleet consisting of 9 Boeing and 23 Airbus planes. There is also a state-owned airline, Air Sinai, with service from Cairo to points in the **Sinai Peninsula**. Zas, Egypt's first privately owned airline, flies daily from Cairo to **Aswan**, **Luxor**, the Red Sea, and the Sinai. Other private carriers may fly domestic routes as long as they operate at times different from Egyptair. Egypt's airlines carried 4.4 million passengers in 1997 and 1 billion metric ton-kms of cargo. Some economists call for the **privatization** of Egyptair, which is inefficient as a state-managed enterprise, but public sentiment opposes this. In any case, government **investment** will still be needed for the construction of new airports (one, **Mubarak International**, is being built west of Cairo) and the expansion and upgrading of existing passenger and freight facilities.

AWQAF, *see* **WAQF**.

AL-AZHAR. Muslim mosque-university in **Cairo**, founded in 972, initially as a center for training Fatimid Shi'i propagandists. Since the reign of Salah al-Din (1171–93), it has been Egypt's major center for training **ulama**, drawing aspirants from all lands where **Islam** prevails. In the 18th century it was an oasis in an intellectual desert, for most **awqaf** that supported mosques and learning had dried up, owing to Egypt's economic decline. During the **French occupation**, al-Azhar was the nerve center of Muslim resistance, despite efforts by

Napoléon Bonaparte and his successors to win the support of its ulama. **Muhammad Ali** weakened al-Azhar by nationalizing many of the *awqaf* that had supported it, but started providing state subsidies, thus enabling him to appoint its rector. Some of the rectors, such as **Hasan al-Attar** and Ibrahim al-Bajuri, were leaders of Islamic reform, but major changes did not occur until after the 1858 Land Law (*see* **Land Reform**), which freed its *awqaf* from state control. **Khedive Isma'il** paid for repairs to the physical structure and urged its shaykhs to teach geometry, history, **music**, and other elective subjects. The government passed legislation that set standards for admission to the faculty. Khedives **Tawfiq** and **Abbas Hilmi II** also sponsored repairs to the physical plant; the latter is honored by a new building called *al-Riwaq al-Abbasiyya*.

Two professors of this era, Shaykhs Muhammad al-Mahdi and **Muhammad Abduh**, put through major reforms: establishing a general library for al-Azhar as a whole; fixing standards for the admission, registration, and examination of students; raising pay for the teachers; creating an administrative structure; placing the mosque schools of **Tanta**, Disuq, and Damietta under its supervision; improving the remuneration and accommodation of the students; and installing electric lighting and plumbing. A major reform law was passed in 1911 after an era of turmoil—politically as well as academically inspired—among the teachers and students. It further systemized the levels of instruction, the academic calendar, and the management of al-Azhar and its subsidiary institutions, including the recently formed School for **Shari'a** Judges. The 1911 law set up the Great Scholars Corps (*Hayat Kibar al-Ulama*), comprising 30 leading shaykhs of whom 11 were Hanafi, nine Shafi'i, nine Maliki, and 1 Hanbali, with standards for admission to this august group.

Although forbidden under the 1911 law to participate in politics, the teachers and students played a major role in the **1919 Revolution**. During the constitutional period al-Azhar was often a bone of contention between **Abdin Palace** and the **Wafd Party**. King **Fuad I** heavily subsidized al-Azhar, seeking its shaykhs' support for his claims to the **caliphate**. Reform laws were passed in 1923, providing for postgraduate studies; in 1925, placing al-Azhar under the supervision of the **education** ministry and bringing **Dar al-Ulum** under its control, but this law was later annulled; in 1929 replacing the students' bread dole with semiannual scholarship stipends; and in 1930,

1933, and 1936 modernizing the administrative structure to make al-Azhar more like a modern university, with specialized colleges (*kulliyat*) for theology (*usul al-din*), law (*al-shari'a al-islamiyya*), and Arabic language (which included the liberal arts generally). Al-Azhar began sending missions to all parts of Asia and Africa to provide information about Islam and published a magazine, *Nur al-Islam*, later renamed *Majallat al-Azhar*. The 1936 law was especially comprehensive, setting up the administrative and curricular structure that survived until al-Azhar was nationalized and further modernized in 1961.

Since the 1961 reforms, the university (as it has now officially become) has added modern buildings in various Cairo neighborhoods and new faculties for medicine, engineering, and other relatively secular subjects. It had an enrollment in 1950 of 2,794, with preparatory institutes in Cairo, **Alexandria**, Damietta, Tanta, Zagazig, **Asyut**, **Minya**, Shibin al-Kum, Disuq, and **Suhaj**. Its enrollment in 1962 was 3,798, plus 25,020 at its preparatory institutes. In that year **women** were admitted to al-Azhar for the first time, and in 1972 it had 16,852, including 1,208 women. Although Muslims from foreign countries had always been a component of the student body at al-Azhar, their numbers rose markedly in the early 20th century, with the largest contingents coming from **Sudan**, the eastern Arab countries, the Maghrib, other parts of Africa, and other Asian countries. Foreign student enrollment peaked at 4,291 in 1955; it later dropped to about 2,500 in 1972. In 2002–3, the reported total enrollment at all its branches was about 350 thousand students.

AZZAM, ABD AL-RAHMAN (1893–1976). **Pan-Arab** diplomat and politician. A supporter of the **National Party** in his youth, he studied medicine in London and volunteered as a paramedic for the **Ottoman** army during the first Balkan War. In **World War I** he joined the **Libyan** guerrillas against the Italians in Cyrenaica, returning to Egypt after the war. He joined the **Wafd** when **Sa'd Zaghlul** was prime minister and was elected to Parliament, but later left the party and drew close to **Ali Mahir**. He was Egypt's minister to **Iraq**, Iran, and **Saudi Arabia**, served as counselor to the Arab delegations to the 1939 London Conference on **Palestine**, and became minister of *awqaf* and social affairs in Ali Mahir's **cabinet** in 1939–40. A leading advocate of Arab unity from the early 1930s, Azzam took part in several all-Arab congresses. In 1945 he was chosen to be the first

secretary-general of the **Arab League**, playing a leading role in the **Palestine War**, but resigned after the **1952 Revolution**. He lived outside Egypt for many years but returned in 1972. Portions of his Arabic memoirs were published serially in Egypt and Lebanon and in book form as *Safahat min al-mudhakkirat al-sirriyya li awwal amin amm li al-Jami'a al-Arabiyya* (Pages from the Secret Memoirs of the Arab League's First Secretary-General).

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BADR, OPERATION (1973). Egyptian name for its surprise attack by land, sea, and air against **Israeli** forces east of the **Suez Canal**, launched on 6 October 1973, the 10th day of Ramadan by the Muslim calendar and hence the anniversary of Muhammad's first victory over the pagan Meccans at Badr in AH 2 (624 CE). The operation was planned over a five-year period, but mainly from 1971, when Lieutenant-General **Sa'd al-Din al-Shadhili** became the commander-in-chief of Egypt's armed forces. He tried to foresee military contingencies and to ensure the cooperation of **Syria**, so that the armies of the two countries would simultaneously attack Israeli positions in the **Sinai Peninsula** and the Golan Heights. The assaults caught the Israelis unprepared and initially drove their forces back, shattering the common belief in Israel's invincibility. Backed by surface-to-air missiles, Egyptian troops bridged the Suez Canal, crossed it in great numbers, captured most of the Israeli bunkers on the **Bar Lev Line**, and penetrated the **Sinai** to a depth of 16 km, but failed to reach the strategic **Gidi** and **Mitla** passes or to follow up on their initial gains in the ensuing **October War**.

BADRAN, SHAMS AL-DIN (1918–). Officer and close political associate of **Abd al-Hakim Amir**. He served as defense minister just before the **June War** and was also a member of the Committee to Liquidate Feudalism (see **Kamshish Incident**). He was tried and imprisoned after Egypt's defeat. Later released, he moved to Europe, where he reportedly became an agricultural feed salesman.

BAGHDAD PACT. Anti-Communist military alliance in the Middle East. Its name was taken from the Pact of Mutual Cooperation concluded between **Iraq** and Turkey in February 1955, which was

preceded by bilateral agreements between Turkey and Pakistan in 1954 and between the **United States** and Turkey, **Iraq**, and Pakistan. It was joined by **Britain**, Iran, and Pakistan during 1955, with encouragement from the United States, and viewed as a barrier to Communist penetration. It was strongly opposed by **Jamal Abd-Nasir** for introducing great power rivalries and the Cold War into the region, and he appealed to Arabs in Jordan and other countries to oppose it. The alliance was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1959 after Iraq withdrew from membership. Following Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979, it, too, withdrew from CENTO, causing its formal dissolution.

BAGHDAD SUMMIT (1979). Meeting of Arab heads of state, called by **Iraq's** Vice President Saddam Husayn, to condemn **Anwar al-Sadat's** separate peace with **Israel** (*see* **Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty**). The Arab leaders agreed to break diplomatic relations with Egypt, to terminate various economic development schemes in the country, and to expel it from the **Arab League**. They imposed an embargo on **trade** with Egypt but did not send home the million Egyptian professionals and workers in their countries.

AL-BAGHDADI, ABD AL-LATIF (1917-99). Officer and politician. A graduate of the **Military Academy**, he was a leading member of the **Free Officers** and the **RCC**, then became inspector general of the **Liberation Rally**. Defense minister under **Muhammad Najib** in 1953-54, he was moved to municipal affairs when **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** took power in 1954 and later assumed control of **planning**. He became president of the **National Assembly** in 1957 and, upon the creation of the **UAR**, became its vice president for economic affairs and minister of **planning**. After **Syria** seceded, he served as Egyptian minister of **finance** and economic planning. In 1962 Baghdadi became one of Egypt's five vice presidents and resumed the presidency of the National Assembly. Dropped as vice president in 1964, he quit the National Assembly and withdrew from public life. He criticized the 1971 **Egyptian-Soviet Friendship Treaty** and later the **Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty**. His memoirs were published in 1977.

AL-BALAGH. Title of several Egyptian **newspapers**, of which the best-known was the **Wafd Party** organ edited by Abd al-Qadir Hamza and published in 1923–53.

BANDUNG CONFERENCE (1955). Meeting, hosted by Indonesia's Sukarno, of Asian and African leaders, at which **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** met for the first time China's Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), who advised him to buy arms from Czechoslovakia. *See also* **Czech Arms Deal, Nonalignment.**

BANK MISR. Egyptian bank and holding company, prominent in Egypt's industrialization in the 1920s and 1930s, founded by **Tal'at Harb** in April 1920 with a share capital of £E80 thousand, 92 percent of which came from large landowners interested in the availability of credit to finance their **cotton** cultivation. Its early growth was due partly to a student-led boycott, fueled by the **1919 Revolution**, against British firms, including banks. Its sustained development was fueled by growing patronage by the national, provincial, and local governments, which were encouraged to shift their deposits from the foreign-owned **National Bank of Egypt** to Bank Misr.

It began its **industrial** activities by establishing an Arabic printing press in 1922, a paper company in 1923, a cotton-ginning mill in 1924, and a fleet of **Nile River transport** ships and a **cinema** company in 1925. In 1926 came its major and most profitable investment, the Misr Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company, with its headquarters at Mahalla al-Kubra. In 1937 it had 110 thousand spindles and 2,500 looms in operation and employed 15 thousand workers. The Egyptian government gave funds to Bank Misr to contract loans with small industry and agricultural cooperatives and to purchase cotton for storage. It also founded Misr Airworks (*see* **Aviation**), an insurance firm, and a shipping company that won an Egyptian government concession to transport Muslim pilgrims to the **Hijaz**. It set up branch offices in most of Egypt's provincial towns and spawned foreign subsidiaries in **Syria**, Lebanon, and **France**. In 1930 its share capital reached £E1 million.

In the 1930s it suffered from falling prices on the world cotton market but benefited from the protective **tariffs** imposed, especially by **Isma'il Sidqi's** government, on imported goods. Bank Misr came to rely heavily on British capital and expertise in the expansion of its

enterprises, and it also became involved in the cross fire between the **Wafd** and Egypt's other political parties. Depressed cotton prices caused some landowning families to postpone repayment of their mortgage debts, often owed to Bank Misr, and the result was a liquidity crisis for the bank, at a time when small depositors with Egyptian Post Office savings accounts (which had been administered by Bank Misr since 1927) were trying to withdraw their funds. The bank appealed to the Egyptian government for financial aid, and **Ali Mahir** and **Husayn Sirri** insisted that Tal'at Harb resign his presidency in favor of Hafiz Afifi, who gradually replaced its board members and insisted that it concentrate on profiting from its existing enterprises instead of founding new ones. Of its many subsidiaries, only the **textile** firms were consistently profitable. When the government agreed in 1941 to guarantee the bank's deposits, it insisted that all unprofitable Misr companies go into voluntary liquidation. During **World War II**, though, Egypt's inability to import European manufactured goods led to the growth of the bank's surviving firms, but they came to depend more on government support.

Although Bank Misr and its subsidiaries were nationalized in 1960, most of its enterprises survived under state ownership and were later privatized. It currently has many shareholder-owned companies in textile production, **iron and steel**, food security, paper manufacture, construction materials, **sugar** refining, **tourism**, and housing. It has a section that offers Islamic banking facilities. The bank has branches in Lebanon and Romania and has formed partnerships with the First National Bank of Chicago, Banco di Roma, and Union des Banques Arabes et Françaises. Bank Misr's total assets in June 2001 were valued at £E62.1 billion. Its net income from **banking** activities was £E1.224 billion, with profits of £E187 million.

BANKING SYSTEM. Banks did not exist in Egypt under the **Mamluks**, **Ottomans**, or **Muhammad Ali**. The first joint-stock bank was the Bank of Egypt, founded in 1858 with a nominal capital of £500 thousand sterling (one half paid up) subscribed by London investors. Other banks were formed in Egypt during the 1860s and 1870s to help service the growing government debt (*see Finance*). The banking system stagnated during the convulsions caused by **Ahmad Urabi's** movement and the **British occupation**, reviving as economic conditions stabilized. Foreigners and religious minorities

dominated the Egyptian banks, in part because Muslims opposed the lending or borrowing of money at interest. Mortgage banks were among the earliest to benefit Egyptians directly, competing with village money-lenders to meet the financial needs of the **fellahin**. The **National Bank of Egypt**, founded in 1898, became the bankers' bank and the sole issuer of **currency**.

Only after **World War I** did Egyptians themselves go into banking, notably **Tal'at Harb**, with his **Bank Misr**, which served also as a holding company and entrepreneur. Other Egyptian-owned banks continued to be overshadowed by those owned and managed by foreigners, but after **World War II**, Egypt's Parliament enacted laws requiring that Egyptians form the majority of stockholders and directors of all corporations, including banks. These laws were slightly relaxed following the **1952 Revolution**, but later **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government tightened controls on foreign financial institutions, nationalizing them in 1961. Under **Anwar al-Sadat**, however, foreign banks were readmitted into Egypt, although their share of the country's total economic activity remains small.

Currently, Egypt's banking industry can be classified into five categories: (1) public-sector commercial banks, (2) private-sector commercial banks, (3) state-owned specialized banks, (4) state-owned housing banks, and (5) foreign commercial banks. All banks operate under supervision from the **Central Bank of Egypt**. The public-sector banks accounted for 85.6 percent of total deposits and 84.4 percent of total loans within the industry as of 31 December 1999. The government has encouraged the creation of private-sector commercial banks, but remains a large minority shareholder in most of them. Egyptian banks may also be divided into three functional categories: commercial banks, business and investment banks, and specialized banks. The first of these categories is dominated by four large public-sector banks: the National Bank of Egypt, Bank Misr, Banque du Caire, and Bank of Alexandria. There are 10 fairly dynamic and profitable joint venture/private banks, some of which are mainly owned by foreign shareholders, serving mainly the business community. Egypt has a number of secondary banks, notably specialized real estate banks. There are also branch offices of European and North American banks, such as **Crédit Lyonnais**, **Citibank**, and **American Express**.

The Central Bank has stopped issuing licenses for would-be entrants into the banking system. Its regulatory power also includes setting reserve requirements for local and foreign **currency** deposits, minimum levels of capital, limits on investment in single companies, and exposure to the currency of a single foreign country. Banking products include overdrafts, loans in any convertible currency, letters of credit, letters of guarantee, and foreign exchange transactions. Banks have more cautiously entered into syndicated finance, bond issues, and project finance. They lag behind banks of other countries in making Internet transactions.

All public-sector banks have divisions that practice Islamic banking, offering ownership shares in lieu of interest payments. Egypt's banks have been fairly profitable, serve the business community well, and are gradually being privatized. It should be noted, however, that Egypt remains a cash **economy**, most Egyptians do not have checking or savings accounts or credit cards, and that few banks make small loans for projects that would directly aid low-income entrepreneurs. Citibank Egypt has recently tried to attract more Egyptians to open accounts and to use debit cards. The government has encouraged the Banque du Caire to follow suit.

AL-BANNA, HASAN (1906–49). Founder and Supreme Guide of the Society of **Muslim Brothers**. Born in Mahmudiyya, a village near **Alexandria**, he was trained as a teacher at **Dar al-Ulum**. He taught principles of **Islam** in various cities, but especially **Ismailia**. At first he followed the teachings of Muslim reformer **Rashid Rida**. In 1928 Banna founded the Society of Muslim Brothers as an association for religious teaching, but, with the removal of its headquarters from Ismailia to **Cairo** in 1932, it evolved into a political society aiming at the purification of Islam and calling for the transformation of Egypt into an Islamic state. Banna's simple doctrine won widespread support among urban workers and some younger intellectuals, and his charisma won him sympathy among Muslims in many Arab countries. He founded a daily **newspaper**, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*, to propagate his ideas, and he secretly ran candidates for the Chamber of Deputies.

After the **United Nations** voted to partition **Palestine**, the Brothers were among the leading advocates of open resistance, and they formed volunteer brigades to fight against the **Zionists**. As his society grew more radical and prone to **terrorism**, the government

tried to suppress it by seizing its funds, closing its branches, and interning some of its leaders while Egypt was under martial law during the **Palestine War**. After Prime Minister **Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi** was assassinated in December 1948 by a student attached to the Brotherhood, Banna was murdered by government agents in February 1949. Several collections of Banna's speeches and articles have been published, as have his memoirs, *Mudhakirat al-da'wa wa al-di'aya*. A highly articulate speaker and writer, he was personally incorruptible in an era dominated by corrupt politicians, but his ideological rigidity blunted his political impact.

BAR ASSOCIATION, EGYPTIAN. Egypt's earliest lawyers' group was the **Mixed Courts Bar Association** established in 1876 by the European advocates practicing in these new tribunals. Among the functions of the Mixed Courts Bar Association were to supervise admission of lawyers into the profession, to discipline its members, to defend their prerogatives against judges and administrators, to hear complaints against lawyers, to provide free legal aid to the needy, and to lend money to colleagues in financial trouble. It served as the model for the lawyers in the **National Courts**, who formed their *niqaba* (bar association) in 1912.

The lawyers in the National Courts envied the Mixed Courts advocates and had petitioned the justice ministry under **Sa'd Zaghlul** in 1910 to be allowed to form their own syndicate with similar rights and duties. The government accepted their petition, and the lawyers met for the first time in November 1912 to elect their first president, choose a 15-member bar council, and adopt their bylaws. The **Shari'a** lawyers set up their own *niqaba* in 1916. The National Courts Bar Association played a highly visible political role between 1919 and 1952, usually within the **Wafd Party**, which provided most of the association's leaders. The Mixed and Shari'a courts' *niqabas* were absorbed by the National Courts Bar Association in 1949 and 1956, respectively, as their parent legal systems were integrated into the National Courts.

The **1952 Revolution** led to an erosion of the Bar Association's independence, especially after it backed a return to parliamentary government and rallied to **Muhammad Najib** in March 1954. When the lawyers denounced the military dictatorship and called for the dissolution of the **RCC**, **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government dismissed the Bar Association officers and suspended its rules, then

appointed **Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i** as its new president. The association did not meet again until 1958, and then only to elect new officers. It remained in conflict with the Nasir government; **Ali Sabri**, as leader of the ASU, even made the Bar Association admit public-sector lawyers.

Law was a "receding profession" under Nasir, but **Anwar al-Sadat** began admitting more lawyers to the **cabinet**, made a symbolic visit to the Bar Association, and claimed to have restored the rule of law to Egyptian politics. It was symbolically significant that **Fuad Siraj al-Din** used the Bar Association for the site of his speech announcing his creation of the **New Wafd**. In Sadat's last years, the Bar Association became a forum for opposition to his policies, including the peace treaty with **Israel**; he locked up half the members of its elected Bar Council in his September 1981 roundup. Under **Husni Mubarak**, the Bar Association resisted his regime's efforts to curb its activities, and its often-reelected leader, Ahmad Khawaja, received much press coverage for his criticisms of government policies. A slate of **Muslim Brothers** was elected to the Bar Council in 1992. They were ousted by the government in 1996 as part of its crackdown on **Islamists**. Elections scheduled for 2000 were cancelled by the government at the last minute, out of fear that the Muslim Brothers would win.

BAR LEV LINE. Fortified defense line east of the **Suez Canal**, erected by **Israel** after Egypt began shelling its troops in 1968. It withstood Egyptian artillery attacks during the **War of Attrition** but was breached by Egyptian troops during **Operation Badr** in 1973.

AL-BARDISI, UTHMAN (1758–1806). Mamluk factional leader between the **French occupation** and the rise of **Muhammad Ali**. Initially acting as a surrogate for the aging **Ibrahim Bey**, he was a rival to the **Alfi Bey** faction and an ally to Muhammad Ali, who in 1802 was just taking charge of his Albanian regiment that made up the bulk of the **Ottoman** army in Egypt. He and Muhammad Ali besieged the Ottoman governor, **Khusrev Pasha**, in Damietta, devastating the city in the process of capturing him. Bardisi's Mamluk factions took charge of **Cairo**, where their high tax levies alienated the population to Muhammad Ali's advantage. Arrears in pay led to soldiers' demonstrations in Cairo, imposing new levies on the civilian population. Bardisi scolded the Cairo **ulama** for allowing this

revolt, but Muhammad Ali openly supported the people. Muhammad Ali's forces drove Bardisi's Mamluks out of Cairo, to the delight of the ulama and the merchants. His death in November 1806 was popularly ascribed to poisoning by Alfi Bey.

AL-BARUDI, MAHMUD SAMI (1839–1904). Army officer, **cabinet** minister, premier, and neoclassical Arabic poet. He claimed descent from the brother of a **Mamluk** sultan and from a family of Buhayra **tax farmers**. His father was an artillery officer under **Muhammad Ali**, and Mahmud was educated in one of his military schools, graduating in 1854. He then worked for the **Ottoman** government while **Sa'id** was governor of Egypt. When **Isma'il** went to Istanbul upon his succession in 1863, he brought Mahmud back to command his viceregal guard and later to serve as his private secretary. Mahmud also served in the Egyptian corps that aided the Ottoman army in Crete in 1865 and in the war against **Russia** in 1877–78, attaining the rank of brigadier general. He was named governor of Sharqiyya province in 1878. The nationalist officers around **Ahmad Urabi** demanded his appointment as war minister in 1881 and as premier in 1882. He sided with the Urabist officers against the British expeditionary force. After the Battle of **Tel el-Kebir**, he was tried, exiled to Ceylon, and not readmitted into Egypt until 1900. Weakened and blind, he played no further role in Egyptian public life. His patriotic **poetry** is still read and admired for its classical Arabic allusions and motifs, and he is regarded as a leader of Egypt's literary renaissance.

BASIN IRRIGATION. System of **Nile River** water utilization used extensively in Egypt up to modern times. The land is divided into basins measuring between 1 and 4 thousand **feddans** by the construction of a longitudinal bank near the Nile with cross banks between this ridge and the desert's edge. As the Nile rises, water is let into these compartments through short canals with regulating sluices. The land is flooded to an average depth of one to two meters and the water is held there for 40–60 days. Once the Nile recedes, the water is drained back, depositing its fertile silt. The basins are usually in chains of four or five that are filled by a short canal, following a strict timetable, starting with the southern basins. In years when the Nile flood is low, water may be stored in some basins through the low Nile season. Winter crops sown in basin lands after the water recedes include wheat, beans, *birsim* (Egyptian clover), lentils, barley,

and chickpeas, crops that mature and are harvested in March or April, after which the land awaits the next flood. In the 20th century, some basin-irrigated lands in Upper Egypt were adapted to **cotton** culture by using wells and pumps.

Water-raising devices have irrigated higher grounds since antiquity: the *shaduf* (a bucket on a pole with a counterweight of mud or stone), the Archimedian screw (a wooden cylinder with a helix inside and an axis at each end), and the waterwheel or *saqiyya* (by which an animal turns a horizontal wheel that is geared to a vertical wheel carrying pots on its rim to dip into the water as it turns, dropping the water as they reach the top of their rotation). The system has enabled people to utilize the same plots of land for centuries with little capital outlay, but it does require a government capable of ensuring fair distribution of the waters. Starting in **Muhammad Ali's** reign, parts of the Delta were converted to **perennial irrigation**; the process was extended to Upper Egypt under **Isma'il**, during the **British occupation**, and under **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**, concurrent with the construction of the **Aswan High Dam**.

BAYT AL-UMMA. The "house of the nation," or home of **Sa'd Zaghlul** in central **Cairo**, often the site of demonstrations by the **Wafd** between 1919 and 1927, later converted into a museum of the Egyptian struggle for independence from **Britain**.

AL-BAZ, USAMA (1931–). Politician and diplomat. Born in Daqahliyya, he was educated at **Cairo University's** Law Faculty and received his Master of Laws from Harvard University in 1961. Serving as a deputy attorney general in 1953–56, he entered the Egyptian foreign service in 1959. He became a counselor and senior lecturer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Training Institute. Following **Anwar al-Sadat's** purge of the **Centers of Power** in May 1971, al-Baz took charge of the ASU youth secretariat. He became deputy head in 1974 and head in 1975 of Foreign Minister Isma'il Fahmi's private office, becoming head of **Husni Mubarak's** office for political affairs in 1977, when Mubarak was vice president, and has been his office director ever since he became president in 1981. He often serves as Mubarak's spokesman to journalists and foreign (especially **Israeli**) diplomats.

BEDOUINS. Arab camel nomads. Traditionally, they migrated within deserts, following seasonable availability of water and forage for their camels or other animals. In modern times, the Egyptian government—and indeed most Middle Eastern states—have tried to make them settle, sometimes with the inducement of agricultural land. They are organized into tribes and clans based on patrilineal kinship, sometimes modified by adoption, and their loyalties are almost always to these extended family units rather than to a nation, region, or village. They tend to look down on Egyptians, both rural and urban, as degenerate and dishonorable, and they obey an elaborate code that defines the honor and status of their tribe.

Traditional tribal honor was closely tied to martial virtues, and the **Mamluk** rulers of Egypt often used bedouin auxiliaries in their armies, but no Egyptian government has done so since the time of **Muhammad Ali**. During the 19th century bedouins were exempt from Egyptian conscription, but about 12 thousand now serve in a special frontier force equipped with remote sensors, night-vision binoculars, communications vehicles, and high-speed motorboats. Others have given up **animal husbandry** for transport and smuggling, replacing their camels with pickup trucks and their tents with cinder-block huts. Most bedouins now buy subsidized flour and **sugar** through the Egyptian government and carry identity cards. Their proportion of Egypt's total population has declined during the 19th and 20th centuries. They were estimated to number 1.38 million for the entire country, including the **Sinai Peninsula**, in 2000.

BEVERAGES. In a hot and dry country, people and animals must drink copiously and often. For most Egyptians throughout their history, water has been their primary beverage, drawn usually from the **Nile River** but also from artesian wells. Egyptians often flavored their water with fruit syrups, flower petals, or licorice roots. Brewing beer and *buza*, a fermented beverage made from barley, goes back to ancient times. Viniculture was also common in ancient Egypt, and many types of wine were consumed. Although **Islam** forbids consumption of alcoholic beverages, Egyptian Muslims often drank beer or wine, as did **Jews** and Christians. Up to the late 19th century brewing and wine making were mainly household industries.

In 1897 the Crown Brewing Company, registered in Belgium, where it produced Stella Artois Beer, began operations in **Alexan-**

dria. Two years later the Pyramids Brewery opened in **Cairo**. The latter company prospered and in 1922 absorbed its Alexandria competitor, becoming noted for its production of Stella Beer. It changed its name in 1953 to Al Ahram Beer Company (it has no connection to the **newspaper *al-Ahram***). The company was sequestered by the Egyptian government following the **July Laws** in 1961 and nationalized in 1963. The company introduced Stella Export in 1967 and a nonalcoholic beer called Birell in 1985. It later added other malt-based fruit beverages, especially for other Arab countries, and a premium beer for export to Europe. Privatized in 1996, Al Ahram Beverages Company opened a subsidiary cannery in 1998 and a modern beverage plant in 1999. Heineken purchased the company in September 2002.

Egyptian viniculture was long dominated by Greeks, notably the Gianaclis family, which began procucing wines in 1882, just after the **British occupation** began. The Gianaclis firm was nationalized in 1961. After its last Greek vintner died in 1989, the state-owned firm (which at one time had 55 thousand employees) deteriorated. The ambient temperature in its storage cellar frequently reached 40 degrees Celsius, none of the remaining employees knew which grapes were to be used for which wine, and the finished product was often unfit even to be used as vinegar. Imported wines were subject to import duties as high as 3 thousand percent *ad valorem*. Egypt's wine market was largely limited to **tourism**, and few visitors to Egypt ever ordered a second bottle of the state-owned wine. In 1999 the government sold the company to a privately owned firm, which brought in a French vintner, installed modern equipment, replaced many of the older vines, and began turning out a reasonably good *vin du pays*. The same company also produces vermouth and rum.

Cold nonalcoholic beverages were long provided by the *saqqa* (water carrier) with his goatskin bag, cups, and clanking finger cymbals. A familiar figure in cities and towns, he often sold water flavored with the juice of sugar cane, various fruits, and licorice. By the early 20th century, the Greeks in Egypt had begun preparing and bottling carbonated beverages. A notable example was the Spathis family, which produced a lemon-lime soda that was long popular among Egyptians, orangeade, ginger ale, and cider. The presence of thousands of foreign troops during **World War II** led to the introduction of cola beverages. Coca Cola opened its first bottling plant

in 1945. Other companies, including Pepsi Cola, Schweppes, Seven Up, Dr. Pepper, and Royal Crown Cola, have followed suit. It was estimated in 2001 that Coca Cola controlled about 45 percent of the bottled beverage market, Pepsi Cola about 40, and Al Ahram slightly more than 10 percent. Cold bottled soda has become a major component in Egypt's beverage culture, especially since the introduction and spread of mechanical refrigeration. Traditional fruit juices survive and are increasingly processed and sold in bottles. The market for packaged and prepared milk is small; combined revenues for all kinds of milk amounted to only \$76 million in 1999.

Coffee and tea are Egypt's main hot beverages. Coffee was introduced from Yemen, probably in the 16th century. Its beans are traditionally ground into a fine powder that is boiled three times with water and varying amounts of **sugar**, sometimes flavored with cardamom, and served in small cups. Instant coffee remains rare. Tea drinking entered Egypt from Asia in medieval times and has lately grown more popular than coffee. It is estimated that Egyptians drink 5 billion liters of tea per year, or more than 500 cups per person. Arosa has 55 percent of the market, Lipton 19, Jawhara eight, and the rest split among various local and foreign manufacturers. Tea leaves are steeped and sometimes boiled for a long time and served very hot and sweet in glasses. Other hot beverages include *karkaday* (hibiscus flower tea), *hulba* (a medicinal drink made from fenugreek), and *yansun* (brewed from anise seed). The serving and sharing of beverages is an essential element of hospitality for all classes and religious groups in Egyptian society.

BEVIN-SIDQI TREATY (1946). Abortive pact between the foreign ministers of **Britain** and Egypt, under which Britain agreed to withdraw completely from Egyptian territory by 1949 and to maintain the status quo in the **Sudan** until Britain and Egypt could reach an agreement and gain the assent of the Sudanese people. Rumors spread in Cairo, however, that **Isma'il Sidqi** had in fact extracted a British concession to unite the Sudan with Egypt. Britain's prime minister, Clement Attlee, publicly denied the rumors. Following King **Faruq's** opening speech to Parliament, stating that Egypt would be responsible for preparing the Sudanese for independence as soon as possible, the British governor-general of the Sudan issued a statement insisting that it would be up to the Sudanese themselves to choose their country's status. Sidqi replied that the governor's

statement contradicted his draft treaty with the British, and so he and his ministers resigned. The treaty would have given Egypt in 1946 what it eventually won in 1954; its failure underscores the Sudan's importance to Egyptian politicians before the **1952 Revolution**.

BIBLIOTHECA ALEXANDRINA. Modern attempt to revive the ancient Library of **Alexandria**, as called for in the 1990 **Aswan Declaration**. Construction began in 1995, and the library's official opening took place in October 2002. The complex, including the library, a 3,200 seat conference center, **museum**, and planetarium, is located on a 40-thousand-square-meter site in Alexandria's Shatbi district, across from the **University of Alexandria** Faculty of Arts. Designed by the Norwegian, Snohetta Architects, the Library is a giant disk sloping toward the sea. Its 13 floors (mostly below ground), are designed to house a collection of 8 million volumes and a projected staff of over 500. The collection will focus primarily on Alexandria and ancient and modern Mediterranean civilizations.

BILHARZIA. Common name in Egypt for schistosomiasis, an endemic tropical disease caused by flatworms or flukes, which live as parasites inside certain species of freshwater snails that flourish in expanses of stagnant water created by **irrigation** systems, such as those built in the **Nile Valley** and Delta. Their larvae enter the body of a person or animal through the skin from the stagnant waters and become parasites of their new host. Their eggs accumulate in the blood, liver, lungs, kidneys, and other organs, obstructing blood circulation, causing tissue damage and infection, and weakening the victim, leading at times to urinary tract diseases, bladder cancer, sexual malfunctions, and even death. Some eggs leave the victim through body wastes and may reenter the water and the host snails. The disease is named after Dr. Theodor Bilharz, assistant director of Egypt's medical school from 1850 to 1862, although his discoveries were not widely disseminated and the fluke was rediscovered by an Italian researcher in the 1870s.

The incidence of the disease burgeoned with the transition from **basin** to **perennial irrigation**, which required peasants to stand in stagnant water for long periods of time. An American physician, writing in 1913, estimated that 30 percent of Egypt's inhabitants were infected. In 1924 an Egyptian writer raised that estimate to

between 70 and 80 percent, a figure that remained constant in succeeding years despite strenuous efforts at treatment and control by both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Egyptian government. Bilharzia spread following the completion of the **Aswan High Dam**, with a further increase in the more pathogenic species at the expense of the one that causes milder symptoms.

At first, doctors treated infected persons with such drugs as antimony tartrate, but peasants disliked losing workdays to make office visits and soon became reinfected in the irrigation ditches anyway; a more effective treatment has been to treat the waters in which the snails breed with a copper sulfate compound. Well-intended efforts to improve village sanitation have not eliminated bilharzia, which remains, along with trachoma, diabetes, and hepatitis, an endemic public health problem for Egypt. It was estimated in 1998 to have infected 6 million Egyptians. *See also* **Health Care**.

BLACK BOOK (1943). Scandalous revelations of political and financial misdeeds by **Mustafa al-Nahhas** and his wife, published by former **Wafd Party** Secretary-General **Makram Ubayd**. Even though few of the allegations were ever proven, the book discredited the Wafdist government that had been imposed on King **Faruq** by the British.

BLACK SATURDAY. The 26 January 1952 riots, marked by burning and looting of buildings, especially those owned by Europeans or popularly associated with Western influence, in central **Cairo**, following the killing by **British** troops of 50 Egyptian auxiliary policemen in **Ismailia** a day earlier. The heavy destruction of property and loss of European and Egyptian lives were widely construed at the time as evidence of the Egyptian government's inability to maintain order. Consequently, King **Faruq** dismissed the **Wafd Party** government of **Mustafa al-Nahhas** and appointed a series of Palace **cabinets** that failed to restore public confidence in the monarchy, which was toppled by a military coup six months later. It has never been determined who started Black Saturday; popular theories at the time implicated the Society of **Muslim Brothers** or the Egyptian Socialist Party, formerly *Misr al-Fatat*.

BLUE SHIRTS. **Wafd Party**-affiliated youth organization, formed in 1935 to counter the growing influence of the **Green Shirts** under

Misr al-Fatat. In 1936 there were two rival societies, one consisting mainly of students and “well-educated youth,” the other mainly of nonstudents, but these groups and others were consolidated during 1936–37 into one organization having an estimated 30 thousand members. Its participation in a demonstration near **Abdin Palace** in December 1937 led King **Faruq** to dismiss **Mustafa al-Nahhas’** government, and Egypt banned all the “shirt” organizations in 1938.

BLUNT, WILFRID SCAWEN (1840–1922). English poet, Orientalist, horse-breeder, and supporter of Egyptian nationalism. He briefly served in the British foreign service, but after his marriage to Anne, the granddaughter of Lord Byron, he left the service and spent several years exploring the Arabian desert. He is best known for his involvement in **Ahmad Urabi’s** revolution in 1881–82. He later wrote a memoir about that movement, entitled *The Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt* (1907). After Urabi’s defeat, Blunt hired a British attorney to defend the colonel at his treason trial and helped get the death sentences imposed by the Egyptian courts reduced to exile or imprisonment.

Using his official connections, Blunt agitated for an early withdrawal of British forces from Egypt, about which see his *Gordon at Khartum* (1912). He supported the later **National Party** of **Mustafa Kamil**, whom he greatly admired, and **Muhammad Farid**. Blunt financed the publication of a monthly magazine, *Egypt*, from 1911 to 1913. A wealthy Sussex landowner and minor poet, he often misled Egyptians by exaggerating his influence with British politicians. He published a bowdlerized version of his diaries, the originals of which are held by the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, commenting freely on politics in Egypt and elsewhere between 1888 and 1914, called *My Diaries* (1921).

BONAPARTE, *see* **NAPOLÉON BONAPARTE**.

BOURSE, ALEXANDRIA. The **cotton** exchange opened in 1861 as the *Société Anonyme de la Bourse* at Minyat al-Basal, a district of **Alexandria** harbor. Its buildings were constructed and enlarged during the decade following 1869, and each cotton exporter had its own office in the Bourse. *The Société Égyptienne de la Bourse Commerciale de Minet-al-Basel* was incorporated in 1884. The cotton exporters had their own organization, the *Association Cotonnière*

d'Alexandrie, which established standard grades for cotton in 1883; this became the Alexandria General Produce Association in 1885. Cotton futures were traded at another Bourse, the *Société Anonyme de la Bourse Khédiviale d'Alexandrie*. Both were nationalized under the 1961 **July Laws** and later closed. The **People's Assembly** voted to reopen the cotton exchange in 1994.

BOUTROS-GHALI, BOUTROS (1922–). Professor, editor, and diplomat. He was educated at **Cairo University** and at the University of Paris, receiving degrees in public law, economics, and political science, as well as a Ph.D. in international law. A professor at Cairo University since 1949, he was a Fulbright research scholar at Columbia University in 1954–55. He edited *al-Ahram al-iqtisadi* and *al-Siyasa al-duwaliyya*. In 1967–69 he directed the research center of the Hague Academy of International Law. Boutros-Ghali lectured on law and international relations at Columbia, Princeton, New Delhi, Warsaw, Geneva, Algiers, Dakar, Dar as Salam, and Nairobi universities, among others, took part in various international conferences, and produced more than 100 books, chapters, and articles in French, English, and Arabic.

As secretary of state for foreign affairs, he accompanied **Anwar al-Sadat** on his peace mission to Jerusalem and played a key role in the **Camp David** summit. He served from 1978 to 1991 as secretary of state for foreign affairs and played an important peace-making role within the **Organization of African Unity (OAU)**. Strongly Francophile, Boutros-Ghali was heading Egypt's delegation to the Francophone summit in Paris at the time he was elected secretary-general of the **United Nations** in November 1991. He served from 1992 to 1996, mediating the Cambodian crisis, the India–Pakistan dispute, and the civil wars in Bosnia and Somalia, among other issues. The **U.S.** government thwarted his quest for a second term, as described in his memoir *Unvanquished* (1999). He now heads *La Francophonie*, the international union of French-speaking peoples.

BRIGHT STAR, OPERATION. Joint land and air military maneuvers of Egypt and the **United States**, held in 1981 and in odd-numbered years thereafter. Similar exercises were conducted in Oman, Somalia, and **Sudan**. Their initial aims were to strengthen U.S. ties with Egypt and those other countries when President Ronald Reagan was

seeking a “strategic consensus” in the Middle East against Communism and to reassure Egypt’s government following **Anwar al-Sadat**’s assassination. The largest maneuvers were held near the **Suez Canal** in 1987 and used nine thousand ground, air, and sea troops from each country. The 2001 exercises involved 10 countries.

BRIONI DECLARATION. Joint Yugoslav–Egyptian communique issued by Josip Broz Tito and **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** on 18 July 1956 following meetings held at the seaside Yugoslav town of Brioni. It reaffirmed the principles outlined at the **Bandung Conference**, which Tito did not attend, and also called for more economic and cultural exchanges between the two countries. The two leaders were later joined by Jawaharlal Nehru for further talks, leading to another statement issued on 19 July. Its key elements were (1) the Bandung principles should govern international relations, (2) the division of the world into blocs perpetuated fears rising from local conflicts, (3) nuclear disarmament was essential for peace, and (4) faster economic development was needed. The leaders also called on the **United Nations** to accelerate its admission of new members. These issues reflected the concerns of the emerging African and Asian nations in contrast to those of the **United States** and the **USSR**, which exercised the dominant influence on global affairs at the time. *See also Positive Neutrality.*

BRITAIN. Egypt has had commercial relations with England since the 16th century but did not constitute a major object of British policy until the **French occupation** in 1798. Seeing a threat to their control of India, the British fought **Napoléon Bonaparte**’s navy on the Mediterranean and sank many French ships at **Abu-Qir**. Allied with the **Ottoman Empire**, Britain drove the French from Egypt in 1801. These events initiated a long British interest in Egypt. Fearful of French influence over **Muhammad Ali**, Britain tried unsuccessfully to occupy Rosetta in 1807 and intervened in 1839 to drive **Ibrahim** from **Syria**. The British government tried to block the building of the **Suez Canal**, lest it facilitate a French attack on India. Once the Canal was completed, however, British shippers became its main users. When **Khedive Isma’il** became financially embarrassed, the British government bought Egypt’s 44 percent interest in the **Suez Canal Company**. Britain also joined **France** in creating the *Caisse de la Dette Publique* in 1876 and the **Dual Control** two years later.

Egyptian nationalists often accuse Britain of scheming to take control of their country, and indeed some English writers predicted this. However, the British government's policy was to seek Ottoman intervention if needed to maintain order in Egypt and collaborated with France only if it failed to do so, as in the **Joint Note** of January 1882 upholding the authority of Khedive **Tawfiq** and implicitly threatening **Ahmad Urabi's** revolution. When the latter grew stronger and threatened foreigners' financial interests and personal safety, the European countries, led by Britain and France, sent warships to the vicinity of **Alexandria** harbor. When the Egyptian government, following riots in which some 60 Europeans were killed, reinforced its harbor fortifications, the British fleet bombarded them, while the French fleet (owing to a change in the French government) sailed away. Once having secured Alexandria, Britain sent an expeditionary force, which entered the Suez Canal, landed at **Ismailia**, and defeated Urabi's Egyptian army in the **Battle of Tel el-Kebir**. It occupied **Cairo** on 14 September 1882.

Britain's prime minister at that time, Sir William Gladstone, stated on numerous occasions that his government would withdraw its troops from Egypt as soon as order had been restored to the country. Good relations with France and preserving Ottoman territorial integrity remained Britain's main goals, and neither would be served by a prolonged occupation of Egypt. But the longer British troops stayed, the more reforms seemed to be necessary. Some British merchants and entrepreneurs lived and worked in Egypt, and many Britons back home held Egyptian bonds that had to be repaid. Actually, though, there were more **Italians** and **Greeks** who lived and worked in Egypt, and the proportion of the Egyptian public debt held by French investors was higher than that held by the British. Britain stayed partly because it had failed to stem the **Mahdi's** uprising in the **Sudan** and hoped to restore Egyptian rule to the provinces under Mahdist control. It also wanted to ensure the safety of the Suez Canal, its main route to India and its other possessions in East Africa and South Asia, and gradually came to believe that its ever-expanding plans for Egypt's reform and modernization would benefit Europe as a whole. A growing number of British advisers came to control the **cabinet** ministers and heads of major government departments, as the agent and consul general, Lord **Cromer**, came to dominate Khedive Tawfiq. The rise of the **National Party** during the khedivate of **Abbas Hilmi II** mobilized

some opposition to the **British occupation** among the **efendiyya**, but did not influence British policy, either in London or in Cairo.

During **World War I** Egypt became Britain's main military base in the Middle East, but not until the **1919 Revolution** did it become clear that most Egyptians wanted independence. For the next 35 years the British fought openly or maneuvered covertly to maintain their military occupation, first by declaring Egypt's independence in 1922, subject to **Four Reserved Points** that required further negotiation; then by the **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty** that limited Britain's occupation; and finally by the 1954 **Anglo-Egyptian agreement** that evacuated Britain's Suez Canal base but permitted reoccupation under certain conditions.

Throughout this period, Britons lived in Egypt, managed large and small businesses there, lent money to and borrowed money from the Egyptian government, taught in universities and schools, and often formed close relationships with Egyptian citizens. Two prominent **women**, **Jihan Sadat** and **Suzanne Mubarak**, each had one Egyptian and one British parent. Many Egyptians went to England or Scotland for higher education, technical training, or travel. Egypt's **currency** was tied to the sterling pound up to 1949. On the negative side, most Britons in Egypt lived in near-complete segregation from Egyptians, except their servants. The 1906 **Dinshaway Incident**, the repression of the **1919 Revolution**, and the killing of 50 auxiliary policemen just prior to **Black Saturday** are remembered by Egyptians as examples of British cruelty, just as many English people recall the assassinations of British officials, officers, and teachers working in Egypt.

The 1956 **Suez War** drastically reduced Britain's presence in Egypt, as Britons were sent home, British-owned firms were nationalized, and diplomatic relations were broken. In 1962, however, Egypt and Britain resumed diplomatic relations, despite differences over the **Yemen Civil War**, due in part to Britain's control of Aden and other southern Arabian sultanates. As Britain relinquished control of its remaining empire east of Suez, its relations with Egypt gradually improved. **Anwar al-Sadat's infitah** policy lured back some British investors and visitors. Cultural ties between the two countries have long been close in **literature, theater, archaeology**, and Arabic studies. The British Council has been especially prominent in building cultural ties. In recent years, London has become a refuge for Arabic writers and journalists seeking to avoid Egypt's **ensorship** or its **prisons**.

seeking to avoid Egypt's **censorship** or its **prisons**. Since 1988 Britain has been the leading non-Arab investor in Egypt's **economy**, many British **tourists** have visited the country, and diplomatic relations have been cordial.

BRITISH AGENCY, *see* **RESIDENCY**.

BRITISH OCCUPATION. Term commonly applied to Egypt's de facto subjection to **Britain** from September 1882, when British forces, estimated at 30 thousand, defeated the 10 thousand man Egyptian army of Colonel **Ahmad Urabi**, until June 1956, when the last British troops withdrew from their **Suez Canal** base. For most of the period between 1883 and 1914, the actual size of the British contingent in Egypt was less than 5 thousand. It comprised four battalions of infantry, a cavalry regiment, and two artillery batteries. When **World War I** broke out, these troops were replaced by British territorials (roughly equivalent to the U.S. National Guard), consisting of the 42nd Lancaster division and six yeomanry squadrons. They were augmented by some 50 thousand imperial troops, mainly Indians, Australians, and New Zealanders, who repulsed the **Ottoman** attack on the Canal in 1915. More British Empire troops were stationed in Egypt during and after the Gallipoli Campaign, angering many Egyptians by their riotous behavior.

The war's end did not immediately diminish the size of the occupying army, due to the disorders caused by the **1919 Revolution**, but most troops were withdrawn after Britain's unilateral declaration of Egypt's independence in 1922. The **Wafd** and other nationalist parties wanted Britain to evacuate Egypt completely, but Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were protracted. The 1936 **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty** limited the British army of occupation to 10 thousand troops during peacetime, but in 1939 55 thousand British troops remained in Egypt and the **Sudan**. During **World War II** burgeoning contingents from Britain and its overseas dominions occupied the Suez Canal, **Cairo**, **Alexandria**, and other strategic posts in defense of Allied interests.

After the war popular pressure against the occupation intensified. The British agreed to evacuate their bases in Cairo, **Alexandria**, and other Egyptian towns, but retained and reinforced their installations along the Suez Canal, as a part of the Western strategy to contain **Communist** expansion. Successive Egyptian governments

tried in vain to negotiate with Britain for complete **evacuation** of Egypt and the Sudan. Popular agitation turned into direct action, as Egyptian *fidaiyin* attacked British bases and their local employees went on strike, leading in early 1952 to armed confrontations and to **Black Saturday**.

The **1952 Revolution** stilled the agitation, but the new regime resumed talks with Britain, under **U.S.** diplomatic pressure. Britain and Egypt finally agreed to the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal bases, retaining only civilian technicians to reactivate them in case of an attack by any outside power against an **Arab League** member or Turkey. Inclusion of this state, a member of NATO, subtly tied the Canal's strategic importance with the West's defense against the **USSR**, but did not draw Egypt into an alliance. The British occupation ended 20 months later. The Anglo-French attack in the 1956 **Suez War** led to a temporary reoccupation of some facilities and to Egypt's nullification of Britain's reoccupation rights under the 1954 agreement.

BULAQ. Port city for **Cairo** from **Mamluk** times until the late 19th century. Under **Muhammad Ali** it became the site of the first Arabic printing press owned by the Egyptian government (*see* **Press**). The press was established in 1822 under the direction of Niqula al-Musabiki, of **Syrian** origin. Privately owned from 1865 to 1880, it then was restored to state control. In addition to producing printed editions of many Arabic manuscripts, it printed military manuals, school textbooks, administrative circulars, and the official *al-Waqai' al-Misriyya*. Bulaq city has lately been engulfed by Cairo. Some of its monuments and historic residences have fallen victim to urban overcrowding and the extension of the Nile **Corniche**.

BUREAUCRACY. Because of its complex hydraulic economic and social organization, Egypt has the world's oldest bureaucracy, or civil service. The Egyptian government has long taken part in the provision and distribution of **Nile River** floodwaters and in taxing the agricultural produce of the peasants, hence has needed a corps of trained clerks and inspectors throughout its history. Under Arab, **Mamluk**, and **Ottoman** rule, **Copts** predominated in the civil service, especially in accountancy. At the time of the **French occupation**, **Napoléon Bonaparte** announced: "All Egyptians shall be

called upon to manage all posts: the wisest, the most learned, the most virtuous shall govern, and the people shall be happy.”

In reality, the French took the higher posts formerly reserved for Mamluks, and Copts kept their preponderant role. They, along with the **Armenians**, benefited from the Westernizing reforms of **Muhammad Ali**, who expanded the bureaucracy and widened its functions. He also founded the *Darsakhana al-Mulkiya* (Civil Service School) in 1829 to train bureaucrats in Western methods of administration and accountancy; it was followed in 1834 by the *Madrasa li-Ta'lim al-Idara al-Mulkiya* (School of Civil Administration). Despite these schools and the government policy of sending some students on missions to study civil administration in Europe, most high posts still went to Turks, Middle Eastern Christians, and foreigners.

Muhammad Ali's successors replaced his higher functionaries with their own appointees; **Sa'id** and **Isma'il** greatly increased the number of European civil servants. Under the financial stringencies introduced by the **Law of Liquidation** (1880), their number was to have been reduced, and **Ahmad Urabi's** followers also objected to the fact that in 1882 Europeans, who made up 2 percent of Egypt's civil service, drew 16 percent of the total salaries. The **British occupation** led to a gradual reduction in the proportion of continental Europeans in the civil service, but Britons increased from 299 in 1886 to 455 in 1899. Under **Cromer** the Egyptian government began hiring recent Oxford and Cambridge graduates for teaching jobs, inspectorships, and advisory posts, even where qualified Egyptians were available. The British came to dominate especially the higher government positions. **World War I** claimed many of the ablest British bureaucrats, but the Anglicization of the civil service continued and was one of the grievances leading to the **1919 Revolution**.

As a result of the **Milner Mission's** report and the 1922 declaration of Egypt's independence, the British turned over many administrative functions to Egyptians. Under the **1923 Constitution** the Egyptian government systematically pruned its civil service of British and other foreign functionaries. Regrettably, though, government **employment** became snarled in partisan politics; as the **Wafd Party** and its rivals gained and lost power, their protégés benefited or suffered accordingly, and high positions became prizes for friends and relatives of the politicians. The government was considering setting

up an independent civil service department under the prime minister when the **1952 Revolution** occurred.

The new regime instituted a system of regular grades and salary schedules, with promotions and raises based on merit and with definite penalties for corruption, political activity, holding outside jobs, or favoring friends or relatives. Almost half the senior bureaucrats under **Faruq** were purged. Egypt's bureaucracy ballooned from 250 thousand in 1952 to 1.2 million in 1970 because of the growing state role in Egypt's **economy** and because of **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** 1962 commitment to offer a government post to every graduate of the national universities. Public corporations, managing most of Egypt's nationalized industries, rose from one in 1957 to 46 in 1970.

Despite **Anwar al-Sadat's** *infitah* policy, the number of civil servants rose further to 1.9 million (3.2 million if public-sector companies are included) in 1978 and 4.7 million in 2001. In 1998 government employment accounted for 42 percent of all newly created jobs, despite the privatization of some public-sector companies. **Atif Ubayd's** **cabinet** has added more than a million government jobs.

With the monthly salary at the lowest civil service rank a mere £E 200 (\$45), bureaucratic morale and performance have deteriorated. A UN study found that the average Egyptian bureaucrat works only 27 minutes per day. The decentralization of provincial and local government has reduced central control over the bureaucracy outside **Cairo**. Short of a revolutionary change in Egypt's government, its bureaucracy will remain an obstacle to its political and economic development.

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CABINET, *see* **COUNCIL OF MINISTERS**.

CAIRO. Egypt's capital since 969 CE, when it was founded by the Fatimid dynasty. Located some 20 km south of the apex of the Nile Delta, Cairo's strategic location dominates the central approach axis to Upper Egypt. A major intellectual and economic center under the **Mamluks**, Cairo was eclipsed when Egypt was subordinated to the **Ottoman Empire** but it began to revive under **Muhammad Ali** and was expanded and largely transformed under Isma'il. Although under

British occupation from 1882 to 1946, Cairo became the major center of Egyptian resistance to Western colonialism. It also became the virtual capital of Arab culture, including **literature**, journalism, the **visual arts**, recording, **cinema**, **radio**, and **television**. Its daily **newspapers**, weekly magazines, and literary monthlies circulate throughout the Arab world. It contains several well-known universities, including **al-Azhar**, **Cairo University**, **Ain Shams University**, and **AUC**, which draw students from all parts of the Arab world. Cairo's **Egyptian Museum** and other **museums** are major **tourist** attractions, and the famous Giza Pyramids and Sphinx are nearby.

The city has served as the headquarters of the **Arab League** in 1945–79 and since 1991 and of **AAPSO**. It was the site of a **World War II** meeting of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, and of several summit conferences of Arab kings and heads of state since 1964. Arab leaders meeting in Cairo also effected an agreement between Jordan's King Husayn and the Palestinian *fidaiyin* in September 1970, ending the Jordan Civil War. Its population was approximately 250 thousand in 1850, 1 million in 1930, 1.5 million in 1947, and 6.8 million in 1996. If Shubra al-Khayma, Giza, and **Helwan** are included, greater Cairo currently has 15.5 million inhabitants and adds some 300 thousand more each year. Air pollution, crowded housing, and traffic congestion are, therefore, major problems for the people of Cairo.

CAIRO TOWER. Lotus-shaped, 187-meter tall structure built in **Zamalek** between 1955 and 1961 by the Egyptian government on lands that formerly had belonged to the **Gezira Sporting Club**. The tower, containing a revolving restaurant, was built as a **tourist** attraction and was the world's tallest concrete structure at the time of its completion. Formally inaugurated by **Kamal al-Din Husayn** in April 1961, the tower is popularly believed to have been financed by an £E450 thousand bribe from the **U.S. Central Intelligence Agency** to President **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**.

CAIRO UNIVERSITY. Egypt's first secular institution of higher learning, founded in 1908 as the "National University" and situated in the center of **Cairo**, in what is now **AUC**'s main building. Credit for first proposing the University has been given to Prince **Fuad I**, **Mustafa Kamil**, **Muhammad Abduh**, **Sa'd Zaghlul**, **Qasim Amin**, **Education Undersecretary Ya'qub Artin**, and **Jurji**

Zaydan. The initiative was seized in 1907 by **Abbas Hilmi II**, who appointed his uncle Fuad to manage the new institution, which rented the palace of **tobacco** magnate Nestor Gianaclis and initially offered courses in **literature**, philosophy, and history, all taught by European professors. It gradually added vocationally oriented courses in the social sciences, criminology, and law, and admitted Egyptians from **Dar al-Ulum** and other schools. Few British nationals taught at the University, but Italian and French professors were prominent. Student enrollment peaked at 415 in 1909–10 and—after tuition fees were raised—fell back to 107 in 1921–22; about 20 percent were Europeans, and many Egyptians tried to attend lectures without registering for degree candidacy. Many held full-time jobs and could only attend classes offered at night.

Hobbled by financial problems, the University barely survived **World War I** and the **1919 Revolution**, and the Egyptian government, together with its British advisers, began to consider establishing a state-owned university. It was reorganized as the Faculty of Arts within the University of Cairo, to which were added the Faculties of Law, Medicine, and Science in 1925. The Higher School of Commerce, the Polytechnic and Agriculture schools, and Dar al-Ulum were gradually assimilated into the new institution. **Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid** was its first rector. Initially housed in Za'faran Palace in Abbasiyya, it was moved in 1928 to a French-designed campus in Giza, on what then was rural land donated by the Egyptian royal family. In its early days, Cairo University tended to be a cultural battleground between the largely Franco-phone faculty and those who wanted instruction in English. Gradually Egyptians replaced Europeans in the deanships and professorial chairs, making Arabic the primary language of instruction in the Arts and Law faculties; the scientific and technical subjects tended to use English. **Women** were admitted for the first time in 1928; the first woman joined the staff in 1930. University fees remained a deterrent to the admission of poor students until 1962, when **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** abolished all tuition charges. The lack of residence halls also tended to exclude poorer students with provincial backgrounds; the first men's hostel was opened in 1949 and the first one for women only in 1957.

Student political involvement, imitating the pattern begun by the government **Law School** students during the **Mustafa Kamil**

era and in the 1919 Revolution, became endemic and vitiated the University's teaching function. The years 1935–39 and 1945–52 were especially marked by student strikes and demonstrations, as the **Muslim Brothers**, *Misr al-Fatat*, and the **Communists** gradually gained at the expense of the **Wafd** and other political parties. Rectors and deans were frequently changed by the government on political rather than academic grounds. Many students left their classes to become *fidaiyin* against the British in the **Suez Canal** zone in 1951. When **Mustafa al-Nahhas** abrogated the 1936 **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty**, all British teachers at the University were dismissed, weakening especially the English and Classics departments.

The **1952 Revolution** led to many changes in the University. Many of its students demonstrated in favor of **Muhammad Najib** and were later purged, creating a more repressive atmosphere. Government outlays on higher education skyrocketed under Nasir, but a growing number of universities competed for the state budget. Admissions rose rapidly, especially after tuition fees were abolished in 1962, but faculty-to-student ratios worsened steadily. Some faculties were able to maintain high admission standards, notably Medicine, Engineering, and Pharmacy, but Commerce, Law, and Arts (humanities) became dumping grounds for students whose general secondary (*thanawiyya amma*) scores did not qualify them for the prestigious schools. Some faculty members were siphoned off by other Egyptian universities, the new scientific research centers, and (especially after 1967) emigration to higher-paying universities in other Arab countries. Nasir made the state the employer of last resort for university graduates, but also a disturbing force in campus governance, as the minister of higher **education** appointed rectors and deans without regard to faculty wishes. On the other hand, professors and holders of higher degrees from the University have gained acceptance in **cabinets** and other high positions since 1952. Some of the faculty autonomy diminished by the Revolution was later restored by Nasir and **Anwar al-Sadat**. In student politics, the *jama'at* have displaced Marxist and other secular groups, and many students have adopted Islamic patterns of dress and behavior.

Cairo University has spawned, at least indirectly, all the other national universities in Egypt and many in other Arab states, but its precarious independence, inadequate funding, and burgeoning

student enrollments have left it weaker than its founders hoped it would be. Its reported enrollment rose from 2,027 in 1925–26, 7,021 in 1935–36, 18,246 in 1950–51, 27,973 in 1961–62, and 47,463 in 1965–66 to 76,794 in 1992. It had 155 thousand students and 5,519 instructors in 23 faculties in 2002.

CAISSE DE LA DETTE PUBLIQUE. The commission, comprising representatives of **Britain**, **France**, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, to which Germany and **Russia** were later added, that was set up to manage the Egyptian government debt in 1876 to ensure its repayment to foreign creditors. Its powers were enlarged with the appointment of the European ministry in 1878 and the promulgation of the **Law of Liquidation** in 1880. Often assailed during the early **British occupation** for obstructing financial and **irrigation** reforms, the *Caisse* served to represent Egypt's major creditors up to the declaration of the British **Protectorate** in 1914, but did not interfere with the government's projects after the 1904 *Entente Cordiale*.

CALIPHATE. The institution of leadership of the Muslim *umma*, established after Muhammad's death in 632 and maintained until its abolition by the Turkish government of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) in 1924, a move many Muslims condemned. Egypt spearheaded several abortive attempts to revive the caliphate under Kings **Fuad I** and **Faruq**. Some **Islamists** have lately campaigned to restore the caliphate to promote Muslim unity.

CAMP DAVID ACCORDS (1978). Agreements reached in September 1978 between President **Anwar al-Sadat** and Israeli Premier Menachem Begin, with the help of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, aimed at establishing peace between Egypt and **Israel** and a framework for solving the issue of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation. The accords led to the **Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty**, but the subsequent **Palestinian Autonomy Talks** between the two sides foundered on the irreconcilable differences between them.

CAPITULATIONS. Treaties granting extraterritorial immunity from local laws and taxes to subjects of Western countries living in the **Ottoman Empire** or other Muslim states, and also to Muslims living in Western countries. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, Europeans who benefited from the Capitulations often exploited

Egypt and other Ottoman lands, and their privileges became a focus of nationalist resentment. They were phased out in Egypt following the 1937 **Montreux Convention**.

CAVE MISSION (1876). **British** commission of inquiry headed by Sir Stephen Cave, a Member of Parliament, and charged with determining Egypt's financial condition. The immediate cause was **Khedive Isma'il's** sale of the Egyptian government's shares in the **Suez Canal Company** for £E4 million to the British government, which he invited to send a financial adviser. After a two-month visit, Cave reported in April 1876 that Egypt's **finances** were in a crisis, especially if Egypt contracted new loans at high rates of interest. The other European powers inferred that the Egyptian government was close to bankruptcy and that Britain was trying to take control of Egypt's finances. Egyptian stock prices fell, and Isma'il, unable to float new bonds, had to suspend payment on his treasury bills. In May he issued decrees creating the international *Caisse de la Dette Publique*, with four members representing Britain, **France**, Austria, and Italy and issuing a new plan to fund Egypt's bonded and floating debt at £E91 million, bearing 7 percent interest. The bondholders rejected this offer and demanded a new settlement, leading to the **Goschen-Joubert Mission**.

CENSORSHIP. The state has tried to control written materials entering Egypt or circulating within the country since ancient times. The Egyptian government promulgated press legislation as early as 1865 and enforced a stringent **Press Law** between 1881 and 1894, when publishers found that they could evade prosecution under the **Capitulations** by seeking foreign protectors. But the Press Law was revised in 1909 and strengthened following the assassination of **Butros Ghali** in 1910. The British imposed strict censorship of printed materials and letters entering Egypt during **World War I** and again during **World War II**; tense political conditions after the war led to a continuation of these restrictions under Egyptian government auspices. The government imposed strict censorship on **Zionist** materials in 1948, and unstable political conditions during and after the **Palestine War** led to a continuation of government controls until after the fall of the monarchy.

After the **1952 Revolution**, the new regime lifted censorship in August but resumed it in October 1952. **Muhammad Najib**

again removed restrictions in March 1954, but the widespread street disorders accompanying the power struggle between Najib's and **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** factions necessitated their reimposition in April. Nasir later imposed surveillance on mail, films, and printed materials deemed injurious to **Arab socialism**. Although **Anwar al-Sadat** ended most forms of censorship in 1974, the Egyptian government still censors some films, videos, and printed matter for political subversion, religious fanaticism, and pornography. **Mubarak** tried (but failed) to impose a new press law in 1995 as a part of his campaign to curb Islamist violence. An *ad hoc* committee of **al-Azhar ulama** censors written and graphic work for their religious or moral content.

CENTERS OF POWER. Clique of leftist Egyptian officers and their civilian allies at the end of the **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** era, informally led by **Ali Sabri** and including Interior Minister **Sha'rawi Jum'a**, Presidential Affairs Minister **Sami Sharaf**, War Minister **Muhammad Fawzi**, and the speaker of Egypt's **National Assembly**. They also held most of the executive positions within the **ASU** and hoped to take power after Nasir died. They acquiesced in **Anwar al-Sadat's** succession, believing that he lacked an independent power base and could easily be controlled. Sadat soon won the backing of the more conservative members of Nasir's government, appointing one of them, **Mahmud Fawzi**, as his prime minister over the leftists' objections and winning the support of the senior military officers. Sadat struck at the leftists on 14 May 1971 by dismissing Ali Sabri as vice president and proceeded to purge his supporters the next day in his **Corrective Revolution**. Most were tried, deprived of their posts and their property, and imprisoned. Personal rivalries and inadequate institutionalization of Nasir's regime led to their downfall.

CENTRAL AUDITING AGENCY. Office set up by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** to supervise the management of public-sector companies and government departments. It is independent of the **cabinet**.

CENTRAL BANK OF EGYPT. Egypt's national bank, founded in 1961, responsible for issuing **currency** and making loans, when needed, to other banks. Its total capitalization in 2001 was £E100 billion. According to the bank's reported statistics, it held foreign assets close to £14 billion and domestic assets exceeding £56 billion.

The total number of Egyptian pounds in circulation was 70.338 billion (about \$15 billion) in December 2001.

CENTRAL SECURITY FORCE RIOTS (1986). Large-scale disorders in **Cairo**, resulting in the total destruction of **tourist** hotels near the Pyramids and the Sphinx, at least 60 deaths, 300 injuries, and 2 thousand damaged cars. The leaders and most of the participants were illiterate draftees whose duties in this paramilitary police force, set up after the 1977 **Food Riots** to augment the regular police, included guarding public buildings, embassies, roads, and bridges, for a monthly wage of £E6. The riots were set off by a rumor that the Egyptian government was planning to extend their three-year service by an additional year. The clashes lasted for four days before they were suppressed by loyal units of the **armed forces**. A 10-day curfew ensued, and 20 thousand conscripts were dismissed. **Husni Mubarak** continued, however, to utilize the Central Security Force, which had grown to 150 thousand members by 2000, against students, striking workers, and **Islamist** militants.

CENTURY STORAGE SCHEME. Elaborate system of dams put forth by various hydrologists during the early 20th century for the several tributaries of the **Nile River**, as a means of increasing the amount of irrigated land in Egypt and the **Sudan**, facilitating year-round water storage, and ensuring an adequate summer supply for Egypt's **agriculture**. However, this proposal would have had to involve all the states containing those tributaries in its planning and execution. The only action taken on any facet of the Century Storage Scheme was the building of the Owen Falls Dam in Uganda in 1948–54. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**'s government decided to scrap this proposal in favor of building the **Aswan High Dam**. *See also Irrigation.*

CHAMPOLLION, JEAN-FRANÇOIS (1790–1832). French Oriental scholar and the father of modern Egyptology. He was educated at home by his elder brother, at the Lycée in Grenoble, and at the Collège de **France** and the École Spéciale des Langues Orientales Vivantes in Paris. He taught in Grenoble from 1809 to 1821. As conservator of the Louvre's Egyptian collections, using his knowledge of Greek, Coptic, and other ancient languages, he gradually devised a system for translating the demotic and hieroglyphic versions of the Rosetta stone, which had been found by **Napoléon Bonaparte**'s

troops. He thus laid the groundwork for all later studies of ancient Egyptian inscriptions.

CHARTER, NATIONAL (1962). Egyptian government document stating and justifying the goals of **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's Arab socialism**. It explained the historical conditions in Egypt that made the **1952 Revolution** necessary, noted changing political and social conditions in the world that called for socialist action, summarized the history of Egypt's struggle for independence from Western imperialism, contrasted the country's false democracy before 23 July 1952 with Nasir's truly democratic movement that stressed social justice, explained the role of Arab socialism in bettering economic conditions at home and Egypt's position in the world, laid out a socialist strategy for Egypt's **agricultural** and **industrial** development, invoked individual freedom and modern science as the means to achieve socialism, pledged Egypt to work for Arab unity, and proclaimed a **foreign policy** of opposition to imperialism and the pursuit of peace and international cooperation. It was a widely publicized statement of Nasir's policies up to 1967.

CHEETHAM, Sir MILNE (1869–1938). **British** administrator. Born in Preston, England, he studied classics at Christ Church College, Oxford, after which he entered the diplomatic service and served in various posts before he went to **Cairo** as first secretary and then as counselor. He took charge of the **Agency** for **Gorst** in the summers of 1910 and 1911 and likewise for Lord **Kitchener** in subsequent summers. At the beginning of **World War I**, he piloted Britain's diplomatic mission through a difficult six months of imperial mobilization at a time when Egypt was still legally a privileged province of the **Ottoman Empire**, which declared war on Britain in November 1914. When the British government declared its **Protectorate** over Egypt in December 1914, Cheetham became acting **high commissioner**, pending the arrival of Sir **Henry McMahon**. He took charge of the **Residency** in the fall of 1915 and again during the spring and fall of 1919, hence he confronted the crisis brought about by the **1919 Revolution**. He also advised the **Milner Mission** during its visit to Egypt in 1919–20 and influenced the early policies of Lord **Allenby** as high commissioner. Cheetham later served as Britain's chief diplomatic representative in several European capitals

and retired in 1928. His unpublished memoir, "British Policy, 1910–45," is in the Middle East Centre, St. Antony's College, Oxford.

CHOLERA. Infectious intestinal disease caused by a bacterium usually transmitted in food or water contaminated by persons who have the disease, but sometimes also by flies. The bacteria settle in the intestines, causing diarrhea and vomiting so severe that the patient quickly becomes dehydrated, goes into shock, and dies. Treatment requires strict isolation of the patient and sterilization of utensils, burning or disinfection of all bodily wastes, and prompt replacement of body fluids. Strict sanitary measures, including quarantine, are needed to stop its spread to other people. Egypt suffered major cholera epidemics in 1831, 1848, 1865, 1883, 1902, and 1947.

CINEMA. Motion picture shows in Egypt began in 1904, if not earlier, and cinema halls were erected in **Alexandria** and **Cairo** before **World War I**. The influx of **British** imperial troops during that war did much to introduce Egyptians to cinema productions from Europe and North America. Egyptian film production began in Alexandria in 1917. A full-length silent film, *al-Bahr byidhaq leh* (Why Does the Nile Laugh?) soon followed, and in 1925 serious efforts at film production began, leading to the appearance of four movies two years later. The first sound film, *Awlad al-dhawāt* (Children of the Upper Class) was synchronized in Paris soon after the talking pictures began in the West. A large Arabic film company, Studio Misr, owned by **Bank Misr**, was founded in 1934. Cinema halls proliferated in the cities and towns of Egypt and the rest of the Arab world, to which Egyptian films were often exported. Egyptian films competed in the Venice Film Festival as early as 1936.

Objections to the motion picture **industry** have been raised by conservative Muslims, notably **al-Azhar**, **al-Shubban al-Muslimin**, and the Society of the **Muslim Brothers**. The state censors films on moral, political, and religious grounds. In some parts of Egypt, **women** and adolescent boys have been discouraged from going to cinema halls. Even though official and unofficial **censorship** has weakened Egypt's film industry in recent years, people throughout the Arab world continue to enjoy films and videos by such producers as **Yusuf Shahin** and starring such actors as **Omar Sharif**. The Cairo International Film Festival has been held annually since 1976.

CIRCISSIANS. Natives of the Caucasus mountain region east of the Black Sea, or their descendants living in Egypt. Many of the **Mamluks** claimed Circassian origins.

CITADEL, CAIRO. Fortress built by Salah al-Din (r. 1169–93) and augmented by later rulers of Egypt, situated on the Muqattam hills overlooking **Cairo**. **Muhammad Ali** sometimes held court at the Citadel, massacred the **Mamluks** there in 1811, and destroyed many older monuments in order to build his Jawhara Palace. Its Muhammad Ali Mosque, completed by his grandson, **Abbas Hilmi I**, still dominates the Cairo skyline.

CLEOPATRA BOYCOTT. American labor's response to **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** 1959 ban on the shipping of goods to or from **Israel** through the **Suez Canal**. The Seafarers' International Union blocked the unloading of the Egyptian merchant ship *Cleopatra* from 13 to 16 April 1960, alleging that American sailors were being mistreated in Arab ports and their ships blacklisted by the Arabs for trading with **Israel**. Despite requests by President Dwight Eisenhower to end the boycott, it was supported by the courts and by Congress. The union called off its pickets after most Arab ports staged a retaliatory boycott of American shipping and the **U.S.** State Department issued a statement promising to investigate grievances, support free access to the canal, and seek a settlement to the Arab–Israeli conflict.

CLOT, AUGUSTE BARTHÉLEMY (1793–1868). French physician. Born in Grenoble, he was educated at the Hospice de la Charité, Marseilles, and Montpellier. He opened a surgical practice in Marseilles, until **Muhammad Ali** invited him to serve as his chief surgeon in Egypt. Clot organized a public health service and a medical school. He and his European staff trained many Turks and Egyptians in **Cairo** to become army surgeons, taking some of his best pupils to **France** for specialized training there. His two-volume work, *Aperçu générale sur l'Égypte*, was published in 1840. He was an outstanding example of a French citizen who dedicated himself to Egypt's modernization. A Cairo street bears his name.

COMMUNICATIONS. Given its location athwart a main international **trade** route, Egypt was one of the first countries involved in long-distance communications. **Muhammad Ali** set up a rudimentary

postal service for his own officials and officers and also commissioned the East India Company, due in part to its energetic agent, **Thomas Waghorn**, to improve the **Cairo–Suez** road, carry the mails, and erect a line of telegraph semaphores along that route. These tasks were taken over by the Peninsular and Oriental Steamship Company in 1840. Four years later, the Egyptian government set up its own Transit Administration to manage these services. Egypt's postal service was officially begun in 1865 under **Khedive Isma'il** to carry letters and parcels within Egypt. Its functions were expanded to include transmitting money orders in 1868.

The telegraph was introduced into Egypt soon after the **railroad**. In 1855 **Sa'id**'s government commissioned an English firm to run lines from **Alexandria** to Cairo and from Cairo to Suez. In the following year the Eastern Telegraph Company linked Alexandria with Crete and Istanbul by a cable under the Mediterranean. The same company began planning to lay a cable between Suez and Bombay, but technical problems in the Red Sea delayed completion of this project, so early British cable communication with India passed through Mesopotamia and Persia instead. In Egypt a representative of the Eastern Telegraph Company got a 50-year concession to extend the lines used by the Egyptian government. Under Isma'il, the number of lines increased from six, totaling 500 km, to 36, spanning more than 9 thousand km, facilitating official, commercial, and private communication.

Egypt's first telephones were installed in 1881 by the American Bell Company. The number of telephones rose from 66 thousand in 1940 to 122 in 1951 and approximately 600 thousand in 1984, but the demand for commercial and home telephones far exceeded the supply. Domestic service remained erratic, despite improvements during the 1980s, but international service improved once direct-distance dialing was begun. Egypt had almost 4 million telephone lines and 637 thousand mobile phones in 1999; these figures reached 7.7 and 4.5 million in January 2003. The Egyptian Company for Mobile Communications was capitalized at ££3.251 billion in 2001.

The inauguration of telex facilities in the 1970s eclipsed the telegraph system, and lately fax machines have been introduced to Egyptian offices. The Arab communications satellite network, with Egypt as a focal point, opened in 1991. More recent advances include the introduction of e-mail. Egypt had approximately 50 Inter-

net service providers and 300 thousand users in 2000. One 2002 report stated that Egypt has 900 thousand users. *See also* **Computers**.

COMMUNISM. Ideology calling for state or other collective ownership of the means of production, to be achieved by a workers' revolution against a dominant capitalist class. Because Egypt was under **British occupation** in the late 19th and early 20th century and because most of its capitalists were foreigners, Egyptians spent most of their political energy on such national liberation movements as the **National Party** and the **Wafd**. Some did espouse **socialism**, but not necessarily in its **Marxist** form. The Egyptian **Socialist Party** began in 1921 as an umbrella organization that included Fabians and social democrats as well as Marxists, but the next year it was recast as the Egyptian Communist Party, a member of the Comintern, having ties with at least 20 labor organizations in Egypt. In 1924 they challenged **Sa'd Zaghul**'s authority by calling workers' strikes against the Egyptian Oil Company and **Alexandria textile** factories, but were suppressed by the army. The leaders were arrested, their trade union confederation was disbanded, and the Communist Party, banned by the government in 1925, languished for two decades.

Egyptian **Jewish** intellectuals played a major role in its revival as part of their anti-Fascist efforts in the late 1930s; some Copts and Muslims took part, but in lesser numbers. The Union of Peace Supporters, formed in 1934 by Paul Jacot Descombes, was democratic-leftist, but hesitated to organize the Communist movement in Egypt because its membership was mainly foreign, young, and well-off. Three Jewish Marxists, Marcel Israel, Hillel Schwartz, and Henri Curiel, founded the Democratic Union in 1939, but it soon split into factions. In 1943, Curiel formed the **Egyptian Movement for National Liberation (EMNL)** to bring Marxist ideas to the Egyptian masses. He opened a socialist bookstore in central **Cairo**, interviewed surviving Communists from the former party, and contacted workers in Shubra al-Khayma and al-Mahalla al-Kubra, eventuating in the creation of the Congress of the Union of Egyptian Workers in 1946. Hillel Schwartz formed *Iskra* in 1943, appealing especially to the intelligentsia via the universities. Other factions included the group around the magazine *New Dawn*, the Popular Vanguard for Liberation, and the **Wafdist Vanguard**. After **World War II**, the major student and worker groups jointly formed the **NCWS**, which included Communists as well as other leftists.

In 1947 the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation merged with *Iskra* to form the *Haraka al-Dimuqratiya li al-Taharrur al-Watani* (Democratic Movement for National Liberation), usually called **Hadeto**, Egypt's main Communist movement from 1947 to 1954. Several Egyptians, notably Isma'il Sabri Abdallah and Fuad Mursi, formed the Egyptian Communist Party in 1950, aided by **France's** Communists. Although it based its theoretical framework on the writings of Lenin and Stalin and hoped, therefore, to organize the working class, its membership came mainly from students and intellectuals of bourgeois origin, and it practiced a tighter party discipline than *Hadeto*. Its tentative approaches to *Misr al-Fatat*, the **National Party**, and to **Ihsan Abd al-Quddus**, editor of *Ruz al-Yusuf*, proved abortive. Unlike *Hadeto*, it did not support the **1952 Revolution**, calling it a military dictatorship with Fascist coloring. All leftist groups opposed **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** efforts to crush the political parties, but the Communists survived underground. In 1957 *Hadeto*, its dissident factions, and the Egyptian Communist Party merged as the United Egyptian Communist Party, to be joined in 1958 by the Workers' Vanguard. The formation of the **UAR** and the struggle between the Arab nationalists and the Communists in post-revolutionary **Iraq** led to new troubles for Egypt's Communists, some 2,000 of whom were arrested and jailed in January 1959. Although Nasir moved toward **Arab socialism** with his **July Laws** and **National Charter**, the Communists remained in **prison** until 1964.

Convinced of Nasir's conversion to scientific socialism, all the groups within the United Egyptian Communist Party agreed in 1965 to merge and to work with the **ASU**, especially its leftist **Vanguard Organization**. Although they were allowed to publish a Marxist monthly, *al-Tali'a*, Nasir kept them under surveillance and prevented them from forming new organizations as a political alternative to his regime. In 1972 Egypt's Communist Party was secretly revived and started publishing a **newspaper** about nine times a year called *al-Intisar*, and an internal organ on Party issues called *al-Wa'y*. It now has several splinter groups, some of them Maoist or Trotskyite; a few may be wholly fictitious.

The Egyptian Communists held a congress in 1980 on Egyptian territory, at which they called for "the liberation of the whole Arab homeland from imperialism and **Zionism**." Their party published reports in 1975 and 1983; they are available in English translation in Ismael and Sa'id's *Communist Movement in Egypt*,

1920—1988. The party held another congress in 1985. Four Communists ran as independents in the **1987 elections**; all lost. The party opposed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and called on both Iraqi and **U.S.** troops to withdraw, in order to resolve the crisis peacefully.

The Communists provided a more sophisticated analysis of Egypt's economic and social problems and influenced the ASU's ideology, but their appeal to the Egyptian masses was blunted by their assumed ties to the **USSR**, their hostility to **religion**, their stress on class warfare, and their founders' non-Muslim background.

COMPUTERS. The Egyptian government installed a few mainframe computers in the 1970s, and by 1981 both Apple and IBM began marketing personal computers to business firms and individuals. The spread of computers has been gradual, due in part to their cost and to the shortage of skilled operators and software engineers. In April 2000 IBM entered into a partnership with the Egyptian government to train 3,000 software **engineers** annually over five years. The business sectors that have so far advanced the furthest in computer usage are banking and **communications**, but Internet use, in both English and Arabic, is growing rapidly, and nearly every ministry and every newspaper has its own website. It is estimated that there were 12 computers per 1,000 Egyptians in 2002.

CONSTANTINOPLE CONVENTION (1888). Agreement reached by the European powers and the **Ottoman Empire**, pledging to keep the **Suez Canal** open to ships of all nations in times of peace or war. Egypt was not a signatory to the Convention, which **Britain** violated in both **world wars** by barring Germany and its allies from the canal. Foreign powers invoked the Convention in 1956, when Egypt nationalized the **Suez Canal Company**, as did **Israel** when its ships and cargoes were barred from transiting the canal.

CONSTITUTION (1882). Revised version of a constitution first proposed by **Muhammad Sharif** in 1879. Delegates to the legislature, or **National Assembly**, were to be elected for five-year terms and to receive an annual salary of £E100. Its president was to be chosen by the **khedive** from among three of the delegates proposed by the Assembly. The ministers were singly and collectively responsible to the Assembly; each could be summoned to testify about his actions. Any

bill initiated by the government must be read to the Assembly, debated, voted upon, and accepted by the khedive. No tax could be imposed unless it had been passed by the Assembly.

Although Sharif had not wanted to let the delegates vote on the state budget, the leaders of the Assembly insisted on that right, which appears in Article 35, but they were not allowed to debate the tribute paid to the **Ottoman Empire** or the service of the public debt. The Assembly was to be in session for three months of the year; in case the **cabinet** had to take action at other times, the affair should be submitted to the Assembly for examination at its next session. The Assembly agreed that its delegates would in the future number 125, including 12 representatives from the **Sudan** and the Red Sea provinces and seven for the **bedouin** tribes, and that they should be elected in two stages. The Assembly, which had opened in December 1881, remained in session until 26 March 1882; many of its members, mainly rural landowners, took part in the deliberations during the subsequent political crisis, but the Assembly as a whole was never reconvened, and the 1882 Constitution was abrogated by **Tawfiq** after **Ahmad Urabi**'s defeat.

CONSTITUTION (1923). The most liberal of Egypt's constitutions, at least in theory. It guaranteed most of the civil rights and liberties enjoyed by citizens in liberal democratic countries, including freedom of expression and assembly, inviolability of domicile and property, and the right to practice any belief or religion. It made elementary **education** free and compulsory for both boys and girls. The king wielded executive power and shared legislative power with Parliament, consisting of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, judicial power being assigned to the relevant court systems. The king was the supreme head of state, his person was inviolable, he could veto laws, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, adjourn Parliament for one month, promulgate emergency legislation between sessions, declare war or a state of siege, commission civil officials and military and naval officers, appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers and ambassadors, and name his successor with the assent of Parliament. The ministers were to conduct government policy and were responsible to the two houses of Parliament, where they were given the privilege of the floor but no vote. If Parliament took a vote of no confidence, the ministers would have to resign. If the ministers violated the Consti-

tution and laws, they could be tried by a special court made up of 16 members of Parliament.

Two-fifths of the Senate members were appointed by the king; the rest were elected by universal adult male suffrage. Provinces were assigned senators in proportion to their population. Minimum requirements of age, political position, social station, or property limited eligibility for appointment to the Senate, and the term was for 10 years. Its session would be suspended if the Chamber of Deputies were dissolved. All members of the Chamber of Deputies were elected by universal adult male suffrage. Each province was entitled to a representative for every 60 thousand of its inhabitants or fraction thereof exceeding 30 thousand. Each deputy had to be at least 30 years old, and terms were set at five years. If the Chamber was dissolved for a specific issue, the new one could not be dissolved over the same question. The king was to convene both houses of Parliament in Cairo on the third Saturday of November, and each session was to last for six months. Deliberations were to be public, unless 10 or more members petitioned for a closed meeting, and a quorum for business was a majority of the members. Proposed laws were to be examined by the relevant committees before being passed by the houses. Members were allowed to question the ministers and to investigate political problems, while enjoying immunity from prosecution. The constitution guaranteed the independence of the judiciary. It made provision for provincial and municipal councils, some of whose powers were specified. New taxes and fees could be imposed only by law. The annual budget had to be approved by both houses. **Islam** was the religion of the state; its language was Arabic. Any constitutional amendment had to be approved by a two-thirds majority of both houses and by the king.

In practice, the provisions of the 1923 Constitution were often overridden by the king and sometimes also by the ministers and even Parliament members themselves. It was replaced for five years by the Palace-dominated **1930 Constitution**. Even after its restoration late in 1935, the Palace, the British, and the political parties often violated it. The **RCC** abrogated it after the **1952 Revolution**.

CONSTITUTION (1930). Document promulgated by **Isma'il Sidqi** in October 1930, greatly increasing the powers of King **Fuad I** at the expense of Parliament. Among its provisions were articles giving the king sole power to propose financial legislation, broadening his abil-

ity to veto laws, enabling him to appoint three-fifths of the Senate members, making it harder for Parliament to pass a no-confidence vote against the ministers, and empowering the king to prorogue a session before Parliament had examined the government budget. The 1930 Constitution was fiercely opposed by the **Wafd Party** and the **Liberal Constitutionalists**. Massive popular demonstrations in favor of the restoration of the **1923 Constitution** marked the political scene in late 1935. In December **Tawfiq Nasim's cabinet** agreed to abrogate the 1930 Constitution in favor of the earlier document, which Egyptians had come to view as the guardian of their rights.

CONSTITUTION (1956). The first set of principles for Egypt's government propounded after the **1952 Revolution**. The document included a preamble that stated the aims of the Egyptian people, a brief description of the state, a long list of articles defining the civil and property rights of members of the Egyptian community, a list of the legislative powers to be exercised by the unicameral **National Assembly** and the qualifications and limits of its members, the powers and limits of the president, the responsibilities and qualifications of the **cabinet** ministers, the functions of the judiciary, and methods for revising the new constitution.

Noteworthy changes from the **1923 Constitution** include a temporary ban on political parties, the formation of the **National Union** open to all Egyptians, the enfranchisement of **women**, a plebiscite for the choice of the first president (who would thereafter be chosen by the National Assembly) and for the adoption of this constitution, and an article giving the president "the right to initiate, to promulgate, or to veto legislation." While this document was in force, President **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** wielded more power than the National Assembly, and the constitutional rights of individuals and groups who opposed government policies were often violated. It was replaced in March 1958, after the union with **Syria**, by a provisional **UAR** constitution. This document was modified in 1962 by a constitutional declaration on the political organization of the higher authorities of the state and by the **1964 Constitution**.

CONSTITUTION (1964). Known as the "Interim Constitution," this document differs from the **1956 Constitution** mainly in its commitment to **Arab socialism**. Half of the **National Assembly** members had to be workers or peasants. The president had limited legislative

powers when the Assembly was adjourned or in a national emergency, but his laws were subject to the Assembly's approval. Although the Assembly chose its president, his election had to be confirmed by a nationwide plebiscite. The independence of the judiciary and the finality of its verdicts were confirmed "except as prescribed by law." In practice, President **Nasir** exercised far more power than the Assembly, and civil rights of dissenting individuals and groups were often violated. After the 1968 student demonstrations he promised changes, known as the **30 March Program**, which, if carried out, would have strengthened civil liberties. The 1964 document was replaced by the Permanent Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE). *See also* **Constitution (1971)**.

CONSTITUTION (1971). Legally the "Permanent Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt," it was approved by a nationwide referendum in September 1971. This document claimed to strengthen "the protection, consolidation, and preservation of the socialist gains" and enshrined the ASU as the state's political organization representing the alliance of the working forces of the people: farmers, workers, soldiers, intellectuals, and national capitalists. It also strengthened the people's claim to the nation's property and the state's commitment to economic planning and development, but also safeguarded such individual freedoms as rights to privacy, emigration, and public association. Amendments to the 1971 Constitution were passed in 1977 to permit the formation of political parties (*see* **Party Reforms**) and in 1980 to create the 264-seat Consultative Council (*Majlis Shura*) to supplement the **People's Assembly** (which has 444 elected and 10 appointed members), to abolish the ASU, to affirm Egypt's adherence to the **Shari'a**, and to forbid racial and religious discrimination. *See also* **Anwar al-Sadat**.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERAL PARTY, *see* **LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALIST PARTY**.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM PARTY. Political group, formed in 1907 by **Ali Yusuf**, editor of *al-Muayyad*, to uphold the prerogatives of **Khedive Abbas Hilmi II** against the **National** and **Umma Parties**. Most of its followers were individuals seeking Palace favor; its vice president, Ahmad Hishmat, later became **education** minister.

COOPERATIVES. Egypt's organized cooperative movement began in 1908, when a Nationalist lawyer named Umar Lutfi founded an **agricultural** cooperative society. Other cooperatives were set up by the **National Party**. In 1914 the **Legislative Assembly** discussed—but did not pass—a bill for chartering cooperative societies. Nevertheless, rising prices during 1914–18 inspired the formation of several consumer cooperatives. In 1923 a law for agricultural cooperatives was enacted; another law, passed in 1927, was applied to all types of cooperatives. When the social affairs ministry was formed in 1939, Parliament appointed a special committee and set up a department of cooperatives to supervise them. In 1944 Parliament passed a new cooperatives law that expanded the membership of the special committee and also established advisory councils in the provinces to serve as liaisons with the central department under the social affairs ministry. Cooperatives were exempted from paying the stamp duty on their contractual and other transactions, as well as from the commercial and industrial profits tax. The law set conditions for government grants to cooperative societies. Cooperatives could extend loans to their members and finance social services, using profits made from transactions with nonmembers earmarked for that purpose. Cooperatives were allowed to set up provincial or district syndicates to supervise the work of all local branches. The Agricultural Credit Bank, established in 1931, was transformed into the Cooperative Bank. In 1945 Egypt had over 2,500 cooperatives, whose total membership exceeded 800 thousand members, doing £E8 million worth of business annually.

After the **1952 Revolution**, the government encouraged the expansion of cooperative societies and in 1961 placed them under the supervision of the agriculture ministry, and every farmer was required to join one. The number of agricultural cooperatives rose from 1,727 in 1952 to 4,897 in 1963, offering £E46 million in loans to some 920 thousand borrowers. These societies consolidate resources (such as tractors), preserve incentives (including profits), determine responsibility for planting government quotas of such crops as **cotton**, and buy the state's share of procurement crops at government-fixed prices.

They enhance agricultural growth by encouraging the farmers to use fertilizers and modern technology and to change from a two-year to the preferred three-year crop-rotation system. A drawback

is that rich farmers often take over the cooperatives, corrupting some of their managers. In 1994 the General Cooperative Union of Egypt reported that there were 18,165 cooperative societies having about 11.5 million members: 6,360 agricultural cooperatives with 4.2 million members, 9,762 consumer cooperatives for 5.4 million members, 91 fisheries for 86 thousand, and 493 workers' unions having 230 thousand members.

COPTIC CHURCH. The national Christian church of Egypt, believed to have been founded by St. Mark in 30 CE. The Coptic Church remains predominant in Ethiopia and used to be strong in Nubia. It espouses the Monophysite doctrine, declared heretical by the Orthodox Christian Council of Chalcedon in 451, which teaches that Christ had a single nature, wholly divine. In Egyptian usage, Christians who have remained loyal to the ancient Christian church call themselves "Orthodox," which should not be construed as Greek Orthodox, but rather that they are neither Catholic nor Protestant.

The Roman Catholic Church has had ties with some Copts since 1824, if not earlier, although the formal creation of a Coptic Catholic patriarchate did not occur until 1895. Relations between the Coptic Catholic patriarch and the Vatican have often been troubled, but the current patriarch is also a cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church. In 1999 Catholic Copts numbered 200 thousand. The Coptic Evangelical Church was founded by Presbyterian missionaries in 1854 and now claims more than 200 thousand believers.

Excluding the Catholic and Evangelical groups, the ancient Coptic Orthodox Church of **Alexandria** commands the allegiance of Egypt's Christian population, variously estimated at 6 to 9 million. Traditionally, the Church was ruled by its hierarchy of a patriarch, bishops, priests, and deacons. Since 1873 this ecclesiastical structure has been challenged by a lay-led Community Council (*majlis milli*) in matters of Coptic communal governance. Its functions were administrative, educational, financial, and judicial. At certain times, notably in the 1890s and in the 1950s, jurisdictional conflicts have erupted between the Council and the hierarchy.

A key issue was control of the churches' *awqaf* (endowments), an issue settled by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government in 1960, when each Coptic *waqf* was limited to 200 **feddans** of cultivated and 200 of barren land, the rest being nationalized. The contending groups were both invited to send representatives to the Coptic

Orthodox *Awqaf* Organization. The Coptic Church courts, like all Egyptian religious courts, were abolished in 1955. The **Coptic Museum**, founded in 1908, is an important center for Coptic art and **archaeology**, and since 1954 there has also been a Higher Institute for Coptic Studies. There are currently 20 dioceses in Egypt, and orthodox Coptic dioceses are also located in Jerusalem, Nubia, Khartum, East Africa, France, and North America. A Coptic weekly, *Watani*, is published in **Cairo**. *See also* **Copts, Cyril IV, Cyril V, Cyril VI, Fundamentalism, Religion**.

COPTIC CONGRESS (1911). Meeting in **Asyut** of 1,150 **Copts**, mainly laymen claiming to represent 10 thousand Coptic electors, protesting against alleged Egyptian government favoritism toward Muslims and demanding additional rights and privileges for Egypt's Christians. Condemned by the British, Egyptian government officials, and the church hierarchy, the Congress's demands were not met. An **Egyptian Congress** was later held in response.

COPTS. Adherents of the **Coptic Church**. At the time of the Arab conquest in 639–41 CE, nearly all Egyptians were Coptic Christians, but their share of the population gradually diminished as a result of conversion to **Islam** and the immigration of Arab and later Turkish and **Circassian** Muslims from outside Egypt. Copts have played an important role in the Egyptian government and in most professions and occupations. Some leading Copts in Egypt's national life in the past two centuries include **Butros Ghali, William Makram Ubayd, and Salama Musa**. Egypt's 1996 census estimated the Copts at 6 million, but church authorities dispute these figures and claim that their actual number is closer to 9 million; there are some 5 million Copts in other countries. The recent upsurge of **Islamism** in Egypt has alarmed the Copts, some of whom have reacted by forming their own movements, others by demanding stricter enforcement of laws against discrimination and harassment. *See also* **Fundamentalism**.

CORNICHE, ALEXANDRIA. Mediterranean shore drive linking **Alexandria** with **Abu-Qir**, built while **Isma'il Sidqi** was prime minister in 1930–33. Inaugurated as the *Promenade de la Reine Nazli*, it has, since the **1952 Revolution**, been officially called *Tariq al-Jaysh* (Army Boulevard).

CORNICHE, CAIRO. Nile shore drive from **Helwan** to the **Delta Barrages**, built under the leadership of **Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi** following the **1952 Revolution**, in part by taking land formerly held by the **British** embassy and by various palaces in Garden City.

CORRECTIVE REVOLUTION. **Anwar al-Sadat**'s purge of his enemies on 15 May 1971, purportedly to liberalize Egypt's government by freeing it from the **Centers of Power** created in **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**'s last years. The purge was aided by a rightist clique of officers and officials who opposed the pro-Nasir Centers of Power and by Sadat's ability to gain the support of senior officers in the army, the police, and the presidential guard. Rivalries within the leftist clique, especially between **Ali Sabri** and **Sha'rawi Jum'a**, also hastened its downfall. As a result, Sadat consolidated his rule, the **Free Officers** ceased to be a cohesive force in Egyptian politics, Egypt began to turn against the **USSR**, and the government adopted a more liberal domestic policy. It also showed the strength of the presidency and the **bureaucratic** elite, the **armed forces**' reluctance to wield power, and the absence of mass participation in Egyptian politics.

CORVÉE. Obligation imposed by custom or decree on peasants to perform unremunerated labor on privately owned or government estates or to construct and repair **irrigation** works. During the early 19th century, the corvée could take peasants away from their plots and families for two months, if not longer, every year. No food or housing was provided by the landlord or the state. Unpaid peasant labor helped to build the **Mahmudiyya Canal**, the **Delta Barrages**, and the **Suez Canal**. In the 1860s, in response to public pressure to abolish the corvée, **Isma'il** decreed an end to the practice. It was gradually phased out on his private estates and those of most other landlords by 1882, due partly to the growing monetization of Egypt's rural **economy**. The **British occupation** abolished it except when emergency repairs were needed for flood-damaged irrigation works.

COTTON, EGYPTIAN. Long-staple cotton, domesticated on a large scale for the first time by Louis Alexis Jumel, a French engineer who had been brought to Egypt by **Muhammad Ali** in 1817 to manage a textile factory in **Bulaq**. Seeking a cash crop that would replace wheat, Muhammad Ali was quick to appreciate this new strain of cotton, and from 1821 ordered its large-scale cultivation in areas that

would be easy to irrigate in the summer, starting on the **Nile River**'s Damietta branch. Although the peasants had to be taught how to nurture, harvest, and gin Egyptian cotton, the revenues that the state could realize from its sale led Muhammad Ali to extend its cultivation and to promote **perennial irrigation** to support it. All aspects of cotton growing, processing, and export were subject to a state monopoly, and it became a major revenue source financing the military and other operations of Muhammad Ali's government. By 1835 the value of Egyptian cotton exports exceeded £E1 million. Local spinning and weaving factories (*see* **Textile Industry**) also proliferated, but most did not withstand the competition of foreign, especially British, textile mills after the 1838 Anglo–Ottoman Tariff Treaty (*see* **Tariffs**). Government monopolies over cotton and other agricultural produce declined or were abolished after 1841, except for a brief attempt by **Abbas Hilmi I** to revive them.

Cotton production lost ground to wheat and flax during the 1840s but revived in the 1850s, due perhaps to rising output on the estates belonging to Muhammad Ali's family. It boomed after 1861 when the naval blockade of the **U.S.** North against the South during the Civil War cut off the cotton supply to British and other European textile mills, causing a frantic quest for alternative sources. Cotton exports from **Alexandria** rose from 500 thousand cantars in 1861 to five times that figure in 1865. Prices skyrocketed between 1861 and 1864, and quantities exported by Egypt quadrupled, causing a rapid expansion in the amount of Egyptian land devoted to cotton cultivation. Although cotton output and sales continued to increase in the late 1860s, prices plummeted, creating economic problems for Egyptian farmers and **Khedive Isma'il**'s government. Yet cotton remained Egypt's most profitable crop, and production tripled from 1865 to 1879.

Cotton production mounted further during the **British occupation**; exports rose from 3 million cantars to a peak of 7.5 million in 1911. British policy encouraged this growth by extending perennial irrigation and the expansion of facilities for cotton processing and marketing. The spread of the cotton worm (and, after 1910, the boll worm), poor drainage of irrigated lands, and the weakening of peasant laborers by the spread of **bilharzia** all lessened yields during the early 20th century, but measures were taken to overcome these problems. Cotton remained profitable enough so that landlords and peasants resented (and often defied) government efforts to limit the land

allotted to cotton to increase food output during both **world wars**. Since the **1952 Revolution**, the Egyptian government has promoted diversification of **agricultural** land use. As a result, land area devoted to cotton production was halved during the next quarter century. Cotton yields rose from 1952 to 1980, as irrigation and pest control improved, but stagnated in the 1980s, as labor grew scarcer. Output fell from 460 thousand metric tons in 1982 to 228 in 2000.

COUNCIL OF JUSTICE. **Muhammad Ali's** advisory committee for administration and legal reform. This organization, called *Majlis al-Ahkam al-Misriyya* (Council of Egyptian Judicial Rulings), reviewed petitions from Muhammad Ali's officials, who often adjudicated local disputes and interpreted his decrees. It also received judicial petitions for or against foreigners protected by the **Capitulations**, and in 1849 absorbed the High Court of Justice established in 1842. **Abbas Hilmi I** established regional councils to review petitions presented to the *mudirs*; these were suspended later by **Sa'id**, who soon had to set up a new system of local councils. Because of the Egyptian **cotton** boom, **Khedive Isma'il** set up five provincial courts of first instance within days of his accession.

By 1870 there were courts in every province, with appeal courts for Upper and Lower Egypt, but local officials still bore judicial responsibilities. New village and provincial capital courts were established in 1871 to try small cases and claims. The Egyptian government set up a justice department in 1872. The Council of Justice continued to deliberate on administrative and legislative issues, including **agriculture, education, and taxes**, under Sa'id and Isma'il. With the growing complexity of judicial and administrative functions, the need for systematizing the legal system became acute. Once the **Mixed Courts** were set up, the government began to develop a new legal system for Egyptians. Delayed by **Ahmad Urabi's** movement, its efforts culminated in the **National Courts** in 1883.

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. The cabinet, or executive branch of Egypt's government, since 1878, when **Isma'il** turned over his power to a council headed by **Nubar**. Earlier rulers did, however, have rudimentary councils. **Muhammad Ali** had a *Ma'iyya Saniyya* (viceregal suite), made up of sons, in-laws, **Mamluks**, and selected **Coptic and Armenian** officials, who helped him to manage Egypt.

In his later years he rewarded many of his most trusted officials with large land grants, a practice continued by his successors, in order to preserve the cabinet's loyalty to the viceregal household. In 1847 the *Ma'iyya* was supplanted by the **Privy Council**, which received regular reports from the provinces and the various government departments and formulated state policies and laws. In form, it still served the **khedive** personally; in practice, it acted as his administration and created Egypt's **bureaucracy**. Its ablest members earned high salaries and exercised vast powers.

Egypt's mounting fiscal crisis led **Isma'il** to delegate many of his powers to a council of ministers, replacing his Privy Council, in a formal decree issued on 28 August 1878. The first council, headed by Nubar and including **Mustafa Riyad** and **Ali Mubarak**, was called the "European cabinet" because it had a British finance minister and a Frenchman holding the portfolio for public works. Although barred from his cabinet's deliberations, Isma'il soon engineered its downfall by fomenting an officers' mutiny. A nominally Egyptian (but really khedivist) cabinet, headed by **Muhammad Sharif**, took over in April 1879. It fell from power when Isma'il was deposed three months later. The cabinet's power was eclipsed by the **Dual Control** early in **Tawfiq's** reign but revived in 1881–82, when **Mahmud Sami al-Barudi** and **Ahmad Urabi** led other ministers against the khedive and the Europeans.

During the **British occupation** a British financial adviser was added to the cabinet. The Egyptian ministers, although formally appointed by the khedive, actually were chosen in consultation with Lord **Cromer** and followed the instructions of British advisers. Cabinet posts for **education** and *awqaf* were merged with other ministries, then reestablished. The **agriculture** ministry was formed in 1913. During the **Protectorate** the foreign ministry was submerged; it revived in 1922. Under the **1923 Constitution** the cabinet added ministers for commerce and **industry** in 1934, public health in 1936, social affairs in 1939, supply in 1940, civil defense during **World War II**, and a broad portfolio that included national economy and municipal and rural affairs in 1950. From 1937 some coalition governments included ministers of state without portfolios.

The **1952 Revolution** led to further increases in the size of the cabinet, starting with portfolios for **communications** and for national guidance (later called information), but its power was eclipsed by that of the **Free Officers**, the **RCC**, and such supervisory bodies

as the **Central Auditing Agency**. By 1957 it had 17 members. In 1959 the central cabinet of the **UAR** had 20 members; the Egyptian Region had a 15-member executive council. In 1962 there were four vice presidents (for war, **planning**, social affairs, and local government) and 21 ministers, including posts for the **Aswan High Dam**, economic affairs, higher education, **land reform**, local administration, planning, presidential affairs, and scientific research. The cabinet in 1972 included five deputy premiers and 26 ministers; in 2000 there were 34 members. Since 1952, key government decisions have been made by the president, in consultation with his closest friends, rather than by the council of ministers. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** at times presided over cabinet meetings, but not **Anwar al-Sadat** or **Husni Mubarak**, and internecine rivalries have blunted the effectiveness of this increasingly unwieldy body.

CROMER, Sir EVELYN BARING, Earl of (1841–1917). Britain's agent and consul general in **Cairo** from 1883 to 1907 and de facto governor of Egypt during that time. Baring was educated as an army officer at Woolwich Academy and was commissioned in the Royal Artillery in 1858. Named secretary to the viceroy of India in 1872, he first came to Egypt in 1877 as Britain's public debt commissioner, returned in 1879 to India, and was named British agent in Cairo in 1883, with instructions to prepare for the evacuation of the British army of **occupation** that had defeated **Ahmad Urabi** in 1882. The **Mahdi's** revolt in the **Sudan** against Egyptian rule obliged the British to delay withdrawal from Egypt, and Baring undertook to reform its government's **finances**.

In his early years in the **British Agency**, Baring had a daunting mission, because state revenues did not suffice to finance needed reforms, and the Egyptian government could not float additional loans without the approval of the European powers represented on the *Caisse de la Dette Publique*. Baring, working closely with the British financial adviser, managed to balance the state budget and then, by well-chosen reforms in **irrigation**, to increase agricultural output and hence land-tax revenues. Istanbul's rejection of the **Drummond Wolff Convention** prolonged the British occupation. As **French** naval power in the Mediterranean increased and as Britain distanced itself from the **Ottoman Empire**, the British navy came to need a base at **Alexandria**. Baring, never eager to evacuate Egypt, began instituting the fiscal reforms he

believed Egypt needed, attaching British advisers to as many ministries of the government as possible and exercising discreet influence over the **khedive**.

This "veiled protectorate" worked well under Khedive **Tawfiq**, but less so when his son, **Abbas Hilmi II**, succeeded him. Soon after Baring was elevated to the peerage with the title of Lord Cromer in 1892, the new khedive and the old consul clashed over the choice of a prime minister to replace the ailing **Mustafa Fahmi** and then over control of the Egyptian army, leading to the **Frontiers Incident**. The British government, although still opposed in principle to a prolonged occupation, backed Cromer against the khedive and left him free to pursue his policies for Egypt's regeneration.

In the areas of state finance and **irrigation**, Cromer's reforms succeeded, and his long tenure as consul general made him increasingly impervious to criticism either from his subordinates in the Agency or from the Egyptian **bureaucracy**, to which Cromer gradually added young Englishmen from Oxford and Cambridge. Cromer's annual reports on conditions in Egypt (and, after 1898, the Sudan) were published—and even translated into Arabic by *al-Muqattam*—and tended to become the official version of Egypt's history. As Cromer's financial successes led to Egypt's economic regeneration, European opposition to the British occupation waned, and British reluctance to leave grew.

Rising Egyptian resistance, as expressed by **Mustafa Kamil** or by such moderates as **Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid**, did not influence Cromer, who viewed this opposition as inspired by **pan-Islam**. As the British distanced themselves from the Egyptians, they ceased to understand each other, leading to the 1906 **Dinshaway Incident**. This event occasioned so much criticism of the British occupation in both Egypt and Europe that he decided to resign. For Cromer, the only true Egyptian nationalism must include all the Europeans and other minorities living in Egypt. He believed that his veiled protectorate had benefited all classes of Egyptian society, especially the peasants. Early financial stringencies made him cut expenditures on public health and **education**. Neither he nor his successors ever made up for this neglect, and Egypt would pay a high price for their failure to invest generously in its human resources.

CURRENCY. In **Ottoman** Egypt the standard coin was the silver *para*, 40 of which made one piaster. The government's unit of account was

the *kis* (purse), worth 25 thousand *paras*, or, in the time of **Muhammad Ali** and his successors, about 500 piasters. Owing to the tendency of Ottoman coins to lose value, foreign merchants preferred to use European currencies, such as the Austrian thaler and the Spanish rial. From 1836 to 1885 the main unit of currency was the piaster, commonly abbreviated to PT (French: *piastre tarif*); 97.5 piasters were equivalent to one British sterling pound. The Egyptian pound (Cairene Arabic: *gineh*, from the English “guinea”), commonly abbreviated to £E (French: *livre égyptienne*), consisted of a hundred piasters. Foreign coins were also allowed to circulate and indeed often did so because of the shortage and uneven quality of Egyptian coins.

Money was backed with both gold and silver until 1885, when Egypt based its currency on gold, each pound containing 8.5 grams of gold at standard fineness. In 1887 the **finance** minister limited foreign currencies to the English sovereign, the French 20-franc piece, and the Turkish pound; the Egyptian government issued almost no gold pounds of its own. The sterling pound, the least undervalued of these currencies, soon became Egypt’s standard. The **National Bank of Egypt** began issuing paper money in 1898, but its note issue stabilized at £E2.7 million until 1914. Egyptian land-owners and peasants continued to prefer gold currency for the financing of their **cotton** crops.

With the outbreak of **World War I** the notes of the National Bank of Egypt were declared legal tender and it was no longer required to redeem them with gold. From 1916 until 1949 Egypt was on a sterling-exchange system, under which its currency was backed by British war loans and treasury bills. Since 1949 the Egyptian government has managed its own currency, which initially remained strong because of the large sterling balances it had accumulated during **World War II**. In recent years, however, the Egyptian pound has depreciated in value from \$4.20 in 1949 to 22 cents in 2002. The pound was tied to the **U.S.** dollar until January 2003; when it was allowed to float, its value soon fell to 16 cents.

CYRIL IV (1816–61). The “Father of Reform” and patriarch of the **Coptic Church** from 1854 to 1861. He established new schools for boys and girls in **Cairo**, Mansura, and St. Antony’s Monastery in Bush, and purchased the first printing press for the patriarchate. **Sa’id** sent him in 1856 to negotiate with Ethiopia over its border

with Egypt. He built new churches and restored the Coptic cathedral in Cairo. The cause of his early death has never been explained, but he is remembered as one of the church's greatest patriarchs.

CYRIL V (1824–1927). Long-living patriarch of the **Coptic Church** from 1874 to 1927. Although he helped to found churches, hospitals, benevolent societies, and schools, notably the Clerical College in **Cairo**, he is mainly remembered for his quarrels with successive Coptic Community Councils (*majlis milli*) under lay leadership.

CYRIL VI (1902–71). Influential patriarch of the **Coptic Church** from 1959 to 1971. He had close ties with **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** and with leaders of Eastern Orthodox churches. He chaired the Oriental Orthodox Conference convened in 1965 by Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie in Addis Ababa, hosted the 1968 celebration of the 1,900th anniversary of the Martyrdom of St. Mark, and won membership in the World Council of Churches for his church.

CZECH ARMS DEAL. Agreement concluded in September 1955 by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government to purchase £E200 million worth of jet fighter planes, bombers, and other weapons from what was then thought to be Czechoslovakia, but actually from the **USSR**, with payment to be made in Egyptian **cotton** and other products. The **United States** and **Britain** strongly opposed this transaction, which they feared correctly would tie Egypt, politically as well as economically, to the **Communist** bloc.

– D –

DANCE. Individual and group movement to **music** has always been an important aspect of Egyptian culture, although some Egyptians believe that **Islam** forbids or restricts it. Islamic scholars believe that dance is not objectionable as long as it is not publicly used for sexual provocation. Both sexes dance publicly on occasions for celebration, especially weddings, but dance performances have usually been carried out by especially trained **women**. Before modern times female dancers were divided into two major groups: *awalim* and *ghawazi*. The former were Muslim women who danced for other women on religious occasions such as saints' days (*see* **Sufism**); their Arabic

name implies that they were “learned in Muslim laws.” The *ghawazi* were entertainers who usually danced for men and sometimes engaged in prostitution; they often claimed gypsy or **bedouin** origin. The distinction gradually vanished during the 19th century. As a result of Westernization under **Muhammad Ali** and **Isma’il**, female dancers came to be regarded as entertainers for males and were periodically barred from **Cairo** and Lower Egypt. The spread of theaters and nightclubs, initially for foreigners and later for Egyptians, provided new opportunities for dancers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Egyptian female dancing came to be identified with “belly dancing” and often with illicit consumption of alcoholic beverages and drugs, although other forms of dance also existed. Ballroom dancing was, however, limited to Europeans, minorities, and very Westernized Egyptians. Muslims have generally refrained from dancing in public with members of the opposite sex.

Belly dancing provided **employment** opportunities for women, not only as dancers but also as owners and managers of nightclubs, especially during the **world wars**, when thousands of foreign troops were stationed in Egypt. The **1952 Revolution** led to efforts to restrict belly dancing, but most limitations were easily evaded and, in the interest of encouraging **tourism**, ignored. Leading belly dancers in the 1950s and 1960s were Tahia Carioca and Samia Jamal; the stars during the 1970s included Huda Shams al-Din (Hoda Cham-seddine), Najwa Fuad (Nagwa Fouad), Suhayr Zaki, and Zaynab (“Zizi”) Moustapha; Hindiyya and Sahar Hamdi rose to the fore in the 1980s. Among those who became prominent in the 1990s were Fifi Abduh, Soussou, Lucy, and Dina. The number of belly dancers has declined from 5,200 in the 1980s to 2,300 in 2000, and about a fifth of the nightclubs on Pyramids Road have closed down, due to falling demand for dancers at weddings and the rise of **Islamism**, which discourages sexually provocative dancing and urges dancers to take the veil. The culture ministry has convened a series of conventions (the third of which was held in June 2002) for belly dancers from around the world, partly as a stimulus to **tourism**.

During the era of **Arab socialism**, the government also promoted the introduction into Egypt of folkloric dancing (notably the Rida Troupe), which has remained fairly popular, and of ballet, which has enjoyed only limited appeal.

DAR AL-KUTUB. Egypt's national library, founded in 1869 by **Ali Mubarak** and endowed by **Mustafa Riyad**. It opened as the Khedival National Library in the Mustafa Fadil Palace located in Darb al-Jamamiz in 1870 and remained there until 1904, when it moved to the new National Library in Bab al-Khalq, east of **Abdin Palace**. It was known by several other names (Khedival Library, National Library of *el-Sultania*, and the Egyptian Library) until it was renamed *Dar al-Kutub* after the **1952 Revolution**. It moved to a new building, which it shares with the General Egyptian Book Organization, in its current location on the **Corniche in Bulaq** in 1970. In 1993 it was merged with the National Archives (*Dar al-Wathaiq*), which occupies the adjacent annex. Estimates of its collection range from 2-4 million printed volumes. It also contains many Arabic manuscripts.

DAR AL-ULUM. Higher school established in **Cairo** by **Ali Mubarak** for the training of Arabic teachers in 1872, following a successful lecture series during the previous year. The initial students were Azharites aged 20 or older having already a sound knowledge of Arabic grammar, and classes included the sciences and Islamic *fiqh* (jurisprudence). The school became a major rival to **al-Azhar** as a source of government school teachers of Arabic and Islamic subjects. Initially its classes were held in the Darb al-Jamamiz Palace; in 1901 a special building was opened for Dar al-Ulum in the Munira district, where it remains. Up to **World War I**, students at Dar al-Ulum received monthly stipends, at a time when all other higher schools charged tuition fees, so the school attracted young men whose families could not have afforded to send them to the government **Law School**. By the 1920s, as the supply of teachers began to outstrip the demand, al-Azhar campaigned to have Dar al-Ulum placed under its control, which was done by the **Ahmad Zivar** cabinet in 1925, but this action was reversed by its successor. Dar al-Ulum became a faculty within **Cairo University** in 1945 and was opened to **women** students in 1953. Such distinguished thinkers as Husayn al-Marsafi, **Muhammad Abduh**, and Amin Sami have taught at Dar al-Ulum. Although some Azharis denounced the school as a hotbed of secularism, its graduates include such leading **Islamists** as **Hasan al-Banna** and **Sayyid Qutb**.

DAR AL-WATHAIQ. Egypt's national archives. **Muhammad Ali** established in 1829 the first repository of Egyptian official records, the *Daftarkhaneh* (House of Files), where he sought to centrally store all state treaties, *firman*s, and documents. The original structure was located next to the **Citadel** gate. At the same time, he created regional archives, but in 1862 **Isma'il** closed all of them and transferred their contents to Cairo. In 1932, King **Fuad I** had many of the files moved from the Citadel to **Abdin Palace** to assist in the writing of a royal family history. After the **1952 Revolution**, many of the documents were transferred to the basement of Abdin Palace. In 1954 the revolutionary government established *Dar al-Wathaiq*, but it still suffered from dispersed collections and lack of authority to obtain documents from the ministries. In 1969 many of the documents in Abdin were transferred back to the Citadel. In 1993 *Dar al-Wathaiq* was merged administratively with the *Dar al-Kutub* and now occupies the annex adjacent to the national library in **Bulaq**. The dispersal of documents throughout various ministries and locations such as the *awqaf* ministry, *Dar al-Mahfuzat* and *Dar al-Makhtutat* has weakened *Dar al-Wathaiq*, but its archivists have made inroads into collecting, organizing, and preserving the Egyptian government's documentary heritage.

DARWISH, SAYYID (1892–1923). Musical composer and singer. Born in **Alexandria** and educated in a *kuttab*, he memorized the Quran and mastered its cantillation, then went on to recite postclassical Arabic **poetry**. He traveled with a theatrical troupe to **Syria** from 1909 to 1913, further learning the art of reciting poetry. On his return to Egypt, he learned how to play the *'ud*, developing a new style of performance. He organized his own theatrical troupe. In 1916 **Salama Hijazi** gave him his debut on the **Cairo** stage. He organized another troupe in 1921. Freeing Arabic **music** from its dependence on Turkish and Western modes, he composed hundreds of songs for public performance. He was one of the first Arab musicians to record his music. Profoundly moved by the speeches of such nationalists as **Mustafa Kamil** and **Sa'd Zaghlul**, he wrote the patriotic song "*Biladi, biladi*" (My Country, O My Country), now Egypt's national anthem. Darwish lived among poor people, and his compositions reflected their musical traditions. Addicted to cocaine, he died in Alexandria of heart trouble, impoverished and largely forgotten. A Cairo concert hall bears his name.

AL-DA'WA. Weekly magazine of the Society of **Muslim Brothers**, edited by Hasan al-Ashmawi, from 1951 to 1954, when it was outlawed by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**. After the Society was allowed to revive, it was edited by **Umar al-Tilmisani** from 1976 until **Anwar al-Sadat** banned it in September 1981. The ban remains in effect.

DELTA BARRAGES. Two large dams, constructed 20 km north of **Cairo**, where the **Nile River** divides into the Rosetta (west) and Damietta (east) branches to form the Egyptian Delta. Built by **French** engineers in 1847–61 and strengthened by the **British** in 1887–90, the Barrages raised the water upstream to a height of four meters above the normal Nile level so that some of its waters could be diverted into three takeoff canals whose entrances lay above the dams, thus helping convert Delta farmlands to **perennial irrigation**.

DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION (1947), *see* **HADETO**.

DESCRIPTION DE L'ÉGYPTE (1808–29). Monumental French scholarly work. Consisting of nine volumes of text and 14 of drawings, it provides detailed information about Egyptian antiquities, natural history, and social conditions at the time of the **French occupation**.

DINSHAWAY INCIDENT (1906). British atrocity against Egyptian peasants accused of assaulting uniformed British officers who were hunting pigeons near the village of Dinshaway in Minufiyya Province. One officer died, probably of sunstroke. The British in Egypt feared that this assault portended a national insurrection and demanded exemplary punishment of the villagers. The accused assailants, numbering 52, were hastily arrested, tried, and sentenced to death, public flogging, or imprisonment. The sentences led to widespread protests in Europe and Egypt, and their summary public execution promoted the rise of the **National Party** and hastened the retirement of Lord **Cromer**. It remains a black mark cited by Egyptians against the **British occupation**.

DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES (1974). The pressing goal of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's efforts to mediate an interim agreement between Egypt and **Israel** after the **October War**, because the two sides' armies were intermingled due to the Israeli

crossing of the **Suez Canal**, isolating Egypt's Third Army on its east bank. The two countries signed an agreement on 18 January 1974, allowing Israel's forces to evacuate lands west of the Canal and Egypt's army to maintain a limited presence on its east side.

DRUMMOND WOLFF CONVENTION (1887). Abortive agreement, negotiated with **Ottoman** Sultan Abdulhamid II by Sir Henry Drummond Wolff at the behest of **Britain's** foreign secretary, Lord Salisbury. It would have ended the **British occupation** of Egypt after three years. However, because the Convention allowed a British right of reentry under certain specified conditions, **France's** and **Russia's** ambassadors in Constantinople persuaded the sultan not to sign. The Ottoman government's rejection of this agreement greatly prolonged Britain's occupation of Egypt and also the presence of an Ottoman high commissioner in **Cairo** from 1885 to 1914, an official with few powers but many opportunities to foment **pan-Islam** and pro-Ottoman feeling among the nationalists.

DUAL CONTROL. Joint Anglo-French financial administration in Egypt from 1876 to 1882, supplementing the supervision provided by the already existing *Caisse de la Dette Publique*. Two controllers were in the "European cabinet" headed by **Nubar** from August 1878 to March 1879, in which an Englishman was finance minister and a Frenchman held the portfolio for public works. Four months after **Khedive Isma'il** engineered the downfall of that cabinet, he was himself deposed by the **Ottoman** sultan in favor of his son, **Tawfiq**. The British and French governments appointed their controllers, Sir Evelyn Baring (*see Cromer*) who had served on the *Caisse*, and de Balignières, the former works minister. They drafted what would in 1880 become the **Liquidation Law**. Its strict controls on Egyptian government expenditure fomented nationalist discontent among the Egyptian army officers and government officials, leading to the rise of **Ahmad Urabi** in 1881.

Once the **Mahmud Sami al-Barudi cabinet** took control in February 1882, the controllers were no longer able to manage the budget, and the Dual Control was formally ended when the British occupied Egypt in September. The Dual Control's program for retiring the Egyptian government debt was too stringent for the country's economy and could have been imposed only by the concerted

use of military force, which neither **Britain** nor **France** was willing to employ until after the Urabists had taken power.

DUFFERIN MISSION. Committee sent by the British government, just after **Britain's** army occupied Egypt in 1882, to study the country's administration and to recommend improvements, without committing Britain to an indefinite military occupation of Egypt. Its final report, written in 1883 by its chairman, Lord Dufferin, called for the continued presence of European advisers in the Egyptian government, especially in **finance** and public works. His report refuted the need for a formal constitution and argued that strong rule would be needed to restore order and confidence, but it did call for establishing a General Assembly, made up mainly of rural landowners, and a Legislative Council having very limited powers. This recommendation became the basis for Egypt's **Organic Law of 1883**. Although the report opposed long-term British rule over Egypt, its prescriptions implied the indefinite maintenance of Britain's paramount influence, thus laying the groundwork for **Cromer's** administration.

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER (1888–1959). U.S. secretary of state from 1953 to 1959 under President Dwight Eisenhower. He believed that the independence of the Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, could best be safeguarded by their joining an anti-Communist defensive alliance, modeled on NATO. During a visit to Egypt in 1953 he tried to persuade **Muhammad Najib** and **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** to help set up a Middle East Defense Organization, but they deferred the issue until they had secured **Britain's** agreement to give up its **Suez Canal** base. Dulles later opposed Nasir's **positive neutrality**, which he reportedly condemned as "immoral."

Angered by Nasir's diplomatic recognition of **Communist** China in 1956, he tried to teach the Egyptians a lesson by withdrawing an American offer to help finance the building of the **Aswan High Dam**. This rebuff caused Nasir to nationalize the **Suez Canal Company**. When Britain and **France** joined forces with **Israel** to invade and defeat Egypt in the **Suez War**, Dulles condemned their aggression against Egypt and joined the **USSR** in pressuring them to withdraw their forces from the Canal Zone and the **Sinai Peninsula**. In 1957 Dulles called on the Arab countries to subscribe to the **Eisenhower Doctrine**, which seemed to be

aimed at isolating Egypt politically, but most Arab governments refused to do so. His policies were criticized by both the Arabs and Israel for their Cold War focus and indifference to their national concerns.

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EARTHQUAKE (1992). A severe earthquake, measuring 5.9 on the Richter scale, struck middle Egypt and **Cairo** on 12 October 1992, causing large-scale damage in **Bulaq**, Shubra al-Khayma, and **Heliopolis**. The quake and its numerous aftershocks left 541 dead, more than 6 thousand injured, and possibly as many as 100 thousand people homeless. Costs of rebuilding were estimated at £E3 billion. Government efforts to keep order and provide relief to the victims, most of whom were poor, evoked widespread criticism and protest demonstrations. Reportedly, **Islamist jama'at** aided victims more than government agencies did. Egypt experienced other earthquakes in 749, 1201, 1730, November 1995, May 1998, and January 2001.

ECONOMY. From antiquity until the recent past, most Egyptians have made their living from **agriculture**, with a higher degree of crop specialization than most other countries. Cereal grains were formerly the major cash crop, but they gave way in the 19th century to the large-scale cultivation of Egyptian **cotton** and more recently to rice, **sugar**, and edible fruits and vegetables for export. For most of its history Egypt has also been an entrepôt for international **trade**, with Mediterranean seaports at **Alexandria**, Rosetta, Damietta, and (since 1869) **Port Said**. Red Sea ports included Suez City and al-Qusayr. There was also an overland caravan trade that passed through **Libya** and **Asyut** and through the **Sinai Peninsula**. The opening of the **Suez Canal** gave Egypt a lead role in international commerce. Manufacturing complemented agriculture and commerce. Trade guilds dominated what were mainly handicrafts industries through the 19th century but gradually vanished during the 20th.

Both individual initiative (see **Bank Misr**) and government policies (see **planning**) helped to industrialize Egypt's economy in the 20th century. Established industries include **textiles**, **munitions**, **pharmaceuticals**, and food processing. Egypt's major extractive **industry** has been **petroleum** (natural gas is now rising markedly);

exploration for other **minerals** is continuing. Overall progress has been uneven. Egypt's gross domestic product rose between 1955 and 1975 at an annual rate of 4.2 percent, outstripping the rate of population growth, but **employment** of the labor force could be ensured only by a high rate of emigration, and emigrant remittances became a major source of national income and foreign exchange. The annual growth rate exceeded 11 percent between 1975 and 1980 and remained high in the early 1980s, but plunged in 1985–87 due to the worldwide oil glut, requiring emergency loans from the **International Monetary Fund (IMF)**. The 1990–91 **Gulf War** damaged Egypt's economy because of the return of Egyptian expatriates who had been working in **Iraq** and Kuwait and the decline of **tourism**. On the other hand, it led to a reduction in Egypt's indebtedness, estimated at U.S. \$40 billion to foreign countries, a figure reduced as a result of Egypt's support of the allied coalition. The ensuing **ERSAP** program has reversed some of the weaknesses of Egypt's economy: low productivity, excessive state control, mismanagement, price inflation (which had averaged 25 percent annually), excessive population growth, and urban overcrowding.

Between 1991 and 2000 Egypt abandoned its protectionist policies in favor of a market-oriented economy. The country managed to reduce its economic and financial imbalances and weathered the 1997–98 crisis in the Asian markets. Liberalization and open markets have led to a decreasing share of the primary sector from 27 percent in 1977 to 17 in 1998, while industry's share rose from 27 to 33 percent in the same period. In terms of international trade, however, industrial products fell from 44 percent of Egypt's exports in 1987 to 32 percent in 1998. The **European Union (EU)** accounted for 31 percent of Egypt's exports and 42 percent of Egypt's imports in 1998; the corresponding figures for trade with the **United States** were 38 and 19 percent. Egypt's real growth in annual gross domestic product averaged 4.3 percent during the 1990s. The U.S. government estimated Egypt's gross domestic product at \$247 billion (\$3,600 per capita) in 2000. It has not grown appreciably since then.

Despite these achievements, Egypt's tertiary or service sector accounts for over half of its gross domestic product, a high figure for a developing country. Both the government budget and the balance of trade have remained consistently negative. In January–March 2002 Egypt's trade deficit was \$1.6 billion, offset by **foreign aid**, private **investment**, and emigrant remittances. Tourism,

usually a major exchange earner, declined due to the unstable Middle East situation and foreign fears of **terrorism** after the 11 September 2001 attack on New York's World Trade Center, but revived in the first half of 2002. Income levels are uneven, a potential cause for unrest. As of 2000, it was estimated that the top tenth of the population enjoyed one-quarter of the national income; the bottom tenth received 4.4 percent. *See also* **Banking, Finance**.

EDEN, Sir ANTHONY (1897–1977). English statesman, foreign minister, and prime minister, who played a major role in the **Suez Crisis**. Born to an aristocratic family, Eden was educated at Eton and later, after seeing action in **World War I**, at Christ Church College, Oxford, where he studied Arabic and Persian and graduated in 1922 with first-class honors. From 1923 he served in the House of Commons, specializing in foreign and defense policy. He entered the cabinet in 1935 as minister without portfolio for League of Nations affairs and later in that year as foreign secretary. Although mainly concerned with meeting the challenge of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, he also negotiated the 1936 **Anglo–Egyptian Treaty**, which preserved **Britain's** occupation of key points in Egypt and the **Sudan**. He resigned from the foreign office in February 1938 in anger at Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's secret negotiations with Italy, an act that later gave him the reputation of "standing up to the dictators." Excluded from the cabinet when **World War II** began, Eden became more active once Winston Churchill became premier in 1940. He wanted to strengthen Britain's troop concentration in Egypt, but refused Churchill's offer to head the Middle East Command, holding out for the foreign secretary appointment that was offered to him in December 1940. He accompanied Churchill to all wartime Allied conferences. While the Labour Party was in power, as an opposition Member of Parliament, he assailed that party's Middle East policy and demanded strong action against Iran after Mohammad Musaddiq nationalized the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company in 1951. After that year's Conservative victory, he reentered the cabinet as Churchill's foreign secretary and heir presumptive. He criticized U.S. Secretaries of State Dean Acheson and **John Foster Dulles** for their pro-Iranian and pro-Egyptian policies and upheld Britain's traditional Middle East role. Only under American pressure did he agree to evacuate the **Suez Canal** in the 1954 **Anglo–Egyptian agreement**.

Once Eden became prime minister in 1955, he entered into a power struggle with **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**, who once said that he behaved “like a prince dealing with vagabonds.” Eden’s efforts to set up the **Baghdad Pact** offended Nasir and did not gain American support. Concerned about the **Czech Arms Deal**, Eden agreed with the United States to form a consortium to finance the **Aswan High Dam**. He was especially angered by the Egyptian agitation that blocked Jordan’s adherence to the Baghdad Pact and King Husayn’s decision to dismiss General John Bagot Glubb as commander of Jordan’s Arab Legion. He and Dulles decided to phase out their High Dam offer. The U.S. government withdrew it, and in response Nasir nationalized the **Suez Canal Company**.

Eden wanted to counter this act by military action, if diplomacy failed to keep the vital waterway under international control. He worked openly with **France**—and secretly with **Israel**—to plan for an attack publicly aimed at retaking the Suez Canal but actually meant to overthrow Nasir. He overlooked or underestimated U.S. and Labour Party opposition to his policies. In a secret meeting held on 22 October in Sèvres, British, French, and Israeli representatives agreed on plans to attack the Suez region. After Israel invaded the Sinai on the 29th, Eden (and French Premier Mollet) issued an ultimatum calling on Israel and Egypt to pull back from the Canal Zone and demanding Egypt’s agreement to a temporary Anglo–French occupation of the area. Egypt rejected the ultimatum, and the British and French paratroopers landed at **Port Said** a week later. Britain was opposed by the other Commonwealth members and by the **United Nations**, where it vetoed two Security Council resolutions condemning the invasion.

On 6 November Egypt and Israel accepted a cease-fire. Soon afterward Eden ordered British troops to halt their attack. Opposition from U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower probably affected him more than threats from the **USSR** or his Labour opposition. Britain was given no role in the **United Nations Emergency Force** (UNEF) or in clearing the canal. Eden, suffering from poor health, resigned his premiership in January 1957. His name became permanently attached to the Suez “debacle.” Sympathetic historians have argued that his error was to misread U.S. intentions, while critics claim that he held anachronistic views about British imperialism, Egypt, and the Arabs. His memoirs, *Full Circle*, cover the Suez Crisis.

EDUCATION. Until recently, most Egyptians were educated within the household, family farm, or workshop, or by apprenticeship; only a minority received institutional schooling. In **Ottoman** Egypt, formal education was controlled by the **ulama** for Muslims, the clergy for **Copts**, and the rabbinate for **Jews**. For Muslim Egyptians, formal schooling came from the rural *kuttabs*, a few urban *madrasas*, and the mosque-university of **al-Azhar**. A somewhat higher percentage of Christian and Jewish children, mainly boys, were educated. A few mission schools were run by Franciscan and Greek Orthodox missionaries. The **Mamluks** gave military and naval training to their own recruits (*see* **Military Academy**). The **French occupation** disrupted rather than benefited Egyptian education.

The basis of a state-controlled, modern educational system was laid during the reign of **Muhammad Ali**, who needed a cadre of military officers, engineers, and managers to carry out his Westernization program. In 1809 he sent his first mission of students abroad, choosing Italian technical institutions; larger missions began in 1826. A government school was opened at the **Cairo Citadel** in 1816, and at the same time a polytechnic institute (*muhandiskhane*) was set up nearby and later moved to **Bulaq**. The first medical school was opened in 1827 at Abu Za'bal and later moved to Qasr al-Ayni. In the same year a veterinary school was opened at Rosetta and moved two years later to Abu Za'bal. Other civilian schools included arts and crafts (1831), **irrigation** (1831), translation (1836), and **agriculture** (1834–39, reopened in 1867). The administration of the state schools was initially centered in the Palace, moved to the war department in 1821, and entrusted to a board called the *Diwan al-Madaris* in 1836. The Diwan intervened vigorously to establish curricula; set salaries for teachers and stipends for students, who were subjected to military discipline; and fix boundaries between rival jurisdictions. Because Muhammad Ali set up few state primary and preparatory schools, most students for the higher schools had to be drawn from army recruits or *kuttab* graduates. Most of the state schools were closed after the **London Convention**.

State-controlled education languished under Governors **Abbas** and **Sa'id**; even the medical school was closed briefly in 1856. The *Diwan al-Madaris* was closed, the school buildings were abandoned, and even the library books were stored in damp cellars, stolen, or given away. One exception was Sa'id's policy of letting missionaries found schools (*see* **Frères** and **Jesuits**). **Isma'il** found on his acces-

sion that his government had only one primary, one preparatory, one military, one naval, one medical, and one pharmaceutical school, all badly neglected. He began importing teachers from **France**, resumed sending student missions to Europe, strengthened the medical school, and encouraged Christian missions and other foreign educational organizations to establish schools in Egypt. Among the schools founded or revived under Isma'il were those of **engineering** (1866), veterinary medicine (1867), **agriculture** (1868–75), and **Dar al-Ulum**. The first state school for girls, later named Saniyya, was set up in 1873 under the patronage of Isma'il's wife.

The Law of 10 Rajab 1284 (7 November 1867) mandated the foundation of one school for each province and for each of the major towns, specifying how they were to be financed, the qualifications and compensation for teachers, their syllabi, the school furniture, and the pupils' clothing. Many village *kuttabs* whose supporting *awqaf* had been depleted were placed under state control. The number of Western-style schools in Egypt reportedly rose by 1876 to 4,817, with 6,048 teachers and 140,977 pupils, although many of these schools were incompletely Westernized village *kuttabs*. Many of the teachers were Europeans, and French rivaled Arabic (and Turkish) as the language of instruction.

Egypt's financial crisis in 1876–82 necessitated many educational cutbacks, a policy that was continued into the **British occupation**. Lord **Cromer** paid lip service to education, but in fact he limited access to state schools to the few Egyptians who could afford to pay tuition fees. English gradually supplanted both French and Arabic as the main language of instruction in the government schools. Foreign organizations (often Christian missions) set up many primary, preparatory, and secondary schools (see **Victoria College**), and some individual Egyptians founded schools that taught in Arabic and upheld Islamic or nationalist values (see **Mustafa Kamil**). Some higher schools, notably law (see **Law School**) and medicine, flourished, but the British opposed creating a large class of educated Egyptians who were apt to oppose their rule and gave little encouragement to the establishment of a national university (see **Cairo University**). All the political parties formed in the early 20th century called for expanded education, and the appointment in 1906 of **Sa'd Zaghlul** as education minister was widely construed as a British sop to Egyptian nationalism, although the British education adviser, Douglas Dunlop, retained control over the ministry's policies.

Following the declaration of Egypt's independence in 1922, the government began increasing the share of the budget allotted to education. The **1923 Constitution** called for universal primary schooling, a goal not reached until later. Since the **1952 Revolution**, Egypt's leaders have all followed a concerted policy of expanding state-controlled schools both to educate and to indoctrinate the people. The number of buildings increased from 6,751 primary, 420 preparatory (junior high), and 286 secondary schools in 1953–54 to 18,184 primary, 9,349 preparatory, and 4,502 secondary schools in 1999–2000. The increase has been especially noticeable in Egypt's villages. The government has also established new universities in **Asyut**, Mansura, Minufiyya, **Helwan**, and other cities and towns.

At present, nearly all children attend elementary school, and more than half also complete secondary school. Egypt had 1,392,741 primary, 351,834 preparatory, and 110,900 secondary school pupils in 1953–54; the comparable figures for 1999–2000 were 7,932,622, 4,661,464, and 3,222,449. University graduates have increased from 4,949 to 243,421 during the same period. All tuition fees for state-run schools and universities have been abolished. Regrettably, academic standards have not kept pace with the growing numbers of pupils, and many school buildings and teachers are overutilized. Teachers are underpaid, and many parents pay for individual tutoring or private schools for their children. The educational system turns out far more Egyptians in liberal arts, law, and commerce than the economy can absorb.

A growing proportion of secondary and higher school students enter technical and scientific curricula, but young doctors, engineers, and technicians often emigrate to the West or to other Arab countries in search of higher salaries and better working conditions. There is also a critical shortage of Egyptians trained as plumbers, electricians, machinists, or aviation mechanics, because many view these as low-status occupations. Egyptians acknowledge the need to revamp public education, but lack the means to implement the necessary reforms. In 2001–2 total state expenditure on education was budgeted at £E20.6 billion, or 8 percent of the gross domestic product. *See also* **Employment**.

EFENDIYYA. General term used, mainly before the **1952 Revolution**, to distinguish educated or upper-class male Egyptians. Over time, the distinguishing factor has changed from landownership to educa-

tion. Contemporary Egyptians often use the term *muthaqqafin* (cultured people or educated people) to denote members of the elite.

EGYPTAIR FLIGHT 990. Air disaster that occurred on 31 October 1999 when an Egyptair Boeing 767 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean 60 miles south of Nantucket shortly after takeoff. All 203 passengers and 14 crew members perished. The United States National Traffic Safety Board (NTSB) findings concluded that the co-pilot, Jamal al-Battuti, intentionally caused the plane to plummet into the sea. These findings were widely disputed in Egypt, where officials believed that the NTSB misinterpreted cockpit voice recordings and failed to investigate potential mechanical causes adequately.

EGYPTIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, *see* **BAR ASSOCIATION, EGYPTIAN.**

EGYPTIAN CONGRESS (1911). Public assembly of Egyptian notables and intellectuals, mainly but not exclusively Muslim, held in **Heliopolis** in late April and early May 1911, as a riposte to the **Coptic Congress** held earlier in **Asyut**. Participants included **Nationalists** and members of other political parties, but the dominant tone was moderate (and possibly British-inspired), addressing Coptic claims and Egypt's other economic and social problems. **Mustafa Riyad** chaired the Congress, whose proceedings were published in English, French, and Arabic.

EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (EEF). The **British Empire** force, based in **Cairo**, that invaded **Palestine** and **Syria**, taking them from the **Ottoman Empire** in 1917–18. Approximately 100 thousand Egyptian workers and peasants volunteered or were conscripted to serve as Labor Corps and Camel Corps auxiliaries, but not as soldiers. Some of them rioted in January 1916. The EEF's heavy demand for Egyptian conscripts and farm animals angered many peasants, contributing to the **1919 Revolution**.

EGYPTIAN FEMINIST UNION (EFU). Women's rights movement founded by **Huda Sha'rawi** in 1923. It first signaled its existence by protesting, together with the men of the **Wafd Party**, against the failure of both the **1923 Constitution** and the electoral law to enfranchise women. In May 1923 it sent a three-woman delegation to

the meeting of the International Alliance of Women in Rome. It was upon their return from this conference that Sha'rawi and one of her companions, Saiza al-Nabarawi (1897–1985), disembarked unveiled, a symbolic step toward women's liberation. The EFU, together with the Wafdist Women's Central Committee, picketed the opening session of Parliament in 1924 to protest their exclusion from its inaugural ceremonies. They then presented a list of 32 nationalist and feminist demands to members and government officials.

Nine of the EFU's 10 charter members came from upper-class backgrounds, but they soon drew in women from other classes. Activities included opening a women's clubhouse, editing monthly journals in French and Arabic, running a clinic and dispensary for poor women and children, and setting up child-care facilities for working mothers. They lobbied for changes in the family laws, but their main successes were in setting a minimum marriage age and improving women's **education**. The government opened its first girls' secondary school in Shubra in 1924 and women were first admitted to **Cairo University** in 1928.

The EFU investigated women's working conditions and pressed for the right to vote in the 1930s. Responding to the growing **Palestine** conflict, it convened an Arab women's conference in **Cairo** late in 1938. A second conference, held in 1944, founded an Arab Feminist Union and elected Sha'rawi as its first president. The EFU survived the death of its founder in 1947, but became overshadowed by other Egyptian **feminist** groups that attracted younger, more politicized women. After the **1952 Revolution**, its activities were taken over by government ministries. Renamed the Huda al-Sha'rawi Society, the group faded away in the 1960s.

EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD, *see* **AL-JIHAD**.

EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT (1975). Diplomatic pact brokered by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and signed on 1 September 1975, in which **Israel** withdrew from the **Gulf of Suez** oil fields and from the strategic **Gidi** and **Mitla Passes** in the **Sinai Peninsula**, in exchange for Egypt's renunciation of war as a means to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. U.S. civilian technicians joined the UN observers in monitoring posts between Egypt and Israel. This was their last agreement before **Anwar al-Sadat's** trip to Jerusalem.

EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY (1979). Document signed in Washington, D.C., by **Anwar al-Sadat**, Israeli Premier Menachem Begin, and U.S. President Jimmy Carter, ending the state of war between Egypt and **Israel**. It provided for the phased withdrawal of Israeli troops from the **Sinai Peninsula** and the reinstatement of the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of **Palestine** as the Egyptian-Israeli border, without prejudice to the status of the **Gaza Strip**. The countries agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other and also to establish full diplomatic relations.

Provisions were made for the stationing of **UN** forces and observers that could not be removed without the approval of the Security Council. Israeli ships and cargoes were allowed free right of passage through the **Suez Canal** and the **Gulf of Aqaba** and their approaches. Egypt and Israel agreed that the treaty would have precedence over such previous treaties as the **Arab League Collective Security Pact** and that they would not enter into any obligations that might conflict with this treaty. Vociferous opposition to the treaty was expressed by other Arab governments and by Egyptian **Islamists**, **Nasirites**, and **Communists**. Many believe that Sadat was assassinated for having signed the treaty, but Egypt has upheld it under **Husni Mubarak**, despite Israel's invasion of Lebanon and pressure from Palestinians, Arabs, and **Islamists** to denounce it.

EGYPTIAN MOVEMENT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION (EMNL). **Communist** movement founded in 1943 by Henri Curiel, an anti-**Zionist Jew** from a wealthy **Cairo** family, originally an Italian citizen educated in French schools. Dedicated to creating a multi-class national front to achieve full national independence for Egypt, Curiel influenced many ethnic Egyptians. His movement merged with *Iskra* in 1947 to form the Democratic Movement for National Liberation, generally called *Hadeto*.

EGYPTIAN MUSEUM. **Cairo** institution housing the world's largest collection of Egyptian antiquities. Up to the mid-19th century, Egyptians were so uninterested in their country's pre-Islamic antiquities that European governments and travelers plundered them freely, thus creating the great Egyptological collections in London, Paris, Berlin, Leiden, and Turin. **Champollion** urged **Muhammad**

Ali to curb the export of precious antiquities. In 1834 Egypt's first **museum** was established in **Ezbekiyya** under **Rifa'a al-Tahtawi**; that collection was later moved to the **education** ministry's quarters in the Cairo **Citadel**. **Sa'id** donated it to Archduke Maximilian of Austria in 1855, starting the collection now in Vienna.

Auguste Mariette became Egypt's first director of antiquities in 1858 and opened a small museum in **Bulaq** in 1863 under the patronage of **Khedive Isma'il**. In 1878 it came under the care of the works ministry. The collection was moved to Giza Palace in 1891; the quarters, although larger, were not wholly suitable. In 1902 the present museum, designed by Marcel Dourgnon in a neo-classic style, was opened in Midan Ismailia (now **Liberation Square**). For many years the directors of antiquities and the curators of the Egyptian Museum were French, but Egyptians have taken control since the **1952 Revolution**. The present museum exhibits more than 100 thousand works, ranging from prehistoric times to the beginning of the Greco-Roman period, displayed in chronological order. Because the museum is very cramped, the culture ministry plans to build a new home, near the Pyramids, for its burgeoning collection.

EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN JOINT DEFENSE AGREEMENT. Mutual defense pact, signed in **Cairo** on 4 November 1966, stating that any aggressive act against either state would be regarded as an attack on the other. Egypt and **Syria** agreed under its terms to set up a defense council and a joint military command. This pact was inspired in part by mounting border tensions between Syria and **Israel**, exacerbated by Israeli air and artillery attacks on a Syrian irrigation project, which if completed would have reduced the supply for Israel's national water carrier, and by Syrian shelling of Israeli settlements from the Golan Heights. A radical regime had recently taken power in Damascus and was urging the Palestinians to fight for their liberation from Israel, but using mainly bases on the Jordanian West Bank. The agreement may have caused Israel to retaliate for Palestinian raids later that month against al-Sammu' in Jordan rather than Syria. It also committed **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government, which had hitherto tried to postpone war with Israel until the Arab armies were fully battle-ready, to come to Syria's aid in any future conflict with Israel. Far from restraining the Syrians, it let them draw Egypt further into the Arab-Israeli conflict, leading to the **June War**.

EISENHOWER DOCTRINE (1957). Official U.S. policy statement, issued by President Dwight Eisenhower and approved by Congress, opposing the spread of **Communism** in the Middle East. Egyptians interpreted the Eisenhower Doctrine as an attempt to limit **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** influence over other Arab countries. **Arab nationalists** attacked the Doctrine. Lebanon's government accepted U.S. aid under its provisions, however, leading to that country's 1958 civil war and consequent American military intervention. Nasir responded by flying to Moscow to seek additional **Soviet** military aid.

ELECTIONS (1984). Marked the first **People's Assembly** elected under the 1983 law introducing proportional representation and during the presidency of **Husni Mubarak**. The **New Wafd Party**, allied with the outlawed **Muslim Brothers**, won 58 seats, against the 303 won by the ruling **NDP**. The assembly was dissolved in 1986.

ELECTIONS (1987). This election produced the largest number of deputies opposed to the ruling **NDP**. The Islamic Alliance, a coalition of the outlawed **Muslim Brothers**, **Liberal Party**, and **Socialist Labor Party (SLP)** won 60 seats, compared with 30 for the **New Wafd Party** and 390 for the **NDP**. This Parliament was ruled unconstitutional and was dissolved.

ELECTIONS (1990). Conducted under severe constraints shortly before the **Gulf War**, this election was boycotted by many parties due to conditions that they viewed as favoring the dominant **NDP**. The only opposition group that entered this election was the **NPUP**, which won six seats.

ELECTIONS (1995). Contested by more than a dozen legal parties, these elections saw the first use of public opinion polls and close observation by **human rights** and election watchdog organizations. The result was the election of 410 **NDP** candidates, while the **New Wafd Party**, the **NPUP**, the **Arab Democratic Nasirist Party**, and the Liberal Party shared a total of 14 seats. There were 30 independents elected; some may have been **Muslim Brothers**. In 2000 the Supreme Constitutional Court invalidated the results, and **Husni Mubarak** called the **People's Assembly** into extraordinary session, in which the delegates passed two amendments to the electoral law to provide full judicial oversight of future elections.

ELECTIONS (2000). Owing to the reports and suits filed by **human rights** organizations against the **1995 Elections**, these elections took place under judicial supervision in the polling places. In some cases, however, police impeded the entrance of would-be voters. The election occurred against a backdrop of issues over dual nationality, constraints imposed on opposition parties by the government, the contest for control of the **New Wafd** after the death of **Fuad Siraj al-Din**, and the high profile arrest of **Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim**. Fourteen legal political parties took part: the **Arab Democratic Nasirist Party**, the Green Party, the Liberal Party, the Misr Arab Socialist Party, *Misr al-Fatat*, the NDP, the NPUP, the **New Wafd Party**, the **SLP**, *al-Takaful* Party, *al-Umma* Party, the Unionist Democratic Party, *al-Wasat* (**Islamist**) Party, and *al-Wifaq al-Qawmiyya* Party.

The results of the three-stage elections showed the voters' disaffection with both the ruling and opposition parties and their growing support for independent candidates. The ruling NDP lost 22 seats, some of which had been held by party leaders, and won 388. The New Wafd won 7 seats, the NPUP 6, the Arab Democratic Nasirists 2, and the Liberals 1. Seventeen seats were taken by independents who acknowledged support for the outlawed **Muslim Brothers**; 21 were won by actual independents. Of the NDP's 388 seats, 218 of the winners ran as independents, often opposing candidates selected by the NDP, but later joined the ruling party. Some analysts believe that the strong support shown for Muslim Brothers may lead to their legalization before the next election.

EMERGENCY LAW (1958). Statute promulgated by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government, authorizing the judicial system to detain suspects without charging them or guaranteeing them due process during an investigation. After 30 days, a detainee may petition the State Security Court to review the case. If the court orders the detainee's release, the interior minister has 15 days to overrule the court, but the detainee may after 30 days petition again for release. Even if the detainee is released, however, the interior minister may rearrest the suspect. The government has often used this law against **Islamists**, leftists suspected of political violence, drug smugglers, illegal **currency** dealers, and even striking workers, pro-Palestinian student demonstrators, and relatives of fugitives. As of 1990 the government admitted to holding 2,411 individuals, 813 of them on political charges. The estimated number of detainees in 2002 was 15 thou-

sand, mainly members of the *Jama'at* or the **Muslim Brothers**. Although some civilian suspects are tried by the military courts, in most cases detainees have been released after interrogation and without trial. The law remains in effect. *See also* **Human Rights**.

EMPLOYMENT. Egypt's labor force was estimated in 2000 at 19.9 million, of whom 30 percent worked in **agriculture**, 22 in **industry**, and 48 in services. The unemployment rate was estimated at 11.5 percent. The *Egypt Human Development Report* published in 1994 broke down 1986 unemployment rates to show that the unemployed were heavily female, urban, aged 15–24, and more apt to be secondary school or university graduates than people lacking **education**. Although **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** promised government employment to all school and university graduates, Egypt's **bureaucracy** is overstaffed and unable to absorb the young people now seeking jobs, numbering 830 thousand annually, of which an estimated 500 thousand view the state as their employer of last resort. In order to avert the potential hazards of a large educated class of unemployed Egyptian workers, the state must either encourage some to emigrate or train more students in technical fields or manual trades that remain in high demand. No statistics are available for Egypt's numerous underemployed workers, especially in state-owned industries.

ENGINEERS. Whether viewed as a craft or a profession, engineering has long been a major occupation in Egypt, especially in matters related to **irrigation**. One of **Muhammad Ali**'s earliest reforms was the establishment of a polytechnic institute (*muhandiskhane*), mainly to train military engineers. Reorganized in 1837, it provided many of the Egyptian experts who developed the **perennial irrigation** system under **Isma'il**. The Polytechnic was closed down under **Abbas Hilmi I** but reopened in 1866. It languished during the early **British occupation** but revived after being reorganized again in 1903. It was integrated into **Cairo University** in 1935.

Egyptian engineers were slow to set up a united organization; one group set up the Royal Society of Egyptian Engineers in 1920 to back the British irrigation projects, while another formed a professional syndicate to oppose them. King **Fuad I** granted formal recognition to the former group in 1922, but it remained a staid debating society with high dues and membership requirements; the syndicate disappeared. Its revival as the Egyptian Syndicate of Engineering

Professions in 1946 was due partly to the impact of wartime inflation on the salaries of younger engineers, partly to the need for an old-age pension plan for employees of the works ministry, but it never called a strike.

The **1952 Revolution**, with its strong emphasis on state-directed modernization, gave engineers new opportunities for advancement, and **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** predilection for corporatism strengthened the engineers' syndicate. As engineers became more prestigious, though, they became more resistant to the egalitarian ideals of **Arab socialism**. Political considerations often collided with engineering or economic realities, causing the overproduction of certain types of engineers and the promotion of some for reasons other than their skills. Setting up highly technical "prestige" industries such as steel manufacturing and automobile assembly plants increased Egyptian dependency on foreign engineers. The failure of academic engineers to keep abreast of scholarly literature in their fields suggested that Egypt was actually falling behind other modernizing countries. Most Egyptian engineers work in organizations, such as government ministries, universities, technical institutes, or large corporations, such as the **Arab Contractors**. Many now leave Egypt for higher-paying jobs in oil-exporting countries. The engineers' syndicate elected an **Islamist** slate of officers in 1992, but the government has passed legislation since then to bar them from power.

ENTENTE CORDIALE (1904). Anglo-French agreement, in which **Britain** promised **France** a free hand in Morocco, in return for which France agreed not to demand a fixed date for the **evacuation** of British troops from Egypt. The pact strengthened the **British occupation** and obliged its nationalist opponents to turn from France to the **Ottoman Empire** or to domestic public opinion for support.

ENVIRONMENT. The concentration of millions of people into the **Nile Valley** and Delta has challenged modern Egypt, but in fact environmental challenges have always faced the Egyptians. Creating dikes, weirs, and channels to confine the Nile River to areas where its waters were needed for **irrigation** has influenced Egypt's environment since antiquity. In modern times, however, the challenge has increased by the shift from **basin** to **perennial irrigation** with the concomitant building of the **Delta Barrages**, **Aswan Dam**, **Aswan**

High Dam, and other public works, as well as by the increase of Egypt's **population**. Natural hazards included periodic droughts, frequent **earthquakes**, flash floods, landslides, volcanoes, and the desert windstorm known as the *khamsin*. To these must now be added water pollution caused by raw sewage, industrial effluents, fertilizer runoffs, and agricultural pesticides; oil pollution threatening coral reefs, beaches, and marine habitats; loss of agricultural land to urbanization and windblown sands; increasing soil salination downstream from the High Dam; air pollution due to industrialization and increased use of **motor transport**; and the strain on all resources caused by the growth of Egypt's population and **tourism**.

Government policies are managed by the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency created by a presidential decree in 1982 and reorganized in 1985 and 1991. Some Egyptians argue that it should be raised to cabinet level, a small Green Party seeks to make public opinion environmentally aware, and more than 60 nongovernmental organizations addressed Egypt's environmental issues in 1997. Progress has been made on some fronts, notably the banning of leaded gasoline and the replacement of petroleum oil by natural gas in electric power plants, but overcoming the challenges will be costly and daunting. In 1999 Egypt's total energy consumption was estimated at 2 quadrillion BTUs (0.53 percent of the world total).

ERSAP. The Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program, a multistage accord signed by the Egyptian government with the **IMF** and the World Bank in May 1991. In 1987 Egypt was in a financial crisis, having fallen behind in retiring its external debt. Its **economy** suffered from declining growth, a worsening balance of payments, mounting double-digit inflation, rising interest rates, and shrinking foreign currency reserves. Its government had signed an interim agreement with the IMF, which was replaced by ERSAP. It called for six fundamental policy changes: macroeconomic policy adjustment, removal of consumer subsidies, elimination of price controls, foreign **trade** liberalization, reform of **labor legislation**, and **privatization** of state-owned enterprises. ERSAP's implementation strengthened Egypt's economy in the 1990s, but some economists believe that this benefited rich Egyptians at the expense of the poor.

EUROPEAN UNION (EU). Formerly the "Common Market" or the "European [Economic] Community." About 40 percent of Egypt's

total **trade** was with EU member states as of 2001, when its government initialed an association agreement under which a free trade area will be established within 12 years of ratification by the EU and Egyptian parliaments, as well as by the parliaments of every EU member state. Implementation of this agreement will open new export opportunities to Egyptian **industry** but also expose it to competition with European producers in many manufacturing enterprises that have so far enjoyed **tariff** protection. Only automobiles and **agriculture** will be exempt from this free-trade area, once the association agreement goes into effect. In addition to stimulating trade with EU members, the agreement will also promote the exchange of goods between Egypt and Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco, which have already signed deals with the EU.

EVACUATION. The termination of the **British occupation** and, therefore, preponderant power over Egypt. This was the desideratum of Egyptian nationalism from 1882 to 1956.

EXCEPTIONAL LAWS (1910). Three laws passed, following the assassination of Prime Minister **Butros Ghali**, by the Egyptian **cabinet** to curb agitation by the **National Party**. They strengthened the limits on press freedom imposed by the 1881 **Press Law**, restricted student demonstrations, and revised the Penal Code to include political conspiracy as a crime. The National Party agitated at home and abroad for their abrogation, to no avail.

EZBEKIYYA GARDENS. Public park in central **Cairo**, designed in 1869 by French landscape gardener Jean-Pierre Barillet-Deschamps, often the site of political rallies. Its condition deteriorated markedly after 1952, but in 2000 it was refurbished, in conjunction with the opening of the Ataba **Metro** station.

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FAHMI, ABD AL-AZIZ (1870–1951). Liberal politician, jurist, and intellectual. Born in a Minufiyya village, he came from a long line of *umdas*. He studied at **al-Azhar**, the **Khedivial** Secondary School, and the School of Administration (later the government **Law School**), earning his *license* in 1890. After working for several years

in the *Niyaba*, he opened a private practice. He headed the **Egyptian Bar Association** three times and was elected in 1913 to the **Legislative Assembly**. A friend of **Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid**, Fahmi helped found the **Wafd** but broke with **Sa'd Zaghlul** in Paris. He served on the committee that drafted the **1923 Constitution**. A founder of the **Liberal Constitutional Party**, he became its president in 1924. He later became justice minister and president of the High Court of Appeals and the Court of Cassation. His memoirs were printed in *al-Hilal* and reissued as a book, *Hadhihi hayati* (This Is My Life).

FAHMI, MUSTAFA (1840–1914). Politician, **cabinet** minister, and twice premier. He was born in Crete to a Turkish family that had earlier settled in Algeria. His father, a colonel, died in the Crimean War, and Mustafa Fahmi was adopted by an uncle who was in charge of the public works department. Fahmi was educated at the **Military Academy** and, upon being commissioned, rose through the Egyptian army to the rank of lieutenant general. He then was appointed governor of Minufiyya, followed by **Cairo**, and finally **Port Said**. He later became director of the **khedivial** estates and then master of ceremonies. He served as minister of public works in 1879, foreign affairs from 1879 to 1882, justice in 1882, **finance** from 1884 to 1887, interior three times (1887–88, 1891–93, and 1895–1908), and war and marine twice (1887–91 and 1894–95). He was prime minister from 1891 to 1893 and again from 1895 to 1908. His illness early in 1893 led to a crisis between Lord **Cromer** and **Khedive Abbas**, who tried to replace his cabinet with one headed by **Husayn Fakhri** without consulting the British consul. Fahmi was allowed to leave the government awhile to recover his health, but returned under **Nubar** and shortly afterward assumed the chair of what would be Egypt's longest-lasting cabinet, one in which the power of the British advisers far outweighed that of the ministers. He was pro-British for most of his active career, deferring repeatedly to Cromer, but after he left office he fell under the influence of **Sa'd Zaghlul**, who was married to one of his daughters. Egyptians tended to view him as too complaisant toward the British.

FAIQ, MUHAMMAD (1929–). Army officer, diplomat, and minister. A 1947 graduate of the **Military Academy**, he served in the army from 1948 to 1955, during which time he became a member of the **Free Officers**. He directed the Bureau of African Affairs in the

president's office from 1955 to 1966, during which time he served as **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** chief contact with AAPSO, the OAU, and various African governments and liberation groups. Faiq was minister of national guidance (and information) in 1967–70 and minister of state for foreign affairs until his resignation in 1971 in opposition to the **Corrective Revolution**. Imprisoned by **Anwar al-Sadat** in 1971–81, he later became secretary-general of the Arab Organization for **Human Rights** and was elected to the **People's Assembly**.

FAKHRI, HUSAYN (1843–1910). Politician, minister, and controversial premier appointed by **Khedive Abbas Hilmi II** against the wishes of Lord **Cromer** in January 1893. Born in **Cairo** to a family of **Circassian** background, he was educated in the princely schools. In 1863 he was appointed as a *mu'awin* (assistant) in the governorate and then transferred to foreign affairs. Sent to Paris by the Egyptian government for the 1867 exposition, he stayed there to study administrative law, returning to Egypt in 1874. He worked in the justice ministry and in the *Niyaba* of the **Mixed Courts**. Fakhri became justice minister in 1879–81 under **Mustafa Riyad**, in 1882–84 under **Muhammad Sharif**, and in 1888–91 under Riyad again; interior minister under **Mustafa Fahmi**; and, after serving for three days as the khedive's prime minister, he would serve as minister of works and **education** under **Nubar** and Fahmi. A lover of science, he belonged to the **Institut d'Égypte**, the **Geographical Society**, and the Committee for the Preservation of Arab Monuments. His son, Mahmud, married Princess Fawqiyya, one of King **Faruq's** sisters. The public controversy over his khedivial appointment in opposition to Cromer gave Fakhri an undeserved reputation as a nationalist.

FALUJA. Palestinian village, the site of a lengthy siege during the 1948 **Palestine War**, regarded by Egyptians as their most heroic stand against the Israeli army.

FAMILY PLANNING. Egypt's **population** has since the 1930s, if not earlier, exceeded the optimum size for its habitable area and arable land. Since the **1952 Revolution** the Egyptian government has pursued policies intended to reduce the rate of population increase. In the mid-1950s it raised the minimum marriage age to 16 for **women** and 18 for men. Various efforts have been made by private organizations, the government, and **UN** agencies to reduce the birth rate in

order to stem population growth. One private group is the Cairo Family Planning Association, founded by Aziza Husayn, who also served as president of the International Planned Parenthood Association and from 1962 to 1977 as Egypt's delegate to the UN Committee on the Status of Women.

The Egyptian government formed in 1965 an interministerial body called the Supreme Council for Family Planning, but it could not fulfill its mission because it included the premier and the ministers of public health, higher **education**, national guidance (information), **planning**, religious affairs, and social affairs, as well as the ministers of state for prime minister's affairs and local administration. This body of overworked ministers could rarely meet as a group. Control over family planning was disputed between the health and social affairs ministries, and there were administrative abuses in programs for inserting intrauterine devices and dispensing birth control pills. More recently the government has streamlined its family planning services. Its spending on family planning rose from £E1.8 million in 1980 to more than double that figure during the 1990s. In 1997 it was reported that 54 percent of all married women of reproductive age used some form of birth control. The net overall fertility rate fell from 6.5 per woman in 1965 to 3.07 in 2001, but a major cause for Egypt's burgeoning population has been the concurrent decline in infant and child mortality.

As of 1997, contraceptive devices available in Egypt included condoms, diaphragms, birth control pills, intrauterine devices, injectable implants, and male and female sterilization. Abortions are legal and performed free of charge by government physicians, provided that the woman's husband approves. Egypt's fairly high birth rate is often blamed on **Islamist** opposition to contraception. A more likely cause is that married couples believe that having many children assures them of financial support in their old age.

FARID, MUHAMMAD (1868–1919). Nationalist leader, writer, and lawyer. The successor to **Mustafa Kamil** as the leader of Egypt's struggle for independence from **Britain**, Muhammad Farid came from a wealthy landowning family of Turkish origin. Trained at the School of Administration, he worked as a lawyer for the Egyptian government and the *Niyaba*. After he was dismissed due to the **Telegrams Incident**, he opened his own law office, one of the first Egyptians to do so. Close to Mustafa Kamil, Farid became one of his

strongest political and financial supporters. After Mustafa's premature death in 1908, he was elected president of the **National Party**.

Farid led the party in Egypt and from March 1912 in exile until his death in November 1919 after a long illness. He adhered to the principle that the British must withdraw their forces from Egypt and that only the **khedive** could grant constitutional government to his subjects. Farid called for the spread of **education** and economic and social reforms. He occasionally sought the help of Egypt's suzerain, the **Ottoman Empire**, especially while in exile during **World War I**, but he often suspected the Turks of not backing Egyptian national aims. He sometimes espoused **pan-Islam**, thus alienating the **Copts**. Although the National Party became divided during Farid's presidency, Egyptians respect him for his patriotic courage and self-sacrifice. His memoirs were published as *Mudhakkirat Muhammad Farid: al-qism al-awwal, tarikhh Misr min ibtida sanat 1891* (1975) and *Awraq Muhammad Farid: Mudhakkirati ba'd al-hijra* (1978). The latter has been translated as *The Memoirs and Diaries of Muhammad Farid, an Egyptian Nationalist Leader (1868—1919)*.

AL-FARIDA AL-GHAIBA. Title of an Islamic tract by [Muhammad] Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954–82), published in December 1981. It was originally intended for members of **al-Jihad**, who may have had prior access to a privately circulated version. It calls on Muslims to fulfill God's command to Muhammad to establish an Islamic state by means of a **jihad**, which he interpreted to mean a holy war. The book demands that the **Shari'a** replace existing secular laws, even if doing this would require attacking or killing Muslims who profess **Islam** but resist a return to its rules and laws, and that current leaders of Muslim countries who have adopted secular habits of thought and action must be killed and replaced by genuine believers. Many Egyptians, especially **Islamists**, have read the book, which has also been translated into English as *The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East*. Faraj was tried for conspiring to kill **Anwar al-Sadat**, convicted, and executed, along with **Khalid al-Islambuli**.

FARUQ (1920–65). King of Egypt from 1936 (under a regency up to his 18th birthday) until his abdication on 26 July 1952. Initially charismatic and highly popular, he was the first member of his family who

could make a formal speech in Arabic. He occasionally led Friday congregational worship at mosques, normally a prerogative of the **caliph**. Some Egyptians, notably **Mustafa al-Maraghi**, hoped to revive the caliphate, which had been abolished by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) in 1924, so that Faruq could be elected to the position. His marriage in 1938 to Safinaz Zulfikar, whom he renamed Farida, was welcomed by the people. He competed with the **Wafd Party**, which controlled the government from 1936 to December 1937, when Faruq dismissed it for sponsoring a mass demonstration near **Abdin Palace** and appointed a **cabinet** made up of politicians from other parties. A rigged election, boycotted by the Wafd, gave these parties control of Parliament in April 1938.

When the British declared war on Germany in 1939, they asked Egypt to follow their example and sent additional troops to defend the **Suez Canal**. The king and his ministers opposed going to war against Germany, which many Egyptians viewed as a potential liberator of their country from **Britain**. While the war was going badly for the Allies in 1940–42, Britain's ambassador to Egypt, Sir **Miles Lampson**, considered deposing Faruq and began calling for the appointment of a cabinet, headed by **Mustafa al-Nahhas**, that would uphold the 1936 **Anglo–Egyptian Treaty**. Faruq hoped to unite Egypt's leading politicians in opposition to British interference, with **Ali Mahir** as his prime minister. Needing to secure British control of the **Suez Canal**, Lampson demanded that Faruq either appoint Nahhas to head a Wafdist cabinet or abdicate (*see* 4 **February [1942] Incident**). Faruq gave in and then withdrew from politics, devoting himself to gambling and sex. He had a car accident in 1943 and, during his prolonged convalescence in a British army hospital, medical maltreatment is thought by many Egyptians to have affected his glands, causing him to act in eccentric ways.

After dismissing the Wafdist ministry in October 1944, Faruq reentered the political fray with a succession of Palace-dominated governments. Discontent spread after **World War II**, as popular pressure mounted to renounce the 1936 Treaty, force the British troops to evacuate Egypt, and annex the Anglo–Egyptian **Sudan**. Although supporting these aims, Faruq could only distract himself and the public with an enhanced enthusiasm for Arab unity. After the **UN General Assembly** accepted the 1947 **Partition Plan for Palestine**, all the Arab governments vied to show support for the Arabs and defiance of the UN decision. Even though Faruq's ministers and

his generals privately advised him that the Egyptian army was not ready for a war, he heeded the blandishments of journalist **Karim Thabit** and committed Egypt to enter the **Palestine War**. Ill equipped and badly led, the Egyptians were soon thrown back. In February 1949 Egypt accepted an armistice with **Israel**, the first Arab state to do so. At the height of the war, Faruq announced his divorce from Queen Farida, who was beloved by the people, and he was publicly hissed for the first time at a **Cairo movie theater**.

Late in 1949 Faruq finally agreed to permit free parliamentary elections, and the Wafd returned to power. As Nahhas and his cabinet initiated some reforms, Faruq came to be seen as marginal, although the Wafd changed his title to "King of Egypt and the Sudan" when it abrogated the 1936 Treaty. His second marriage in 1951, to 16-year-old Narriman Sadiq, followed by a three-month honeymoon cruise, appalled Egyptians. On **Black Saturday**, while downtown Cairo burned, Faruq was hosting a luncheon to celebrate the birth of his first son. He dismissed the Wafdist cabinet and appointed a succession of governments, but could not restore political control. His attempt to rig the elections for the presidency of the Officers Club alienated the Egyptian army, traditionally royalist, and his appointment of his brother-in-law, Isma'il Shirrin, as war minister proved to be the last straw. On 22–23 July 1952 the **Free Officers** seized control and announced that Faruq was deposed. Unable to win support from either the British or the **U.S.** ambassador, he abdicated in favor of his infant son and left Egypt. He spent the rest of his life in Europe. His death in a Rome nightclub in March 1965 may have been arranged by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** secret service.

Although intelligent and charming, Faruq lacked education and mental discipline. He could not discriminate among his would-be advisers and hence failed to lead his people to independence from Britain, constitutional government, economic development, and primacy within the Arab world. When he returned from England to succeed his father as king, he had no enemies; when he left Egypt, a failure, he had no friends.

FASHODA INCIDENT (1898). Confrontation between the 25-thousand-man Anglo–Egyptian army commanded by Sir Herbert **Kitchener**, which had just reconquered the northern **Sudan** and a French expeditionary force headed by General Jean-Baptiste Marchand, which had crossed Africa from west to east to take control of

the upper **Nile**. Although Marchand had preceded Kitchener by several months, he lacked the forces on the scene and the support back home that were available to the British. Despite a brief war scare in London and Paris, Marchand agreed to withdraw. **France's** concession to **Britain** in the Sudan started the reconciliation between the two countries that led to the *Entente Cordiale*.

FATHI, HASAN (HASSAN FATHY) (1900–89). Architect who championed traditional peasant designs. Born in **Alexandria** to a rich landowning family, he studied **architecture** at **Cairo University**, receiving his *license* in 1926. Although trained in the Paris beaux arts tradition, upon visiting his family's Upper Egyptian estates for the first time in 1927, he was struck by the simplicity and rightness of the local building traditions and dedicated himself to making their principles more systematic and better suited to the housing needs of other poor people. Meanwhile, he worked in the architectural section of **Cairo's** municipal affairs department, but later went into private practice. In 1940 he got his first chance to test his ideas when the Royal **Agriculture** Society asked him to design an experimental farm at Bahtim. He investigated and revived **Nubian** techniques of building arches and domes with mud brick and also used these techniques in the construction of some private homes.

Fathi's main achievement was the design and construction, begun in 1945 and only partly implemented, of the village of New Qurna (Gourna, in Qina province, is opposite **Luxor**), about which he wrote a book in 1969 called *Gourna, a Tale of Two Villages*, which was republished in 1973 as *Architecture for the Poor*. He argued that the collective wisdom of a community about its use of space should guide architectural design and town planning. He also served as director of school buildings for the **education** ministry in 1949–52, head of the architecture department of the Fine Arts faculty at Cairo University from 1953 to 1957, and a member of the **United Nations** Committee for Housing in South Arabia. An outstanding teacher, Fathi drew young architects and students from many parts of the world to Egypt to learn his techniques.

FAWDA, FARAJ (1944–92). Secularist speaker and writer. Born near Damietta, he was trained as an agronomist. Well known for his strong opposition to basing Egypt's laws on the **Shari'ah**, he was

shot on 8 June 1992 as he was leaving his home in **Heliopolis**. It is believed that the assassin was a member of *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya*. The murder set off a wave of **terrorism** in Egypt that lasted until the 1997 **Luxor Incident**.

FAWZI, MAHMUD (1900–80). Diplomat, politician, **cabinet** minister, and premier. Fawzi graduated from **Cairo University**'s Law Faculty and did graduate studies in political science and history at the Universities of Liverpool, Columbia, and Rome, which awarded him a Ph.D. Joining the Egyptian foreign service, he held posts in the **United States** and Japan and was Egypt's consul general in Jerusalem from 1941 to 1944. He served as Egypt's chief representative to the UN from 1945 to 1952 and as foreign minister from December 1952 until 1964, deputy premier from 1964 to 1967, and **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**'s special adviser on foreign affairs in 1967–70. From 1968 Fawzi sat on the executive board of the **ASU** and reorganized it, at Nasir's behest, even though he had never been active in internal politics. He served as **Anwar al-Sadat**'s prime minister from October 1970 to January 1972, then became vice president and special adviser to the president on foreign affairs until he retired in September 1974. Although Fawzi served Nasir and Sadat as a respectable spokesman to the outside world, he remained a diplomat-technician without any political influence at home. His *Suez 1956: An Egyptian Perspective* was published in London after his death.

FAWZI, MUHAMMAD (1915–2000). Army officer and politician. He commanded Egypt's forces in the **Yemen Civil War** and succeeded **Abd al-Hakim Amir** as commander-in-chief of the armed forces after the **June War**. He served as **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**'s defense minister from 1968 to 1971. A leftist and political ally of **Ali Sabri**, he belonged to the faction that was purged in the **Corrective Revolution**, in part because he was not trusted by his chief-of-staff, let alone by **Anwar al-Sadat**. Sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, he was pardoned by Sadat in 1974 because of his military record. His *Harb al-thalath sanawat, 1967–1970 (The Three-Year War)* was printed in Beirut in 1983.

FEDDAN. Egyptian land measure unit equal to 1.038 acres or 4,201 m².

FEDERATION OF ARAB REPUBLICS (1971). Abortive combination of Egypt, **Libya**, and **Syria**, accepted in May 1971 by their respective leaders, **Anwar al-Sadat**, Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, and Hafiz al-Asad. Sadat made his commitment to this federation a precipitating factor in his **Corrective Revolution**, claiming that his enemies, the **Centers of Power**, opposed it. The federation project was approved by an Egyptian, Libyan, and Syrian citizens' referendum held in September 1971, and Sadat was proposed as the first president, but it later foundered on his political differences with Qadhafi. An organic union between Egypt and Libya, scheduled to take effect on 1 September 1973, was indefinitely postponed.

FEDERATION OF EGYPTIAN INDUSTRIES. Coalition of Egyptian industrialists, formed in 1922, to represent the interests of Egyptianized capitalism, organized in more than 20 specialized branches. It led the fight to abolish excise taxes on local manufactures and to obtain protective **tariffs** on imports. It nullified union and welfare legislation that would have reduced the competitive advantage of Egypt's cheap labor force. It resisted the "nationalist" challenge of **Bank Misr**, finally replacing **Tal'at Harb** in 1939 with its own board of directors. It deflected efforts to broaden the state's participation in industrialization until **World War II**. Its president, Henri Naus, was a Belgian; its general secretary, Isaac Levy, was a **Jew** from Istanbul; and its link to native capitalists and the state was **Isma'il Sidqi**, who strengthened the Federation at the expense of labor unions, political parties, and other associational groupings.

After the war, the Federation reorganized itself as a semipublic body, hoping to attract investment subsidies and state support for its campaign to Egyptianize corporate management. Under **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** the Federation was turned into an agency of the **industry** ministry, but it emerged under **Anwar al-Sadat** as an advocate for native manufacturers, including public sector managers seeking greater operational independence. Under **Husni Mubarak** it remains, along with the chambers of commerce, a voice for Egyptian industrial capitalism, although challenged now by groups of younger business leaders.

FELLAH. Peasant cultivator. The Arabic and English plural is *fellahin*.

FEMINISM. The movement to attain for **women** rights equal to those enjoyed by men. The earliest voices of Egyptian feminism were those of upper-class Muslim women confined to their harems, but the best-known early advocate of women's rights was **Qasim Amin**, a man who condemned female segregation and seclusion and unfair Muslim divorce laws in his two books on women's liberation, published in 1899 and 1901. In addition, women journalists, mainly **Syrian** Christians or **Copts**, began publishing magazines for women before **World War I**. An opponent of polygyny, **Malak Hifni Nasif**, presented a 10-point program for women's rights at the 1911 **Egyptian Congress** and helped found the Union of Educated Egyptian Ladies (*L'Association Intellectuelle des Dames Égyptiennes*) in March 1914. Both Qasim Amin and Nasif received editorial support from **Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid** in the pages of *al-Jarida*. Egyptian women demonstrated during the **1919 Revolution**, but as nationalists rather than as feminists. One thousand women met at St. Mark's Cathedral in **Cairo** in 1920 to form the Wafdist Women's Central Committee. Its leader, **Huda Sha'rawi**, later founded the **EFU**, which demonstrated when the all-male Parliament opened in 1924. Even though some members wanted voting rights, the EFU worked for **education**, welfare, and legal reforms, avoiding political issues.

A bolder program was sought by some women, led by Durriyya Shafiq [Raja'i], the first Egyptian woman to earn the *doctorat d'état* in philosophy from the University of Paris. She launched an Arabic-language magazine, *Bint al-Nil*, to champion equal rights for women. In 1948 she founded a society by that name, attracting a younger, more activist clientele than the established EFU. The two groups came together briefly in 1949 to represent Egypt within the International Council of Women, but their leaders differed on political issues. In 1951 Shafiq organized a mass rally that culminated in an invasion of Parliament by the 1,500 woman participants, after which she transformed *Bint al-Nil* Society into a political party.

Shafiq supported the **1952 Revolution**, even when it abolished parties, but expected it to provide equal rights for women. To publicize her demands, she began a hunger strike in March 1954, which ended when President **Muhammad Najib** promised to consider them. Later that year, she complained that Egypt's draft constitution, while enfranchising women, proposed to require them (unlike men) to pass a **literacy** test. Egypt's **1956 Constitution** did give women the vote without imposing a literacy requirement. She later denounced

Jamal Abd al-Nasir's dictatorship. When she began another hunger strike at the Indian Embassy in February 1957, Nasir put her under house arrest, her *Bint al-Nil* comrades made her resign, and other feminists condemned her as counterrevolutionary.

Another woman activist was **Inji Aflaton**, who became a Marxist while studying at the Lycée Français. **Communist** groups, especially the House of Scientific Research under **Iskra**, attracted Egyptian women members, who in 1944–45 founded the League of Women Students and Graduates from the University and Egyptian Institutes, a radical feminist group that sent representatives to the 1945 World Congress of Women in Paris but was closed by **Isma'il Sidqi** in 1946. Aflaton, who attended that congress, later formed the Egyptian Peace Movement in 1950 and the Women's Committee for Popular Resistance to back the *fidaiyin* against the British in the **Suez Canal Zone**. These groups were banned by Nasir's regime, which subsumed all political activities under the state. His **ASU** specifically provided for the election or appointment of women to positions in its organization and its committees, which included one especially for women's affairs.

Egypt's feminist movement regained some of its autonomy under **Anwar al-Sadat** due to the visibility of his wife, **Jihan al-Sadat**, who pressed for legislation improving women's rights within marriage. On the other hand, the influx of foreign corporations and consumer goods that resulted from the *infatih* policy, tended to widen the gap between a rich minority and the middle- and lower-class majority, which sometimes reacted against the signs of upper-class Westernization by adopting ideas of **Islamism** opposed to women's rights. **Employment** of women in farming and manufacturing declined, but women entrepreneurs and managers increased their numbers markedly. Egyptian labor emigration, being mainly male, also opened new opportunities for women's advancement in Egypt. **Nawal al-Sa'dawi**, a feminist physician, formed the Arab Women's Solidarity Conference in 1982, but its activities were hindered by the Egyptian government, and it was banned in June 1991 by Cairo's deputy governor. The Association moved to Algiers and challenged the ban in the Egyptian courts. Although no judicial decision has yet been made, it returned to Cairo in 1996 and sponsored a conference there in January 2002 without hindrance. The Egyptian government has sponsored the **National Council for Women**,

chaired by **Suzanne Mubarak**, with an activist agenda, since February 2000.

In recent years, women have been admitted to all universities and technical institutes and have held positions as **cabinet** ministers, ambassadors, business executives, and members of the **People's Assembly**, yet they suffer disadvantages over property inheritance, divorce, child custody, and the right to travel abroad. The People's Assembly did pass some marriage and divorce reforms in 2000. Male-dominated *jama'at* oppose feminism as an undesirable Western influence. As many Muslim women have resumed wearing the veil, some Islamists have made statements that women belong at home, but Islamic feminist organizations have also emerged.

FEZ PEACE PROPOSAL (1982). Eight-point plan for Middle East peace proposed at a summit meeting of Arab leaders in Fez in September 1982. It called on **Israel** to withdraw from and dismantle its settlements in all lands captured in 1967 and guaranteed religious freedom in the holy shrines of Jerusalem. While reaffirming the Palestinians' right to a state led by the **PLO**, with Jerusalem as its capital, it proposed to place the West Bank and **Gaza Strip** under **UN** control for a brief transitional period. The Security Council would guarantee peace among all the region's countries, including the proposed Palestinian state. This plan, which resembled one offered in 1981 by Saudi Crown Prince Fahd, was in response to President Ronald Reagan's Peace Plan of 1 September 1982 and Israel's invasion of Lebanon. **Husni Mubarak** did not attend the Fez summit. Israel rejected the proposal, which was ignored by the **United States**.

FIDAIYIN. Muslims who sacrifice themselves for a cause. The term was applied to Egyptians who attacked British troops in the **Suez Canal Zone** in 1951–52 and later to Palestinians fighting against **Israel** or its backers.

FINANCE, GOVERNMENT. During much of modern Egypt's history, the government has tried to spend more money than it received from taxes or earnings on its investments. The customary solution has been to borrow money, sometimes from Egyptians, more often from abroad. **Muhammad Ali**, the first ruler whose reforms led to heavy expenses, solved his problem by establishing state monopolies over land, **agriculture**, and many types of **industry**. The system deterio-

rated after the **Convention of London**, which limited Egypt's ability to protect its **economy** from British competition to a modest **tariff** duty of 8 percent *ad valorem*. Soon all Western countries exporting to the **Ottoman Empire** (including Egypt) enjoyed the same low customs rates. In addition, their nationals were granted immunity from local taxation by the **Capitulations**.

Abbas Hilmi I kept government expenses low by drastically reducing expenditure on the **armed forces** and **education**. **Sa'id** placed higher demands on his state treasury because of the cost of buying the unsold shares of the nascent **Suez Canal Company** as well as the military outlay of sending Egyptians to fight alongside the Ottomans in the Crimean War. He contracted the first state loan from a foreign bank in 1862. His successor **Isma'il**, intended to keep a tight rein on state expenditure. Encouraged, however, by the boom in demand for Egyptian **cotton**, he soon became lured into contracting heavy debts to European investment bankers to finance his ambitious modernization program. By the end of his reign, the state debt had ballooned from £3 to £93 million sterling, and Europeans were supervising state revenues and expenditures.

One of the motives for **Britain's** intervention against **Ahmad Urabi's** movement was to ensure that the Egyptian government paid its debts to its European creditors. The prolongation of the **British occupation** was mainly due to the perceived need to reform Egypt's economy to make sure that it would meet its obligations. The Egyptian government went further into debt in 1884 to indemnify merchants who had suffered losses during the Urabi revolution and to finance repairs to the **Delta Barrages**. By 1890, however, the government was no longer in danger of bankruptcy and was beginning to consolidate its outstanding loans. The public debt peaked at £107 million in 1890, but lower interest rates eased the strain on the treasury. The debt was never fully retired, but the government raised its reserve funds, and its bonds came to be viewed, by Egyptians as well as foreigners, as a safe investment.

During **World War II** the British government borrowed large sums from Egypt, which up to the 1960s offered the country a cushion for its financial projects. Starting around 1963, the Egyptian government began to accumulate a foreign debt, however, rising from £E247 million in 1965 to £E11.2 billion in 1980; the cost of servicing this debt created a severe burden, slightly relieved as Egypt increased its **petroleum** exports after 1978. The Paris Club

(a group of 19 nations that have lent large sums to developing countries) has made loans to Egypt in 1987 and 1991. In gratitude for Egypt's help during the **Gulf War**, the Western and Gulf states forgave \$14 billion of Egypt's external debts in 1991, following up with further reductions. Egypt's public debt rose during the prosperity of the 1990s, reaching about \$30.5 billion in 2001.

Because of the economic slowdown, Egypt's debt has probably risen since then. The European Investment Fund has lent Egypt 2 billion Euros since 1978 and announced in May 2002 that it would lend 25 million directly to small- and medium-sized industries that are trying to modernize. At a conference held in **Sharm al-Shaykh** in February 2002, the Arab Development Fund, Denmark, Japan, and the Kuwait Fund agreed to lend Egypt up to \$10.3 billion for economic development, in addition to \$1 billion pledged by the World Bank and the African Development Bank.

FIRMAN. Turkish term meaning decree, often applied in Egypt to the rescripts by the **Ottoman Empire** that defined the exercise of autonomy by Egypt's viceroys. These included the *firmans* of 1841 confirming **Muhammad Ali's** nonhereditary control over what later became the **Sudan** and his hereditary governorship of Egypt "within its ancient boundaries." These lands included the parts of the **Sinai Peninsula** and the **Hijaz** used by Muslim pilgrims from Egypt and North Africa to Mecca. The *firmans* sent to **Khedive Tawfiq** in 1879 and **Abbas Hilmi II** in 1892 required some clarification over the exact boundaries of Egypt, which remained a province of the Ottoman Empire until 1914. The Ottoman sultan also modified the conditions of the 1841 *firman* to enable his viceroys to change the hereditary system to one of primogeniture, to adopt the title of khedive, to contract foreign loans without prior permission, to conclude treaties with other countries, and to enlarge the Egyptian army. Egypt's juridical status thus evolved during the 19th century from that of an Ottoman province to virtual autonomy.

FIVE FEDDAN LAW (1912). Government statute, inspired by Lord **Kitchener**, that exempted the last five **feddans** of land owned by an Egyptian **fellah** from being taken in case he or she defaulted on repayment of a loan. The law, which has remained in force with minor amendments in 1916 and in 1953–54, protects the peasant against seizure of land, dwelling houses, draft animals, and tools needed for

cultivation. It did not help the fellahin as much as its framers had hoped, for moneylenders simply refused to lend to peasants who held too little land to provide a guarantee of repayment. It weakened the **Agricultural Bank of Egypt**, founded in 1902 with Lord **Cromer's** encouragement. It had no significant effect on land distribution. *See also* **Landownership**.

FOOD RIOTS (1977). Mass demonstrations in **Cairo** and other Egyptian cities, the largest since the **1919 Revolution**, in January 1977. The protestors, initially workers, students, and housewives, later joined by slum dwellers, were demonstrating against a government decision, imposed by the **IMF** as a condition for further loans to Egypt, to reduce subsidies and hence to raise the retail price of basic foodstuffs. Especially sensitive was the price of *baladi* bread, which had long been fixed at one piastre per loaf. Leftists tried to direct the disturbances into protests against capitalism, and popular chants hailed **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** and pilloried both **Anwar** and **Jihan al-Sadat**. Some **Islamists** burned down nightclubs and attacked luxury stores to protest against Western cultural penetration and immorality. For the first time since 1954, the army was called out to help the police quell the riots; 79 protestors were killed, 800–1,000 wounded, and 1,250–1,500 jailed. Sadat's prestige, high since the **October War**, was shaken. The government restored the subsidies, the regime turned against **Nasirites** and **Marxists**, and Sadat moved toward making peace with **Israel** to relieve Egypt's **economy**.

FOREIGN AID. Egypt has needed (and, generally speaking, received) large amounts of military and economic assistance from the world's wealthiest countries since about 1950, although many donor nations have received a hidden payback from Egyptian emigrants, often highly educated, who have worked in their countries and contributed to their own economies. **U.S.** aid to Egypt (*see* **Agency for International Development**) since 1950 reached a cumulative total of \$24 billion in 2000 and currently averages \$1.3 billion annually in military aid and \$650 million in economic assistance, a sum that is determined largely by the amount of aid the United States provides to **Israel**, publicly estimated at \$3 billion but probably higher.

Aid to Egypt includes a U.S. government subsidy for the importation of American products, direct cash transfers, and an export enhancement program. Second to the U.S. comes **Russia** (or the

USSR), which provided \$325 million toward the construction of the **Aswan High Dam**, funded many economic and cultural projects in Egypt, and sold about \$6 billion in weapons, mostly financed by loans that Egypt never repaid. **France, Britain**, Germany, and Japan have maintained aid programs in Egypt, as has the **UN**. Kuwait's government leads the Arab countries with \$1.3 billion invested in Egypt; **Saudi Arabia's investments** are valued at £E4.6 billion. Numerous private agencies, including the Ford Foundation, CARE, Oxfam, the Red Cross, and various church groups have modest but often well-targeted aid programs. Egypt has run its own foreign aid program to friendly African countries. *See also* **Finance, Government; International Monetary Fund**.

FOREIGN POLICY. Although Egypt was technically a part of the **Ottoman Empire** until 1914 and then was a **Protectorate of Britain**, it has usually conducted official and commercial relations with other countries independently of Istanbul or London. In the 19th century Egypt's merchants traded most with Mediterranean countries, notably **France**, which also supported Egypt diplomatically. Egypt's rulers, notably **Muhammad Ali**, tended, therefore, to be pro-French. Because of Egypt's absolute dependence on **Nile River** waters, they also sought to control or at least to influence the **Sudan**. Under **Khedive Isma'il**, Egypt sent its army to conquer Ethiopia, portions of the Congo, and other Nile sources. These invasions, which were only partly successful, may have led to the Sudanese **Mahdi's** revolt in 1881. The government also encouraged **trade** with **Italians** and **Greeks** and allowed them to immigrate to Egypt. During the **British occupation**, Egyptian ministers usually cooperated with their British advisers, but at times the khedive or discrete elements of the government, such as the *Niyaba*, espoused nationalist policies.

There has often been dissonance between Egyptian official and popular attitudes toward foreign countries. Although the Egyptian government willingly signed the **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty** in 1936, it tried to disassociate itself from Britain during the early years of **World War II**. Once the war ended, nearly all Egyptians wanted the British to leave their bases in **Cairo, Alexandria**, and the **Suez Canal** and to turn over control of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. When negotiations and the **United Nations** failed to resolve the issue, the Egyptian government unilaterally abrogated the 1936 Treaty and tried to pressure Britain's 80 thousand occupying

forces into evacuating their bases. Egypt also led in founding the **Arab League** and hence came to oppose **Zionism**, joining other Arab states to fight **Israel** in the **Palestine War**.

After the **1952 Revolution**, the **Free Officers** entered into the **Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Agreement** in 1953, leading to a plebiscite and eventual independence for Sudan. Negotiating the 1954 **Anglo-Egyptian agreement**, providing for the **evacuation** of the Canal Zone, proved more difficult, and **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** had to finesse Britain and the **United States** into believing that his government might enter into a mutual defense pact against **Communism** if the British left. In 1955 Egypt adopted a policy of **positive neutrality** between the American-led capitalist countries and the Communist ones led by the **USSR**, opposing **Iraq**, which helped to sponsor the pro-Western **Baghdad Pact**. Nasir's Egypt also adopted **Arab nationalism**, seeking closer relations with **Syria**, **Saudi Arabia**, and **Yemen**; this also meant more vocal support for the Arabs of **Palestine** against **Israel**. This led to the **Suez War**, in which Egypt was backed by the superpowers against Britain, France, and Israel.

After those countries had evacuated the **Suez Canal** and the **Sinai**, Egypt returned to positive neutrality and to promoting Arab unity. In 1958 it formed the **UAR** with Syria and appealed to peoples in other Arab countries to persuade or force their governments to join in an **Arab federation**, but only Yemen joined. Egypt also strengthened its ties with other newly independent Asian and African nations through **AAPSO** and the Nonaligned Movement. Syria and the Yemen broke away from the UAR in 1961, but Egypt sought ties with the Algerians, who won their independence from France in 1962, and with republican army officers in Yemen, precipitating the **Yemen Civil War** in that year. Revolutions in Iraq and Syria early in 1963 led Egypt to resume unity talks with the new regimes, both associated with the Ba'th Party. However, the Ba'th was not willing to subordinate itself to Nasir's **ASU**, and so no unification occurred.

Responding to an Israeli threat to draw on the Jordan River waters, Egypt convened all Arab kings and heads of state for a summit in January 1964 in Cairo. In that meeting and two others, the Arab leaders drafted plans for a renewed confrontation with Israel, an eventuality that Nasir hoped to put off until the Arabs were sufficiently rearmed, and proposed setting up the **PLO**. The **Egyptian-Syrian joint defense agreement**, intended to restrain Syria,

instead led Egypt into confrontation with Israel, eventuating in the disastrous **June War**, in which Nasir accused the Americans of flying air cover for Israel and broke diplomatic relations with Washington.

Defeat did not cause Egypt, or its allies, to make peace with Israel, for indeed they rearmed as quickly as possible, but it did lead to reconciliation with Saudi Arabia, compromise settlement of the Yemen Civil War, and more financial power of the Gulf Arabs over the economies and hence the policies of the “confrontation states,” including Nasir’s Egypt. Egypt pursued the **War of Attrition** and backed the radical Palestinians in 1969–70, but it also endorsed **Security Council Resolution 242** and the **Rogers Peace Plan**. By the time Nasir died, he seemed to be moving toward moderating between the Palestinians and Jordan and possibly peace with Israel.

At the outset of his presidency, **Anwar al-Sadat** followed Nasir’s lead, warning against a premature renewal of hostilities with Israel and seeking offensive weapons from the USSR, but also sending his national security adviser to meet with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in order to keep a line open with the **United States**. His expulsion of the **Soviet** military advisers in July 1972 was meant to signal a desire to renew relations with the Americans, a message that is hard for an Arab leader to convey during a presidential campaign year. Meanwhile, Sadat also pursued a **Federation of Arab Republics** and a possible organic union with **Libya**. Closer ties with Syria enabled Sadat to plan the coordinated attack on Israel that led to the **October War**, generally seen as a brief military advance followed by a severe setback but a major political victory for Egypt. Israel was diplomatically isolated, and the oil-producing Arab states used their embargo to win support from Europe, Japan, and Africa. Sadat established close personal ties with Kissinger and U.S.–Egyptian diplomatic relations were restored.

Between 1973 and 1976 Sadat reversed Egypt’s military and political orientation from the Soviet Bloc to the West and backed Kissinger’s **shuttle diplomacy** between the Arabs and Israel. Once Egypt had reopened the Suez Canal and renounced war as an instrument for settling the Arab–Israeli conflict, Sadat advanced his peace offensive with his dramatic visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the subsequent peace talks with Israel, the **Camp David Accords**, and the **Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty**. These steps alienated Egypt

from the Palestinians and most of the Arab governments, which broke diplomatic relations, cut off economic aid, and expelled Egypt from the Arab League. Sadat failed to gain concessions from Israel during the **Palestinian Autonomy Talks**, and Egyptians gradually became disillusioned with the peace process, which they had hoped would lead to economic prosperity.

Sadat's assassination was widely construed as a punishment for his peace policy. Although **Husni Mubarak** has never formally renounced Egypt's peace treaty with Israel, he has minimized his relations with the Israelis and condemned policies that oppressed the Palestinians. He has maintained close ties with the U.S. but has gradually restored Egypt's relations with all of the Arab countries, often mediating their disputes and making Cairo the main locus for reconciliations. He backed the U.S. in the **Gulf War** and hoped to make Egypt and Syria the main peacekeepers in Kuwait. He has also supported the "War on **Terrorism**," inasmuch as **Islamist** terrorists have often threatened his regime. The continued provision of U.S. economic and military aid has strongly influenced Mubarak's actions, but he has also made an effort to strengthen Egypt's relations with both Western and Eastern Europe, including Russia, as it is clearly in Egypt's interest not to depend solely on one wealthy and powerful patron. Egypt's foreign policy has almost always been formulated by its king or its president, flouting at times the advice of his foreign minister or professional diplomats, and rarely, if ever, heeding the wishes of the Egyptian people.

4 FEBRUARY INCIDENT (1942). As German forces advanced in the Western Desert, threatening **Britain's** control over Egypt, Ambassador Sir **Miles Lampson** delivered an ultimatum to King **Faruq**, obliging him to appoint **Mustafa al-Nahhas** at the head of an all-**Wafd** cabinet or to abdicate his throne, at a time when **Abdin Palace** was surrounded by British tanks. The incident proved that Britain could still dominate the Egyptian government. It also weakened the Wafd's popularity and the political poise of Faruq, who became increasingly embittered against the British.

FOUR RESERVED POINTS. **Britain's** limitations on its unilateral declaration of Egypt's independence, issued by Lord Edmund **Allenby** on 28 February 1922. They were (1) the security of British Imperial communications in Egypt, (2) the defense of Egypt against

foreign aggression or interference, (3) the protection of foreign interests and minorities in Egypt, and (4) the [status of the] **Sudan**. These points became crucial in later Anglo–Egyptian negotiations.

FRANCE. Egypt has had relations with France since the time of the Crusades, several of which were actually fought on Egyptian soil. **Trade** relations have continuously existed during **Mamluk**, **Ottoman**, and modern times. King Louis XIV wanted to occupy Egypt, and **Napoléon Bonaparte** actually did so (*see French occupation*). In the 19th century Egypt’s rulers looked to France for military, technical, diplomatic, and financial assistance, and Egyptians were more likely to go for higher education or military training to France than to any other European country. The French government strongly encouraged the construction of the **Suez Canal**. Egypt’s legal system has been heavily influenced by the creation of the **Mixed Courts** and by the adaptation of the *Code Napoléon* to the **National Courts**. French served as Egypt’s main language of diplomacy, law, and commerce in the late 19th century. During Egypt’s financial crisis under **Khedive Isma’il**, France played the leading role in creating the *Caisse de la Dette Publique* and the **Dual Control**. Its government joined with **Britain** in sending the **Joint Note** and favored a policy of intervention but its fleet did not take part in the bombardment of **Alexandria** in July 1882 or the expedition against **Ahmad Urabi** later that summer.

Although the **British occupation** eventually undermined France’s preeminent cultural and economic position in Egypt, upper-class Egyptians continued to speak French in social situations, send their children to French schools, and travel to France for vacations or higher education. The French government at first tried to impede British control by a “policy of pinpricks,” subverting Lord **Cromer**’s efforts at **financial** and **irrigation** reform. Anglo–French rivalry reached its peak during the 1898 **Fashoda Incident** in the **Sudan**. Once France acquiesced in Britain’s predominant position in the Nile Valley, the two countries moved toward reconciliation, as expressed by the 1904 *Entente Cordiale*. Egyptian Nationalists gradually lost hope that France would rescue them from British control, and they turned instead to Germany or to the **Ottoman Empire**. During and after **World War I** France supported the British in Egypt, partly to preserve the commercial and cultural interests of its nationals and especially the **Suez Canal Company**.

The fall of France in 1940 shocked most Egyptians, causing many to support the Germans during **World War II**. Egypt's growing commitment to **Arab nationalism** after the war led to French military support for **Israel** and also to Egyptian political and military aid to Algerians fighting in 1954–62 for their independence from France. Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in July 1956 angered many French shareholders. France joined with Britain and Israel in waging the **Suez War** against Egypt, which retaliated by expelling French residents from Egypt and nationalizing local French-owned companies. France's relations with Egypt improved after Algeria became independent and especially once France withdrew its support from Israel shortly before the **June War**. In recent years France has been active in building diplomatic, commercial, and cultural ties with Egypt. A relatively new entrant into Egypt's **banking system** is the French-affiliated Société Nationale Générale Bank, which had 18 branches as of May 2001. It has cooperated with other French firms investing in electric power, telecommunications, and the **Cairo Metro**.

FREE OFFICERS. Secret Egyptian army organization, led by Colonel **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**, that conspired successfully to overthrow King **Faruq** in July 1952. Perhaps because it was a secret cabal that would later seize control of Egypt, conflicting stories are told about its founders and the date of its origin, but it is reasonably certain that a group of officers including Nasir was meeting regularly by 1945–46 and that it grew larger and more ambitious during and after the **Palestine War**. Its founding members probably included Nasir, **Hasan Ibrahim**, **Khalid Muhyi al-Din**, **Kamal al-Din Husayn**, and Abd al-Mun'im Abd al-Rauf. They were joined later by **Abd al-Latif Baghdadi**, **Anwar al-Sadat**, **Abd al-Hakim Amir**, the brothers **Jamal and Salah Salim**, **Husayn al-Shafi'i**, and **Zakariyya Muhyi al-Din**. Their internal structure was pyramidal, with each officer responsible for developing cells within his own military unit. Many served as liaisons with other political groups: Khalid with *Hadeto*, Kamal al-Din Husayn and Abd al-Rauf with the **Muslim Brothers**, Sadat with **Abdin Palace**, and Nasir with several groups.

In 1949 they formulated a five-part plan to build an organization, issue propaganda, gather intelligence about the regime, contact other subversive groups, and seize power by 1954. **Black Sat-**

urday led the Free Officers to advance their timetable for seizing power to August 1952; Faruq's frenzied efforts to preserve his throne and his opposition to the election of General **Muhammad Najib** to lead the Officers Club further speeded up their plans. The exact timing of their coup d'état was set when they learned of Faruq's plan to name General Husayn Sirri Amir (whom they had just tried in vain to assassinate) as his new war minister, for they expected Amir to arrest several of the conspirators. The coup was executed during the night of 22–23 July with the seizure of the army headquarters in **Cairo**. The Free Officers group, once it controlled the Egyptian government, reorganized itself as the **RCC**. It remains almost unique in Egypt's history as a cabal that actually took power.

FREEMASONRY. Masonic lodges have existed in Egypt since the **French occupation**. Italian immigrants to **Alexandria** established a branch there in 1830, and a larger group of French Freemasons publicly founded a lodge in 1845. French, Italian, German, and British Freemasons set up chapters in **Cairo** and other Egyptian cities later in the 19th century. Between 1872 and 1878 most of these chapters were amalgamated into one Grand Orient, centered in Cairo, with Prince **Abd al-Halim** as their grand master.

They played a significant role in the movement of **Ya'qub Sannu'** and **Jamal al-Din al-Afghani** in 1878–79 and in the later **National Party**, especially under **Muhammad Farid**, who became grand master of the Egyptian Grand Orient in 1910. **Sa'd Zaghlul** was also a Mason. The British Freemasons maintained their own lodge, apart from those attached to the National Party. The Masonic lodges continued to thrive until after **World War II**, when some were suspected of collaboration with **Zionism** and others lost members as foreigners left Egypt. The last lodge, located in **Alexandria**, was closed by the ministry of social affairs in 1964.

FRENCH LAW SCHOOL. The *École Libre de Droit* was opened in **Cairo** by the **Frères** in 1890. The French government soon took control of the school and put it under the direction of Gerard Pélissié de Rausas, who served from 1892 to 1932. Most of its teachers were French, and graduates of the three-year program were awarded the *license en droit* from the authorities of metropolitan **France**. They could easily enter the **Mixed Courts**, but had to study for an addi-

tional year to practice before the **National Courts**. Almost half of its students were not Egyptians, but among those who later took part in Egypt's national life were **Mustafa Kamil** and **Sa'd Zaghlul**. In the 1920s it graduated, on average, 37 lawyers a year. It survived, despite the abolition of the Mixed Courts, until the 1956 **Suez War**. Its library was donated to the Centre d'Études et de Documentation Économiques, Juridiques, et Sociales (CEDEJ), founded in 1969.

FRENCH OCCUPATION. Since the 17th century French rulers had wanted to occupy Egypt for strategic or commercial motives, but their country's long alliance with the **Ottoman Empire** against the Habsburgs barred their doing so. After the 1789 Revolution, **France's** interest in Egypt revived, mainly in order to weaken **Britain** by capturing the overland route to India, much of which it had gained at France's expense in the Seven Years' War (1756–63). **Napoléon Bonaparte**, an ambitious general who had led a successful campaign against Italy, threatened the ruling Directory, which hoped to channel his ambitions into the war against Britain.

Estimating that France's military manpower and equipment would not adequately support an invasion across the English Channel, Napoléon organized an armada to conquer Egypt instead: a convoy of 400 ships, 34 thousand soldiers and some 16 thousand sailors and marines, at least 500 civilians in support roles, and (of great interest to historians) the 167-man Commission on the Sciences and Arts. This armada crossed the Mediterranean in the early summer of 1798, captured Malta, evaded Admiral **Horatio Nelson's** British fleet, and landed in **Alexandria**, which the French captured after light resistance by **Mamluks** and **bedouin** auxiliaries on 1 July 1798. Within three weeks the French crossed the Delta and defeated the Mamluks in the **Battle of Imbaba**, taking **Cairo**.

Napoléon proceeded to set up his headquarters in **Alfi Bey's** palace, later to become the site of **Shepherd's Hotel**, and established a new government, even as some of his forces were trying to capture Upper Egypt. Claiming to be a Muslim, he called on the **ulama** and merchants of Cairo to support his occupation, which he claimed was intended to restore the legitimate rule of the Ottoman sultan at the expense of the rapacious Mamluks. The Muslim leaders were suspicious, having seen the French troops drinking alcohol, chasing women, and relying on **Copts** and **Armenians** as interpret-

ers and financial administrators. Muslims did not willingly wear the revolutionary tricolor or take part in Napoléon's new representative council. A general revolt in October 1798 was suppressed by French bombardment of **al-Azhar** from the **Citadel** and by large-scale killing, looting, and profanation of mosques. Fearing an Ottoman punitive expedition, the Egyptians dared not seem to back the French occupiers, and the failure of Napoléon's expeditionary force to capture the Ottoman fortress at Acre in 1799 proved that France was vulnerable. Heavy exactions of taxes to support the French army of occupation guaranteed its unpopularity, although the Egyptians lacked the means to resist. The Anglo-Ottoman counter-invasion at **Abu-Qir** failed, but France's occupying forces were dwindling due to battle deaths, disease, and desertion, with little hope of reinforcements.

Napoléon, anxious about the rising anti-French coalition in Europe and the weakness of the Directory (according to his admirers) or ambitious for glory on a stage wider than Egypt (according to his detractors), secretly sailed back home. He left his army under the command of General **Jean-Baptiste Kléber**, who mainly hoped to get his men safely back to France. His attempt to do so by diplomatic means, the **Convention of al-Arish**, was not ratified by the British government. He successfully defended Cairo against a superior Ottoman invading force in the Battle of **Heliopolis**, only to face a large-scale popular uprising and then to be assassinated.

General **Jacques Menou** succeeded him. By then the French forces were so decimated and demoralized that no leader could have withstood the British and Ottoman forces that landed near Abu-Qir and besieged them at Alexandria. They finally accepted a face-saving armistice, at about the time that Napoléon, who had seized power in Paris, was ready to return Egypt to the Ottoman government. The British and French drew up a tentative treaty in London in 1801 (the actual peace was signed at Amiens in 1802), evacuating the remaining French troops from Egypt in British warships. After restoring Ottoman and Mamluk rule, the British left Egypt in 1802.

Napoléon's 1798 invasion was Egypt's first experience of conflict with a Christian power since the Crusades. The ensuing occupation was Egypt's first experience of Christian rule since the Arabs expelled the Byzantines in 640. Surrounded by romantic myths because of Napoléon's remarkable personality and ideas, his rule is often cited as starting Egypt's Westernization, although more credit is

due to **Ali Bey** and to the later rule of **Muhammad Ali**. France's most lasting achievements were those of its Scientific Commission, summed up in the *Description de l'Égypte*, but some historians argue that the occupation, by weakening the Mamluks, facilitated the rise of Muhammad Ali.

FRÈRES, COLLÈGE DES. Roman Catholic missionary school in **Cairo**, founded in 1854 and run by the Confraternity of the Christian Doctrine, attended by many wealthy Egyptians, including Muslims, such as **Isma'il Sidqi**. The Frères also established a free school in Cairo in 1847, a school in **Alexandria**, and the **French Law School**.

FRONTIERS INCIDENT (1894). Confrontation between **Khedive Abbas Hilmi II** and the British commander of the Egyptian army, Colonel **Herbert Kitchener**, while the young khedive was on an inspection tour in Upper Egypt, near the frontier of the **Sudan**, then still ruled by the **Mahdi's** successors. Abbas made slighting remarks about the performance of his army's British-officered regiments, causing Kitchener to offer his resignation. Lord **Cromer** pressured the khedive to make a public statement expressing complete satisfaction with his troops, and Kitchener withdrew his resignation. The incident widened the breach between Abbas and the British, especially Kitchener, later **Britain's** consul general in Egypt.

FUAD I, AHMAD (1868–1936). Prince, university leader, and sultan (later king) of Egypt from 1917 to 1936. As the youngest son of **Khedive Isma'il**, he spent most of his youth with his father in Naples and was educated in Geneva and at the military academy in Turin. He returned to Egypt after his father's death and led a dissolute youth. His first marriage, to Princess Shivékia, failed, and he was shot (and narrowly escaped being killed) by her deranged brother. Fuad served briefly as a military attaché in Vienna and as aide-de-camp to Khedive **Abbas**. He was the nominal rector of the Egyptian University in 1908–13, giving lectures on marksmanship and horsemanship, at which he excelled (*see Cairo University*). Although considered in 1914 for Albania's throne, both the Albanian nationalists and the European powers preferred a Christian ruler.

The British chose him for the sultanate in 1917, succeeding **Husayn Kamil**, whose son was viewed as anti-British. Fuad secretly encouraged the agitation that led to the **1919 Revolution**. In April

1919 he married Nazli Sabri, so that he could beget an heir and thus forestall the return of ex-Khedive Abbas or his son, Abd al-Mun'im. He outwardly tolerated but privately hated the **1923 Constitution**, the **Wafd Party**, and **Sa'd Zaghlul** and yearned to replace them with institutions and politicians more amenable to Palace control. He feared assassination and once told an English historian, H. A. L. Fisher, that he had ordered the construction of his coffin upon ascending the Egyptian throne. In 1930, aided by **Isma'il Sidqi**, he suspended the 1923 Constitution and promulgated one that augmented his powers at the expense of Parliament (*see* **1930 Constitution**). Five years later, he acceded to popular demands for the restoration of the earlier constitution and the return of the Wafd Party to power. He appointed Egypt's all-party delegation to negotiate with Britain to settle the Egyptian question but died before the **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty** was completed. Autocratic and avaricious, Fuad had no sympathy for the Egyptian people or for their elected leaders and preferred an absolutist government.

FUNDAMENTALISM. Popular term, originally connoting Protestant Christians who believed in the literal truth of the Bible, now applied popularly to **Islamists**, as well as to militant adherents of other religions, including **Copts**, **Jews**, and **Hindus**, especially those who are politically active and hostile to Western and secular influences. *See also* **Islamism**, **Jama'at**, **al-Jihad**, **al-Qa'ida**, **Religion**.

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GARDEN CITY. Fashionable **Cairo** district south of **Liberation Square**, initially used for palaces, one of which, built for **Ibrahim** in 1830, was razed in 1906. The neighborhood was developed by the Nile Land and Agriculture Company in 1905–7. Designed by José Lambda and inspired by Ebenezer Howard's writings, the community has a series of interconnecting circular roads that resemble a maze. It was intended to be a bedroom community with no commercial district due to its proximity to the downtown area and to the **Gezira Sporting Club**. There were 273 lots for villas, and buildings were limited in height to 15 meters. Building was slow at first, owing to the 1907 depression, but picked up before

and during **World War I**. From 1920 to 1956 it consisted mainly of villas and gardens inhabited by foreign officials and ethnic minorities. The building height limit was abandoned after 1956, when Garden City became the home of Egypt's first skyscraper, the 30-story "Belmont Building," designed by Na'um Shabib. The area has long been a favorite site for embassies, starting with the German one, followed by the British **Residency**. Many banks make their headquarters in Garden City.

GAZA STRIP. Small sector of southwestern **Palestine** held by Egyptian forces at the end of the **Palestine War** and then inhabited wholly by Arabs, many of whom were refugees. The territory was administered by Egypt from 1949 to 1956, taken by **Israel** during the **Suez War**, restored to Egypt in 1957, and recaptured by Israel in the **June War**. Its status was to have been determined by the **Autonomy Talks** following the 1979 **Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty**. The Israelis occupied it until 1994, when they turned it over to Palestinian control, under the terms of the Oslo I agreement with the **PLO**. Intense fighting between Israelis and Palestinians broke out there in September 2000. Israel has accused the Arabs of smuggling arms from Egypt.

GAZETTE, EGYPTIAN. English-language daily **newspaper**, published in **Alexandria** in 1881–1938 and since then in **Cairo**. Its editorial policy was antinationalist during the **British occupation**, but in recent years it has supported the policies of successive Egyptian governments. Its circulation in 1962 was around 20,000, in 1972 8,500, in 1993 35,000, and in 1999 about 90,000.

GENEVA CONFERENCE (1973). One-day meeting, co-chaired by the **United States** and the **USSR**, including **Israel**, Egypt, and Jordan, held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva in December 1973. After formal speeches by the negotiating parties, the Conference was adjourned indefinitely, and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger began his **shuttle diplomacy** that led to the **Separation of Forces Agreements** between Egypt and **Israel** and later in 1974 between **Syria** and Israel. President Jimmy Carter wanted to reconvene the Conference in 1977, but the negotiators could not agree on who should represent the Palestinians. **Anwar al-Sadat's** trip to Jerusalem ended efforts to reopen it.

GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY. Major Egyptian scholarly organization, founded by Georg Schweinfurth in 1875 and initially dominated by Europeans. Reorganized in 1917, it enjoyed the generous patronage of King **Fuad I** and gradually drew in more Egyptians, many of whom were or became leaders in the country's intellectual life.

GEZIRA SPORTING CLUB. Athletic and social organization established on southern and central **Zamalek** by the **British** in 1882, formerly notorious for excluding Egyptians from membership. **Khedive Tawfiq** donated the lands on which the club was built.

GHALI, BUTROS (1846–1910). Diplomat, **cabinet** minister, and premier. Educated in the new **Coptic** school at Harat al-Saqqayin and then at the school of Prince Mustafa Fadil, he later studied at the School of Languages, but never earned a higher degree. He learned Arabic, French, English, Persian, Turkish, and Coptic. After serving as a clerk for the **Alexandria** Chamber of Commerce, he was appointed by Muhammad **Sharif** to the head clerkship of the justice ministry in 1873. He also helped at this time to organize the Coptic (lay) Council (*see* **Coptic church**). When the **Mixed Courts** were being set up, he helped the justice minister prepare an Arabic translation of their law code, although he lacked any legal training. Ghali's work brought him to the attention of Prime Minister **Nubar**, who appointed him to represent Egypt on the *Caisse de la Dette Publique*; he thus became an intermediary between the Egyptian government and its European creditors. In 1879 he became deputy justice minister. Following **Ahmad Urabi's** movement, he mediated between **Khedive Tawfiq** and the Nationalists, securing trials that saved many of them from execution.

Butros Ghali's first ministerial appointment was within the 1893 **Husayn Fakhri** cabinet that pitted **Abbas Hilmi II** against Lord **Cromer**, but he was able to retain the finance portfolio in the compromise cabinet of **Riyad**. Ghali served as foreign minister from 1894 to 1910 under Nubar and **Mustafa Fahmi**, and finally in his own cabinet. He continued to play a mediating role between power centers, signing the 1899 **Sudan Convention**. He represented the cabinet on the bench in the 1906 **Dinshaway** trial, concurring in the death sentences that angered the **National Party**.

Abbas recommended him to Sir **Eldon Gorst** to replace Fahmi as prime minister in 1908, overriding Gorst's concerns about let-

ting a Copt head Egypt's government. As prime minister he further angered politically articulate Egyptians by reviving the **Press Law** and publicly advocating the extension of the **Suez Canal Company's** concession, policies that he is said to have privately opposed. He was assassinated by a Nationalist pharmacist in February 1910; his death set off a wave of Muslim-Christian polemics and more government repression against the National Party. A subtle and conciliatory politician who stayed in office to uphold unpopular policies, Ghali believed that he served Egypt's best interests and fell victim to others who were less willing to compromise than he.

GHALI, BUTROS BUTROS, *see* **BOUTROS-GHALI, BOUTROS**.

GIDI PASS. Strategic point in the western **Sinai Peninsula**, taken from Egypt by **Israel** in 1956 and 1967, relinquished to a UN force under the 1975 **Egyptian-Israeli Agreement**, and restored to Egypt's control in 1979 by the **Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty**.

GORDON, Sir CHARLES "CHINESE" (1833–85). British general noted for his valiant defense of Khartum. The son of an artillery officer at Woolwich, he was educated there and commissioned in the Royal Engineers in 1852. He fought in the Crimean War, the French expedition against the Chinese emperor in Peking, and the suppression on behalf of that emperor (hence his nickname) of the Taiping rebellion. Visiting Istanbul in 1872, Gordon met **Nubar**, who urged him to become governor of Egypt's equatorial province in the **Sudan**. He was appointed to the position at the end of 1873, refusing to take more than one-fifth of the £E10 thousand annual salary that **Khedive Isma'il** offered to pay.

He restored security to that war-torn province, moved its capital from Gondokoro to Lado, and tried in vain to suppress the slave trade. He resigned in 1876 and returned to England, but Isma'il induced him to return by naming him governor of the Sudan, the equatorial provinces, Darfur, and the Red Sea coast. After quelling uprisings in several parts of the Sudan, Gordon managed to destroy the slave **trade**. He resigned soon after **Tawfiq** replaced his father, but not before he was imprisoned briefly by the Ethiopian emperor. After working in Switzerland, India, China, and the Cape Colony, he made a pilgrimage to the Holy Land in 1883. Meanwhile,

Britain's defeat of **Ahmad Urabi** had strengthened the **Mahdi's** uprising against Egypt's rule in the Sudan.

After a British expeditionary force sent there in 1883 was defeated, the cabinet asked Gordon—who was preparing to serve King Leopold in the Congo—to go to Khartum to help the Egyptian government evacuate its garrisons from the country. He was given the position of governor-general of the Sudan, but in **Cairo** he received additional instructions to set up an independent government in Khartum. He hoped, upon arriving there, to negotiate directly with the Mahdi and asked for Turkish and Indian reinforcements, requests that were denied. He managed to evacuate more than 2,500 people and used his remaining forces to organize the defense of Khartum against the Mahdists besieging the city. The British government was slow to send a rescue mission, which arrived at Khartum two days too late to save the city or its chief defender, who had been killed near the gate of his palace. Gordon's death led to widespread British mourning and attacks on Prime Minister Gladstone's government for its dilatory rescue efforts. Modest and retiring, yet fierce, temperamental, and deeply imbued with Christian ideals, he threw himself into any work he was called on to do.

GORST, Sir [JOHN] ELDON (1861–1911). British diplomat and colonial administrator, who served as Britain's agent and consul general in Egypt from 1907 to 1911. Born in New Zealand but reared in London, he attended Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge. In 1885 he became both a barrister and a member of the diplomatic corps, going to Egypt the following year to serve in various capacities under Lord **Cromer**. He was financial adviser from 1898 to 1904 and then returned to London, where, in effect, he represented Cromer in the foreign office until his retirement in 1907, following the **Dinshaway Incident**.

With a new Liberal Party government in power, Gorst was sent to replace Cromer in **Cairo** with instructions to give Egyptians greater responsibility to manage their internal affairs. As British agent, Gorst quickly improved relations with **Khedive Abbas Hilmi II** with his *politique d'entente*, brought more Egyptians into responsible government positions, and weakened the **National Party**. However, his efforts to rein in the burgeoning corps of Anglo-Egyptian officials antagonized many old Egypt hands. The appointment of **Butros Ghali** as prime minister, popularly ascribed to

Gorst, angered the Nationalists and many other Muslims, leading to press attacks and eventually to his assassination. The revival of the **Press Law** alienated Europeans as well as Egyptians and proved unenforceable. His attempt to extend the **Suez Canal Company's** concession in 1909–10 to raise additional funds for development in Egypt and the **Sudan** was resented by Egyptians; when Gorst put the issue to the General Assembly, vehement opposition from the Nationalist press led to its rejection. This act, combined with the assassination of Butros Ghali, caused Gorst to abandon his lenient policy in favor of a harsher one, using the **Exceptional Laws** and various penal measures to silence the Nationalists. He had almost restored British control when he became stricken with cancer and went back to England to die. Unprepossessing but egotistical, resented by most British colonial administrators in Egypt, and distrusted by Egyptians, he never won the respect that his intelligence and strong will warranted. His diaries are at St. Antony's College, Oxford.

GOSCHEN–JOBERT MISSION (1876). Committee sent to Egypt at the behest of **Khedive Isma'il's** French and British creditors, following his proposal to refinance Egypt's bonded and floating government debt, then £E92 million, at 7 percent interest, which they had rejected. Arriving in 1876 to negotiate with Isma'il, Goschen and Joubert obtained the unification of the funded Egyptian government debt, the appointment of French and English controllers, and the creation of the *Caisse de la Dette Publique* to ensure the service of the debt. What they could not have foreseen, however, was that some of the European creditors would use the newly formed **Mixed Courts** to sue the Egyptian government for the fulfillment of the terms under which it had originally contracted its debts. A low **Nile River** flood and large military outlays caused by Egypt's participation in the 1877 Russo–Turkish war ensured that the government would not be able to carry out the Goschen-Joubert mission's recommendations, leading eventually to the formation of the “European Ministry” and the **Dual Control**.

GREEKS. Greeks have colonized Egypt since antiquity. Under the **Ottoman Empire**, Egypt received periodic infusions of Greek subjects, mainly merchants. Greece's War for Independence increased Egypt's Greek population, as some war captives were brought in, and Greeks came in from other Ottoman lands where they felt less

secure. Rising immigration in the late 19th century was partly due to the declining opportunities for artisans and peasants in mainland Greece and its islands; it would have been greater if North America had not drawn so many Greeks. Although most immigrants settled in **Cairo** or **Alexandria**, some went to the **Suez Canal** cities and the rural villages; usually, they kept Greek nationality to benefit from the **Capitulations**. Religious identification with the Greek Orthodox Church, a legacy of the *millet* system, gradually gave way to an ethnicity influenced by nationalism, as Greek consulates gained influence at the expense of the religious hierarchy.

Greeks ran their own schools, hospitals, welfare institutions, **newspapers**, literary journals (viewed as avant-garde by mainland Greek intellectuals), publishing houses, social clubs, and athletic teams. They saw themselves as an extension of European culture into an African land. They held a major role in the sale and export of Egyptian **cotton**, **banking** and **finance**, shipping, retail commerce, skilled trades, and some white-collar occupations. Greeks owned only 1 percent of Egypt's agricultural land in the early 20th century, mostly through land companies, and this share later declined. Greeks owned about one-third of Egypt's cotton gins in the 1870s, a share that also declined later. Some were industrial entrepreneurs; the Gi-anacalis family pioneered cigarette making, one of Egypt's export industries, and also introduced viticulture to Egypt (*see* **Beverages**).

Other Egyptian industries in which Greeks played a major role included soft drinks, chocolates, pasta, paper, ironworks, alcohol, textiles, fertilizers, and building materials. Greek grocers, who often served as moneylenders, were popularly thought to be ubiquitous, but in fact they lost ground to Egyptian competitors after **World War I**. Greek industrial workers took the lead in organizing **unions**. A few labor leaders also espoused **Communism** or **socialism**. Many Greeks aided the Egyptians in their quest for independence; Greek marble was used in the **Sa'd Zaghul** mausoleum, even though some Greeks had been killed or injured during the **1919 Revolution**. Egypt's Greek population peaked at 99,793 in 1927.

The rise of Egyptian nationalism and phasing out of the Capitulations caused some Greeks to emigrate in the 1930s, a trend that accelerated after the **1952 Revolution**, which reduced the professional and commercial opportunities available to Greeks and other minorities. Although Greek names of some business firms

and restaurants survive in Cairo and Alexandria and Egyptian colloquial Arabic words suggest the Greek origins of certain cheeses, poultry, and vegetables, the Greek presence in Egypt today is much diminished.

GREEN SHIRTS, *see MISR AL-FATAT*.

GULF ORGANIZATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF EGYPT

(GODE). Association of Arab countries formed in 1976 to aid in Egypt's industrialization. Its initial capital of almost \$2 billion was supplied by **Saudi Arabia** (40 percent), Kuwait (35 percent), the United Arab Emirates (15 percent), and Qatar (10 percent). The fund was to be used to set up industrial and agricultural **investment** projects and to finance imports of capital goods. Its secondary purpose was to help solve Egypt's liquidity problem and to improve its balance of payments. By May 1978 Egypt had exhausted the entire amount in obtaining loans and credit facilities from Chase Manhattan and other banks to pay back debts and to meet its balance-of-payments deficit. No moneys were used in any productive investments. The Organization also guaranteed a \$250-million loan to Egypt by a syndicate of Western and Japanese banks. Following the **Camp David Accords**, financial aid to Egypt from other Arab countries was cut off. The **U.S. Agency for International Development** has helped make up the difference.

GULF WAR. Iraq, created by the victorious **World War I** allies out of three provinces of the **Ottoman Empire**, was a British mandate under the League of Nations from 1922 to 1932, when it became an independent state. It has long claimed that all or part of the neighboring Emirate of Kuwait belonged to Iraq. When Kuwait became independent in 1961, Iraqi troops occupied that oil-rich country but withdrew under heavy pressure from **Britain** and the other Arab states, including Egypt, which sent a peacekeeping force to occupy Kuwait long enough to forestall an Iraqi annexation.

In 1963 Iraq signed a treaty with Kuwait recognizing its independence, but political disputes flared up occasionally. During the reconstruction period following its 1980–88 war with Iran, Iraq accused Kuwait of stealing its oil by slant-drilling into the Rumayla oil field that they share and rejected Kuwaiti demands for repayment of the \$30 billion in loans it had made during the war, argu-

ing that it had saved Kuwait and the other Gulf states from an Islamic revolution. Iraq's relations with Egypt also worsened, as returning Iraqi soldiers tried to reclaim jobs taken by expatriate Egyptian workers during the war. Some Egyptians were killed, maimed, or deported, angering Egyptians against Iraq and its president, Saddam Husayn.

Husni Mubarak offered to mediate between Iraq and Kuwait, acting in the interests of Arab solidarity. Saddam, however, violated an agreement brokered by Mubarak and invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, declaring Iraq's annexation of the emirate. Egypt initially tried to remain a mediator, proposing and hosting an Arab summit, but several key leaders did not attend. The summit condemned the annexation, and 12 **Arab League** member states voted to send an Arab deterrent force to the Gulf in support of the **United States'** efforts, code-named "Operation Desert Shield," to deter an Iraqi invasion of **Saudi Arabia**. Five thousand Egyptian troops were reportedly there by the end of August. Egypt had about 800 thousand workers in Iraq and 100 thousand in Kuwait prior to the invasion; nearly all of them left the region and returned to Egypt, often suffering extreme privation and loss of all their savings. Mubarak emerged as a leader of the "moderate" Arab states that supported the allied coalition against Iraq, both diplomatically in the Arab League and the **United Nations**, and militarily in "Operation Desert Storm," which took place in January and February 1991. Egypt's contingent in the multinational force reached 38,500 men—two armored divisions with 250 tanks—but their casualties were light.

Iraqi troops were driven from Kuwait, and Egypt was rewarded by the other Arab "moderates" with additional jobs for expatriate Egyptian workers, replacing the Palestinians and Yemenis (whose leaders had backed Iraq), and by the Western and Gulf governments by the cancellation of almost \$14 billion in debts owed to them. An additional \$10 billion owed to Western creditors was rescheduled after the war, and the remaining \$10 billion owed was to be canceled over a three-year period. After the war, Egypt and seven other Arab states that had taken part in "Operation Desert Storm" met in Damascus to set up an Arab regional security force, made up mainly of Egyptian and Syrian troops, for the Gulf States. However, Egypt, angered when Kuwait did not award enough reconstruction contracts to its firms, suddenly withdrew its troops in May 1991, and the Arab security force has never been formed.

Egypt's prominent support for Kuwait in the war against Iraq was due to its renewed attempts to become the leader of the Arab countries, its economic dependence on the oil-exporting Arab states of the Gulf region, and its close ties with the U.S. and other Western governments. Opposing **Mubarak's** policies regarding the war were Egypt's **Islamists**, **Nasirists**, and **Communists**. Students at **Cairo University** demonstrated against the war, but the press and the streets were so controlled during the crisis that no one knows for certain what the average Egyptian felt.

Egypt's government and people emphatically opposed the **U.S.** bombing of Iraq in 1993, 1996, and 1998, and its invasion and occupation of the country in 2003.

– H –

HADETO. Acronym for *al-Haraka al-Dimuqratiya li al-Taharrur al-Watani* (Democratic Movement for National Liberation), Egypt's largest **Communist** faction, formed in 1947 as a coalition of the **EMNL**, *Iskra*, and the smaller People's Liberation Movement. It published *al-Jamahir* and later *al-Malayin*. Its members, approximately 1,700 in 1947, were mainly upper- or middle-class intellectuals, but some skilled workers and labor **union** members joined. *Hadeto* aided textile workers' strikes in Mahalla al-Kubra and Shubra al-Khayma in 1947. It tried to appeal to peasants by advocating **land reform** and to pacifists by opposing Egypt's entry into the **Palestine War**. *Hadeto*, like the Egyptian Communist Party, officially supported the 1947 partition of Palestine and opposed involvement in the war, and many of its leaders were jailed by the **Nuqrashi** and **Abd al-Hadi** governments. Dissident groups, such as the Revolutionary Faction and the Voice of the Opposition, emerged briefly in protest against the leadership's acceptance of Jewish statehood in Palestine. *Hadeto* aided the *fidaiyin* against the British in the **Suez Canal Zone** in 1951–52.

Some discontented Egyptian army officers had *Hadeto* ties, although the **Free Officers** were independent of all other political parties or movements, and it welcomed the **1952 Revolution** as a step toward altering Egyptian society. **Khalid Muhyi al-Din** was the main contact between the **RCC** and *Hadeto*, although he was never a member of the organization. *Hadeto* had also helped the Free Offi-

cers publish their propaganda before the revolution and continued to support them once they held power, even after the **Kafr al-Dawwar Incident**. Less surprisingly, *Hadeto* backed the officers on their land reform program against their first premier, **Ali Mahir**. When the RCC banned all political parties in January 1953, however, *Hadeto* joined the Egyptian Communist Party, the **Muslim Brothers**, the **Wafdist Vanguard**, and other leftists in opposing its policy, forming the **National Democratic Front**. The new organization won the backing of **Muhammad Najib** as well as Khalid Muhyi al-Din, but the triumph of **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** faction sealed the fate of all Communist groups. Most *Hadeto* members were jailed and later released. The **Suez War** led to better relations between the government and the Communists. Leftist publishing houses and even their **newspaper**, *al-Masa*, flourished. In 1958 *Hadeto* officially united with the Egyptian Communist Party.

AL-HAKIM, TAWFIQ (1898–1987). Playwright, novelist, and essayist. Born in **Alexandria** to an Egyptian landowning father and an aristocratic Turkish mother, his family moved frequently because of his father's work as a district magistrate. His earliest exposure to drama came from seeing an Arabic adaptation of *Romeo and Juliet*, allegedly by **Salama Hijazi's** troupe, in Disuq. He attended many dramatic productions in **Cairo**, began studying classical Greek and French drama, and was already writing plays while still in secondary school. He spent four years at the government **Law School**, graduating third from the bottom of his class in 1925. His parents, hoping to distract him from writing for the stage, sent him to Paris to continue his legal studies, but he failed to earn his doctorate and returned to Egypt in 1928.

Hakim then worked for the *Niyaba* of the Alexandria **Mixed Courts** and soon was promoted to deputy public prosecutor. His legal experiences were immortalized in a novel, *Yawmiyyat naib fi al-aryaf* (Diaries of a Prosecutor in the Countryside), published in 1937 and later translated into English as *The Maze of Justice*. During this period he also wrote *Ahl al-kahf* (The Sleepers in the Cave), *Rasasa fi al-qalb* (A Bullet in the Heart), and *Shahrazad* (Sheherazade). His plays scandalized his *Niyaba* colleagues, and he had to resign.

In 1933 Hakim published a novel, *Awdat al-ruh* (Return of the Spirit), an allegory of Egypt's modern renaissance that inspired

many Egyptians, including **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**. He became director of the **education** ministry's research department in 1934 and of the social affairs ministry's information service in 1939, but retired from the government in 1943. In 1951 **Taha Husayn** named him director of *Dar al-Kutub*. He was elected to membership in the **Arabic Language Academy** in 1954, Nasir appointed him to the Supreme Council on the Arts in 1956, and he later represented Egypt at the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris, where he was exposed to the "theater of the absurd." He received the first State Prize for **Literature** in 1961 and was also honored by a government theater named for him, which opened in 1963. Among his plays produced in the Nasir era are *al-Sultan al-hair* (The Perplexed Sultan), a historical drama about the **Mamluks** with contemporary implications, and *Ya tali' al-shajara* (O, Tree Climber), influenced by the theater of the absurd.

Although he had written regularly for *al-Ahram* throughout the Nasir era, Hakim denounced him in 1975 in a controversial manifesto, *Awdat al-wa'y*, translated as *The Return of Consciousness* (1985). He was one of the first Egyptian writers to call for a peace treaty with **Israel**, due perhaps to his disillusionment with Nasir, but he later recanted. In 1983 he published a biting attack on Egypt's religious leaders called *Ahadith ma'a Allah* (Conversations with God), arousing debates throughout the Arab world. He wrote an autobiography, *Sijn al-umr* (Prison of the Life Span). A contentious writer, he was admired by Arabs generally even when they disagreed with him.

HALF-PERCENT SOCIETY. Phrase used by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** as a symbol to justify his **socialist** policies of the 1960s. The "half-percent society" denoted that part of the Egyptian population that controlled most of Egypt's wealth and political power before the **1952 Revolution**. In reality, the upper class was closer to 1 percent of Egypt's population of 21.4 million in 1952. However, his label effectively popularized **Arab socialism**.

HALIM, see ABD AL-HALIM.

HALIM, ABBAS (1897–1960). *Nabil* (prince) of the **Muhammad Ali** dynasty who became a labor leader (*see Unions*). Educated in Germany, he served as an aide-de-camp to Kaiser Wilhelm II, became a

fighter pilot for that country in **World War I**, and later joined the **Ottoman** army. After the war, he spent several years traveling before he was readmitted to Egypt. A patron of sports for all Egyptian classes, Halim headed the Royal Automobile Club and the Royal Flying Club. Having quarreled with King **Fuad I**, his cousin, he backed the **Wafd** in 1930 against **Isma'il Sidqi's** efforts to change Egypt's constitution. In that December he was elected president of the pro-Wafdist National Federation of Trade Unions (NFTUE) in Egypt. He ensured that the National Federation's leaders were actual workers and that its goals furthered their class interests regarding wages, working conditions, housing, **education**, and unemployment compensation. However, his leading associates were skilled, semiautonomous workers and small proprietors, not industrial laborers. His attempt to establish a workers' party in 1931 alarmed his Wafdist allies, but he and **Mustafa al-Nahhas** agreed that the National Federation would leave politics to the Wafd.

Eclipsed for several years due to Sidqi's repressive policies, the NFTUE resumed its efforts to organize workers in 1934, after he had been replaced by **Abd al-Fattah Yahya**. The police barred Halim's **Cairo** palace to the workers, setting off demonstrations in which one worker was killed and others injured. Another demonstration ensued at the slain worker's funeral. Halim was arrested but released after his well-publicized hunger strike. As the NFTUE grew, the Wafd tried to draw it away from Halim, who was forming ties with *Misr al-Fatat*. The labor movement became split between the Wafd and the prince. When the Wafd regained power in 1936, Halim left labor politics, and the NFTUE died out.

Halim tried again in 1937 to lead a labor group, the Committee to Organize the Workers' Movement, but it allowed him only nominal leadership. Halim reappeared in 1939 as "supreme president" of the **Cairo Tramway Workers' Union**, which hoped to exploit his ties with King **Faruq** and enmity to the Wafd. He negotiated on behalf of the transport workers with the tramway company, gaining some benefits for them in July 1940. He also combined the transport workers' organizations into the Joint Transport Federation and, when this new group struck in September 1941, he negotiated on its behalf for higher wages, but failed to fulfill his promises to the workers. This failure, along with the Wafd's return to power in 1942, undermined Halim; **Britain** interned him and a few friends for two years. Once he was free to resume his activities, the

workers distrusted him for his ties with Faruq, who was no longer popular. As Marxist ideas of working-class solidarity spread among the workers, his influence waned in the late 1940s.

HARB, [MUHAMMAD] TAL'AT (1867–1941). Financier, founder of **Bank Misr**, and “father of Egypt’s economic independence.” Born in **Cairo** to a family that claimed tribal Arab origins, he graduated from the government **Law School**, worked for the state domains administration from 1888 to 1905, and became a financial manager for a few large landowners and the director of several companies. He was an ardent patriot and devout Muslim who wrote books glorifying Islamic civilization, defending the veiling of **women**, and opposing the proposed extension of the **Suez Canal Company** concession. While arguing against that project, he called for the establishment of a purely Egyptian bank, a portent of his later efforts. Visiting Germany shortly before **World War I**, he was impressed by its **banking system**.

In April 1920 Harb and his associates formed Bank Misr, which became a holding company for other enterprises spawned by his intelligence and efforts. Notably open to new ideas, by 1937 he was making his business trips to **Syria**, **Iraq**, and the **Hijaz** by airplane. He pioneered in strengthening economic ties between Egypt and other Arab countries, making him a leader among early Arab nationalists. Regrettably, Bank Misr was overextended financially, suffered a liquidity crisis in 1939, and needed financial assistance from the Egyptian government to survive. He resigned as president of Bank Misr but personally chose his successor. Some say he was the victim of a conspiracy by **Ahmad Mahir** and **Husayn Sirri**.

HASANAYN, MUHAMMAD AHMAD (1889–1946). Arab explorer, sportsman, and close associate of the Egyptian royal family. Hasanayn was born in **Bulaq** and educated at Oxford. An avid adventurer, he was sent by King **Fuad I** to explore Egypt’s Western Desert from the Mediterranean to Darfur, discovered several hitherto unknown **oases**, and published an account of his finds, *Fi Sahara Libya*, translated into English as *The Lost Oases* (1925). The Egyptian government appointed him to negotiate with Italy over Egypt’s border with **Libya** in 1924. Fuad then appointed him as a royal adviser. Some believe that he secretly married or had a sexual relationship with Queen Nazli, Fuad’s widow and the mother of King

Faruq, over whom he exercised great influence during the first ten years of his reign. His death in an automobile accident deprived the king of a capable mentor at a critical time.

HATIM, ABD AL-QADIR (1918–). Officer and minister. Dr. Hatim graduated from the **Military Academy** in 1939 and from Staff College in 1952. He also earned a B.A. in political economy at the London School of Economics in 1947 and later an M.A. in political science and a Ph.D. in information from **Cairo University**. One of the **Free Officers** who staged the **1952 Revolution**, he served as **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**'s assistant for press relations. He became a member of the **National Assembly** in 1957, then minister of state for information in 1959, and was minister of information, national guidance, and culture from 1962 to 1966, playing a major role in the introduction of **television** to Egypt. He also served as deputy prime minister from 1964. Out of the government from 1966 to 1971, he rejoined when **Anwar al-Sadat** ousted his rivals, again serving as deputy prime minister and information minister until 1974. He chaired the board of *al-Ahram* in 1974–75 and became an adviser to Sadat. He wrote *Information and the Arab Cause* (1974) and other works about information and propaganda.

HAYKAL, MUHAMMAD HASANAYN (1923–). Political journalist, writer, and editor. Originally from a **Cairo** middle-class family, he graduated from a public secondary school and attended classes at **Cairo University** and **AUC**, but did not graduate. He began his journalistic career as an unpaid reporter for the *Egyptian Gazette* and *Ruz al-Yusuf*, covering the **Battle of al-Alamayn** and Egypt's parliamentary debates. He then became a reporter for *Akhir Sa'a*, winning a King **Faruq** prize for investigative journalism for his coverage of the 1947 **cholera** epidemic. He covered the **Palestine** struggle from 1946 to 1949 for *Akhbar al-Yawm*, interviewing David Ben-Gurion and King Abdallah, also meeting **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** for the first time. Traveling widely, he also covered the Greek Civil War, the Musaddiq crisis in Iran, and the 1952 **U.S.** presidential campaign (supported at the time by a State Department Leader Grant). He claims to have been intimately involved with the **Free Officers**, especially Nasir, at the time of the **1952 Revolution**; whether this is true, Haykal was closer than any other journalist to Nasir while he was in power. He edited *Akhir Sa'a* in the early

1950s and then *al-Akhbar*, of which he became editor-in-chief in 1956, but he soon broke with **Mustafa** and **Ali Amin**.

After numerous attempts by *al-Ahram* to lure him, Haykal finally agreed to be its editor in 1957. He built up this **newspaper** into the most prestigious and influential one in Egypt and arguably the whole Arab world. He also became an adviser, confidant, and spokesman for Nasir and is widely credited with ghostwriting his *Falsafat al-thawra* (The Philosophy of the Revolution). A strong believer in press freedom and scientific management, he made the physical facilities of *al-Ahram* among the most modern anywhere in the world, and the newspaper spawned various influential periodicals, ranging from the Marxist *al-Tali'a* to the conservative *al-Ahram al-iqtisadi*. His weekly column, *Bi al-saraha* (Speaking Frankly), was read throughout the Arab world as an indicator of the direction of Nasir's thinking. He served briefly in 1970 as his minister of information and national guidance.

A loyal **Nasirist**, Haykal soon broke with **Anwar al-Sadat** because of his growing ties with the United States and his willingness to make peace with **Israel**. In 1974 Haykal was dismissed as editor and chairman of *al-Ahram* and barred from publishing articles in the Egyptian press, although he continued to publish in Arabic newspapers in Lebanon, as well as in books and articles written in English and directed at an American audience. Among his publications of that period were his *Nasser: The Cairo Documents* (1973) and *The Sphinx and the Commissar* (1978). He was interrogated by the Egyptian police and the state prosecutor in 1977–78, forbidden to travel abroad, and imprisoned during Sadat's purge in September 1981.

Under **Husni Mubarak** Haykal has not regained his former influence on policy decisions or his editorial power, but he is respected as an intellectual, writer, and **television** commentator. He wrote a scathing attack on his erstwhile friend and sponsor, Anwar al-Sadat, *Autumn of Fury* (1983), and a memoir of the 1956 **Suez War**, *Twisting the Lion's Tail* (1986). He was mentioned as a possible mediator between Egypt and **Libya**. His memoirs of the **June War** were published in 1990 as *1967: al-Infijar* (1967: The Explosion). Haykal's memories of events in which he was an observer or participant are historically valuable but sometimes self-serving.

HAYKAL, MUHAMMAD HUSAYN (1888–1956). Lawyer, writer, editor, and politician. Born to a landowning family in Daqahliyya, he

was educated at the government **Law School** and the University of Paris, where he wrote his doctoral dissertation on the Egyptian public debt. Homesick while he was living there for his native village, Kafr Ghannam, he also wrote a bucolic fiction piece called *Zaynab*, published anonymously in 1913. Upon returning to Egypt in 1914, he practiced law, wrote for *al-Jarida*, published a magazine called *al-Sufur* during **World War I**, and taught at the Law School. When the **1919 Revolution** broke out, he backed the **Wafd** and **Sa'd Zaghlul**, but broke with them over the **Adli-Curzon Negotiations** in 1921. At this time **Adli Yakan**, Haykal, and some other educated Egyptians formed the **Liberal Constitutionalist Party**. In 1922 Haykal became editor of its **newspaper**, *al-Siyasa*, for which he later founded an influential weekly edition, *al-Siyasa al-usbu'iyya*. He kept up his literary production with *Fi awqat al-faragh* (In Moments of Leisure), *Tarajim misriyya wa gharbiyya* (Egyptian and Western Biographies), and a touching eulogy of his son, who died in childhood, called *Waladi*.

In 1934, at a time when the Liberal Constitutionalist were vying for popular favor with the Wafd, the Palace, and the rising Muslim groups, he published *Hayat Muhammad* (The Life of Muhammad), an attempt to apply modern scholarship to the Prophet's biography and to reconcile the principles of personal freedom, which he had long espoused, with Islamic teachings. Increasingly pious, he made the hajj in 1936 and wrote *Fi manzal al-wahy* (In the Dwelling Place of Conscience), relating his experience as a pilgrim. He served as **education** minister in seven **cabinets** during the late 1930s and 1940s and as president of the Senate from 1945 to 1950. He published an additional novel, *Hakadha khuliqat* (Thus Was She Created), shortly before his death and also his memoirs, *Mudhakkirat fi al-siyasa al-misriyya* (Memories of Egyptian Politics), of which two volumes appeared during his lifetime and one posthumously. Ambitious and talented, Haykal felt torn between secularism and **Islam**, freedom and authority, and his party's democratic principles and his belief that Egypt should be governed by its most educated citizens.

HEALTH CARE. Medicine has been an important science in Egypt since **Pharaonic** times, a role reinforced by **Islam's** positive attitude toward hygiene and medical care. Hospitals, public baths, free medical education, and guilds of medical practitioners (female as well as

male) promoted public and individual health in medieval Egyptian society. Although medical practice had deteriorated in Egypt by the time of **Napoléon Bonaparte**, European doctors during the **French occupation** noted the success of native healers in treating typhus and smallpox. Napoléon's army had military hospitals, and the **Institut d'Égypte** planned to found a civil counterpart in Cairo large enough to accommodate 300–400 patients, to be staffed by French doctors and nurses.

As a part of his Westernizing reform program, **Muhammad Ali** set up a medical school at Qasr al-Ayni under the leadership of **Clot Bey** in 1827, by which time there were already some 50 European doctors attending his troops. Frequent plague and **cholera** epidemics, as well as such endemic diseases as ophthalmia and diabetes, and the appearance, with **perennial irrigation**, of **bilharzia**, ensured that civilian Egyptians as well as soldiers would need the attention of these emerging practitioners. Regrettably for Egypt, its new health care system imitated the European pattern, although there was an ephemeral attempt under Muhammad Ali to train “barefoot doctors” to work in the Egyptian countryside.

Egyptians trained in European medicine ministered mainly to the troops or to the Westernized bureaucratic elite; Egypt's peasants looked to midwives, barber-surgeons, faith healers, Sufis (*see Sufism*), and other traditional healers who often lacked adequate training. Likewise, in the area of public health, Egypt adopted the quarantine practices of Mediterranean Europe, even when they failed to halt the periodic influx of cholera. Later reformers, including **Isma'il** and the **British occupation**, reinforced this tendency to imitate Western health-care models to the detriment of public health in the countryside and the growing cities. The last **Wafd Party cabinet** began to redress the problem by establishing rural health centers, which later were expanded under **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**.

Only after the **1952 Revolution** did the Egyptian government take a sustained interest in bringing health care to poor people, promoting public health, and stressing preventive measures. The total number of hospital beds in Egypt was 25,324 in 1952. In 1960 this figure had risen to 55,674, of which all but 7,000 were in state-owned hospitals. In 2001 there were 118,439 beds in hospitals under the health ministry and 21,706 in privately run hospitals. The number of physicians and nurses has increased proportionately.

Islamist societies have outstripped the government in delivering health care to the people, and their candidates were elected as the officers of the Egyptian Medical Association in 1992, though later deprived of power. *See also* AIDS.

HELIOPOLIS. Garden suburb of **Cairo** begun by tramway magnate Baron Empain in 1906. It was also the site of an **Ottoman** defeat by the French under **Jean-Baptiste Kléber** in 1800. Originally named for the ancient city of Heliopolis located nearby, this new suburban development was established about 15 km northeast of Cairo. Referred to today as *Misr al-Jadida*, Heliopolis quickly became one of the most desirable residential areas for wealthy Egyptians who wished to escape the noise and pollution of downtown Cairo. The developers used both European and Egyptian architects to establish combined residential and commercial blocks interspersed with gardens and additional lots for development following strict guidelines. Counter to these architectural guidelines, the Baron also built an Indian-style palace, now empty but still standing along al-Uruba Street. Aided by the building of a high-speed surface **tram** line, the desert town rapidly grew and eventually merged with the expanding city.

HELWAN. Health resort and industrial center located 25 km south of **Cairo**, to which it is linked by **railroads**, the **Metro**, and the **Cor-niche**. During the reign of **Abbas Hilmi I**, its hot springs were uncovered, and it became a center for the treatment of soldiers suffering from skin diseases and rheumatism; these were later opened for civilian use, and several palaces were constructed there. Since 1954 it has been the center of Egypt's **iron and steel industry** and of assembly plants for motor vehicles and **munitions**. Massive workers' demonstrations took place there in February 1968 against **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** policies, leading to the **30 March Program**.

HIGH COMMISSIONER. Title of **Britain's** political representative in Egypt from its declaration of the **Protectorate** in 1914 until the signing of the 1936 **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty**. His office was called the **Residency**.

HIJAZ. Mountainous area of western Arabia ruled by **Muhammad Ali** following his 1811–18 military campaign against the **Wahhabis**.

Some portions of the coastal pilgrimage route to Mecca remained under de facto Egyptian control until 1892.

HIJAZI, ABD AL-AZIZ (1924–). Professor, cabinet minister, premier, and banker. Born in **Cairo** in 1924, he studied at **Cairo University**'s Commerce Faculty and the University of Birmingham. Dean of the Commerce Faculty at **Ain Shams University** (1966–68), he was elected in 1969 to the **National Assembly**, where he chaired its production and economic affairs committee in 1972. He also served as treasury minister (1968–73), deputy prime minister and minister of **finance, economy, and foreign trade** (1973), and prime minister (1974–75). He later led the Bank of Commerce and Development.

HIJAZI, SALAMA (1855–1917). Egypt's first great singer, actor, and stage director. Born into a poor **Alexandria** family, he was trained as a Quran reciter. Exposed to performances by European theatrical troupes as a youth, he had contacts with **Syrian** actors. He organized his own troupe, in which he was a frequent actor and singer, at a theater that he founded in **Cairo** near the **Ezbekiyya Gardens** called Dar al-Tamthil al-Arabi (House of Arabic Acting) in 1905. His troupe toured **Syria** and North Africa and helped to make **music and theater** seem respectable to Arab Muslims.

AL-HILAL. Popular monthly magazine founded in **Cairo** by Jurji Zaydan in 1892. Its contributors have included Khalil Jibran, Amin al-Rayhani, **Taha Husayn, Ahmad Amin, and Salama Musa**, who was its editor from 1923 to 1929. It set up a major publishing house, printing Arabic books for general readers and such popular periodicals as *al-Musawwar*. The magazine continues to appear, but is less influential than it used to be.

AL-HILALI, AHMAD NAJIB (1891–1958). Lawyer, minister, and premier. He served as **education** minister in **Tawfiq Nasim's cabinet** (1934–36). Having joined the **Wafd Party** in 1937, he held the education portfolio in **Mustafa al-Nahhas's** 1942–44 cabinet. In 1943 he published *A Report on Educational Reform in Egypt*. Estranged from the Wafdist leaders, Hilali criticized them for corruption and was expelled from the Party. He headed independent cabinets for three months after **Black Saturday** and again for one day prior to the **1952 Revolution**. Imprisoned briefly by the **RCC**, he

was one of the old regime politicians deprived of their civil and political rights. He died before his rights were restored and his reputation could be rehabilitated.

AL-HUDAYBI, HASAN ISMA'IL (1895?–1973). Successor to **Hasan al-Banna** as supreme guide of the Society of **Muslim Brothers**. Born in a village near Shibin to worker parents, he began his education at its *kuttab*. Although his father wanted to send him to **al-Azhar**, he chose to become a lawyer, graduated from the government **Law School** in 1915, and served his apprenticeship in **Hafiz Ramadan's** office. He practiced law in **Cairo** and **Suhaj** and became a judge in 1924, but quit the bench when he joined the Brothers. Following the assassination of Supreme Guide al-Banna, Hdaybi was named his successor in 1951, partly because he was not associated with **terrorism** or the secret apparatus within the Society. He cultivated King **Faruq** as an ally against the **Wafd**. Arrested on **Black Saturday**, he was immediately released for lack of evidence that he or the Society planned the burning of Cairo. He backed the abortive reform efforts of **Ahmad Najib al-Hilali** and also the **Free Officers**, especially **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**.

Despite his support for the **1952 Revolution**, Hdaybi's relations with Nasir soon cooled when he rejected the officers' offer to admit three leading brothers to his cabinet. Nasir's creation of the **Liberation Rally** antagonized Hdaybi, who feared that it would eclipse the Society. His call for an end to martial law and the lifting of government **ensorship** angered Nasir, as did his secret meetings with the British Oriental secretary during the **Suez Canal** negotiations. The Egyptian government dissolved the Society in January 1954 and arrested Hdaybi and its other leaders. After massive demonstrations supporting **Najib**, Nasir agreed in March 1954 to release Hdaybi, end martial law, lift all censorship, and allow freedom of expression to all viewpoints; in fact Nasir was laying a trap to expose his opponents. Hdaybi, however, backed Nasir's regime, which suppressed all political movements except the Brothers. The government nevertheless went on arresting officers associated with the Brothers, especially their secret branch, and Hdaybi wrote to Nasir, accusing **RCC** of breaking promises. Ignoring a summons to meet with Nasir, he set out on a tour of eastern Arab countries.

When the 1954 **Anglo–Egyptian agreement** was announced, Hdaybi publicly criticized it in a Beirut **newspaper**. He went into

hiding upon returning to Egypt, but sent Nasir another letter, calling for an open debate on their differences. The government instead stepped up its campaign against the Society. The secret branch still existed—but outside Hedaybi's control—and plotted to kill Nasir. When its attempt failed, the plotters were arrested, as were thousands of Brothers, including Hedaybi. He was subjected to a show trial and given a death sentence, later commuted to penal servitude due to his age. His *Sab'at asila fi al-aqida wa al-radd alayha: takhatti al-su'ubat wa al-aqabat* (Seven Questions and Answers about Doctrine: Surmounting Difficulties and Obstacles) was published in 1978. Cautious and conservative, he tried but failed to moderate the society's emotionalism and violence.

HUMAN RIGHTS. Many Egyptians embrace the liberal traditions of Western Europe and North America, calling for restraints against government abridgement of such rights as speech, writing, assembly, due process for trying criminal cases, and religious practice. No Egyptian government, whether **Ottoman, Mamluk, Khedival, British**, royal or republican, has consistently upheld these rights. Some Egyptians argue that, in a society in which most people are poor, the major human rights should be to **education, health care**, insurance against old age and disability, and protection from excessive rents and interest charges, entitlements that were sometimes honored by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government.

This regime, however, flouted the liberal tradition of human rights in its treatment of old regime leaders, suspected agents of **Zionism** or of the **United States, Communists**, and **Muslim Brothers**, resorting to surveillance, imprisonment without trial, and torture. **Anwar al-Sadat's** regime, despite public displays of liberalization, applied similar measures to its political enemies. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR), founded in 1985, publicized state violations of the **1971 Constitution's** guarantees. **Husni Mubarak's** regime, often assailed for human rights violations on issues involving homosexuals, female genital mutilation, and the imprisonment of **Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim**, has focused on economic growth and combatting the *jama'at*. It accused the EOHR of being a **British** tool and arrested its leaders in 1998, but the organization remains active, issuing frequent press releases. Cairo also hosts the Arab Organization for Human Rights, founded in 1983 and led by **Muhammad Faiq**.

HUSAYN, AHMAD (1911–82). Leader of *Misr al-Fatat*. Born in **Cairo**, he graduated from the **Cairo University** Faculty of Law in 1931. He worked as a lawyer and journalist, writing for *al-Siyasa*. He and Fathi Ridwan founded *Misr al-Fatat* (Young Egypt) in the early 1930s in the belief that the existing political parties had abandoned their patriotic ideals. They also inaugurated the “Piaster Plan,” inviting all Egyptians to invest one piaster (then worth 5 U.S. cents) in locally owned and managed manufacturing firms. He became a strong and charismatic leader, especially of Egyptian Muslim youth, and was thought to enjoy King **Faruq**’s support against the **Wafd Party**. Accused of insulting the monarchy, he was arrested several times. His disciples included **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** and **Anwar al-Sadat**, who later put many of his ideas into practice. He became totally paralyzed in 1969 and died in relative obscurity. His memoirs appeared in *al-Sha’b* in August 1981.

HUSAYN, AHMAD (1902–84). Landowner, agronomist, minister, and diplomat. He was social affairs minister in the last **Wafd Party cabinet** and Egypt’s ambassador to the **United States** when **Dulles** withdrew the American offer to help build the **Aswan High Dam**.

HUSAYN, KAMAL AL-DIN (1920–99). **Free Officer** and cabinet minister. Born in Banha, he graduated from the **Military Academy** in 1939 and later from the Staff College. He taught there before the **1952 Revolution**, with which he was long connected. He served on the **RCC**. After supervising the National Guard, he became minister of social affairs in 1954 and **education** minister in 1956. He headed the Liberation Army in **Port Said** during the **Suez War**. While he was minister, numerous reforms were made in Egyptian education. Husayn was named head of the Supreme Council for the Arts, Letters, and Social Sciences in 1958 and of the **National Union**’s Egyptian branch in 1959. He became minister for local administration in 1961 and, after Syria withdrew from the **UAR**, also vice president for social services. After serving as secretary-general for the **National Congress of Popular Forces** in May 1962 and then as a member of the ASU executive, he left politics in 1963, mainly because the nationalization of property was affecting his family’s interests. Under house arrest during the late 1960s for opposing **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**’s policies, Husayn was released by **Anwar al-Sadat**

in 1970. Elected to the **People's Assembly**, he was later expelled for accusing Sadat of "punishing the Egyptian people."

HUSAYN, TAHA (1889–1973). Writer, educational administrator, and minister, sometimes called "the dean of Arab letters." Blind from early childhood, he studied at a *kuttab* in his native town, Magh-
agha, and had memorized the Quran by the age of nine. He entered **al-Azhar** in 1902 and came under the influence of **Muhammad Abduh** and his circle of Muslim modernists. Disappointed in al-Azhar, he began attending lectures at the Egyptian University (*see Cairo University*) and in 1913 was the first student to earn a Ph.D. there. Taha Husayn went to Paris in 1915 and earned a *doctorat d'état* at the Sorbonne in 1919 on his thesis *La Philosophie sociale d'Ibn Khaldoun*.

After his return to Egypt he became a lecturer in ancient history at the Egyptian University and in 1925 was given the chair of Arabic **literature**. He published a book in 1926, *Fi al-shi'r al-jahili* (On Pre-Islamic Poetry), in which he questioned the authenticity of pre-Islamic Arabic **poetry** and of some narrative chapters of the Quran, arousing protests at al-Azhar and in Parliament. He withdrew the book, replacing it in 1927 with a revised version, *Fi al-adab al-jahili* (On Pre-Islamic Literature). He served in 1930–31 as dean of the Faculty of Arts at Cairo University, but was dismissed after a year by the **education** minister. He joined the **Wafd Party** and became an editor of its **newspapers**.

In 1938 Husayn published one of his best-known books, *Mustaqbil al-thaqafa fi Misr*, later translated into English as *The Future of Education in Egypt*, arguing that Egypt was more a Mediterranean country than an Arabic or Islamic one. He was appointed acting rector of **Faruq** (Alexandria) University in 1944 and was education minister from 1950 to 1952. He withdrew from politics after the **1952 Revolution** but continued to publish books and articles that were widely read in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world, including memoirs, three volumes of which have been translated into English as *An Egyptian Childhood* (1932; reprinted 1990), *The Stream of Days* (1943; revised 1948), and *A Passage to France* (1976). A strong Westernizer, Taha Husayn's personality was more influential than the ideas he espoused.

HUSAYN KAMIL (1853–1917). Sultan of Egypt from 1914 until October 1917. Born and educated in **Cairo**, he was the son of **Khedive Isma'il** and hence a younger brother of **Tawfiq**. He completed his studies in Paris. Public works director under Isma'il, he is said to have ordered the construction of the **railroad** from central Cairo to **Helwan**. He also headed the war department. When Isma'il was exiled in 1879, Husayn Kamil accompanied him for three years, then returned to Egypt and supervised the farming of his lands, also serving on the boards of several Egyptian and foreign companies. He organized the first agricultural fair and inaugurated a flower show in the **Ezbekiyya Gardens** in 1896. One of the leaders of the Islamic Benevolent Society, he was sympathetic to Egypt's peasants and hostile to the **National Party**. He chaired the Legislative Council in 1909–10. When **Abbas Hilmi II** was deposed in 1914, the British named him the first "sultan" of an Egypt severed from the **Ottoman Empire**. Two attempts were made on his life while he was sultan, but he died from natural causes. The **British Protectorate** and war-time conditions did not permit him to use his organizational abilities.

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IBRAHIM (1789–1848). General and acting viceroy. The presumed eldest son of **Muhammad Ali**, he was born near Qavalla (Macedonia) and first came to Egypt in 1805 with his brother, Tusun. He was sent by Muhammad Ali on the campaign to the **Hijaz** and Najd in 1813 and took command of the **Sudan** expedition in 1823. In 1831 he led the Syrian campaign, taking Acre, Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo. The **Ottoman Empire** sent an expeditionary force against him, but Ibrahim defeated it at Alexandretta and invaded Anatolia. When his forces crossed the Taurus Mountains and threatened to take Istanbul, the European powers threatened to intervene to protect the Ottoman sultan, and so Ibrahim signed the **Convention of Kütahya**, giving Egypt suzerainty over **Syria**. Ibrahim became governor of the new province, with his capital at Antioch, and introduced many of his father's reforms. Another Ottoman effort to dislodge him from Syria failed in 1838. After Abdulmejid became sultan in 1839, he made an alliance with the **British** to expel Ibrahim's forces from Syria. Ibrahim was defeated and obliged to return to Egypt in 1840, but Muhammad Ali was permitted under the **Con-**

vention of London to pass control of Egypt down to his heirs. He did so in 1848, naming Ibrahim governor of Egypt with the concurrence of the Ottoman government. Ibrahim went to Istanbul to receive his decree of investiture, became ill, and died shortly after his return to **Cairo**. Some people believe that he espoused Arab nationalist ideals during his governorship of Syria, presumably to stress its ties with Egypt. His relationship with Muhammad Ali was clouded by the latter's suspicion that he was not truly Ibrahim's father, but he was an effective military commander and provincial governor.

IBRAHIM, HASAN (1920–90). Founding member of the **Free Officers** and member of the **RCC**. Born in **Alexandria**, he graduated from the **Military Academy** in 1939 and from Flight College in 1940, later studying economics in London. He fought in the **Palestine War** and took part in the **1952 Revolution**. He was appointed minister of general supply in 1955 and was secretary-general of the Alexandria branch of the **ASU**. He became vice president in 1964 but withdrew from public life in January 1966 to work in business.

IBRAHIM, [MUHAMMAD] HAFIZ (1871?–1932). Nationalist poet, often called *Sha'ir al-Nil* (Poet of the Nile). Born in a Nile River houseboat near Dayrut, he lost his father at an early age. His mother brought him to **Cairo**, where he was educated. He began as a boy to write **poetry**, influenced by classical poets and also by **Mahmud Sami al-Barudi**. He began practicing law, without formal training, with some lawyers in **Tanta** and **Cairo**, and then entered the **Military Academy**, graduating in 1891 with a commission in the artillery. He served under Sir **Herbert Kitchener** in the **Sudan** campaign, spending time in Sawakin and Khartum, where he formed a secret nationalist society with some fellow officers. Apprehended by the British, he was court-martialed and transferred to the reserves. Hafiz then sought the protection of **Muhammad Abduh** and obtained a police post at a monthly salary of £E4 until he was pensioned off. He became an editor of *al-Ahram*, winning fame for his poetry and prose as he came under the inspiration of **Mustafa Kamil**. He was named head of the literary section of **Dar al-Kutub** in 1911, remaining there until shortly before his death.

His poetry, neoclassical in style, excelled in expressing popular feelings and humor in terms that ordinary people could understand. Hafiz recited his poetry publicly to large groups of listeners and con-

tributed his verses to the Egyptian press. He often addressed social problems or political events in his verse, thus affirming his political support for Egyptian national aspirations. Especially famous are his attacks on the British for the **Dinshaway Incident** and for suppressing a **women's** demonstration during the **1919 Revolution**. He also wrote elegies and poems about natural disasters. In addition to his two-volume *diwan* (collection of poems), he translated Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables* and a book on economics from French into Arabic. Hafiz was closer to the Egyptian people than his famous rival, **Ahmad Shawqi**, but the two were reconciled before they died and are now equally revered throughout the Arab world.

IBRAHIM, SA'D AL-DIN (1938–). Controversial Egyptian–American sociologist. Originally from Mansura, he studied at **Cairo University** and earned his doctorate from the University of Washington. He taught at Cairo University, the American University of Beirut, and several **U.S.** universities before becoming Professor of Political Sociology at **AUC**. His publications include *Al-intikhabat al-amrikiyya wa azmat al-sharq al-awsat* (The American Elections and the Middle East Crisis), *Internal Migration in Egypt, I'adat al-i'tibar lil-rai al-Sadat* (Reconsideration of President Sadat), and *Egypt, Islam, and Democracy: Critical Essays*. Founder and director of the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies, he criticized the conduct of the **1995 Elections** and the policy of discrimination against Egypt's **Copts**. He was tried in a military court and convicted in 2000 and again in 2002 for defaming Egypt, accepting money for the Ibn Khaldoun Center without government authorization, embezzlement, and bribing public officials (some people allege that his real crime was speculating about the possible succession of **Jamal Mubarak** to his father's position). Sa'd was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. His trial was widely publicized in Egypt and abroad (especially by **human rights** supporters), and the **U. S.** government suspended any new aid projects in Egypt. He was again released in December 2002 and was finally acquitted in March 2003 by the Higher Court of Cassation.

IBRAHIM, YAHYA (1861–1936). Politician, **cabinet** minister, and last premier before the **1923 Constitution**. Born in a village near Bani Suwayf, he was educated at the main **Coptic** college in **Cairo** and the government **Law School**, where he later taught. He served as

president of the National Court of Appeals, **education** minister (1919–20 and 1922–23), premier and interior minister (1923–24), and finance minister (1925–26). While he was prime minister the 1923 Constitution and the Election Law were promulgated and **Sa'd Zaghlul** was allowed to return from exile. He was the first president of the **Ittihad Party** in 1925. Although well meaning, he could not resist pressure from either King **Fuad I** or the British **Residency** to execute policies in their favor.

IBRAHIM BEY MUHAMMAD. Mamluk leader of Egypt, successor of **Muhammad Abu al-Dhahab**, and rival to **Murad Bey Muhammad** as Egypt's ruler from 1775 to 1798. A rapacious tyrant, he escaped to **Syria** when **Napoléon Bonaparte** invaded Egypt. He returned after the **French occupation** and opposed the **Ottoman** governor, **Khusrev Pasha**, but he played no further role in the country's history. He and his followers encamped near present-day Dongola, thus evading **Muhammad Ali's** massacre of the Mamluks in 1811. News of his death reached **Cairo** in March 1816.

ID AL-ADHA. Feast of the sacrifice, also called *Id al-Kabir* and *Qurban Bayram*, the annual Muslim holiday commemorating Abraham's obedience to God's command by offering his son, Ishmael (Isma'il), as a sacrifice. The 10th day of the pilgrimage month, it is traditionally observed by butchering a sheep and sharing its meat with the poor.

ID AL-FITR. Feast of the fast-breaking, also called *Ramadan Bayram*, the annual Muslim holiday ending the month of daytime fasting, Ramadan.

IDRIS, YUSUF (1927–91). Doctor, journalist, and playwright. Originally from Sharqiyya province, he earned his M.D. at **Cairo University** in 1951. He worked briefly as a physician and health inspector, but drifted into journalism, writing on social problems. His first collection of short stories, *Arkhas layali* (*The Cheapest of Nights*), published in 1954, gained widespread public attention. His first play, "The Farhat Republic," was produced in 1957. He began introducing Western experimental techniques into his work during the 1960s. In 1966 he was awarded the medal of the republic after he had refused a prize from *al-Hiwar*. He hoped to create an indigenous Arab drama derived from the shadow and puppet plays that have been a staple of

Arabic Islamic culture for centuries, as in *al-Farafir* (The Small Birds) produced in 1966 and *al-Mukhattatun* (The Striped Ones) in 1969. The latter play criticized the **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** regime's restrictions on intellectual freedoms. Idris later wrote psychological plays and tried to develop an Arabic style that could express the most subtle and tender nuances of the mind and spirit.

AL-IKHWAN AL-MUSLIMUN, *see* **MUSLIM BROTHERS**, **Society of**.

IMBABA, BATTLE OF (1798). Often misnamed the "Battle of the Pyramids," this was the major triumph of **Napoléon Bonaparte's** army over the **Mamluks**. His decisive victory, due to greater numbers and more effective use of artillery, paved the way for his conquest of **Cairo** and the **French occupation** of Egypt.

INDUSTRY. Large-scale manufacturing in Egypt is currently dominated by **petroleum and natural gas** extraction and refining, the **textile industry**, food processing, **tourism**, chemicals, **pharmaceuticals**, construction, cement production, and metals, especially **iron and steel**. Even though the Egyptian government has been committed to a policy of **privatization** since **ERSAP** in 1991, the actual process has been slow, especially in textile spinning and weaving. **Munitions** and **civil aviation** remain largely under government control. In an effort to encourage foreign **investment** in Egypt's industrial development, the government has set up free **trade zones** in **Port Said**, **Alexandria**, **Damietta**, **Ismailia**, **Suez**, and **Nasr City** and plans to establish similar zones in the northern **Sinai** and on the Red Sea. Industry accounted for 33 percent of Egypt's gross domestic product in 2000 and employed 22 percent of its labor force.

INFITAH. **Anwar al-Sadat's** open door policy of restoring capitalism in Egypt, a reaction against **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's Arab socialism**. Officially launched with the **October Paper**, relaxation of government controls on business had begun in 1971, when Egypt's **economy** was declining. The acceleration of this policy after the **October War** was designed to attract foreign funds to help finance importing materials and parts needed to restore Egypt's economy to full production, to convert the short-term foreign debt to longer and less onerous terms, and to implement **investments** that would provide

future income, jobs, and foreign exchange. Law 43 (1974) activated the *infatih* policy by giving incentives to Arab and foreign investors in **industry**, land reclamation, **tourism**, and **banking**, with reduced taxes and import **tariffs** and guarantees against nationalization. Some of Sadat's advisers wanted to limit the policy to encouraging foreigners to invest in Egypt's economy; others hoped to apply capitalist norms to domestic firms, whether publicly or privately owned.

The latter view prevailed, undermining state **planning** and **labor legislation** and leading to increased corruption, profiteering, and conspicuous consumption of foreign-made goods, especially by the new entrepreneurial class, often called *munfatihin* (those who operate the open door). Sadat's attempt, encouraged by American advisers, to remove exchange controls and reduce subsidies on basic foodstuffs, led to the 1977 **Food Riots**, but liberalization continued. The *munfatihin* have become an interest group in their own right, resisting government efforts to restrict their opportunities for enrichment or to trim their level of consumption. The *infatih* policy increased Egypt's dependency on the richer Arab countries, Europe, and the **United States**. It has also widened the gap between rich and poor Egyptians, with potentially explosive social implications.

INSTITUT D'ÉGYPTE. Scholarly organization, founded in Egypt by **Napoléon Bonaparte** in 1798, to work for the advancement of knowledge in Egypt; to study the natural, industrial, and historical sciences relevant to the country; and to advise the government on specific matters related to policy. The Institute impressed some Egyptians such as **Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti**, who visited it and witnessed some of its scientific experiments. Its findings laid the basis for many scholarly monographs as well as the monumental *Description de l'Égypte*. Closed after the French withdrew from Egypt, it was revived in 1859.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF). Organization set up in 1945 (proposed by the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference) to stabilize the world's national currencies. It has been prominent in advising the Egyptian government, during and since the *Infatih*, on its transition to a market economy. The January 1977 **Food Riots** are commonly ascribed to its recommendation to remove the government subsidies that kept down the price of basic foodstuffs.

INVESTMENT. Generating a surplus of national income over consumption is essential to the growth of any economy. In Egypt, a developing country with relatively low per capita income, much of the investment must come from foreign sources. From about 1850 to 1952 private investment, mainly from **Britain** and **France**, provided most of Egypt's capital. From the **1952 Revolution** up to the *Infitah*, Egypt depended for a time on **foreign aid** from governments, the **United Nations**, and various nongovernmental organizations. Since 1974 investment in Egypt's **economy** has come from oil-exporting Arab countries, the **United States**, the members of the **EU**, Japan, but mainly from foreign, privately owned business firms.

The U.S. Department of State estimated American investment in Egyptian **industry** in 1999 at about \$2 billion, of which \$1.423 billion were invested in **petroleum and natural gas**, \$32 million in chemicals and allied products, \$163 million in **banking**, and an undisclosed amount in **beverages** and food processing. The Egyptian-British Chamber of Commerce has actively promoted UK investment in Egypt and trade missions between the two countries. It was estimated in May 2002 that British and Egyptian companies currently have \$5 billion invested in joint ventures and that further investment in the petroleum industry could bring this figure to \$6 billion within a year. French investments in Egypt were reported in April 2001 to have reached 4 billion francs, a substantial portion of which has gone into the **Toshka Project**, but also into banking, telecommunications, electronics, and the **Cairo Metro**. Germany's investments are often funneled through the German-Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry. It was reported in 2001 to be seeking investment opportunities in Egypt for 14 companies, mainly from eastern Germany. German companies are also involved in the **pharmaceutical** industry, the improvements to the Cairo International Airport, and a network for distributing agricultural ingredients in Egypt. Cognizant of the need to ensure future economic vitality, the government is making strenuous efforts to attract more private foreign investment.

IRAQ. Predominantly Arab country controlling the lower Tigris and Euphrates River valleys, created by the League of Nations in 1920, and placed under a British mandate from 1921 to 1932. Iraq was ruled by members of the Hashimite dynasty and tended to support

Britain politically, helping in 1955 to create the **Baghdad Pact** despite **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** opposition.

In 1958 Iraq's monarchy was toppled by a military coup, led by Abd al-Karim Qasim, and the country renounced the pro-Western Baghdad Pact. Many people hoped that Qasim would commit Iraq to joining the **UAR**, but he chose instead to play a delicate balancing act between **Arab Nationalism** and **Communism**. In 1963 Qasim was overthrown and replaced by a Ba'athist government, which negotiated with Nasir about a union with Egypt and **Syria**. Although these talks failed, Iraq remained committed to Arab unity. It backed the creation of the **PLO**, supported Egypt in the **June War** and **War of Attrition**, and imported growing numbers of Egyptian workers. Egyptians also helped to develop Iraq's political, legal, and **educational** institutions.

Many Iraqis were ambivalent, admiring Egypt's cultural leadership but often competing to surpass it. Iraq, the only Arab state never to sign an armistice with **Israel**, opposed **Anwar al-Sadat's** peace initiatives and led the Arab rejectionist front against the **Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty**. After it went to war with Iran in 1980, however, Iraq came to need political, financial, and military support from other Arab governments. Egypt's aid was so important that Iraq agreed to resume diplomatic relations with **Husni Mubarak's** government in 1987. Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen agreed to form a customs union, the Arab Cooperation Council, in 1989. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 caused a rupture of its ties with Egypt, which aided the allied coalition in the ensuing **Gulf War**. The two countries resumed diplomatic relations in 2000, and the Egyptian government has become increasingly opposed to the **UN** sanctions, which many Egyptians regard as politically motivated and harmful to the Iraqi people. The government and people both opposed the **United States'** invasion of Iraq in 2003.

IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY. The state-owned Egyptian Iron and Steel Company was founded in 1954 at **Helwan**, using low-grade iron ore deposits found near **Aswan**. In the 1970s additional iron ore deposits, of a higher quality, were found near Bahriyya **oasis**. The Helwan factory, built by the **Soviets** between 1955 and 1973, grew rapidly up to 1967, and total Egyptian production of reinforced iron rose from 50 thousand metric tons in 1952 to 347 thousand in 1977. Production of cast-iron parts, steel sections, and steel sheets also

increased, but more gradually. Lately, the **industry** has reduced its per-unit costs of production. The government has let out contracts to upgrade the Helwan plant, a Japanese firm is building a new plant at al-Dukhayla, near **Alexandria**, and another is projected at Abu-Za'bal, near **Cairo**. Current annual production capacity is 3 million metric tons. Demand for ferrous products exceeds the local supply.

IRON GUARD. Secret pro-Axis society organized by Yusuf Rashad at King **Faruq's** request in 1944 or 1945. The society's two purposes were to facilitate the king's contact with the **armed forces** and to carry out covert actions against his opponents, most notably the **Wafd**. **Anwar al-Sadat**, a former ally of Rashad, may have been recruited into its organization and involved in some of its clandestine activities, but his family denies that he was ever a member.

IRRIGATION. Egypt, with the retreat of the glaciers after the last Ice Age, became mainly a desert country unable to support a substantial population without the **Nile River**. Thanks to the annual flood, the Nile is beneficent to human habitation and the cultivation of crops, but only if its waters are harnessed. Egypt receives little or no rainfall, except along portions of the Mediterranean coast, and the Nile has no tributaries that originate within the country. Even before the dynastic period of ancient Egyptian history (3000 BCE), the peoples of Egypt were building basins and channels to utilize the Nile waters. The major method used since antiquity is called **basin irrigation**, a system of water utilization that produces one annual crop. Since the early 19th century, however, Egypt's rulers have converted first the Delta and later the Middle and Upper Nile Valley to **perennial irrigation**, a system that produces two or three crops per year, by constructing larger canals, barrages, and dams.

Since floods varied and either a high Nile or a low one could devastate Egypt's harvests, the Egyptian government studied programs that would provide year-long water storage, such as the **Century Storage Scheme**, but ultimately opted for the construction of the **Aswan High Dam**, which was completed in 1971. Total irrigated land was estimated in 1993 at 32,460 square kilometers. So great is Egypt's dependence on irrigation that it is now tapping underground water sources, building seaside desalinization plants, and opening a large channel from Lake Nasir to an **oasis** in the Western Desert (see **Toshka Project**). In addition, the Uwaynat

Project will irrigate some 80 thousand hectares in the southern part of the Western Desert, and the al-Salam Canal will carry water from the Delta to irrigate 160 thousand hectares in the northern **Sinai Peninsula**. In August 1997 the government announced a plan to subsidize loans to farmers to enable them to convert about 265 hectares of orchards from traditional to drip irrigation, a step toward the conservation of increasingly scarce water resources.

ISKRA. **Marxist** splinter group. Founded in 1943 by Hillel Schwartz, it appealed mainly to wealthy, cosmopolitan **Jews**. Many of its members were **women**. It established the House of Scientific Research (*Dar al-Abhath al-Ilmiyya*) as a front organization to acquaint Egyptians with **Communist** ideas under the guise of scientific and cultural research and discussion. It was closed by **Isma'il Sidqi's** government in 1946. *Iskra* appealed to students in **Cairo University's** Faculties of Law, Medicine, and Science. Some Egyptian intellectuals such as Anwar Abd al-Malik, Shuhdi Atiya al-Shafi'i, and Sharif Hatata became Marxists through exposure to *Iskra*. Essentially a marginal group, it merged in 1947 with the **EMNL** to form **Hadeto**.

ISLAM. The religion, now prevalent in Egypt and in many other African and Asian countries, that believes in one all-powerful God who has been revealed through scriptures to a series of prophets ending with Muhammad, to whom the Quran was revealed between 610 and 632 CE. Islam stresses the idea that its believers constitute a single community (Arabic: *umma*) and that their religious solidarity should take precedence over family, tribal, or racial loyalties. Many Muslims, therefore, think that Islamic loyalty should supersede nationalism. See also **Islamism**, **Jama'at**, **Muslim Brothers**.

AL-ISLAM WA USUL AL-HUKM. Title of a controversial book, written by **Ali Abd al-Raziq** and published in 1925, which argues that the **caliphate** is not a necessary institution in **Islam**. The treatise deeply offended many **ulama** and also King **Fuad I**, who was trying to persuade Muslims to make him their new caliph, after the Turkish government of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) had abolished the **Ottoman** caliphate in 1924.

AL-ISLAMBULI, KHALID (1957–82). Egyptian army lieutenant convicted of assassinating **Anwar al-Sadat**. Born in Mallawi (near

Minya), his father was a legal adviser to the nationalized **sugar** refinery in Naj' Hammadi. Khalid graduated from the **Military Academy**, and was commissioned in the artillery corps. His immediate motive was to avenge the arrest of his brother, Mahmud, leader of the student *jama'a* at Asyut University in the sweeping roundup of Sadat's opposition in September 1981. He was also inspired by *al-Farida al-ghaiba* by Abd al-Salam Faraj, ideological spokesman for **al-Jihad**, advocating the replacement of the Sadat regime by an Islamic state. Khalid had charge of an armored transport vehicle in the 6 October military parade and managed to replace the soldiers assigned to ride with him by three accomplices and to conceal the grenades and ammunition gathered by his accomplices in his duffel bag, which was not searched. When his vehicle reached the reviewing stand, it stopped, the conspirators pretended to salute Sadat, and then opened fire. As Sadat collapsed, Khalid shouted: "I have killed Pharaoh!" Although Sadat's bodyguards killed several of the conspirators, Khalid and some of his confederates, although wounded, were later able to stand trial. Among five (out of 24) defendants who were sentenced to death, he was executed on 15 April 1982.

ISLAMIC ALLIANCE. Coalition of the **Muslim Brothers** with the **Liberal Party** and **SLP**, formed to run a common slate of candidates in the **1987 elections**. It won 60 seats, against 390 for the **NDP**. The Alliance parties boycotted the **1990 elections**, protesting what they felt were unfair electoral laws, but did contest the **1995 elections**.

ISLAMIC CONGRESS. Muslim organization founded by Egypt in 1954, joined later by Pakistan and **Saudi Arabia**, and initially led by **Anwar al-Sadat**. Established in part to compensate for **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** suppression of the **Muslim Brothers**, it hoped to use the organization to spread Islamic culture, to coordinate the economic policies of the Muslim countries, and to promote administrative and financial reforms. Its first congress was convened in Mecca in 1955. Sadat told an interviewer in 1958 that the regime hoped that the Congress would replace all of Egypt's existing agencies as a religious guide, because it was better attuned to the needs of modern Muslims. The Congress focused special attention on the newly independent Black African countries, and scholarships at Egypt's universities were offered to African Muslim students. **Kamal al-Din**

Husayn replaced Sadat as president of the Islamic Congress in 1961. After convening an international meeting of **ulama** in 1966, the Congress became dormant. Its relative obscurity, partly due to the formation of a Muslim League (including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran) hostile to Nasir, also reflects the lack of Islamic focus in his political program. It has been superseded by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, founded in May 1971 following the September 1969 Rabat Islamic summit and three preparatory meetings of Muslim foreign ministers. *See also* **Pan-Islam**.

ISLAMIC GROUP, *see* **ABD AL-RAHMAN, UMAR; ISLAMISM; JAMA'AT; AL-JAMA'A AL-ISLAMIYYA; and AL-TAKFIR WA AL-HIJRA**.

ISLAMIC GUIDANCE, SOCIETY OF. Rival organization to the **Muslim Brothers**. Organized by Hafiz Salama, formerly a member of *Shabab Muhammad*, his society set up centers of Quranic teaching at the Martyrs Mosque in Suez and the Nur Mosque in Cairo's Abbasiyya district. The organization openly opposed **Anwar al-Sadat's** peace policies in the 1970s and agitated strongly in 1985 for the immediate application of the **Shari'a** to Egypt. The government responded by putting all private (*ahli*) mosques under the *awqaf* ministry's supervision, hoping to curb **Islamism**.

ISLAMISM. Preferred term for the ideology, popular among many Muslims in Egypt and other countries, that the **Shari'a** should be the basis for the government and laws of all Muslim states. This doctrine is often called "Islamic Fundamentalism" in the Western press and even by some Muslims themselves. Islamist groups in Egypt include *al-Shubban al-Muslimin*, the **Muslim Brothers**, *Shabab Muhammad*, the **Society of Islamic Guidance**, *al-Jihad*, *al-Takfir wa al-Hijra*, *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya*, and other *jama'at*. Islamism has always appealed to Egyptian Muslims, but its ideas were eclipsed somewhat by the Westernization policies of **Muhammad Ali, Isma'il**, and their successors, and by the **Arab socialism** of **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**. The revival of this ideology was inspired by the successful Islamic revolution in Iran, the Muslim resistance (in which some Egyptians took part) against the **Soviet** occupation of Afghanistan, and the formal reestablishment of the **Shari'a** in **Sudan** and Pakistan. Egypt's Islamists have assailed their government for its

peace with **Israel**, overreliance on **U.S.** support, repression of domestic dissent, and failure to meet popular needs. During the 1990s the government repressed Islamists, especially because of their attacks on **cabinet** ministers, police officers, **Copts**, and foreigners. They have lost popular support in Egypt since the 1997 **Luxor Incident**. Some government policies, notably **copyright** and arrests, were intended to blunt their appeal. *See also* **pan-Islam**.

ISMA'IL (1830–95). Modernizing governor, later **khedive**, of Egypt from 1863 to 1879. Born in **Cairo** and educated at the princes' school founded by his grandfather at Qasr al-Ayni and at **France's** military academy in St.-Cyr, he then went to Istanbul to serve on the sultan's council. When he returned to Cairo, he chaired Egypt's corresponding council. Upon succeeding his uncle, **Sa'id** in 1863, he began to modernize Egypt by ordering the construction of factories, **irrigation** works, and public buildings. Many cultural institutions began during his reign, including the Cairo **Opera House**, *Dar al-Kutub*, the **Geographical Society**, the **Egyptian Museum**, and many primary, secondary, and higher schools, such as **Dar al-Ulum**. The **Suez Canal** was completed while he was viceroy. Isma'il established the system of **provincial** and local administration and convoked the first representative assembly in 1866. Other developments included the organization of the **National**, **Mixed**, and **Shari'a Courts**, the creation of a postal service, and the extension of **rail** and telegraph lines throughout Egypt. He sent explorers to the African interior and armies to conquer most of the **Sudan**.

Isma'il tried to make Egypt more independent of the **Ottoman Empire**, obtaining the title of *khedive*, the authority to pass down his khedivate to his eldest son, and the right to contract loans without obtaining prior permission from the sultan. His industrial, military, and construction projects proved expensive, and he also sponsored many other extravagant schemes having no long-term value to Egypt, such as his many palaces and expensive luxuries that he purchased for his wives and mistresses. Initially he financed his reforms by revenues from the expanded production of Egyptian **cotton**, demand for which soared during the American Civil War, but when **textile** manufacturers were able to buy cotton from other sources, Isma'il resorted to higher taxes and loans obtained from European bankers on ever less favorable terms. Increasingly hard-pressed to repay them, he resorted to unorthodox fiscal measures such as the

1871 *Muqabala*, the sale of the Egyptian government's shares in the **Suez Canal Company**, and finally accepting European financial control through the *Caisse de la Dette Publique*.

In 1878, after a low **Nile River** flood, poor harvests, and rising military outlays, Isma'il surrendered much of his authority to a "European **cabinet**," headed by **Nubar** with English and French ministers. In March 1879 a riot by officers who had been put on half-pay led to the resignation of the European cabinet and its replacement by one headed by **Muhammad Sharif**. The European bondholders and their governments suspected that Isma'il had engineered the uprising to regain his absolute rule. In June their envoys in Istanbul called on Sultan Abdulhamid II to dismiss Isma'il in favor of his eldest son, **Tawfiq**. Isma'il left Egypt and lived out his years in Naples. A willful and visionary man, ambitious for Egypt's development and his own aggrandizement, his achievements were eclipsed by his fiscal mismanagement, which led to Egypt's subjection to **Britain**.

ISMAILIA. Egyptian city that has contained the headquarters of the **Suez Canal Company** until the latter was nationalized in 1956 and, since then, of the Suez Canal Authority. The Society of **Muslim Brothers** was founded there, and it was the site of several meetings between **Anwar al-Sadat** and other national leaders.

ISRAEL. The Jewish State of Israel, established in 1948 in three-quarters of what had been the British Mandate of **Palestine**, has challenged Egyptian **foreign policy**. Much of the modern history of the Middle East has been dominated by the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Egypt, more than any other Arab state, championed the Arab cause from 1948 to 1977. The establishment of Israel meant the triumph of **Zionism**, which Egypt had formerly tolerated, and later led to the expulsion of most Egyptian **Jews**. Some Egyptian Muslims, notably **Isma'il Sidqi**, had earlier tried to foster good diplomatic and commercial ties with the Jews of mandated Palestine. On the other hand, individual Egyptians had backed Arab claims to Palestine and opposed Zionism, and the **Muslim Brothers** and *Misr al-Fatat* actively backed the Arabs in Palestine during the 1930s. The Egyptian government did not take up the issue until it was invited to send representatives to the 1939 London Round Table Conference. Egypt's delegation was headed by **Ali Mahir**, who used his position to curry

favor with delegations from other Arab countries as well as the Zionists. Egyptians often offered to mediate between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, just as they preferred to fight for Nile Valley unity rather than for **Arab Nationalism**.

The **World War II** premiership of **Mustafa al-Nahhas** marked the change in Egypt's policy. After Nahhas rejected Iraq's 1943 proposal, backed by **Britain**, for a Fertile Crescent union, he adopted Arab nationalism (and opposition to Zionism), hoping also to distract Egyptians from the damaging revelations of the *Black Book* and to win support from Muslim activists. King **Faruq**, **Ahmad Mahir**, and **Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi**, not wishing to be outdone by the **Wafd Party**, completed Nahhas's work of creating the **Arab League** under Egyptian leadership. After the war ended, Egypt's government and people opposed admitting more Jews to Palestine, leading to popular demonstrations on Balfour Day (2 November) 1945 and to rioting and looting against Jews and other religious minorities. The presence of the Arab League in **Cairo**, diplomatic pressure from other Arab states, and the power of the Muslim Brothers continued to stir up anti-Zionist feeling, even when Egypt was also trying to revise the 1936 **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty** and to regain control over the **Sudan**.

The UN General Assembly's **Partition Plan for Palestine**, which Egypt had wrongly assumed would not pass, galvanized the government into action. Even though military commanders and some politicians warned that Egypt was not ready to fight a war, the government declared war against Israel on 15 May 1948 (the day after it became independent). The Arab armies were defeated (*see Palestine War*), and Egypt and Israel signed an armistice agreement at the **Rhodes Proximity Talks** in 1949. While publicly opposing any peace with Israel, Egyptian diplomats did engage in quiet talks with Israelis in Paris, and the **United States** also facilitated secret contacts between **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** and Moshe Sharett, who was Israel's prime minister in 1954–55. However, Egypt and Israel remained publicly hostile, as Israel tried to inspire Egyptian attacks on Americans (*see Lavon Affair*) and attacked the **Gaza Strip** in February 1955. Egypt rearmed and sent *fidaiyin* raids into Israeli border settlements. Israel sided with **Britain** and **France** as they planned and executed their 1956 attack known as the **Suez War**. Egypt agreed to the presence of UNEF in Gaza and in **Sharm al-Shaykh**, thus guaranteeing Israeli access to the **Gulf of Aqaba**, between 1957

and 1967. When Nasir ordered the removal of UNEF, the remilitarization of the **Sinai**, and a blockade against Israeli shipping at the **Ti-ran Straits** in May 1967, these actions led to the **June War**, in which Israel again defeated Egypt.

At the postwar **Khartum summit**, Egypt joined the other Arab countries in rejecting any negotiations, peace, or diplomatic relations with Israel, but soon afterwards accepted **Security Council Resolution 242** and Gunnar Jarring's efforts to mediate between Israel and the Arab countries. It also kept the **Suez Canal** closed as Israel's armed forces continued to occupy its eastern shore. Both countries shot sporadically at each other across the Canal; these skirmishes escalated into the **War of Attrition** in 1968 and 1969. Egyptians suffered from raids by Israeli fighter jets and were encouraged to support Palestinian *fidaiyin*. In June 1970 Nasir's government agreed to a temporary cease-fire under the **Rogers Peace Plan**, but indirect talks failed. In 1971 **Anwar al-Sadat** offered a more permanent cease-fire in exchange for a partial Israeli pullback from the Canal. When his plan was rejected, he warned Israel of a "year of decision," in which Egypt would resume hostilities, but in fact he postponed action in 1971 and 1972.

In 1973, however, Egypt joined with **Syria** in starting the **October War**, which overcame Arab fears of Israel, despite Israeli advances, and paved the way for the **Kilometer 101 Talks**, **Geneva Conference**, **shuttle diplomacy**, and the first **Separation of Forces agreement**. The thaw continued as Egypt, in reopening the Suez Canal, allowed passage by ships carrying cargo to Israel and as the two countries signed the **Egyptian-Israeli agreement** of 1975, renouncing war as a means of settling their differences. Following an attempt in 1977 to reconvene the Geneva Conference, Sadat decided to go to Jerusalem to offer peace terms at the Israeli Knesset. A flurry of conferences and visits between the leaders of the two countries failed to resolve their differences, until U.S. President Jimmy Carter invited Sadat and Menachem Begin to meet at **Camp David** in September 1978. After further negotiations, the leaders agreed to the **Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty** in 1979. The two states held occasional **Palestinian Autonomy Talks**, but after the assassination of Sadat, these talks were quietly shelved.

Although Egypt established full diplomatic ties with Israel, it withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv after the Israelis invaded Lebanon in 1982. Israeli tourists, scholars, and businessmen

flocked to Egypt, but few Egyptians went to Israel, partly because doing so would have hindered their travel to Arab countries. **Husni Mubarak** avoided visits, except in 1995 for the funeral of Yitzhak Rabin, but he did facilitate the Oslo II Accords and the abortive attempts to make peace between Israel and Syria. Egypt returned its ambassador in 1986 but withdrew him again after the outbreak of the second *Intifada* in October 2000. In April 2002 Egypt withdrew most of its remaining staff from Tel Aviv. **Trade** between the two countries has declined, and most Egyptians have become openly angry at Israel for its invasions of Gaza and the West Bank cities, which had been ceded to Palestinian control in the Oslo II Agreement.

ITALIANS. Italians were, after the **Greeks**, Egypt's second largest ethnic minority. Italian immigrants came in the 19th century for mainly political reasons and tended to be army officers, professionals, and technicians. Italians staffed a silk factory under **Muhammad Ali**, who also was attended by Italian physicians. Others came to be closely associated with the **khedivial** family and held many high posts in Egypt's government. Later immigration comprised merchants, artisans, and unskilled workers, most notably in construction. During the **British occupation**, the Italian presence in the Egyptian government declined, but they remained important in retail commerce, skilled trades, and nascent industries. Their numbers peaked in the 1927 census at 51,175, concentrated mainly in **Cairo**, **Alexandria**, and **Port Said**. Their communal organization was less close-knit than the Greeks'; with the rise of fascism they came under intense Italian government supervision, and many were expelled in 1940. Most remaining Italians left Egypt after the **1952 Revolution**.

ITTIHAD PARTY. The organization set up in January 1925 by followers of King **Fuad I** to counter the influence of the **Wafd**. Its chief organizer, Hasan Nashat, was a wily and ambitious operator, whom the British later pressured the king to send abroad as Egypt's ambassador to Spain and later to England. This palace party formed a coalition government with the **Liberal Constitutionalists** but did not win seats in the 1926 parliamentary elections. Its first president was **Yahya Ibrahim**, with **Ali Mahir** as vice president; it had an administrative board and an executive committee. Its program resembled that of the Liberal Constitutionalists, with whom it competed for

members among the landowning notables. It merged with the **Sha'b Party** in 1938 and the combined group survived up to the **4 February Incident** but never gained any popular support.

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AL-JABARTI, ABD AL-RAHMAN (1754–1822). Writer, biographer, and chronicler of events in Egypt in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Born in **Cairo** and educated at **al-Azhar**, he served as a clerk in **Napoléon Bonaparte's** council during the **French occupation**. During the reign of **Muhammad Ali**, al-Jabarti became the chief Hanafi mufti (jurisconsult). When one of his sons was killed, he became blind from crying. Soon afterwards Muhammad Ali had him executed by hanging. Al-Jabarti's best-known work is a chronicle of events from AH 1100 to 1236 (1685–1821), called *Ajaib al-athar fi al-tarajim wa al-akhbar* (Amazing Records from Biographies and History), which has been translated into English.

JAHIN, SALAH (1930–86). Cartoonist, poet, playwright, and actor. Born in **Cairo**, he was educated in **Asyut** and **Tanta** schools and at **Cairo University's** law faculty. He began writing for *Ruz al-Yusuf* in 1955 and drew cartoons for *Sabah al-Khayr*. Upon joining the staff of *al-Ahram* in 1962, his cartoons became highly influential. He also wrote poems in colloquial Arabic as well as an operetta, several stage and **television** plays (in some of which he acted), and patriotic songs. Among his earliest songs were *Ihna al-sha'b* (We are the People) and *Wallahi zaman, ya silahi* (By God, It's Time, O My Weapon), which became Egypt's national anthem under **Nasir**. The government asked him to head a committee to write children's books in 1962 and to serve in 1966 as editor of *Sabah al-khayr*, but he resumed drawing cartoons for *al-Ahram* in 1967. He became de-spondant after Egypt's defeat in the **June War**. Owing to his leftist political views, he lost influence under **Anwar al-Sadat**, but his **poetry** and art continue to appeal to many Egyptian people.

JALLABIYYA. The gown-like garment worn by male Egyptian peasants and laborers. Although **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government tried to discourage its use in factories for safety reasons and perhaps because it was viewed as "backward," it remains popular because it is inex-

pensive, modest, and comfortable in a hot climate. **Islamists** have tried to persuade men to resume wearing it, just as they have promoted **women's** reveiling.

AL-JAMA'A AL-ISLAMIYYA. Islamist society, one of many that grew out of the student religious societies (see *Jama'at*) that initially promoted better moral behavior but which became increasingly involved in political activities as **Anwar al-Sadat** adopted his *Infitah* policies, befriended the **United States**, made peace with **Israel**, clamped down on political dissent, and arrested many political and religious leaders. Different tendencies arose within the society. One tendency, strong among students at **Cairo** and **Alexandria University**, allied itself with the **Muslim Brothers**. Another, mainly limited to a small Alexandria faction, adopted the *salafi* views of **Muhammad Abduh** and **Rashid Rida**. The prevalent tendency, mostly among students in the universities of Upper Egypt, was to oppose the government and to work closely with **al-Jihad**. The two groups formed a consultative council (*majlis al-shura*) in 1981 under the leadership of Shaykh **Umar Abd al-Rahman**.

Members of the society fought against government security forces in **Asyut** and **Cairo** after **Sadat's** assassination, and most of its leaders were captured, tried, and imprisoned. While in prison, they drafted a set of principles called *Mithaq al-amal al-Islami* (Covenant of Islamic Action). The document calls on members to follow the commands of God and the Prophet Muhammad, to commit themselves to emulate the deeds of his associates, to adhere to a pure **Islam** uncontaminated by alien ideologies, to command others to worship God, to reestablish the caliphate, to promote good deeds and eliminate what is forbidden in Islam, to resort to force where gentle preaching fails, to cultivate pious attitudes, and to organize Muslims to cooperate in obedience to the **Shari'a**.

Al-Jam'a al-Islamiyya opposes foreign **investment** and **tourism** in Egypt. Tourists introduce bad morals, flock to pagan temples, and enrich a spiritually misguided government. Accordingly, members have attacked **Nile River** cruise boats, tour buses, the **Egyptian Museum**, sound-and-light shows, individual travelers, and most notoriously tourist groups (see **Luxor Incident**). The Egyptian government has fought back by modernizing its policing methods, conducting security sweeps, jailing militants, replacing **sugar** cane (which conceals would-be attackers) with sugar beet

cultivation, and spreading propaganda against **terrorism**. It was estimated in 1994 that 10 thousand militants had been imprisoned; the current number is probably higher. Some members have fled to **Sudan**, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Europe, and North America and are associated with *al-Qa'ida*. To the extent that the West in general, or **U.S.** foreign policy in particular, angers Egyptians, this group retains popular support, but terrorism within Egypt is now widely condemned by its people.

JAMA'AT. Generic term for **Islamist** societies formed under **Anwar al-Sadat**, initially in 1972 with his blessing in order to combat **Communist** and **Nasirist** groups, especially in the national universities. The leading *jama'at*, such as *al-Takfir wa al-Hijra*, attacked his regime for what they viewed as his secularizing tendencies, failure to address Egypt's social problems, and movement toward peace with **Israel**. Increasingly popular among young, urban Muslims of all classes, they often provide to poor people better social and medical services than what the government provides, notably during the 1992 **earthquake**. They dissociate themselves from the revived **Muslim Brothers**, which is viewed as conservative. One of these societies kidnapped and murdered Sadat's former minister of *awqaf* in July 1977. Another, **al-Jihad**, was implicated in Sadat's assassination in October 1981. A related group, *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya*, committed numerous assaults, robberies, and murders during 1992–97, hoping to discredit and overthrow **Husni Mubarak's** regime. In response, the government has jailed many members of the *jama'at* and even executed some, making strenuous efforts to limit the appeal of these revolutionary societies. The international Islamist group, *al-Qa'ida*, has many Egyptian members, notably **Ayman al-Zawahiri**.

AL-JAMASI, MUHAMMAD ABD AL-GHANI (1921–2003). Army general and **cabinet** minister. Born in al-Batanun (Minufiyya), he was educated at the **Military Academy**, Staff College, and **Nasir High Military Academy**. He held a series of staff positions in the 1950s and took charge of the Armor School in 1961–66. At the time of the **June War** he was chief of the Army Operational Branch. He rose through the ranks from chief of staff for the Eastern Military Zone, deputy director of the Reconnaissance and Intelligence Department in 1968–70, commander of the Egyptian operational group on the **Syrian** front in 1970–71, chief of the Armed Forces Training

Department in 1971–72, to chief of the Operations Department and deputy chief-of-staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces in 1972–73, finally becoming chief-of-staff in 1973–74. From 1974 to 1978 Jamasi served as minister of war and war production and also commander-in-chief of the armed forces, also becoming a deputy prime minister in 1975. In 1978 he became military adviser to **Anwar al-Sadat** and then left public life. His memoirs, *Mudhakkirat al-Jamasi* (1990), have been translated into English as *The October War: Memoirs of Field Marshall El-Gamasy of Egypt*.

AL-JANZURI, KAMAL (1933–). Economist, minister, and premier. Janzuri was born in Minuf, graduated from **Cairo University** in 1952, and took part in the revolutionary regime's earliest reforming efforts. He then earned a Ph.D. in economics from Michigan State University. He taught briefly and served as an adviser to the **Saudi** government. Appointed governor of the New Valley in 1976 and of Beni Suef in 1977, he then took charge of the Institute for National Planning. He became minister of **planning** in 1982 and served as premier from January 1996 until October 1999. As prime minister he implemented reforms to promote industrial development, foreign **investment**, and **tourism**. His sudden dismissal may have been due to Egypt's liquidity crisis of 1998–99, the slow pace of **privatization** during his premiership, or to excessive state expenditure for such large-scale undertakings as the **Toshka Project**.

AL-JARIDA. Daily **newspaper** founded in 1907 by the **Umma Party** and edited by **Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid** until 1914. A pioneer in literary criticism, **feminism**, and social reform, *al-Jarida* included among its contributors **Muhammad Husayn Haykal**, **Malak Hifni Nasif**, and **Taha Husayn**. Many Egyptian intellectuals read it. Less popular than *al-Liwa*, this journal tried to articulate purely Egyptian interests, independent of **British**, **Ottoman**, or **khedivial** influences. Many students in the government **Law School** and the Egyptian University came to its offices. Wartime **ensorship** led to its closure.

JAWISH, ABD AL-AZIZ (1872–1929). Journalist and educator. Born in **Alexandria** to a Tunisian father and a Turkish mother, he attended **al-Azhar** and later Borough Road Teacher's Training College in London. Upon returning to Egypt, he worked as an inspector for the **education** ministry, but resigned in 1908 to become editor of

the **National Party** daily newspaper, *al-Liwa*. Shaykh Jawish soon became famous for his attacks on British administration and also on the Coptic editors of a rival newspaper, *al-Watan*, causing many Egyptians and foreigners to assume that he was hostile to **Copts** generally. He was tried four times for his anti-British articles, served two prison sentences, and eventually went into exile. He served as editor of the Arabic-language publications of the CUP in Istanbul and during **World War I** of *Die islamische Welt* and *al-Alam al-islami*, published in Berlin by the German foreign office. After the war Shaykh Jawish worked for Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) but broke with him when he abolished the **caliphate**. In 1924 he returned to **Cairo**, where he resumed work in the **education** ministry and became vice president of *Jam'iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin*. Admired by young Egyptians as an orator and writer, his bombastic style alienated more conservative supporters of the National Party.

JEEP CASE. Trial of **Muslim Brothers** who were Egyptian army officers. The incident takes its name from the discovery in November 1948 of an army jeep filled with papers that provided the first proof that the brothers had a secret apparatus using **terrorism** to undermine public order, giving the government grounds to dissolve the Society on 6 December 1948. The trial of the arrested brothers was delayed for two years; some of the evidence proved to be tainted, and half of the defendants were acquitted.

JESUITS. Roman Catholic missionaries who established influential schools in Egypt, such as the Collège de la Sainte Famille in **Cairo's** Fajjala district. Its graduates included conservative politician **Ahmad Ziwari** and a Jewish **Communist**, Henri Curiel.

JEWS. Egypt has had a significant Jewish community since antiquity. In early Islamic, **Mamluk**, and **Ottoman** times, Jews played a major role in the economic life of the country. Egyptian Jewry was not a unified community, but included Karaite as well as rabbinic Jews, who in turn were divided between Ashkenazim (Jews of East European origin), Sephardim (Jews of Spanish and Portuguese origin), North Africans, and Egyptians. Their communal leadership was, however, mostly Sephardic. During the 19th century many Jews migrated into Egypt from other parts of the **Ottoman Empire**, North Africa, Italy, and Eastern Europe, usually for economic reasons but

sometimes to escape persecution, for the general policy of Egypt's rulers was to tolerate and encourage the Jewish *millet*. Jewish immigrants, both Sephardic and Ashkenazi, settled in **Cairo**, **Tanta**, and the burgeoning **Suez Canal** cities. Their overall number rose from 25 thousand in 1897 to 60 thousand in 1919.

During **World War I** more than 10 thousand Jews, mainly of East European background and strongly in favor of **Zionism**, took temporary refuge in Egypt from **Palestine**. Egyptian Jews gradually grew more Westernized, often adopting Italian and later French as their lingua franca. They had their own schools, charities, hospitals, clubs, sports teams, **newspapers**, and political organizations. Although most Jews supported the **British occupation**, a few worked for closer relations with the **Wafd** and other secular nationalist movements. Very few contemplated going to Palestine, but many were interested in the work of the Zionist settlers there.

Jews played a major role in such professions as medicine, in **banking**, in retail sales, and in the marketing of Egyptian **cotton**. Most regarded Egypt as their permanent home, although up to the 1940s many claimed a foreign nationality to enjoy protection under the **Capitulations**. There was always at least one Jew in the Senate, and one community leader was finance minister in the 1920s (his wife was a lady-in-waiting to Queen Nazli). The rich and educated Jews were active in their Community Council (*majlis milli*), as opposed to the rabbinate. Egyptian Jews also led boycotts against Nazi Germany, opposed fascism, and helped to organize the nascent **Communist** movement.

The rise of political Zionism and the State of **Israel** eroded the Jews' secure position in Egypt, especially following the 1936–39 Palestinian Arab Revolution, which made Egyptians more aware of Zionism. Although the Egyptian government continued to protect the Jews, generalized attacks against them appeared in nationalist newspapers and in speeches of some of the leaders of *Misr al-Fatat* and the **Muslim Brothers**. Unscrupulous leaders stirred up urban mobs against both Christians and Jews after **World War II**, especially during the **Palestine War**, even though Egypt's Jewish leaders repeatedly denounced Zionism and raised £E40 thousand for Egypt's war effort in June 1948. Between 1948 and 1956, most Jews tried to remain in Egypt, but rising nationalism threatened the autonomy of their schools and other institutions, undermined their business firms, and hampered their role in the professions. The role of

some Egyptian Jews in Israeli espionage (*see* **Lavon Affair**) put their community at risk.

The 1956 **Suez War** led to a general policy of repression against Jews, and the majority of the community left Egypt, many for **France** or Canada, others for Israel. Those who remained faced further discrimination under **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** and were interned in concentration camps during and after the **June War**. Since **Anwar al-Sadat's** peace initiative, conditions have ameliorated for Egypt's Jews, but most of those who remain are elderly and politically passive. Their number was estimated by the American Jewish Congress in 2001 at 100, probably a low figure. Barring some new influx, however, Egypt's Jews will soon vanish, an unwilling victim of Israel's victories.

JIHAD. Although the word literally means "struggle" in the sense of defending **Islam** against attackers or against evil thoughts and deeds, to both Muslims and non-Muslims, it often connotes "holy war" by Muslims against unbelievers or all non-Muslims. Egypt's *jama'at* have stressed this militant aspect of jihad, which some call the sixth pillar of Islam. *See* **al-Farida al-ghaiba**.

AL-JIHAD. **Islamist** revolutionary group (*see* *Jama'at*) that plotted the assassination of **Anwar al-Sadat** in 1981. Sometimes known as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, most of its supporters were Muslim students from Upper Egypt, such as the brother of the leading assassin, **Khalid al-Islambuli**. Following the assassination, members of the group seized control of **Asyut** for four days. Most of its leaders were arrested and tried during 1982, some were executed, and many received long prison terms. Its ideology is expressed in **al-Farida al-ghaiba** (translated into English as *The Hidden Imperative*), written by Abd al-Salam Faraj, who was executed with Islambuli. Jihad members after the assassination of Sadat made attempts on the lives of several interior ministers, U.S. diplomats, an editor of **al-Musawwar** who had criticized their movement, and the Speaker of the **People's Assembly**. It was partly eclipsed in the 1990s by **al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya**, but has lately been associated with **al-Qa'ida**.

JOINT NOTE (1882). Letter written by the French and British foreign ministers to the Egyptian government in January 1882, upholding the authority of **Khedive Tawfiq** against **Ahmad Urabi's** followers

and implicitly threatening military intervention. The note strengthened the extremists within the **National Party** against the moderates and the khedive, however, because Egyptians did not believe that **France** and **Britain** would actually intervene.

JULY LAWS (1961). **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** decrees instituting **Arab socialism** and nationalizing many Egyptian firms. Actually, these "laws" were one step in a larger process by which the Egyptian government took control of the country's major economic assets, starting with the **Suez Canal Company**, **British-**, **French-**, and **Jewish-** owned firms that Nasir nationalized after the **Suez War**, **Bank Misr**, and the **National Bank of Egypt** in 1960, and Belgian-owned firms nationalized during the 1960–61 Congo crisis. Under the July Laws, technically Laws 117–119 for 1961, the state nationalized all remaining **banks** and insurance companies, 50 shipping companies and firms in heavy and basic industries, obliged 83 other companies to sell at least 50 percent of their shares to public agencies, and stipulated in the case of 147 medium-sized companies that the state would acquire all shares in excess of a limit of £E10 thousand in shares per shareholder. Additional laws nationalized privately owned utilities, all foreign **trade**, and the **Alexandria cotton** exchange. It is estimated that Egypt acquired £E124 million in assets as a result of these acts.

In 1963–64, privately owned shares of the affected companies were nationalized, and, in addition, **pharmaceutical** companies and large construction firms were also brought under state ownership. Law 127 (1961) lowered the limit on individual landownership to 100 **feddans**, or 300 per family. Other properties belonging to "reactionary capitalists" were placed under sequestration. These laws also attempted to remove gross disparities in income distribution. All gross incomes exceeding £E10 thousand per year were to be taxed at 90 percent, and owners of sequestered property received no compensation beyond £E5 thousand annually for a "living allowance" and £E15 thousand in compensation for seized property. The July Laws turned many Syrian capitalists against the **UAR**, probably precipitating **Syria's** secession two months later. For Egypt, they strengthened state power against the landed aristocracy and industrial bourgeoisie. These **socialist** decrees were to some degree reversed by **Anwar al-Sadat's** policy of *Infītah*. In some cases nationalized property has been returned to its owners.

JUM'A, SHA'RAWI (1920–88). ASU leader and interior minister, widely regarded as **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** most influential companion in his last years. Born in **Cairo**, he graduated from the **Military Academy** in 1942. He taught there during the 1950s and worked for the *Mukhabarat* from 1957 to 1961, after which he was named governor of Suez. He then was minister of state for presidential affairs, director of the **Institute for Socialist Studies**, and head of the ASU's security department in 1964. He was interior minister from 1966 to 1971 and became secretary-general of the ASU central committee in 1969. He was a leading member of **Ali Sabri's** faction and one of the leaders purged by **Anwar al-Sadat** in his 1971 **Corrective Revolution**. Tried for conspiracy and sentenced to life imprisonment, he was released in 1977 for health reasons. He then stayed out of public life but sometimes gave press interviews.

AL-JUMHURIYYA. Government-owned daily **newspaper** set up by the **RCC** after the **1952 Revolution**. Its first editor was **Anwar al-Sadat**. Usually pro-leftist, it has rarely competed successfully against *al-Ahram* or *al-Akhbar*. Its estimated 1972 circulation was 80 thousand; in 1999 it reached 900 thousand.

JUNE WAR (1967). Conflict in which **Israel** inflicted a major defeat against Egypt, taking the **Gaza Strip** and the **Sinai Peninsula** as well as against Jordan and **Syria**. The war took most experts by surprise, because Israel was in an economic recession and Egypt's best troops were committed to the **Yemen Civil War**. Its root causes included the rise of the **PLO** and especially of its *fidaiyin* raids, which caused Israeli retaliation against their bases in Jordan; the mounting conflict over the utilization of the waters of the Jordan River and its tributaries; and the **Egyptian-Syrian joint defense agreement**. More immediate causes were a dogfight between Syrian and Israel aircraft in April 1967 and the subsequent report by **Soviet** intelligence that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border.

Accused by other Arab leaders of "hiding behind the **United Nations' skirts**," **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** ordered the withdrawal of the **UNEF** that had been posted in the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip since the **Suez War**. Secretary-General U Thant promptly complied, and Nasir proceeded to move large numbers of troops through **Cairo** and into the Sinai, as his **newspapers, radio,** and **television** threatened the infliction of immense losses on Israel

if it attacked Egypt or Syria. Egypt raised the stakes on 21 May by closing the Straits of **Tiran** and proclaiming a blockade against Israeli shipping in the **Gulf of Aqaba**. Some writers, notably **Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal**, argue that Israel was laying a trap for Egypt, but most accounts stress the incautious threats made by Egypt and other Arab governments against Israel. On 30 May Egypt and Jordan settled their long-standing differences with a military pact that effectively placed Jordan's army under Egyptian command. Israel, unable to obtain what it viewed as adequate backing from the **United States** and other Western nations, mobilized its armed forces, prepared for war, and formed a coalition cabinet that included Moshe Dayan as defense minister.

On 5 June Israel launched a preemptive attack against the air bases of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and **Iraq**, catching them off-guard and destroying most of their fighter planes. Without air support, the Arab armies were easily defeated on the ground; Egypt's forces were driven from the Sinai within 72 hours. The Egyptian public, having been told by the state broadcasting and print media that its forces were winning the war, was shocked when it found out that they had been defeated, although official sources blamed this defeat on clandestine U.S. military aid to Israel. In a nationally televised speech on 9 June, Nasir took full responsibility for Egypt's humiliating setback and offered to resign. Mass demonstrations ensued throughout Egypt, urging him to remain as president. After 24 hours he relented.

Egypt suffered severe military and economic losses in the June War; these included 356 of its 431 fighter aircraft, about 700 of its 1,300 tanks, and some 3 thousand men killed, 5 thousand wounded, and 4,980 prisoners or missing. Although the **USSR** quickly replaced lost equipment, it took direct charge of Egypt's military reconstruction. The oil-exporting Arab states pressed Egypt to pull out of Yemen and later to modify its economic policies. The **Khartum summit** ruled out negotiations with Israel, but Egypt later accepted **Security Council Resolution 242** as a basis to end the conflict.

– K –

KAFR AL-DAWWAR INCIDENT. Suppression by the Egyptian army just after the **1952 Revolution** of a workers' uprising at a **textile** manufacturing center 25 km south of **Alexandria** in August of that

year. The mill was owned by **Bank Misr**, its director had been connected with King **Faruq**, and the workers' efforts to unionize had been stymied. The workers at the Dyers' Company struck on 9 August, declaring their support for **Muhammad Najib** and asking for the right to form a **union**. The workers' demands were met. The workers at the other Misr factories in Kafr al-Dawwar then struck, too, locking themselves into their factories, and some suspicious fires started. Soldiers were dispatched from Alexandria, unknown snipers shot at them, and the army returned fire. Two soldiers, a policeman, and four workers were killed and many others were wounded. The army arrested 545 workers, hastily court-martialed some of them, and eventually executed two of the ringleaders. Left-wing sources questioned the fairness of the proceedings and aver that the management started both the fires and the firing. The incident underscored the determination of the **RCC** to oppose any workers' efforts at unionization and to combat any labor groups associated with **Communism**.

KAMIL, MUSTAFA (1874–1908). Nationalist leader, orator, and editor. The son of an army officer from an ethnic Egyptian family, Mustafa Kamil was educated in government schools, the **French Law School**, and the University of Toulouse, where he received his law degree in 1894. An ardent opponent of the **British occupation**, he drew close to **Khedive Abbas Hilmi II** and Sultan Abdulhamid II, both of whom supported him materially as well as morally in his campaigns to persuade European governments and peoples to demand the **evacuation** of Egypt promised by successive **British** governments. Together with **Muhammad Farid**, **Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid**, and other Egyptians, he formed a secret society called the "Society for the Revival of the Nation," initially under the aegis of the khedive. The society soon became known as the **National Party**, for which Mustafa founded a daily Arabic **newspaper**, *al-Liwa*, and a boys' school that bore his own name.

As the likelihood of French support waned after the **Fashoda Incident**, Mustafa gradually distanced himself from Abbas, publicly breaking with him in 1904. He continued to court support from the **Ottoman Empire** and to promote **pan-Islam**. He also hailed Japan's rising power in a book called *al-Shams al-mushriqa* (The Rising Sun). He backed Ottoman claims to part of the **Sinai Peninsula** during the 1906 **Taba Incident** and condemned the

atrocities of British rule in Egypt following that year's **Dinshaway Incident**. In October 1906 he became reconciled with the khedive, who supported him financially to found *The Egyptian Standard* and *L'Étandard égyptien* as Nationalist dailies to influence European opinion.

In December 1907 he formally established the National Party, which elected him as its first president. Stricken with tuberculosis (although some people thought that he was poisoned), he took to his bed and died on 10 February 1908. His funeral occasioned a massive demonstration of popular grief. Mustafa Kamil is remembered as a fervent patriot, demanding the British evacuation of Egypt and constitutional government, and as an occasional supporter of the Ottoman Empire and pan-Islam. A **museum** bearing his name, near the **Cairo Citadel**, memorializes his contribution to the nationalist movement and contains his tomb, as well as those of **Muhammad Farid**, **Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i**, and Fathi Ridwan.

KAMSHISH INCIDENT (1966). Murder of a village-level **ASU** official by a powerful rural landowner. The incident, which raised intense debates in the **National Assembly**, pitted socialists who resented the local power retained by "feudalists" (large landowners) against those who opposed the arbitrary policies of the Committee for the Liquidation of Feudalism, which was chaired by **Abd al-Hakim Amir**, himself a landowner. The debate, which took place in May 1966, marked the apogee for **Arab socialism** in Egypt.

KHALIL, MUSTAFA (1920–). Egypt's prime minister from 1978 to 1980. He graduated from **Cairo University's** Faculty of Engineering and received a doctorate in 1951 from the University of Illinois. He was **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** minister of communications and housing from 1956 to 1965 and of **industry** and energy from 1965 to 1966, also serving as deputy prime minister in 1964. Opposed to the leftward drift of the Egyptian government, he resigned in 1966 and did not return to political life until after **Anwar al-Sadat's** 1971 **Corrective Revolution**. He became the last secretary-general of the **ASU** in 1976 and presided over its division into three *manabir* (pulpits or platforms) that evolved into separate political parties in 1977. He accompanied Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977 and took part in the negotiations with Israel. In addition to being premier from October 1978 to May 1980, he served as foreign minister from May 1979.

When Sadat assumed the premiership in 1980, Khalil became deputy chairman of his **NDP**. Although less influential under **Husni Mubarak** than under Sadat, he retains his party post, belongs to the president's inner circle, and maintains relations with Israeli leaders. He serves on the Board of Trustees of **AUC** and chairs the board of the Arab International Bank.

KHARTUM SUMMIT MEETING (1967). Conference of Arab heads of state held on 31 August and 1 September 1967, eventuating in a declaration rejecting recognition of, or peace negotiations with, **Israel**, although it can be interpreted as favoring an externally imposed settlement. The meeting also helped reconcile **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** with King Faysal of **Saudi Arabia**, ending the **Yemen Civil War** and ensuring that the oil-rich Arab countries would aid Egypt and other states that were directly confronting Israel.

KHEDIVE. French rendition of a Turkish title, taken from a Persian word meaning "little lord," used by Egypt's viceroys from 1867 to 1914. Although the khedive was legally the viceroy for the sultan of the **Ottoman Empire** and was appointed and dismissed by an imperial *firman*, he actually exercised some sovereign powers, including the appointment of his **council of ministers**, the rector of **al-Azhar**, and high-ranking military and naval officers. He could sign treaties with foreign powers and borrow money for the state treasury. The succession to the khedivate went to the eldest son rather than the senior male relative as in other Muslim states. The khedive also administered (and allegedly misappropriated) *waqf* monies up to 1913. After 1882 the khedive's exercise of power was limited by the advice of **Britain's** agent and consul general in Egypt.

KHEDIVIAL MAIL LINE. Egypt's passenger and mercantile shipping firm, founded by **Bank Misr** under the aegis of the Misr Maritime Navigation Company in 1934. It used to play an important role in transporting Muslim pilgrims to the **Hijaz**.

AL-KHULI, LUTFI (1928–99). Essayist, journalist, politician, playwright, and short story writer. Although trained as a lawyer, he soon moved into **literature** and journalism. Politically leftist, he influenced the direction of **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** socialist policies in the 1960s. In the 1970s he was appointed editor-in-chief of *al-Tali'a* and

editor and columnist for *al-Ahram*. In 1988 he was elected secretary-general of the **Afro-Asian Writers' Association**, which he served until his death. His later years were troubled due to accusations that he was advocating closer relations with **Israel**.

KHURSHID, AHMAD. Ottoman official. Appointed **Alexandria's** mayor after the French evacuated Egypt in 1801, he was named Egypt's governor in 1804 at **Muhammad Ali's** behest. Allied with **Britain's** diplomatic representative, he tried to get Muhammad Ali and his Albanians removed from Egypt, bringing in the *Delhi* (madmen) troops from **Syria**. Muhammad Ali managed to win the *Delhis* to his side and, backed by a demonstration of **ulama** and guild leaders in **Cairo**, had himself named governor of Egypt in May 1805. Abandoned by his troops, Khurshid was besieged in the **Cairo Citadel**, from which he agreed to depart only after he saw the Ottoman decree investing Muhammad Ali as governor of Egypt. His brief rule in Egypt was totally ineffectual.

KHUSREV PASHA. Ottoman official and first governor of Egypt after the expulsion of the French. A singularly incompetent administrator, he commanded an Ottoman force that could not compete against the **Mamluks** or the Albanian troops of **Muhammad Ali**. After he tried to repatriate the latter with false promises to pay them, they deposed him in 1803, igniting a protracted power struggle in **Cairo**.

KILLEARN, see LAMPSON, MILES.

KILOMETER 101 TALKS (1973). Negotiations between Egyptian General **Abd al-Ghani Jamasi** and Israeli General Aharon Yariv. Held in a tent on the road between **Cairo** and Suez, following the **October War**, they were the first publicly known talks between an Israeli and an Arab officer since 1949. Their purposes were to implement the cease-fire called for in **Security Council Resolution 338**, to return to the positions each side had occupied on 22 October, to ensure that food, water, and medicine could cross Israeli lines to Suez city, to end the Israeli blockade of nonmilitary supplies to the Egyptian Third Army entrapped on the **Suez Canal's** east bank, to replace Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road with **United Nations** ones, and to exchange prisoners of war. The talks reportedly broke down because of differences between the official positions of

Israel, which demanded a return to the prewar lines, and of Egypt, which wanted Israel to give up nearly half the **Sinai**. In fact, the negotiating generals nearly reached an accord. Some Israelis allege that Kissinger sabotaged it because he wanted to mediate any talks between the two sides, as he would later do in the first **Separation of Forces** agreement in January 1974. The Egyptians and Israelis accepted its technical details at precisely the same spot as before.

KISHK, ABD AL-HAMID (1933–). Popular preacher and Islamic jurisconsult. Born near Damanhur, he began school in **Alexandria**. He became blind at the age of 12, but continued his education at **al-Azhar**'s faculty of *Usul al-Din*. He entered the service of the *awqaf* ministry as a mosque preacher and imam. He preached from 1964 to 1981 at Ayn al-Hayat Mosque (also called *Masjid al-Malik*) in the Hadaïq al-Qubba district of **Cairo**. He was jailed under **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**, allegedly for refusing to approve the execution of **Sayyid Qutb** and for dodging questions about the compatibility of **Islam** with **Arab socialism**. He became immensely popular under **Anwar al-Sadat**. His sermons usually tended to be apolitical and to stress personal piety and preparation for the end of the world. He was one of the many political and religious leaders who were rounded up and jailed by Sadat in September 1981. Although released from prison in January 1982, he has not been allowed to preach regularly in a mosque since that time. However, tape cassettes of his sermons remain in circulation and 10 volumes of his legal verdicts were published between 1988 and 1992. He is at times called an **Islamist**, but his public utterances have tended to shun politics.

KITCHENER, Sir [HORATIO] HERBERT (1850–1916). **British** general, colonial administrator, and agent and consul general in Egypt from 1911 to 1914. Born to an Anglo-Irish landowning family, he studied in Switzerland and at the Royal Military Academy in Woolwich. Commissioned into the Royal Engineers in 1871, he conducted land surveys in Palestine, Cyprus, and the Sinai from 1874 to 1883. He then joined the Egyptian army and took part in the unsuccessful **Charles Gordon** rescue mission in 1884–85. He served in Zanzibar and the Eastern **Sudan** before becoming adjutant general to the Egyptian army in 1888. Soon after his accession, **Khedive Abbas Hilmi II** chose Kitchener, with the concurrence of the British government, to become commander-in-chief of the Eryp-

tian army, but their relations soured due to the 1894 **Frontiers Incident**. He organized and led the Anglo–Egyptian campaign to regain the Sudan from the **Mahdi**'s successors in 1896–98 and repulsed **France**'s effort to capture the **Nile River** headwaters at **Fashoda**.

Kitchener played a major role in **Britain**'s victory over the Boers in South Africa in 1899–1902 and then became commander of the Indian army. After **Sir Eldon Gorst**'s death, Kitchener was sent to Egypt by the Liberal cabinet to keep the country quiet and to improve its economic condition. While serving as Britain's chief diplomatic representative and de facto colonial administrator, he subdued the Nationalists, improved the **irrigation** system, persuaded the Egyptian government to pass the **Five Feddan Law**, established the **agriculture** ministry, and revised the 1883 **Organic Law**. He pressured **National Party** leaders to go into exile and banned most of their **newspapers**. Twice he narrowly escaped assassination. He kept Egypt out of the **Ottoman Empire**'s wars in **Libya** and the Balkans. His relations with Abbas deteriorated to the point where he was thinking of deposing him just before **World War I** broke out. In August 1914, Kitchener was importuned by Prime Minister Asquith to enter the cabinet as his war minister. Although popular and often perceptive, Kitchener never enjoyed being a wartime mobilizer in London as much as he had cared about managing Egypt, to which he always hoped someday to return.

KLÉBER, JEAN-BAPTISTE (1753–1800). General in **Napoléon Bonaparte**'s army and his successor as commander of the French forces in Egypt. The son of a Strasbourg mason, he enlisted in the Bavarian army in 1777 but returned to Alsace in 1785. He later joined the local guard, eventually becoming a general in the French army. Napoléon invited him to command a division in his Army of Egypt, where he saw action in most of the major battles against the **Ottoman Empire**. When Napoléon returned to **France** in 1799, Kléber took over his command. Early in 1800 he signed the abortive **Convention of al-Arish**. He successfully secured **Cairo** from an Ottoman attack by his victory at **Heliopolis**. Shortly afterward, he was stabbed to death at his headquarters. A soldier's soldier, lacking in charisma and self-confidence, he was intelligent and capable.

KÜTAHYA, CONVENTION OF (1833). Treaty ending **Ibrahim**'s first campaign against the **Ottoman Empire**, confirming Egypt's

control over **Syria**, Adana, and the **Hijaz**. Only military and naval intervention by **Russia**, which became for a time the Ottomans' main protector, kept Egypt from taking more of Anatolia.

KUTTAB. Muslim elementary school, usually located near or in a mosque and supported by a **waqf**, stressing Quran recitation and memorization. Traditionally, attendance was limited to boys, although **Islam** does not oppose **women's education**, and a few girls were admitted to *kuttabs* or were tutored at home. The *kuttab* teacher was called a *fiqi* (Egyptian colloquial Arabic for the classical word *faqih*, meaning legal expert); he would sometimes be assisted by an *arif*. Up to the reign of **Muhammad Ali**, the *kuttab* was Egypt's main means of primary education, but in the 19th century the state began to set up competing secular schools that prepared pupils for the new professional schools. Under the 1867 educational reforms, the *kuttabs* were subject to government inspection. Starting in 1907, they were integrated into the state-controlled educational system.

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LABOR LEGISLATION. Egyptian government regulation of working conditions began late, partly because so many business firms were controlled by foreign nationals protected by the **Capitulations** from local legislation. Licensing of factories did not begin until 1904, and five years later **employment** of children under nine years in **cotton** ginning, **tobacco**, and **textile** factories was banned, a prohibition extended to 20 other **industries** in 1931. A statutory limit of nine hours per day was applied to **women** workers in 1933 and men in 1935, although they were permitted two additional hours of overtime. Enforcement of these rules was lax. No legal liability for industrial accidents existed until 1936, no compulsory insurance until 1942, and no required contracts for workers until 1944. **Unions** were officially recognized only in 1942. A 1948 law set up arbitration procedures for labor disputes, and in 1950 collective agreements between employers and unions were regulated. The **1952 Revolution** had no immediate effect on workers, except that the government banned strikes after the **Kafr al-Dawwar Incident** and subjected unions to state control. Strikes have been banned in Egypt ever since.

Jamal Abd al-Nasir often spoke out for the welfare of workers and committed his government to bettering their conditions. Public Law 91 of 1959 recodified all existing labor legislation. It fixed maximum work hours for adults and juveniles; raised sick pay, indemnities for termination of employment, and the length of paid vacations; banned child labor; and set minimum wages. Public Law 92 extended insurance to employees of all industrial firms in Egypt. The **July Laws** increased workers' rights, including profit sharing and compulsory social insurance. New legislation in 1971 and 1972 further extended paid vacations and limited workweeks, but restricted sick leaves. The minimum wage was applied to private employers. The government also committed itself to find **employment** for all secondary school and university graduates, accelerating the growth of the **bureaucracy**. The enforcement of labor laws was weakened by the *infitah*, but Egyptian wages and working conditions have recently improved because of competition for skilled labor from other, more munificent, Arab countries.

LAMPSON, Sir MILES WEDDERBURN (1880–1964). British diplomat. Originally from Killearn (Stirlingshire) and educated at Eton, he entered the foreign office. Lampson was appointed **high commissioner** for Egypt and the **Sudan** in December 1933. His early diplomatic achievement was the signing of the 1936 **Anglo–Egyptian Treaty**, after which his title changed to ambassador. His firm stance ensured that Egypt would remain a base for Britain's Eighth Army and Mediterranean Fleet during **World War II**, although Egypt remained a nonbelligerent for most of the war. Suspecting King **Faruq** and his advisers of favoring the Axis Powers, Lampson precipitated the **4 February [1942] Incident**, forcing the king to accept a **Wafdist cabinet** to carry out the 1936 Treaty. Although Lampson's behavior has often been assailed, especially by Egyptians, others argue that the British Empire could not have survived World War II without firm action in Egypt before its victory at **al-Alamayn**. He was elevated to the peerage as Baron Killearn in 1943. As Egyptian agitation grew for the British **evacuation** after the war, the Labour government removed him from **Cairo**, naming him high commissioner for Southeast Asia. Some of his journal was published as *The Killearn Diaries, 1934–46*, parts of which were translated into Arabic and printed in *al-Ahram*; the full text can be found at the Middle East Centre, St. Antony's College, Oxford. A tough negotiator,

Lampson ignored nationalism in Egypt, where more subtle diplomacy would have averted ill feeling toward Britain. *See also Mustafa al-Nahhas.*

LAND REFORM. Unequal agricultural land distribution (*see Land-ownership*) was a major problem for Egypt, but few people, except the **Communists**, proposed reforms until the 1940s. The peasants were proverbially apathetic, large landlords dominated all legislative bodies, and the royal family owned about one-fifth of all Egypt's arable land. The first public discussion of land redistribution occurred when a senator proposed a bill in 1944 to limit **agricultural** landholdings to 50 **feddans**; the bill was formally rejected in 1945. A few social reformers raised the issue at that time, but the general attitude of the political parties, all of which were led by landowners, remained hostile. Egyptian leaders aware of the problem argued that portions of the state domains should be given to Egypt's landless peasants. Leaders of the **Muslim Brothers** and *Misr al-Fatat* expressed some interest in redistribution, but neither group stressed the issue before the **1952 Revolution**.

An issue more widely discussed in pre-revolutionary Egypt was the abuse of the *waqf ahli* system, which had enabled some landowners to evade Islamic inheritance laws. Proposals to abolish or modify the system were first made in 1927, revived in 1936, and finally passed in a 1946 act that restricted the right of property owners to set up new *awqaf* by bequest, but existing ones were not abolished. The party leaders differed on whether the system needed further reforms. Muslim modernists perceived the need for *waqf* reform, and few families opposed such changes.

One of the first major acts of the 1952 Revolution was to enact major land reform legislation, nationalizing all lands held by the deposed King **Faruq** and his relatives and limiting the total amount of agricultural land that could be owned by an individual to 200 **feddans** (with an additional 100 for each dependent). The *waqf ahli* system was abolished five days later. Motives for these measures include the nonlandowner origins of most of the **Free Officers**, the previous system's tendency to impede industrialization by overvaluing land as a store of value, the contribution of the poor health of the landless peasant soldiers to Egypt's defeat in the **Palestine War**, and the need for measures to restore order after the 1951 peasant revolts. In practice, these reforms were less radical

than they sounded, because many large landowners were allowed to sell their excess landholdings, usually to peasants who already owned some land, before they could be confiscated by the state. In addition, owners of land that was confiscated were reimbursed with government bonds. The limits were reduced to 100 feddans per individual in 1961 and 50 in 1969. The 1952 Land Reform law led to the redistribution of 365,247 feddans to 146,496 families; later laws brought the total up to almost 800 thousand feddans going to 334,727 families.

The growth of farm **cooperatives** helped to maintain high output levels and to spread modern methods of cultivation, but richer peasants still wielded great power, and about 40 percent of the rural population in 1980 owned no land at all. The government's solution to this problem is to reclaim lands for agriculture, but even if the most optimistic statistics of 2.6 million feddans reclaimed between 1952 and 1998 are true, landlessness and inadequate landholdings still plague many of Egypt's rural poor. Egyptians hope the **Toshka Project** will open to them new arable lands in the Western Desert.

LANDOWNERSHIP. When Egypt was a part of the **Ottoman Empire**, its lands, except those set aside as *waqf*, were theoretically the property of the sultan, who had the authority to delegate its exploitation to his subjects. The peasants were supposed to use the land and to enjoy a portion of its produce, but other shares were to go to their supervisors and tax collectors, who initially were salaried state officials expected to remit all taxes in money or in kind to the imperial treasury. By the 18th century, however, tax collectors were frequently assigned portions of land as **tax farms** (*iltizam*), for which they paid a fixed sum to the Ottoman treasury and were entitled to keep whatever they could collect, an obvious incentive to extortion. Many peasants fled from their farms. Tax payments were often not assessed on households, but rather on villages, imposing hardships on those peasants who continued to cultivate their lands. The tax farmers (*multazim*) were often **Mamluks**, Egypt's military aristocracy; however, some were **ulama** or rich peasants. Some tax farms were turned into hereditary property (*malikane*), and one-fifth of all cultivated land had become Muslim or Coptic *awqaf*.

The **French occupation** was too brief to affect the land tenure system. However, **Muhammad Ali** reasserted state control over the

land, first by establishing a government monopoly over grain **trade** in 1808, then by ordering a cadastral survey in 1813–14, and then by abolishing the *iltizam* system. New cadastral surveys in the 1820s increased the state's ability to tax lands and to control their use. At the height of his power, Muhammad Ali effectively owned most of Egypt's arable lands. He began to make large land grants to relatives, high-ranking army officers, and his most trusted officials. **Ibrahim, Abbas, Sa'id, and Isma'il**, continued this devolution, creating most of Egypt's landholding aristocracy.

In 1855 Sa'id promulgated a land law that established the rights of private ownership, including inheritance and sale to other subjects or even to foreigners. Some lands were classified as *ushriyya*, subject to an annual tithe; most lands were *kharajiyya*, subject to the higher land tax called the *kharaj*. Peasants could establish ownership rights by cultivating a land parcel for five years and by obtaining a registration certificate from the *mudir*. Islamic inheritance laws, which require equal shares to all sons and half-shares to all daughters, usually fragment landholdings. Many peasants owned parcels that were too small or too scattered among others' lands to support a household. By the early 20th century most of Egypt's arable land was concentrated in the possession of members of the **khedivial** (later royal) family, absentee landowners who lived in **Cairo** or **Alexandria**, or foreign-owned land management companies (whose share of privately owned land peaked at 13.2 percent in 1910). Other lands, usually uncultivated, became part of the state domains. During this period, the Egyptian government distributed parts of these domains to graduates of the Agricultural College, but in general private landholdings became ever more concentrated in the royal household and a few wealthy families. Most peasants owned too little land to support their families; tenant farmers or wage laborers predominated in Egypt.

Many articulate Egyptians called for agrarian redistribution, but legislation was impossible as long as large landowners dominated the Parliament. Soon after the **1952 Revolution**, the **RCC** enacted its famous **land reform** that limited the maximum holding to 200 **feddans** per individual. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** regime tried to redistribute large estates to landless peasants, but it could never equalize landholdings or break completely the power of the large landowners. The trend under **Anwar al-Sadat** was to restore estates that had been taken from their owners for political reasons. Egypt is still

characterized by wide disparities in the quantity and quality of the land owned by its citizens.

LANE, EDWARD WILLIAM (1801–76). **British** Arabic scholar. Although trained as an engraver, he was fascinated by Egypt and went there in 1825 to explore the country and to write a book on its ancient monuments. He became increasingly interested in the modern inhabitants of the country, settled in **Cairo** for three years, and wrote a pioneer ethnographic study entitled *An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*. He later translated the *Thousand and One Nights* from Arabic into English and compiled an Arabic-English dictionary in eight volumes, a project that he did not live to complete. His *Description of Egypt*, never printed in his lifetime, has been published by the AUC Press.

LAVON AFFAIR. **Israeli** political scandal that originated in a botched attempt in 1954 to damage Egypt's relations with the **United States** by hiring Egyptian **Jews** to plant explosives in the U.S. Information Agency Libraries in **Alexandria** and **Cairo** and also in a movie theater. The agents were arrested, tried, and sentenced to death or imprisonment early in 1955. The sentences may have caused **Israel's** raid on **Gaza** that February, leading eventually to the **Suez War**.

LAW SCHOOL, GOVERNMENT. Main law school in **Cairo**, which has had during its history several names, locations, and affiliations. The parent institutions were the School of Languages and Translation, formed in 1836 by **Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi**, and the short-lived School of Administration. These institutions lapsed and were revived under **Isma'il** in 1868, becoming the **Khedivial** School of Law in 1886. Up to 1907 French administrators ran the school, a re-doubt of **France's** educational influence, even as English language instruction came to prevail in the primary and secondary schools. The replacement of its able French director by a mediocre English one became a nationalist and diplomatic cause célèbre, but the school had British directors until 1923, during which time it taught in English, though Egypt's courts used mainly French and Arabic.

Ali Mahir became its first Egyptian director, the school was assimilated in 1925 into **Cairo University**, and French and Arabic became its languages of instruction. European, especially French,

professors dominated the Law Faculty until after **World War II**, although French-trained Egyptians also entered the faculty. The Cairo school also spawned satellite educational institutions in **Alexandria** in 1938 and in **Heliopolis**, which would later be incorporated respectively into the **Universities of Alexandria** and **Ain Shams**. Following the French system, the social sciences were taught under the aegis of law, and legal studies were highly theoretical. New graduates learned the practical side of the legal profession by working as *stagiaires* in the offices of established attorneys. Students tended to come from upper-class backgrounds, and many had the advantage of graduating from French-language lycées, equipping them better intellectually and linguistically for their studies than graduates of government schools.

Law students played a central role in the national movement from the inception of the **National Party**; they organized the first great student strike in 1906, helped to lead the **1919 Revolution**, and participated in every major demonstration thereafter. Although the **1952 Revolution** suspended parliamentary democracy for a while and hence reduced the political role of lawyers, the number of students enrolled in law faculties of Egypt's national universities continued to increase far beyond the market for their services. In modern times Egyptian law graduates, notably **Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri**, have greatly influenced the development of secular law and legal **education** in other Arab countries.

LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, *see* **ARAB LEAGUE**.

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY. Legislature set up under the 1913 **Organic Law**. During its brief existence in 1914, its elected vice president, **Sa'd Zaghlul**, emerged as a leading critic of the Egyptian government, a portent of his role in the **1919 Revolution**.

LESSEPS, FERDINAND DE (1805–94). French diplomat and entrepreneur, the creator of the **Suez Canal**. Born in Versailles, the son of a French consul who had earlier served in Egypt, he was educated at the Lycée Napoléon (Collège Henri IV). After briefly studying law, he became an apprentice consul, working for his uncle in Lisbon and later for his father in Tunis. In 1832 he was appointed vice-consul in **Alexandria**, where he got to know most of the leading European and Muslim inhabitants, learned Arabic, and explored the country-

side on horseback. During this time he met Prince **Sa'id**, then an adolescent under strict orders from his father, **Muhammad Ali**, to lose weight. Lesseps befriended the boy, fed him macaroni anyway, taught him French, and took him riding; years later the friendship would serve Lesseps well. In 1838 he was transferred to Holland and then to various consulates in Spain. During the 1840s he became attracted to the doctrines of **Saint-Simon**, including the idea of building a canal across the Isthmus of Suez. Betrayed by Louis Napoléon's Second Republic while he was its consul in Rome, Lesseps suffered public disgrace and resigned from the French foreign service. He then returned to his pursuit of the Suez Canal.

The violent death of **Abbas I** and succession of Lesseps's friend Sa'id as viceroy of Egypt caused him to hasten back to Alexandria. He renewed his friendship with the new ruler and wrote him a memorandum on the advantages of a maritime canal joining the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. Easily convinced of the merits of the project, Sa'id announced the Suez Canal as his own decision to an assemblage of foreign consuls. It took just five days for Lesseps to draft a formal agreement, by which Sa'id granted the **Suez Canal Company** a 99-year concession to build and operate the projected waterway. Permission from the **Ottoman** sultan, which Sa'id had set as a prerequisite, proved hard to get, and although merchants in London (as elsewhere) saw the advantages of the canal project to world shipping, the British government opposed the Suez Canal. French Emperor Napoléon III, allied with **Britain** in the Crimean War, also resisted the project at first.

For a while even Sa'id turned against the project and refused to meet with Lesseps. Only belatedly did those governments support the project, well after the work had begun. Although Lesseps persuaded many capitalists to invest in his company, the capital requirements of building the canal exceeded his estimates, and Sa'id had to commit large sums from his own pocket, shares that were assumed by the Egyptian government when Sa'id died and was succeeded by his nephew, **Isma'il**.

As construction began, British and other hostile observers noted the reliance on Egyptian **corvée** labor and persuaded the Ottoman government to pressure Egypt to pay the workers, further raising construction costs. Fortunately for Lesseps, the excavating machine had just become economically feasible. He also had ties through his wife to the French Empress Eugénie, who influenced her husband to

back him. Napoléon III arbitrated the *corvée* issue between the Canal Company and the Egyptian government, arranging a settlement by which Egypt paid 84 million francs (\$17 million) as compensation for the loss of *corvée* labor, just as Lesseps was finding new machinery less costly than his lost conscripts. British efforts to obtain Ottoman intervention to block this settlement failed after the grand vizier was suddenly relieved of a personal debt to a Paris bank. Construction went on despite Anglo–French diplomatic rivalry and a **cholera** epidemic in Egypt. Once the French National Assembly passed an act authorizing the Company to issue preferred shares, Lesseps could assure everyone that the Suez Canal would be opened by 1869. The **khedive** planned an extravaganza that included visits from many European heads of state, much development in **Cairo**, and several months of feasting and ceremonies.

The canal began operation, with Lesseps heading the company that he had founded. His hope that the governments of the world would buy shares, making his enterprise truly international, was never realized, but the Egyptian government's slide into near bankruptcy in 1875 enabled Britain to buy its shares at a bargain rate, with Lesseps's blessing. But his own power waned, especially after **Tawfiq** replaced Isma'il in 1879, and he failed to stop British troops from invading Egypt via the canal in 1882 to quell **Ahmad Urabi's** movement. His efforts to recapture some of his earlier glory by organizing the construction of a canal across Panama led to financial scandals in Paris and further disgrace. A man of boundless energy and vision, Lesseps's hope that the Suez Canal would benefit Egypt was never realized, and most Egyptians now view him as the archetypal exploiter of their country.

LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALIST PARTY. Egypt's largest political rival to the **Wafd Party** between 1922 and 1952. It originated when a political organization, *Jam'iyyat Misr al-mustaqilla* (Society of Independent Egypt), was formed to back **Adli Yakan** against **Sa'd Zaghlul** during his negotiations with **British** Foreign Minister George Curzon. The society also backed **Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat** when he succeeded Adli as premier. After one of its leaders, Hafiz Afifi, received a license to publish *al-Siyasa* as its journalistic organ, Adli's backers decided to transform the society into a political party, drawing heavily on surviving members of the 1913 **Legislative Assembly**. The first meeting of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party was

held in October 1922. Like the prewar **Umma Party**, it called for constitutional government and rejected **pan-Islam**, but its published principles tended to be vague.

Led by Adli Yakan, **Muhammad Mahmud**, and finally **Muhammad Husayn Haykal**, its main supporters were large landowners, provincial notables, and intellectuals. It cooperated with the Wafd between 1925 and 1928 in opposing the Palace and between 1930 and 1935 in rejecting the **1930 Constitution**, but at other times it formed coalition cabinets with supporters of Kings **Fuad I** and **Faruq**. Some of its members defected in 1930–35 to the **Ittihad** and **Sha'b** Parties, but the Liberal Constitutionalists regained popularity after the fall of the **Isma'il Sidqi** and Palace **cabinets**. The party boycotted the March 1942 elections, which were won by the Wafd. It joined **Ahmad Mahir's** coalition government and took part in the January 1945 elections, boycotted by the Wafd and won by the **Sa'dist Party**. Liberal Constitutionalists also held cabinet posts under **Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi**, **Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi**, and **Husayn Sirri**. The party was dissolved and its assets seized after the **1952 Revolution**. Some of its members were later tried, and all who had held public office since 1942 were deprived of their political and civil rights for 10 years. In the 1923–52 period of Egypt's history, it came close to becoming a fourth force after the "power triangle" of king, Wafd, and British, but it enjoyed little popular support.

LIBERAL PARTY. Right-wing group formed in 1978 as the Socialist Liberal Organization, following **Anwar al-Sadat's Party Reforms**. Led by Mustafa Kamil Murad, a rich **cotton** broker who had led the Federation of Chambers of Commerce during the 1970s, it appealed to the *munfatihin*, the beneficiaries of Sadat's *infatih*, and had won 12 seats as the right-wing *minbar* in the 1976 elections. Backed by large landowners and a few professionals, the party called for selling off state-owned companies, ending subsidies, and seeking unrestricted foreign **investment**. It later moved closer to the **Muslim Brothers** and the **SLP**, forming the **Islamic Alliance** that won 60 seats in the **1987 elections**. It boycotted the **1990 elections**, but did enter the **1995 elections**. It has a weekly newspaper, *al-Ahrar*.

LIBERATION PROVINCE. Experimental land-reclamation area, near **Alexandria**, started in 1953 under the leadership of one of the **Free Officers**, Majdi Hasanayn, who hoped to make it a socialist show-

case, organizing resettled peasants into cooperative work teams and housing them in 12 model villages. The plan was to reclaim 1.2 million **feddans**, financing the initial stages by selling confiscated royal properties. In practice, of the first 25 thousand people settled there by the government, all but 2 thousand worked in construction and manufacturing, **industry** being favored over **agriculture**.

In 1957 the project was absorbed by the agriculture ministry, where **Sayyid Mar'i** began redistributing its lands to small peasant proprietors between 1957 and 1961. Of the 800 thousand **feddans** of sandy desert soil to be reclaimed, only some 25 thousand were under cultivation in 1959, at a reported government expenditure of £E25–30 million, due in part to faulty planning and mismanagement. Only 389 families had been accepted as settlers. Another Free Officer, Abd al-Muhsin Abd al-Nur, took charge of the project in 1961 and resumed the policy of collective ownership of reclaimed land, mainly in the northern sector, up to 1967. Meanwhile, an American company reclaimed 14 thousand and an Italian consulting-engineering firm reclaimed 37,600 feddans in the southern sector, whose management was entrusted to a state authority. The **Soviets** agreed to reclaim large parts of the Western Desert and to build a 10 thousand feddan model farm in the northern sector. Peasant settlers were organized into **cooperatives**, but nearly all administrative direction came from the state. Shortly before his death, **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** acknowledged that the project had failed.

Under **Anwar al-Sadat**, 20 to 30 feddan lots of the reclaimed lands were assigned to graduates from the agriculture faculties of the various national universities, and smaller lots were given to former employees of the state authority. The state farms were privatized, starting in 1976, and the government also tried in 1984 to bring in agribusiness firms to manage part of the southern sector. Three such firms, all capitalized by oil-exporting Arab countries, were reported to be in operation as of 1987. Egypt's large **investment** in land reclamation, infrastructure, and employees has not yet been justified by the lands reclaimed or the number of peasants resettled there.

LIBERATION RALLY. Organization formed in 1953 by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** to mobilize Egyptian supporters for his policies and to replace the outlawed political parties. It co-opted a few labor groups, such as the **Cairo** Transport Workers **Union**, which aided Nasir's

1954 struggle against **Muhammad Najib**. Its most visible activity was to organize popular demonstrations for the regime; it played no role in formulating major government policies. Under the **1956 Constitution**, it was replaced by the **National Union**.

LIBERATION SQUARE (*MIDAN AL-TAHRIR*). Major open area in **Cairo**, east of the **Nile River**, developed during the reigns of **Sa'id** and **Isma'il**, who built several palaces and government offices on its periphery. Called Midan Isma'il until 1954, it was the site of the **Qasr al-Nil Barracks**, where **Ahmad Urabi** first challenged the **Turco-Circassian** officers in 1881 and where **British** troops were billeted from 1882 to 1947. The barracks' site was later used for the Nile Hilton Hotel and the **Arab League** Headquarters. The **Egyptian Museum** bounds the square on the north and the **Mujamma'** and the **Umar Makram Mosque** on its south. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government used the square as a symbol for his modernization projects. Although officially renamed for **Anwar al-Sadat** after his assassination in 1981, the change never gained popular acceptance, but the central **Metro** station bears his name.

LIBYA. Egypt's relations with its western neighbor have often been troubled. The first attempt to set Egypt's western border appears in the *firman* sent to **Muhammad Ali** by the **Ottoman Empire** in 1841. Its demarcation excluded both the coastal village of Sollum and the Siwa Oasis from Egyptian territory; in fact, however, both were treated as parts of Egypt in the 19th century. The Italian invasion of Tripoli in 1911 and subsequently of Cyrenaica angered many Muslim Egyptians, but **Kitchener** barred transit of Ottoman soldiers and matériel across Egypt. Italy could not quell the resistance of the Sanusi **Sufis**, who enjoyed some Egyptian support. During **World War I** the Sanusis invaded Egypt's Western Desert, but were repelled by the British. In 1922 the Sanusi leader, Idris (who would later become king of independent Libya), took refuge in Egypt and stayed there until 1951, but the Sanusi rebellion against the Italians continued through the 1920s. At Italy's insistence, Egypt agreed in December 1925 to cede the Jaghbug Oasis (a Sanusi stronghold) to Libya and to form a joint boundary commission, which fixed the Egyptian-Libyan border in 1926.

During **World War II** the British, as well as the Egyptians, encouraged the Sanusiyya to rebel against Italian rule. Libya

served as a base for the Italians in 1941 and then the German Afrikakorps to invade Egypt, but the Allies successfully stopped the Axis at **al-Alamayn** in October 1942. British forces subsequently captured Libya and established a temporary government there; it was later placed under UN trusteeship, leading to formal independence in 1951. Egypt's relations with the Kingdom of Libya under Idris (r. 1951–69) were correct but not friendly, due mainly to **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** policy of **Arab nationalism**.

The major turning point was the 1 September 1969 revolution that ousted King Idris and brought Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi to power. An ardent Arab nationalist, Qadhafi pledged his support for Nasir and for the struggle against **Israel**. Soon after **Anwar al-Sadat** succeeded to the presidency, he entered into unity talks with Libya, leading in 1971 to the **Federation of Arab Republics**, which would have provided for an organic Egyptian–Libyan union. Due to Qadhafi's nationalist zeal, however, the federation and union were postponed and finally canceled in 1973, shortly before the **October War**, about which Qadhafi received no advance warning. By July 1977 Egyptian–Libyan relations had deteriorated to the point of border warfare. Skirmishes escalated to air raids and attacks by Egyptian paratroopers on Jaghbug. Both sides claimed victory, and neither one published its casualty figures, but the brief war may have hastened Sadat's peace initiative toward Israel.

An added factor in Egyptian–Libyan relations has been the presence of many Egyptian professional and manual workers in Libya due to its oil industry; some were expelled due to the border war or the **Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty**, but many Egyptians have continued to migrate to Libya, which needs their skills but uses their presence as a means of putting pressure on the Egyptian government. Libya has assailed Egypt's close ties with the **United States**, especially after the latter bombarded Tripoli in April 1986, and the Egyptian government accused Libya of harboring terrorists. More recently, **Husni Mubarak** and Qadhafi have met, the two countries have restored diplomatic relations, and Egyptian and Libyan flights resumed in July 2000 between the two countries.

LIQUIDATION, LAW OF (1880). Egyptian government statute formally proposed by **Mustafa Riyad's** cabinet at the behest of the main European creditor governments and drafted by the **Dual Control**. The controllers reorganized the Egyptian public debt, setting a

budget that would balance the demands of Egypt's creditors against the country's needs and creating a sinking fund for the eventual liquidation of the debt, assuming that the controllers would have indefinite responsibility for managing Egyptian state finances. They had no means of enforcing their plans, however, and the rise to power of **Ahmad Urabi** and the Egyptian nationalist army officers in 1881–82 proved to the Europeans that only military intervention would ensure that the Egyptian government paid its debts. During the **British occupation** the *Caisse de la Dette Publique* tried to enforce portions of the Liquidation Law, blocking British attempts to institute **irrigation** or other economic reforms.

LITERACY. The ability to read and write, although highly prized by Islamic culture, has long lagged in Egypt, especially in the countryside and among girls and **women**. This regrettable situation is due in part to the neglect of basic instruction under **Muhammad Ali** and his successors, who aimed at creating a technocratic elite (*see Education*), and to the inadequate attention to state-controlled education under the **British occupation**. At the time of the **1952 Revolution**, fewer than 50 percent of all primary-school-aged children were enrolled, and nearly 75 percent of the population over 10 years of age was illiterate. The **Free Officers** abolished all school fees and greatly increased government spending on education, but as recently as 1999 only 55 percent of Egypt's adult population could read.

LITERATURE, PROSE. Although Arabic-speaking peoples place a high store on the ability to compose and recite **poetry**, most of their literary output was and is in prose. The highest model, for many Arabs, is the Quran, which is written in a type of rhymed prose called *saj'*, hence many books until quite recently were given titles and contained passages written in rhymed prose, notably the *maqamat*. Up to the late 19th century, most prose writers tried to use an ornate style, known as *badi'*, that stressed manner over matter, elegance over content. **Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti** wrote a prose chronicle of Egypt's history that included descriptions of the **French occupation** and the rise of **Muhammad Ali**. Another early modern writer, **Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi**, composed an account of his sojourn in **France** and later published essays on **education** and social reform.

Ali Mubarak wrote a detailed description of Egypt and also an amusing commentary on the confrontation of Eastern and West-

ern cultures, a staple of later Egyptian fiction writers. The introduction of journalism expanded the opportunities for writers and changed the nature of prose writing itself, leading to a style that was more concise and direct and closer to the vernacular language of the people. Early journalist pioneers include **Muhammad Abduh**, **Sa'd Zaghlul**, **Shaykh Ali Yusuf**, **Mustafa Kamil**, **Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid**, **Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Jawish**, and **Mahmud Abu al-Fath**. The power of journalism made the essay, usually a commentary on some current political or social issue, the prevalent literary form of the early 20th century.

Although a few works of imaginative fiction came out earlier, Egypt's first novel was **Muhammad Husayn Haykal's Zaynab**, published in 1914. The short story spread more rapidly as an art form because of the plethora of monthly and weekly magazines; only in the 1930s did the Arabic novel emerge as a respected genre, after **Ibrahim Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini's** success with *Ibrahim al-katib*. **Tawfiq al-Hakim** wrote several novels about rural life, including *Awdat al-ruh* (Return of the Spirit). **Taha Husayn**, who was already notorious for his scholarly critique of pre-Islamic poetry, developed the literary autobiography as another prose genre, starting with his *al-Ayyam*, published serially in *al-Hilal* in 1926–27 and in book form in 1928. The influence of **Pharaonism** inspired various novels, short stories, and plays dealing with ancient Egypt, at times as a vehicle for indirectly criticizing corrupt or oppressive rulers.

One novelist who began his career writing what he hoped would be a long series of historical novels after the pattern of Sir Walter Scott was **Najib Mahfuz**, who later wrote a trilogy chronicling the life of a **Cairo** family between 1910 and 1950, for which he won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1988. His later novels expressed disillusionment with the promises of the **1952 Revolution**. Other writers, like **Abd al-Rahman Sharqawi** and **Yusuf Idris**, wrote novels about the problems of the rural poor from a more **Marxist** perspective. Some of the best fiction writing has satirized either the cultural confrontation between Egypt and the West or the foibles of the rich or politically powerful. Nonfiction writing still includes literary or political essays, the latter being somewhat limited by **censorship**.

Some of the writings of **Nawal al-Sa'dawi** on issues related to **women** or sex have antagonized the government, and lately a censorship board of **al-Azhar** has blocked the publication of both fic-

tion and nonfiction works that it deems contrary to **religion** or to public morals. **Islamist** propaganda has led to the assassination of the controversial secularist **Faraj Fawda** and to an attempt on the life of Najib Mahfuz. Most Egyptians feel that the quality, and certainly the quantity, of Arabic prose literature, notably in journalism, has fallen off in recent years.

AL-LIWA. Daily **newspaper** founded in 1900 by **Mustafa Kamil**, becoming the **National Party** organ in 1907. Its sharp attacks on the **British occupation** won widespread backing from Egyptian students and young intellectuals, and it attained a daily circulation of 15 thousand by 1908, the highest in Egypt at the time. Edited by Mustafa Kamil until his death in 1908, it was then briefly taken over by his brother, but the National Party's executive board named **Abd al-Aziz Jawish** as its editor. His attacks on the Egyptian ministers and their British advisers soon led to legal actions and then to the revival of the 1881 **Press Law**, under which it received two warnings. The party's control of *al-Liwa* was challenged in the **Mixed Courts** by Mustafa Kamil's heirs, who won their case in February 1910. It was placed under judicial sequestration. Although it still came out, it was superseded for two years by *al-Alam*. Restored to the National Party in March 1912, it was suppressed by the Egyptian government in September under the amended Press Law. The Nationalists then used *al-Sha'b* as their daily newspaper up to **World War I**, when it voluntarily ceased publication.

LIWA AL-ISLAM. Name of two Egyptian Muslim magazines, of which the more recent is the government-approved weekly published since 1982. Its 1999 circulation was 30 thousand.

LLOYD, Lord GEORGE AMBROSE (1879–1941). **British high commissioner** from 1925 to 1929. He was educated at Eton and at Trinity College, Cambridge. After a few years working in business, he became an honorary attaché in Istanbul and then headed a commission to inquire into future **British trade** with the **Ottoman Empire** and the Persian Gulf. Elected to the House of Commons as a Conservative in 1910, he traveled during recesses to Europe and the Middle East. He held various staff positions during **World War I**, serving briefly at Gallipoli in 1915 and Basra in 1916. Lloyd was later attached to the Arab Bureau, where he came to know many of

the Arab leaders. He then served for five years as governor of the Bombay presidency, improving housing and irrigation, but also curbing nationalist agitation. He again won a seat in the 1924 parliamentary elections, but in the following year he agreed to become high commissioner for Egypt and the **Sudan**, replacing Lord **Edmund Allenby**. Lloyd tried to establish firm control over Egyptian affairs, but the foreign office criticized his policies and undermined his position by negotiating in 1927 with **Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat** for a treaty. When a Labour government took power in 1929, the new foreign secretary obliged him to resign. Lloyd then served on the boards of several companies, spoke out strongly in favor of imperial causes, and took charge of the British Council in 1937. His views on rearmament, collective security, and Indian policy agreed with those of Winston Churchill, under whom he returned to official life in 1940 as colonial secretary. An idealistic and resolute statesman, his devotion to British imperialism rendered him unsympathetic to Egyptian national aspirations.

LONDON, CONVENTION OF (1840). Treaty between Austria, **Britain**, Prussia, **Russia**, and the **Ottoman Empire**, in which they offered to **Muhammad Ali** and his heirs control over Egypt and the province of Acre (roughly what is now **Israel**), provided that he agreed within 10 days to withdraw from the rest of **Syria** and returned to the sultan the Ottoman fleet, which had defected to **Alexandria**. The European powers agreed to use all possible means of persuasion to effect this agreement, but Muhammad Ali, backed by **France**, refused. British and Austrian forces then attacked Acre, defeating his troops late in 1840. Muhammad Ali finally accepted the terms of the Convention and the *firman*s subsequently issued by the sultan, confirming his rule over Egypt and the **Sudan**. He withdrew from **Syria** and Crete and sent back the Ottoman fleet. The London Convention and the *firman*s were the legal basis for Egypt's status as a privileged Ottoman province. Later nationalists cited them to discredit claims for the **British occupation**.

LORRAINE, Sir PERCY (1880–1961). **British high commissioner** from 1929 to 1933. Educated at Eton and New College, Oxford, he fought in the Boer War, then entered the diplomatic corps in 1904. He served in a number of Near Eastern and European posts before he became high commissioner for Egypt and the **Sudan** in 1929. How-

ever, his policy of letting King **Fuad I** dominate his ministers led the foreign office to remove him in 1933. He then was sent to Ankara, where he developed close ties with Kemal Atatürk.

LUTFI, ALI (1935–). Economist, politician, minister, and banker. Born in **Cairo**, he was educated at **Ain Shams** and Lausanne Universities. Appointed to the Commerce Faculty at Ain Shams in 1957, he became chair of its economics department in 1980. He also served as a part-time professor in the Higher Institute of Cooperative and Administrative Studies and the Institute for Arab Studies and Research in Cairo. He sat on the board of directors of the Bank of Alexandria (1977–78) and of the Bank for Commerce and Development since 1981. Appointed **finance** minister in 1977, he served as prime minister in 1985–86 and has since then been speaker of *Majlis al-Shura*. He is the author of many books and research papers on economic **planning** and development.

LUXOR. City in Upper Egypt, famous for its Pharaonic temple, **tourist** hotels, and proximity to other ancient Egyptian temples and tombs, including that of **Tutankamon**. It has recently become Egypt's 27th governorate, with a population estimated at 412,300 in 2002 and a land area of 55 km².

LUXOR INCIDENT (1997). **Terrorist** act in which six members of *Jama'a al-Islamiyya* killed 58 foreign tourists (mainly Germans, Japanese, and Swiss) and four Egyptians at Queen Hatshepsut's Temple across the **Nile River** from **Luxor**. The *Jama'a* later claimed that its leaders had not approved the attack, although it supported their agenda to topple **Husni Mubarak's** regime by striking at the **tourism** industry. As a result the government cracked down on suspected terrorists, and the Egyptian public turned against the **Islamists**. Egypt's tourist industry, which normally brings in \$4 billion annually, suffered great losses after the attack, but recovered by the summer of 1998.

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MA'ADI. A planned green suburb 15 km south of **Cairo** developed at the beginning of the 20th century. Its name is derived from the

Arabic word for the ferry that once crossed the **Nile River** near that location. The original community was laid out by the Delta Land Company (DLC) on 434 **feddans** purchased from the **Jewish Mosseri** family in 1905. The DLC had been incorporated in 1904 by a group of Egyptian Jewish financiers, notably the Cattau, Manashe, and Suares families. The first houses were built in 1908, followed by a station erected on the Delta Light Railways line the next year. By 1910 a road also connected Ma'adi with Cairo. The town plan, an English one, had avenues radiating diagonally from a series of interconnected squares. The entire network was overlaid with interconnecting vertical and horizontal streets. This layout simplified the development of sewage and water lines. A few streets were initially named for the king and company directors' families, but most of the streets were numbered. The community had to conform to strict construction guidelines that limited building heights to 15 meters. Fences could not be more than two meters high, and it was required that half of any given plot be devoted to landscaping. Wall colors were also prescribed. Specific types of trees (poinciana, jacaranda and casuarinas) were planted to provide windbreaks and protection from blowing sand.

Ma'adi was originally populated by a large expatriate community of wealthy English, Scots, and Swiss as well as the original Jewish settlers. The community grew from seven houses in 1908, to 32 in 1911, and 269 in 1935. Various religious and educational institutions were built to serve the community, including the St. John the Baptist Church in 1930, the Meyr Yehuda Biton Synagogue in 1934, and the Faruq al-Awwal Mosque in 1939.

The Cairo branch of **Victoria College** was built in 1950. In addition to its permanent Egyptian and expatriate residents, Ma'adi hosted thousands of Australian troops during **World War I** and New Zealanders during **World War II**. After the **1952 Revolution**, the DLC was nationalized. In recent years additional development has extended Ma'adi's bounds well beyond its original borders and those of neighboring Digla. Apartment buildings surround the community. Indeed, many of the original villas have been replaced by low- and high-rise apartment blocks, flagrantly violating the original 15-meter-height limits. Despite these changes, however, its green squares and tree-lined streets still make Ma'adi one of the most attractive residential communities for well-to-do expatriates and Egyptians alike.

MAHANNA, RASHAD (1918–). Army officer, nationalist and participant in the **1952 Revolution**, although he was not a member of the **Free Officers**. Mahanna entered the **Military Academy** prior to the liberalization of entrance requirements that admitted most of the future revolutionaries. He was part of a group of 18 officers led by Col. Mustafa Kamal Sidqi and arrested in 1947 in a plot to assassinate the chief-of-staff. He was invited to join the Free Officers, but preferred not to become a member. He did participate in their meetings and was one of the opposition board members elected to the Officers Club in December 1951. He was called upon at the last minute during the coup and successfully enlisted artillery units in support of the Revolution. Although many of the Free Officers suspected his connections with the **Muslim Brothers**, they put him on the Regency Council in July 1952 along with Prince Abd al-Mun'im and Bahi al-Din Barakat. He was dismissed from the council and arrested in January 1953 when he was implicated in a plot against the **RCC**. Sentenced to life in prison, his sentence was commuted to house arrest and then ended in 1967.

MAHDI. For educated Muslims, the *mahdi* is the divinely guided leader who will come to restore justice on earth shortly before the Day of Judgment; in popular **Islam**, the *mahdi* is viewed as a messiah. For Egyptians and Sudanese, “the Mahdi” usually connotes Muhammad Ahmad (1848–85), who became convinced that he had a mission to cleanse the world of the immorality that he ascribed to the rulers of the day. He led a rebellion against Egyptian rule in the **Sudan** from 1881, gaining popular support throughout the country and defeating British expeditions headed by William Hicks in 1883 and by General **Charles Gordon** in 1884–85. He tried to organize a government modeled after that of the early Islamic *umma* but died in Omdurman soon after he and his followers captured Khartum in 1885. Some of his descendants later led the Sudanese political party opposing union with Egypt.

MAHFUZ, NAJIB (1911–). Novelist and playwright, winner of the 1988 Nobel Prize for **Literature**. Born in **Cairo**, he graduated from **Cairo University**'s Faculty of Arts in 1934 with a degree in philosophy, worked as a secretary in the University from 1936 to 1939, then at the ministry of *awqaf* from 1939 to 1954, when he was appointed director of technical supervision at the culture ministry; and,

finally, served as director of the **Cinema** Organization. Mahfuz published his first story in 1932, his first collection of stories in 1938, and his first novel in 1939. After writing three historical novels on Pharaonic subjects that were disguised attacks on Egyptian politicians ruling under British tutelage, he published a number of novels about life in **Cairo**, notably *al-Qahira al-Jadida* (New Cairo), *Khan al-Khalili*, and *Zuqaq al-Midaqq* (published in English translation as *Midaq Alley* in 1966). He then wrote several other novels and film scripts followed in 1956–57 by his famous trilogy: *Bayn al-Qasrayn* (translated into English as *Palace Walk*), *Qasr al-Shawq* (*Palace of Desire*), and *al-Sukkariyya* (*Sugar Street*), portraying three generations of a Cairo family and the evolution of Egyptian politics, society, and culture in the 20th century.

In 1959 he published a controversial novel, *Awlad haratina* (translated as *Children of Gebelawi*), which treats Judaism, Christianity, and **Islam** in allegorical terms offensive to strict Muslims. His novel *Miramar*, written just before the **June War**, assailed the pretensions and shortcomings of **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** regime. A later work, *al-Maraya* (translated as *Mirrors*), contains 55 autobiographical sketches representing multiple viewpoints. His *al-Hubb taht al-matar* (Love in the Rain) shows the June war's impact on Egypt's youth. After the **October War**, Mahfuz was one of Egypt's first writers to call for peace with **Israel**, and his books were boycotted—but still read—by Arabs outside Egypt. His Nobel Prize, the first to be awarded to an Arab writer, recognized his success in expressing the Egyptian people's hopes and fears and in shaping classical Arabic into a vehicle of popular speech. He was assaulted and seriously injured by an **Islamist** in 1994.

MAHIR, AHMAD (1885–1945). Lawyer, **cabinet** minister, premier, and party leader. The son of a prominent landowning family famous for its nationalism, he earned his *license en droit* from Montpellier University and taught at the government **Law School**. He joined the **Wafd** during the **1919 Revolution** and was elected as a Wafdist to Parliament in 1924, briefly serving as **education** minister under **Sa'd Zaghlul**. Accused of backing a terrorist group involved in assassinating Sir **Lee Stack**, he left the government, but later won a seat in Parliament, serving as speaker in 1936.

His efforts to effect a reconciliation between young King **Faruq** and the Wafd led to his expulsion from the party. He and

Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi proceeded to set up the **Sa'dist Party**, which claimed to represent the principles of the Wafd's late founder. Their new movement soon sided with the king against the Wafd. Following the 1938 election, which the Wafd boycotted, the Sa'dists formed a coalition cabinet with the **Liberal Constitution- alists**, and Ahmad Mahir became **finance** minister. In 1940 he was again elected speaker of Parliament. After Faruq dismissed the Wafdist cabinet, led by **Mustafa al-Nahhas**, that had been forced on him by the British, Ahmad Mahir headed a coalition government from October 1944 until February 1945, when he was assassinated by a young nationalist (probably a member of *Misr al-Fatat*) just after he had won Parliament's endorsement for the Egyptian government's declaration of war against the Axis Powers. An honest and patriotic statesman, he was not politically close to his brother **Ali**.

MAHIR, ALI (1883–1960). Prominent politician, **cabinet** minister, and premier on four separate occasions. From a landowning family famous for its opposition to the **British**, he graduated from the government **Law School** and worked for a time in the *Niyaba* in Cairo. He joined the **Wafd** in 1919 but soon drifted into the court party surrounding Sultan (later King) **Fuad I**. Ali Mahir administered the Law School, chaired the assembly that drafted the **1923 Constitution**, and was elected to Parliament, as an independent, in 1924. At times when the **Wafd Party** was out of power, he held many cabinet portfolios, including **education** (1925–26), **finance** (1928–29), and justice (1930–32). He served as prime minister in early 1936 during the period when Egypt was resuming parliamentary government, as office director for both King Fuad (in 1935) and his son (in 1937), and as a member of the regency council in 1936–37, until King **Faruq** attained his majority. He formed a royalist government in August 1939, serving as both foreign and interior minister.

Although Mahir acquiesced in the expulsion of German and Austrian nationals from Egypt and the increase of the British garrison after the outbreak of **World War II**, he became increasingly anti-British and appointed nationalists to cabinet positions, causing the British to suspect him of secret contacts with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. He resigned in favor of **Hasan Sabri** in June 1940. When the British suspected that Faruq was about to reappoint him to head a neutralist cabinet in 1942, they forced the king

to appoint a Wafdist cabinet (*see* **4 February Incident**). Ali Mahir was kept under house arrest for the rest of the war. In January 1952 when **Black Saturday** led to **Mustafa al-Nahhas's** fall from power, he headed another royalist government. When the **Free Officers** ousted Faruq in July of that year, they asked him to form a civilian cabinet, but he soon resigned because he opposed their **land reform** law and other revolutionary ideas. He played no further role in Egyptian politics.

MAHIR [AL-SAYYID], AHMAD (1935–). Diplomat, ambassador, and foreign minister. Grandson of the **Sa'dist Party** leader of the same name, he was born in **Cairo** and earned a law degree from **Cairo University**. He later served as Egypt's ambassador to the Congo, **France**, Portugal, Belgium, **Russia**, and the **United States**, serving on the **Camp David** negotiating team in 1978. He was appointed foreign minister in place of **Amr Musa** in 2001 when the latter became secretary-general of the **Arab League**.

MAHMAL. Muslim ceremony marking the start of the annual procession carrying the *kiswa*, the embroidered cloth covering made in Egypt for the Ka'ba, from **Cairo** to Mecca. The ceremony developed under the **Mamluks** and continued under **Muhammad Ali** and his successors, but became a political issue between Egypt and **Saudi Arabia**, leading to its suspension between 1926 and 1936 and to its definitive abolition in 1962.

MAHMUD, MUHAMMAD (1877–1941). Politician, **cabinet** minister, and premier. Born in a village near **Asyut** to a wealthy, Upper Egyptian family, he was educated in **Asyut**, **Cairo**, and at Balliol College, Oxford. He held various administrative positions, becoming governor of Fayyum, the **Suez Canal** district, and Buhayra. He joined the **Wafd** during the **1919 Revolution** but soon broke with **Sa'd Zaghlul** and became one of the founders of the **Liberal Constitutionalist Party** in 1922, serving as its vice president and becoming its president in 1929. He first joined the cabinet in 1926, became **finance** minister in 1927, and premier in 1928–29. During his term of office, he reached a tentative agreement with the foreign office, but the **British** insisted on getting the approval of the **Wafd Party**, which demanded the restoration of parliamentary democracy under the **1923 Constitution**, so he resigned. He was a member of the coa-

lition of politicians that negotiated the 1936 **Anglo–Egyptian Treaty**. After King **Faruq** dismissed the Wafdist government in 1937, he formed a caretaker coalition cabinet. His party regained power in the 1938 elections that were boycotted by the Wafd, and he became prime minister in 1938–39. Intelligent, patriotic, but rather nervous, he tended to look down on rival politicians.

MAHMUDIYYA CANAL. Artificial waterway, built at **Muhammad Ali**'s command in 1817–20, as a navigation canal connecting **Alexandria** to **Bulaq**. Muhammad Ali relied on **corvée** labor to build the canal, peasants often showed up for work with ropes around their necks, and its construction took the lives of somewhere between 12 and 100 thousand laborers. In addition to promoting **river transport**, the canal irrigated about 10 thousand **feddans** of Delta land and brought additional drinking water to Alexandria. It has been dredged often and substantially improved.

MAJLIS AL-SHA'B, *see* **PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY**.

MAJLIS AL-SHURA. Consultative council or advisory body set up by **Anwar al-Sadat**, backed by a plebiscite in 1980, as the upper house of Egypt's Parliament. It was meant to counter opposition to Sadat's policies by the **SLP** in the lower house and to replace the **ASU** Central Committee. A third of its 210 members are supposed to be presidential appointees; the rest are popularly elected. All its elected members have so far been **NDP** members or independents.

MAKRAM, UMAR (1755–1811). Popular leader and *naqib al-ashraf* during the **French occupation**. Born in **Asyut** and educated at **al-Azhar**, he led a crowd of **Cairo** residents against **Napoléon Bonaparte**'s invasion. When their resistance failed, he escaped to al-Arish, then Jaffa, but after Napoléon captured these cities, Makram returned to Cairo. When the **Ottoman** army invaded Egypt from **Syria** in 1800 and threatened to oust the French, he led another popular uprising that lasted 37 days but collapsed after the Battle of **Heliopolis**. Umar escaped again and did not return until the British and Ottoman armies had expelled the French from Egypt. Upon returning to Cairo and resuming his duties as *naqib*, he backed **Muhammad Ali**'s rise to power but, when he demanded a voice in Egypt's affairs, was expelled to Damietta and four years later to

Tanta. He petitioned Muhammad Ali for permission to make the hajj to Mecca and, upon his return, resumed living in Cairo. Soon afterward, a small rebellion broke out. Muhammad Ali, suspecting Umar's involvement, expelled him again to Tanta, where he died. Egyptians view him as an early hero of their independence struggle.

MALET, Sir EDWARD (1837–1908). English diplomat and **Britain's** agent and consul general in Egypt from 1879 to 1883. He came from a family of diplomats and, after three years at Eton, entered the British foreign service when he was 17. After holding various posts, he served as minister plenipotentiary in Istanbul during 1878, the year of the San Stefano and Berlin treaties, forming close ties with **Ottoman** Sultan Abdulhamid. In October 1879 Malet was sent to Egypt, shortly after **Khedive Tawfiq** had succeeded his father, and negotiated for financial and administrative reforms. Initially sympathetic to **Ahmad Urabi's** demand for constitutional government, he insisted that Egypt must repay its public debts and sought Ottoman military intervention under European supervision; otherwise, he believed that joint Anglo–French action would be needed.

When riots broke out in **Alexandria** in May 1882, he refused asylum on a British warship and stayed in the city to try to restore confidence among the Europeans. He suddenly became gravely ill and had to leave to regain his health, but returned in time to accompany Sir **Garnet Wolseley** on his entry into **Cairo** in September 1882. He opposed executing Urabi and his associates. Malet then collaborated with Lord **Dufferin** in planning the reorganization of Egypt's government, but his health remained poor and he was replaced later in 1883 by Sir Evelyn Baring, later Lord **Cromer**. His incomplete memoirs were edited by Lord Sanderson after his death and published as *Egypt, 1879–1883*. He included a section on his Egyptian experiences in his general memoirs, *Shifting Scenes*. Ambitious and capable of influencing Tawfiq, he lacked the self-assurance and familiarity with Egypt needed to uphold British interests.

MAMLUKS. Turkish or **Circassian** slave soldiers, originally imported by the Ayyubid dynasty (1171–1250). They became a military oligarchy ruling over Egypt (1250–1517) and **Syria** (1260–1516) and retained power during the era of **Ottoman** rule in most of Egypt. Their factionalism and failure to resist **Napoléon Bonaparte's** inva-

sion in 1798 discredited them among Egyptians and, although restored to power by the **British** in 1802, they were weakened and finally exterminated by **Muhammad Ali** in 1811.

AL-MANAR. Influential monthly magazine founded by **Muhammad Abduh** and edited by **Rashid Rida**. Published in **Cairo** from 1898 to 1940, it advocated **Islamic** reform and circulated throughout the Muslim world.

AL-MARAGHI, [MUHAMMAD] MUSTAFA (1881–1945). Islamic scholar, reformer, and rector of **al-Azhar**. Born in Maragha (near Jirja), he was educated in **Cairo** and became a disciple of **Muhammad Abduh**. He entered the **Shari'a Court** judiciary, and served from 1908 to 1919 as the chief judge in the **Sudan**. He was named rector of al-Azhar in 1928–29 and from 1935 until his death. He influenced young King **Faruq**, encouraging his campaign for the caliphate. Maraghi wrote works on Quranic interpretation and a famous book about translating the Quran into foreign languages.

30 MARCH PROGRAM (1968). **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** promises to restive students and workers who demonstrated against the government in February 1968. While affirming Egypt's continuing commitment to Arabism and socialism, it called for the restructuring of the **ASU** through a system of successive, multilevel elections and for the drafting of a permanent constitution that would ensure workers' rights of political participation, guarantee individual freedom and security, define the branches of the government and their functions, stress the independence of the judiciary and the right to seek justice, and protect public, cooperative, and private property rights. Although these reforms were not fully implemented in Nasir's lifetime, some liberalization of the legal system, the curbing of the **Mukhabarat**, and work on what became the **1971 Constitution** did ensue.

MAR'I, SAYYID (1913–93). Landowning politician and **cabinet** minister. Originally from Sharqiyya province, he studied agricultural engineering at **Cairo University**, graduating in 1937. He became keenly interested in agrarian reforms, planning, and development and was first elected to Parliament in 1944 as a **Sa'dist**. After the **1952 Revolution** he advised **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government

about **land reform** and played a major role in formulating the program, becoming minister of state for agrarian reform in 1956. During the union with **Syria**, Mar'i was minister of **agriculture** and land reform. He was also on the executive committee of the **National Union** in 1956–61 and of the **ASU** from 1962, serving also as its secretary-general in 1971–73. He was agriculture and land reform minister from June 1967 and also deputy prime minister from November 1970 until December 1971. He was one of **Anwar al-Sadat**'s most trusted advisers and had close ties to his family through his son's marriage to Sadat's daughter. He was nominated to head the **UN Food and Agriculture Organization** but was not elected. He chaired the **People's Assembly** from 1974 to 1978 and then assisted and advised Sadat until the latter's assassination. Mar'i has been a political survivor, a large landowner dedicated to agrarian reform, and a man highly gifted in adjusting to the changing tides of power in the Egyptian government. His memoirs, entitled *Awraq siyasiyya* (Political Papers), were published in 1978–79.

MARIETTE, AUGUSTE (1821–81). French founder of Egypt's Antiquities Service, excavator of many archaeological sites, and organizer of the **Egyptian Museum**. Born in Boulogne-sur-Mer, he studied at the Collège de Boulogne and earned his *baccalauréat-ès-lettres* at Douai. Supporting himself as a French teacher, he became interested in ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics, which he taught himself. In 1849 he took a position at the Louvre Museum, where he transcribed all its inscriptions. Sent to Egypt to acquire **Coptic** manuscripts in 1850, he began excavating the Memphis Serapeum, where his discoveries made him famous.

In 1855 he became assistant curator of the Louvre's Egyptian department. He campaigned vigorously for the preservation of Egyptian monuments, which were rapidly being destroyed. At the same time he began many excavations of sites in the **Nile Valley**, eventually numbering 35 sites with more than 2,780 workers, maintaining high standards of **archaeological** workmanship. Mariette's numerous and prodigious publications could not encompass all of his discoveries, and many of his notes were destroyed when his **Cairo** house was flooded in 1878. He also helped to compose the libretto for *Aida*. After his death, his remains were interred in a sarcophagus now set in front of the **Egyptian Museum**.

MARXISM. Any socialist ideology that follows closely the teachings of Karl Marx. Due in part to the great inequality of incomes and living standards in Egypt, Marxist ideas appealed to an articulate minority of Egyptians in the 1940s and later influenced **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government, but never dominated **Arab socialism**, which sought to combine nationalist and Islamic ideas with a quest for economic equality and social justice. *See also* **Communism, Hadeto, Iskra, Socialism.**

MASPÉRO, GASTON (1846–1916). French Egyptologist. The son of Italian immigrants, he was born and educated in Paris, attending the Lycée Louis-le-Grand and the École Normale. He became professor of Egyptology at the École des Hautes Études and then at the Collège de France in 1874. He went to **Cairo** six years later as director of an expedition that transformed itself into the Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale. In 1881 he succeeded **Auguste Mariette** as director of the **Egyptian Museum** and of the Antiquities Service. He returned to **France** in 1886 but came back in 1899 to resume direction of the Antiquities Service, which he did much to develop in the next 15 years. Among his 1,200 publications are the *Cairo Catalogue*, *Histoire ancienne des peuples d'Orient*, and *Egypt: Ancient Sites and Modern Scenes*.

AL-MAZINI, IBRAHIM ABD AL-QADIR (1889–1949). Humorous writer, literary critic, and modernist poet. Born in **Cairo**, his family traced its origins to the Minufiyya village of Kum Mazin. Trained as a teacher, he soon left pedagogy for journalism. He was especially gifted at translation from English to Arabic. He wrote Arabic **poetry** for a while, then shifted to prose after reading widely in English and Arabic **literature**. He worked for *al-Akhbar*, *al-Balagh*, and other daily **newspapers**; wrote articles for weekly and monthly magazines; and briefly published his own review, *al-Ussu'*. Mazini belonged to the **Arabic Language Academies** of both Damascus and Cairo. His *Ibrahim al-Katib* has been translated by Majdi Wahba into English as *Ibrahim the Writer* (1976). William Hutchins translated several of his short stories, with an introduction, in *Al-Mazini's Egypt* (1983). His poetry was deeply subjective, at times derivative from classical Arabic or English models, but moving and amusing.

MCCMAHON, Sir [ARTHUR] HENRY (1862–1949). **British** officer, imperial administrator, and **high commissioner** for Egypt and the **Sudan**. Born in Simla (India) to a military family, he was educated at Haileybury and the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, where he was the top 1882 graduate. He held a series of military and diplomatic posts in India. At the start of **World War I**, when **Kitchener** took charge of the war office and **Britain** proclaimed a **Protectorate** over Egypt and the Sudan, McMahon was named the first British high commissioner. He managed to maintain order in a troubled time, as two attempts were made on the life of Sultan **Husayn Kamil**, the reservists rioted, and thousands of troops from all parts of the British Empire occupied Egypt. He is best known for the Husayn–McMahon Correspondence, his exchange of letters with Sharif Husayn of Mecca, in which he is thought to have guaranteed that the sharif's family, the Hashimites, would rule over Palestine, **Syria**, and **Iraq** once they had overthrown **Ottoman** rule there during the war. He was recalled suddenly at the end of 1916. An enthusiastic sportsman and a great conversationalist, McMahon knew little about Egypt and its needs.

MENOU, JACQUES “ABDALLAH” (1750–1810). French general and successor to **Napoléon Bonaparte** and **Jean-Baptiste Kléber** as commander of **France's** Army of Egypt. The son of an officer, he rose through the ranks and in 1798 joined the Army of the Orient (Egypt) and became governor of Rosetta and then **Alexandria**. He fervently upheld France's imperial mission in Egypt. He acquired notoriety by marrying a Muslim Egyptian woman and converting to **Islam**. Upon succeeding Kléber in 1800, Menou was defeated by the **British**. After his return to France, he held several political and military posts in Napoléon's empire. He was widely ridiculed during his lifetime for his stout, unmartial appearance, his conversion to Islam, and his belief in a permanent **French occupation** of Egypt.

METRO. High-speed light railway, using some existing tracks and partly constructed by a French company, connecting al-Marg, central **Cairo**, **Ma'adi**, and **Helwan**, with 33 stations, five of them underground. The 42.5 km project was begun in 1982. The southern leg was opened in September 1987 (18 months later than originally planned), the northeastern leg in 1989. The original cost estimate of

\$197 million has doubled. The city built a second line from Shubra al-Khayma to Giza, and a third line, linking Imbaba to Cairo International Airport, was to have begun construction in 2001 (but postponed). Metro construction is intended to reduce the congestion of Cairo's streets, buses, and trains. An **Alexandria** metro, linking **Abu-Qir** to the main **railway** station by 2010 and to al-Maks by 2017, is now projected.

MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY. Press service founded in 1956 and controlled by the Egyptian government.

MIDDLE EAST SUPPLY CENTRE. Cairo-based organization, formed in 1941 by the **British** government and later joined by U.S. representatives, that coordinated manufacturing and transport in the Arab states and Iran during **World War II**, when imports from Europe were unavailable. It stimulated the development of manufacturing **industry** in Egypt and strengthened economic ties among the Middle Eastern countries, but it was dissolved in 1945, because no foreign or local government was willing to sustain it.

MIG. Any one of several types of **Soviet**-made supersonic jet warplanes. The single-seat MIG-21, with its 30 mm cannon and carrying capacity of 1,000 kg of bombs, missiles, or rockets, formed the backbone of Egypt's air force from the **Czech Arms Deal** to 1977, when **Anwar al-Sadat** started buying **French** Mirage fighter jets and U.S.-made F-4s. Only about forty MIGs remained in the air force in 1999, used mainly for reconnaissance and training.

MILITARY ACADEMY. Institution for training Egyptian army officers since the early 19th century. The **Mamluks** had only informal methods for training their soldiers and officers, derived from the **Ottoman** system. The **French occupation** exposed their weakness and also led to the training of some young Mamluks—and **Copts** and Turks—in European fighting methods. **Muhammad Ali** established his first military training school, patterned after the Ottoman *nizam-i-jedid*, in the **Cairo Citadel** in 1815, relying heavily on Christian trainers. Fierce Muslim opposition obliged Muhammad Ali to move his academy out of **Cairo**, first to Isna in 1820 and then to Aswan, where the school was managed by Colonel **Octave Sève** and other Europeans. Unable to fill the cadet ranks with his personal slaves,

Muhammad Ali imported Blacks from the **Sudan** and, when they could not survive Egypt's climate, began recruiting Egyptian peasants in 1822, but the majority of his officer corps continued to be Turks, **Circassians**, and other Muslims from outside Egypt. Initially, the Academy trained infantry officers, but artillery, cavalry, and naval sections were soon added. A lower military school was founded in **Bulaq** but moved in 1825 to Qasr al-Ayni. Renamed *al-Madrasa al-Tajhiziyya al-Harbiyya* (Military Preparatory School), it moved again to Abu-Za'bal in 1836 and closed in 1842. The first staff college was opened in 1826. Other schools taught military **music**, veterinary science, and **munitions** manufacturing.

Military cutbacks in 1841 caused most of the schools to shut down; **Abbas Hilmi I** closed the remaining ones for the training of naval, cavalry, and artillery officers (the one for infantry officers had almost no students). During his reign a consolidated military academy, *al-Madrasa al-Mafruza*, was founded in the new suburb of Abbasiyya; its enrollment, nearly 1,700 students in 1849, exceeded those of all the abolished schools combined. **Sa'id** dealt harshly with this school, changing its director several times and abolishing it in 1861. Earlier, he had set up a new military school, located in the Citadel and directed by **Rifa'a al-Tahtawi**. It, too, closed in 1861, and in the following year a new academy was opened at the **Delta Barrages**, near an ephemeral military **engineering** school. **Isma'il** completely revamped the military educational system, consolidating the schools at the **Abbasiyya Barracks** in 1865, with branches for infantry, cavalry, artillery and military engineering, staff (an innovation often credited to General Charles Stone, an American Civil War veteran), and noncommissioned officers' training. Schools for naval officers and architects, located in **Alexandria**, were revamped. Egypt's campaigns to conquer the **Sudan** and other parts of Africa, together with the Ottoman demand for Egyptian forces, caused these schools to grow rapidly in the 1870s, but the ensuing financial crisis threatened their survival.

After the **British** quelled **Ahmad Urabi's** movement, the Egyptian army was dissolved and its training schools closed. The Military Academy was reopened in 1887 with a set two-year training program. During most of the **British occupation**, its size and importance lagged behind the professional schools, as British officers dominated the higher ranks of the Egyptian army. As late as 1937 the army had only 600 officers and 18 thousand other ranks.

A turning point was the 1936 **Anglo–Egyptian Treaty**, which enabled the government to expand its armed forces. In what would prove a fateful move, the **Wafd cabinet** opened admittance into the Military Academy to secondary school graduates who could pass a competitive examination. Formerly limited to sons of wealthy landowners who could furnish letters of introduction to secure admittance, the Academy now included ambitious sons of peasants, lower- and middle-class **bureaucrats**, and merchants, including the core of the **Free Officers**. As **World War II** began, Egypt’s armed services grew, and the Army Staff College was founded in 1939.

The **1952 Revolution** enhanced the prestige of the military academies in proportion to the increased power of the officers in Egyptian politics, and admissions and academic standards soon rose accordingly. In many areas of Egyptian life, graduation from the Military Academy or one of the related schools has become a prerequisite for political or business advancement. Other military schools include the Naval Academy at **Ras al-Tin (Alexandria)**, the Air Force Academy at Bilbays, the Military Technical Academy in **Heliopolis**, the Higher War College and the National Defense College (combined in 1965 to become the **Nasir High Military Academy**), and the Air Defense Academy in Alexandria.

MILLET. Turkish word for religious association for **Jews**, Orthodox Christians, and **Armenians** living in the **Ottoman Empire**, including Egypt. The rabbis and clergy within each *millet* took charge of justice, **education**, welfare institutions, and maintenance of local order. Reforms in the Ottoman *millet* system in the 19th century led to the establishment of a lay-led communal council, called *majlis milli* in Arabic, in each religious community. In Egypt, the **Coptic majlis milli**, founded in 1873, often clashed with the clergy; the Jewish council also had tense relations with the rabbinate. The *millet* system gave considerable autonomy, but not full equality with Muslims, to Jews and Christians living under **Islam**.

MILNER MISSION (1919). Official **British** commission sent by the foreign office in 1919 to ascertain Egyptian political aspirations “within the framework of the **Protectorate**.” Its formation was announced eight months before it actually arrived on the scene, diminishing its ability to address the causes of the **1919 Revolution**. The **Wafd** and its supporters organized a nationwide boycott of the

Milner Mission, showing widespread opposition among the Egyptian people to any continuation of the British Protectorate. The members did meet with King **Fuad I**, the current and some former ministers, and a few notables. Muslim **ulama**, **Coptic** priests, **women**, and students all played a part in the popular boycott, which was coordinated by the Wafd's central committee. Milner's final report, published in 1920, admitted strong Egyptian support for independence and greatly influenced British policy. Ironically, Milner had begun his own career in **Cairo**, under Lord **Cromer**, and his book, *England in Egypt* (1892), had persuaded European public opinion to accept the **British occupation** at that time. His papers are in Oxford's Bodleian Library.

MINING AND MINERALS. Mining has been going on in Egypt since antiquity, but the country is not well endowed with mineral resources. Other than **petroleum and natural gas**, the main mineral currently exploited in Egypt is iron ore (*see* **Iron and Steel Industry**). As of 1998 Egypt mined 3 million metric tons of iron ore (this figure is based on the metallic content of the ore), 250 thousand tons of salt, 1.5 million tons of phosphate, and 1.3 million tons of gypsum. Egypt also has small quantities of manganese, kaolin (clay), talc and steatite, asbestos, magnesium, potassium, natron, sulphur, and limestone. An Australian firm has found gold deposits in Sukariyya and in the Eastern Desert, working together with the Egyptian Geological and Survey Authority. Egypt's first coal mine was opened in 1995 in the northern **Sinai**, where there are large deposits. Heavy mineral sands in the Delta may yield ilmenite and zircon.

MINYA. City and provincial capital in Upper Egypt. The site of a temple erected to Thoth, the ancient Egyptian goddess of Wisdom, Minya is seldom visited by tourists because it has been one of the centers of **Islamist** activity and **terrorism**, although it is close to various pharaonic temples and tombs. It has a university, and about 15 percent of the inhabitants are **Copts**. The city's current population is estimated at 230 thousand.

MISR AL-FATAT. Egyptian nationalist youth movement, popular in the 1930s, often viewed as pro-Fascist. Its founder and first president was **Ahmad Husayn**; Fathi Ridwan, later active in the **National Party**, was its general secretary. Both were 22 years old when they

founded the original movement, *Jam'iyyat Misr al-Fatat*, in October 1933. The movement grew out of an industrialization project called the "Piaster Plan" that the two young men began while still in law school; this project collected money nationally to start factories to make goods commonly imported by Egyptians. Its first campaign (1932) raised £E17 thousand, which was eventually used to start a *tarbush* factory. The factory proved to be quite profitable, in part because every educated male Egyptian had to wear one. Later fundraising efforts and factories were less successful economically. The society began as an ultranationalist youth movement, consisting of "members" and "fighters" (*mujahidin*), whose elite status was shown by their uniforms, which included the dark green shirts for which *Misr al-Fatat* became well known, and their nationalistic rallies.

The society called on the Egyptian youth to help build a mighty empire composed of Egypt and the **Sudan**, allied with the Arab states, and leading the Muslim world. It adopted as its motto "God, Fatherland, King"; denounced the privileged position of foreigners in Egypt; promoted the expansion of **agriculture** and **industry**; sought the improvement of **education**, of rural and urban living conditions, and of family life; called for the elimination of "immorality, alcoholic beverages, and effeminacy"; and inspired a "martial spirit" among young men. *Misr al-Fatat* did not endorse any of the existing political parties, but soon turned against the **Wafd** and supported the monarchy and **Ali Mahir**, who may have subsidized it. It adopted *al-Sarkha* as its mouthpiece and briefly also used a Nationalist daily, *Wadi al-Nil*, before establishing its own journal, *Misr al-Fatat*. Accused of Fascist leanings, Ahmad Husayn was publicly hostile to Mussolini's Italy and was even rebuffed by the German Embassy, which he visited.

The rallies, uniforms, and well-publicized boycotts of foreign manufactures were the society's best-known activities. In 1936 it became a party, but it could not run for parliamentary elections because its members were almost all under 30, the minimum candidacy age. *Hizb Misr al-Fatat* did gain influence in 1937 through its "**Green Shirt**" clashes against the Wafd's "**Blue Shirts**," its publication of pamphlets and a "Book of the Month" (for Egypt a novelty that other publishing houses would later take up), its movements, and eventually the government), and its support for the **Palestine** Arabs. Later, it engaged in anti-**Zionist** propaganda that

soon turned into attacks on Egyptian **Jews**, as well as campaigns against taverns, pornography, and prostitution. Still unable to win broad support, it contemplated uniting with the more popular **Muslim Brothers**.

In 1940 Ahmad Husayn renamed his group the Islamic National Party, but the government's wartime **censorship** severely hampered its activities. It reemerged, again as *Misr al-Fatat*, in 1944, but its ideology seemed increasingly anachronistic and unrelated to Egypt's needs. In 1946 it reorganized itself as the Egyptian Socialist Party, winning one seat in the 1950 parliamentary elections. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** and other **Free Officers** may have belonged to this group, but they did not try to preserve it when they made all the parties disband in 1953. A party with the same name was founded in 1990.

AL-MISRI. The influential daily **newspaper** of the **Wafd Party**, edited by **Mahmud Abu al-Fath**. It survived the **1952 Revolution** and the later abolition of the Wafd, and Mahmud's brother, Ahmad Abu al-Fath, was initially close to the **Free Officers**. It was banned, however, following its April 1954 attacks on **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** and the **RCC** in editorials headed "Back to your Barracks." Its estimated circulation of 150 thousand was the largest of any newspaper in the Arab world at the time.

AL-MISRI, AZIZ ALI (1879–1965). Arab nationalist officer and politician. Of mixed Arab and **Circassian** background, Aziz Ali studied at Istanbul's military academy and was commissioned into the **Ottoman** army in 1901. He became a member of the CUP, but after it restored the **Ottoman** Constitution, he turned against the committee and began to advocate **Arab nationalism**, founding a secret society called *Qahhaniyya* (named for Qahtan, legendary ancestor of the southern Arabs) in 1909 and an Arab officers' group called *Ahd* (Covenant) in 1913. Arrested, tried for treason, and sentenced to death early in 1914, Aziz Ali was freed by the Ottoman government and allowed to go to Egypt. When the Arab revolt began in 1916, he served briefly as chief of staff to its leader, Sharif Husayn.

In the interwar years he joined a few fringe groups dedicated to reorienting Egypt toward Arab nationalism and then some pro-Nazi organizations. In 1939 Premier **Ali Mahir** named him chief of staff of the Egyptian army, but the British accused him of undermining

Egypt's participation in **World War II**, as mandated by the 1936 **Anglo–Egyptian Treaty**, and insisted on his dismissal in February 1940. He deserted the Egyptian army and tried to reach the Axis forces in the Western Desert but was caught in 1941 and put on trial. Due to legal technicalities, he was released by **Mustafa al-Nahhas** in 1942. Aziz Ali helped the **Free Officers** prepare for the **1952 Revolution**. They named him Egypt's ambassador to Moscow in 1953 and wanted to make him president in place of **Muhammad Najib**, but he retired in 1954. Fiercely nationalistic, his enthusiasm often exceeded his political judgment.

MITLA PASS. Strategic mountain pass in the western **Sinai Peninsula**, captured by **Israel** in 1956 and 1967, relinquished to a UN buffer force under the 1975 **Egyptian–Israeli agreement**, and restored to Egypt in the 1979 **Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty**.

MIXED COURTS. Tribunals, organized by **Nubar** and set up in 1875–76 by the Egyptian government by agreements with the Western countries, to try civil cases involving foreign nationals protected by the **Capitulations**. In his efforts to persuade foreign governments to accept his proposed judicial system, Nubar won early backing from Germany and **Britain** and eventually overcame **Ottoman** fears that the Mixed Courts would detach Egypt from Istanbul. **France** resisted the projected Courts, even though they would use mainly the *Code Napoléon*, because it preferred the older system by which all cases between Egyptians and foreign nationals were tried in the consular courts of the latter. The Mixed Courts later served as a model for the **National Courts** and the Egyptian legal profession generally. In their heyday, the Mixed Courts conferred great privileges on foreign residents and businesses in Egypt, and yet the Egyptian nationalists defended them as a bulwark against the **British occupation**. As an Egyptian capitalist class emerged in the 1920s, and especially once Egypt's government adopted a policy of protecting infant **industries** in 1930, needing permission from foreign governments to raise import **tariffs** rendered the Mixed Courts anachronistic to most politically articulate Egyptians. They were gradually phased out after the 1937 **Montreux Convention**, closing forever in 1949.

MONITEUR ÉGYPTIEN. Egypt's French-language official **newspaper**, founded in 1832.

MONTREUX CONVENTION (1937). The Egyptian government, supported by **Britain**, negotiated with the countries having capitulatory treaties, leading to an agreement by the signatories to phase out the **Capitulations** and the **Mixed Courts** by 1949.

MOTOR TRANSPORT. The first automobile was imported into Egypt by Prince Aziz Hasan in 1899, and he made the first intercity car trip with two friends from **Cairo** to **Alexandria** in 1904. Cairo saw its earliest buses in 1905, and the first taxi company opened for business in Alexandria in 1907. In that year a car dealership was founded in Cairo. The Royal Automobile Club of Egypt was opened in 1924, and the first race was held in San Stefano in 1925. Car ownership burgeoned during the 1920s and 1930s among wealthy Egyptians and foreign residents, leading to the paving of some city streets and a few rural roads.

The spread of private cars has been somewhat slower in Egypt than in most other Arab countries, but traffic congestion is severe in the big cities. Traffic jams cost Egypt at least £E2 billion a year in lost economic activity, accidents claim the lives of over 5 thousand people (60 percent of them pedestrians) annually, and gasoline engines aggravate air pollution. In 1997 there were 1,155,837 registered private automobiles (including hearses), 277,150 taxis, 43,740 buses, 510,766 trucks and vans, 429,756 motorcycles, 20,993 construction vehicles, 135,880 government-owned cars, 7,092 diplomatic cars, and 103,892 other motor vehicles in Egypt. Most Egyptians rely on buses (often in poor condition) and group taxis for both interurban and local transportation, supplemented by the **railroads**, **metro**, **tramways**, and **river transport**, where relevant.

In 1997 Egypt had seven automobile assembly plants with a potential annual output of 85 thousand units, but they were operating at one-third capacity, due partly to a requirement that 45 percent of all car parts must be locally manufactured. Egyptians annually buy more than 75 thousand cars, of which half are imported despite **tariff** duties ranging from 40 to 150 percent *ad valorem*.

AL-MUAYYAD. Daily Arabic **newspaper**, originally founded by **Mustafa Riyad** in 1889 to counter the pro-French *al-Ahram* and pro-British *al-Muqattam* and edited by Shaykh **Ali Yusuf** until his death in 1913. Its growth as a popular newspaper was a giant step in the development of vernacular journalism in Egypt, but its uncritical

support of **Khedive Abbas** led eventually to its eclipse by *al-Liwa* as an Egyptian nationalist organ.

MUBARAK, ALI (1823–93). Official, **engineer**, **cabinet** minister, and writer. Born in Birinbal (Daqahliyya province) to a family of **ulama**, Ali decided at an early age to enter government service. Educated at the **Cairo** and Paris polytechnics and at an artillery school at Metz, he served a year in the French army before returning to Egypt in 1849. He attracted **Abbas I**'s attention by developing an economical method of facilitating the passage of boats through the **Delta Bar-rages** and was promoted from teaching in the artillery school to managing all government primary and preparatory schools and the *Muhandiskhana* (Polytechnic). Dismissed from government service by **Sa'id**, he served in the Crimean War. He held various low-paying positions and was repeatedly dismissed from government service.

Isma'il's accession enabled Ali Mubarak to move up through a series of government posts, becoming director of **education** and public works and then of **communications** and **railways** in 1868, of *awqaf* and again of communications in 1869, of education again in 1870 and 1872, and of public works again in 1871–72. He served on the **Privy Council** in 1873–74, became head of the office of engineering and adviser of the public works department in 1875, and served again on the cabinet as director of education in August 1878. He would later serve in three cabinets under **Tawfiq**. Ali often was dismissed from government posts because he lacked protection, even within the village elite. He depended wholly on his ruler's patronage.

Strongly patriotic, Ali urged Egyptians to view government work as a chance to serve the people, not merely to enrich themselves. He did benefit materially from his posts, but less than other officials. He was proud of his ethnic Egyptian background, cared about the students and peasants under his care, and advanced the careers of other Egyptians. He wrote a patriotic story inspired by the traditional *maqamat* (a genre of Arabic **literature**, written in rhymed prose), *Alam al-Din*, and a detailed description of 19th century Egypt still used by historians, *al-Khitat al-Tawfiqiyya*.

MUBARAK, JAMAL (1963–). Entrepreneur and party leader. Born in **Heliopolis**, he was the second son of **Husni Mubarak** and **Suz-
anne Mubarak**. He earned his B.A. in business administration in

1983 and an M.B.A. in 1986 from AUC. After working for Bank of America in **Cairo** and London, he was appointed in 1990 to a presidential economic advisory board. He later formed a private equity firm called MedInvest. Capitalized at \$50 million in 1997, it had grown to \$100 million by 2002. He invested heavily in and worked to open up Egypt's information technology and telecommunications sectors. He also chairs the Future Generations Foundation, which sponsors training programs and operates advanced-level courses for Egyptian executives with the Harvard Business School.

He was nominated to the secretariat of the **NDP** in 2000, amid rumors that he was being groomed to replace his father as president. Despite broad popular support among Egyptian youth and market capitalists, he chose not to run for Parliament in the 2000 elections. He worked instead to promote internal party reforms in order to open up access for both a younger and a wider range of party members, but has encountered resistance from army officers and older NDP leaders. At its eighth general convention in 2002, he was appointed assistant secretary-general for policy, the party's third most powerful position, one that enables him to develop and formulate the party's stance on various issues.

MUBARAK, [MUHAMMAD] HUSNI (1928–). Officer, politician, and Egypt's president since 1981. Born in Minufiyya province to a middle-class family, Husni Mubarak graduated from the **Military Academy** in 1949 and the Air Force Academy in 1950. After a brief stint as a fighter pilot, he was an instructor at the Air Force Academy in 1954–61 and spent the following academic year at the **Soviet General Staff Academy**. He was commandant of the Air Force Academy in 1967–69, air force chief-of-staff in 1969–71, and then became commander-in-chief of the air force where he spearheaded Egypt's preparations for the **October War**. Because of the air force's stellar performance in the war, he was promoted to the rank of air marshal in 1974. The following year Mubarak was appointed vice president by **Anwar al-Sadat**, whom he served loyally for the duration of Sadat's life.

Mubarak assumed the presidency after Sadat's assassination, was nominated within a week by the **NDP**, and was confirmed by a referendum without opposition. His early policies included maintaining close relations with the **United States**, on whose economic aid Egypt had become dependent; strengthening state control over

the **economy** to promote efficiency, raise general living standards, and curb government corruption; reestablishing diplomatic and economic ties with the Arab states without breaking Egypt's relations with **Israel**; and curbing the resurgent **Islamists**. He was elected by a national referendum to a third term as president in 1993 and to a fourth in 1999, but without any opposing candidates. He survived an Islamist assassination attempt in Addis Ababa in June 1995, an attack that seems paradoxically to have increased his popular support at home.

In recent years Mubarak has devoted his energy to suppressing Islamist opposition in Egypt, promoting **privatization** of Egyptian **industry**, and working for a peaceful resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Although he has avoided making visits to Israel, he has hosted political leaders from that country who visited Egypt. He also maintains cordial relations with Yasir Arafat and sometimes conveys his views on **Palestine** to American leaders, who view him as an ally in their war against **terrorism**. He is of necessity authoritarian in governing Egypt, relies heavily on the NDP, and has so far avoided naming anyone to be vice president and hence his putative successor. More self-effacing than his predecessors, he inspires neither strong loyalty nor aversion among most Egyptians.

MUBARAK, SUZANNE [SALIH THABIT] (1941–). Wife of the president. Born in **Minya** to an Egyptian physician father and a British hospital matron mother, she grew up in **Heliopolis** and married **Husni Mubarak** in 1958. She earned her B.A. in political science in 1977 and M.A. in sociology and anthropology in 1982, both from AUC. Profoundly interested in children's rights and welfare, she has promoted many projects to improve schools and to build public libraries. She also set up Egypt's Reading for All Program, headed Egypt's delegation to the **United Nations** Conference on **Women** in Nairobi, and was the keynote speaker at the Lugano (Italy) Conference on the International Convention of the Rights of the Child. UNESCO asked her to help start the **Bibliotheca Alexandrina**.

MUDIR. Governor of a rural province (called a *mudiriyya*), before 1960.

MUFATTISH. **Financial** or **irrigation** inspector; specifically, **Khediye Isma'il's** powerful official, **Isma'il Siddiq**.

MUHAFAZA. Formerly, the term used for the governorates of **Cairo** and **Alexandria**, used since 1960 to denote all Egyptian provinces. *See also* **Provincial Government**.

MUHAMMAD ALI (1769–1849). **Ottoman** officer, reforming viceroy from 1805 to 1848, and founder of the dynasty that ruled Egypt until 1952. Born in Qavalla (Macedonia), he was the son of a tobacco merchant who was also a soldier. His military (and possibly naval) experience was gleaned from fighting bandits and pirates in his province, and he became an officer in the Ottoman army despite his lack of formal education; he did not learn to read until he was 45. He came to Egypt in 1801 as second in command of a 300-man Albanian regiment in the Ottoman army, allied with the British, to end the **French occupation**. He persuaded the **Mamluks** to aid the Ottomans and his Albanians against the French. He then maneuvered the **ulama** and Mamluk factions to oust the Ottoman-appointed governors **Khusrev** and then **Khurshid**, so that he could himself be named governor in 1805. He went on challenging the remaining Mamluks, until he ordered their massacre in 1811.

Acting as a loyal vassal of the Ottoman sultan, Muhammad Ali sent troops to suppress the **Wahhabi** rebellion in Arabia, thus conquering the **Hijaz** for Egypt. Constructing a **Nile River** fleet, he also sent forces to conquer the eastern **Sudan** in 1822, hoping to staff his armies with Blacks, who could not endure Egypt's climate. He replaced them with Egyptian peasants, who had not been conscripted since antiquity. He ordered dams, dikes, canals, and catch basins built to improve Nile **irrigation**. Many cash crops were introduced, including long-staple Egyptian **cotton**. By putting all **agricultural** land under a state monopoly, he controlled the output and price of cash crops, enabling him to pay for his other reforms.

Muhammad Ali was the first non-Western ruler who tried to **industrialize** his country on a Western model. He sent student missions to European universities, military academies, and technical institutes; he also imported Western instructors to staff the academies and schools that he founded in Egypt to train officers, **engineers**, physicians, and administrators. He set up factories to spin and weave **textiles** and to manufacture **munitions**, staffing them with Egyptian peasant conscripts. He created an arsenal in **Alexandria** for naval ship construction, enabling Egypt to take part in the Morean campaign against the Greek war for independence, but most of the Eyp-

tian fleet was sunk at **Navarino** and the Ottomans eventually lost that war. When they reneged on their promise to award Crete to Muhammad Ali, his son **Ibrahim** invaded **Syria** in 1831 and governed that region for eight years. When the Ottomans tried to retake Syria, Ibrahim defeated them at **Nezib**, the reigning sultan died, and the Ottoman fleet deserted Istanbul for Alexandria. **Britain** and Austria intervened against the victors, eventually making Ibrahim withdraw from Syria but promising that Muhammad Ali could pass down his governorship of Egypt to his heirs. Once Egypt accepted the 1840 **London Convention**, it had to abide by the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman Tariff Treaty, which caused most of the state-run factories to close because they could not compete against British manufactures, and also had to limit its army to 18 thousand active soldiers.

Muhammad Ali then lost interest in his Westernizing reforms. He let his factories and schools decay and gave away many state-controlled lands to family members or to favored officers and officials of his government. Treated with silver nitrate for a bowel complaint, the cure affected his mental powers, and in 1848 he agreed to relinquish his governorship to Ibrahim, who died soon afterward of tuberculosis, leaving the post to **Abbas Hilmi I**. Muhammad Ali was one of the ablest men ever to govern Egypt and did much to increase the country's power and wealth, but he showed no concern for his subjects' welfare and established a system of personal rule that, in the hands of less capable descendants, would prove ruinous to his dynasty and injurious to Egypt.

MUHAMMAD ALI (1876–1955). Younger brother of **Abbas Hilmi II**, horse breeder, art collector, owner of Manyal Palace on the island of Rawda, world traveler, and writer, he served on King **Faruq**'s regency council in 1936–37 and was heir apparent until the king's son was born in 1952. A handsome, cosmopolitan gentleman, aloof from politics, he wrote memoirs, portions of which appear in Emine Foat Tugay's *Three Centuries* (1963).

MUHAMMAD ALI CLUB. Upper-class Egyptian men's social organization. Located in central **Cairo**, it has been converted into a club for foreign diplomats.

MUHYI AL-DIN, KHALID (1922–). Officer, leftist politician, and close friend of **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**. Born to a middle-income land-

owning family in Daqahliyya province, he graduated in 1940 from the **Military Academy** and also earned a B.A. in economics at **Cairo University** in 1951. He was associated with *Hadeto*, but never joined that **Communist** group. A member of the **Free Officers** and the **RCC**, he backed **Muhammad Najib** against Nasir, leading to his expulsion and brief arrest. Khalid led the left wing of the officers' group, served on the Central Committee of the **National Union**, became a member of the **National Assembly** in 1957, chaired the Egyptian Peace Council, hence became a member of the World Peace Movement's presidential council in 1958, and edited *al-Masa* (a leftist **newspaper**) in 1955–59. He briefly chaired the board of *al-Akhbar* in 1964 and the **Press Council** in 1965. He became a member of the eight-man executive committee of the **ASU** in 1964, chaired the **Aswan High Dam Committee**, and was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize in 1970.

Under **Anwar al-Sadat** Khalid's power waned. Within the **ASU** he took the leadership of the leftist platform that evolved into the **NPUP** and was one of the three delegates elected to the **People's Assembly** in 1976. In 1978 he founded its party organ, *al-Ahali*. In 1979 he was charged with antistate activities but was never tried. As a former **RCC** member, he was spared when Sadat jailed other dissidents in 1981. Now a leftist "loyal opposition" to **Husni Mubarak**, he published *Li-hadha nu'aridu Mubarak* (For This We Oppose Mubarak) in 1987. Khalid won a parliamentary seat in 1990, after three earlier defeats, and has emerged as an elder statesman. His **1952 Revolution** memoir has been translated into English.

MUHYI AL-DIN, ZAKARIYYA (1918–). Officer, politician, and vice president from 1961 to 1968. Like his cousin, **Khalid**, Zakariyya studied at the **Military Academy**, graduating with **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** and **Anwar al-Sadat** in 1938. Joining the **Free Officers** on the eve of **1952 Revolution**, he became a member of the **RCC**. As interior minister from 1953 to 1962, his responsibilities also covered state security and the secret service. He became vice president one month before the **UAR** broke up. He also was premier and interior minister from October 1965 to September 1966. When Nasir resigned at the end of the **June War**, he designated Zakariyya as his successor, but this nomination was withdrawn after massive protest demonstrations. He continued to serve as vice president and also as

deputy prime minister until he left the cabinet in February 1968. He has held no government post since that time, although he was considered as a possible successor to Nasir in 1970. He publicly opposed Sadat's peace initiative with **Israel**. Zakariyya is thought to have opposed the extension of **Arab socialism** and of close ties with the **USSR**, but he could not persuade Nasir to adopt his policies.

MUJAMMA'. Concave-shaped, 13-story office building, completed in 1952. It has served as a major office building for Egypt's **bureaucracy** and many people assume that it was inspired, even designed, by the **Soviets**. In fact, King **Faruq** commissioned its construction. Its architect, Ahmad Isma'il, also designed **Alexandria University's** Engineering Faculty. Its association with mindless government power is firmly fixed in the popular mind, as shown in the comic film, *Irhab wa kabab*, starring Adil Imam.

MUKHABARAT. Egypt's secret police under **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** and his successors. The organization has been especially active in promoting state security and suppressing (or at least limiting) dissent at times when Egypt's presidency felt threatened. Under Nasir, the *Mukhabarat* used surveillance and **prison** internment against the **Communists**, **Muslim Brothers**, and Egyptians suspected of collaboration with **Zionism** or Western powers, such as **Britain** and the **United States**. Just after the **Corrective Revolution** of May 1971, Anwar **al-Sadat** publicly repudiated the organization's practice of taping telephone conversations, but later used its methods to control **Nasirists** and Communists. **Husni Mubarak** employs the *Mukhabarat* in his struggle against **terrorism** and the *jama'at*.

MUKHTAR, MAHMUD (1883–1934). Egypt's best-known sculptor. Born in a village near al-Mahalla al-Kubra, he attended his village *kuttab*, then studied in Prince Yusuf Kamal's School of Fine Arts in **Cairo**, graduating in 1911, and was sent to complete his studies at the *École Supérieure des Beaux Arts* in Paris. During his stay there, he was attracted to the heroic interpretations of the sculptor Antoine Bourdelle and to the Art Deco movement. In addition, he was strongly influenced by his teacher Guillaume Laplagne and by his early exposure to Egyptian Arab folk epics. Although he enjoyed fully the bohemian life of a Paris artist, he remained strongly nationalistic. Upon returning to Cairo, he sculpted the statue called *Nahdat*

Misr (The Awakening of Egypt), which was featured in a modern Egyptian art exhibit in **France** in 1930. It was then placed in front of Cairo's main railway station and later on the mall leading to **Cairo University**. Upon returning to Egypt, he began a statue of **Sa'd Zaghlul** but died of tuberculosis before he could finish it. Mukhtar's best work combines pharaonic formalism with a romantic celebration of Egypt's folklore and environment. His sculptures are well known and loved by the Egyptian people and many are housed in the Mukhtar **Museum** in **Zamalek**.

MUNITIONS INDUSTRY. The manufacture in modern Egypt of fire-arms and warships began under **Muhammad Ali**, who set up production complexes in the **Cairo Citadel**, the **Bulaq** arsenal, and the **Alexandria** shipyard, but these early factories were closed following the 1840 **London Convention**. Munitions production resumed under **Isma'il**, but high production costs and insufficient domestic demand soon ended the program, which remained dormant throughout the **British occupation**. During **World War II** when German submarines throttled Allied shipping, Egyptian capitalists such as **Ahmad Abbud** set up factories to produce bullets, bombs, torpedoes, and guns. The 1948 **Palestine War** stimulated the industry, and the Egyptian government later contracted with European firms to assemble warplanes, arms, and ammunition.

After the **1952 Revolution**, the government tried to strengthen its military, setting up three new ammunition factories in 1954. Pressures to rearm mounted along with border tensions with **Israel** in 1955 and especially after the **Czech Arms Deal**. Five major military factories were established in the late 1950s and early 1960s, producing HA-200 trainer aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, spare parts for imported **Soviet** fighter planes, and armored personnel carriers. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government tried to take control of munitions industries and to avoid joint-venture programs with European firms. It tried to develop all areas of arms production, relying heavily on West European engineers and technicians. The missile program, for example, was crippled by **U.S.** and Israeli pressure on the West German government, causing the German engineers to leave before they had perfected the guidance systems. Egypt allegedly manufactured chemical weapons used in the **Yemen Civil War**. Unable to attract foreign buyers, Egypt's munitions factories also began making consumer products, such as sewing machines, **radios**, and tele-

phones, for the local market. The aircraft factories were converted into maintenance workshops, and the locally manufactured rifles and armored vehicles were deemed unfit for field combat. Personal rivalries between factory directors also rendered them inefficient and unprofitable, and defeat in the **June War** revealed the weaknesses of Egypt's armament policy. In his last years, Nasir pressed the **Soviets** to strengthen his country's military industries.

Shortly after Nasir's death, the **USSR** agreed to license Egyptian production of helicopters, radar systems, and heavy ammunition, but **Anwar al-Sadat** was already looking to the Western countries to revitalize the munitions industry. In 1971 he revived the ministry of military production, through which he began negotiating with **France** and **Britain** to license new munitions factories. After the **October War** he followed a strategy that combined Arab petrodollar financing, Western technology, and Egyptian facilities and labor, manufacturing parts instead of whole weapons systems and preferring arms that were highly destructive relative to their production costs. Egypt also used reverse engineering to produce missiles and bombs suited to the **MIG-21** fighter jet and the Soviet **BMP** armored vehicle. In 1975 several governments set up an industrial consortium (*see* **Gulf Organization for the Development of Egypt**), but the 1979 **Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty** aborted its work.

Unlike other production sectors, the munitions industry remains wholly state controlled. The government sponsors domestic research and development in order to reduce its dependence on foreign scientists and engineers. Egypt sells arms to other Arab and African countries; Egyptian arms sales played a major role in aiding **Iraq** in its war against Iran. In 1988, 29 Egyptian firms were producing weapons worth \$1.5 billion. Egypt also signed an agreement with the United States to assemble the **M1A1** main battle tank. Due to the **National Service Project Organization (NSPO)** a growing share of the production of Egypt's munitions factories is entering the civilian market. Items thus manufactured include clothing, doors, window frames, stationery, microscopes, and many food items. Military contractors have built many of Egypt's new roads, bridges, sewer lines, and other infrastructure projects, most notably in the new **irrigation** developments. The military has become ever more involved in Egypt's economic life, with portentous consequences for future relations between the armed forces and the citizenry.

MUQABALA (1871). Law, promulgated by the *Mufattish* for **Isma'il**, that invited landowners to pay in advance six times the annual land tax in return for a perpetual 50 percent tax reduction. The measure benefited mainly large landowners, bringing into the treasury only half the revenue expected by the government. It was abolished in May 1876 but reinstated in November, although without the previous land tax reductions. This law came to be viewed by Egyptian landlords as a privilege to be shielded from the foreign financial advisers, who called in 1879 for its abrogation. It was repealed in January 1880 by **Mustafa Riyad's cabinet** at the behest of **Tawfiq** and the **Dual Control**. As a result, many landowners backed **Ahmad Urabi** and his nationalist movement.

AL-MUQATTAM. Pro-British Arabic daily **newspaper**, founded in 1889 by two Syrian Protestant College graduates, Ya'qub Sarruf and Dr. Faris Nimr. It was widely believed by Egyptians to enjoy moral and probably material support from the **British Agency** before **World War I**, but later became more independent. Unable to compete against *al-Misri* and *al-Akhbar* for readers, it closed in 1952.

AL-MUQTATAF. Scientific monthly published by the editors of *al-Muqattam* from 1876 to 1952, initially in Beirut and later in **Cairo**. It competed for influence with *al-Hilal*.

MURAD BEY MUHAMMAD (?–1801). **Mamluk** leader, successor to **Muhammad Abu al-Dhahab**, and rival to **Ibrahim Bey Muhammad** as Egypt's leader (1775–98). A cruel and extortionate ruler, he commanded the Mamluk cavalry that lost to **Napoléon Bonaparte's** army in the Battle of **Imbaba**. As Napoléon occupied **Cairo** and tried to open negotiations with him, he fled to Upper Egypt. Murad Bey spurned his offer of the governorship of Jirja province and tried to offer money to the **French** forces to leave Egypt. He repeatedly evaded French attempts to capture him and later offered to make an alliance with the **British**, whom he would have allowed to occupy **Alexandria**, Damietta, and Rosetta. The Mamluks would also have paid the **Ottomans** an annual tribute and a war indemnity. He died of the plague before he could conclude this agreement.

MUSA, AMR (1936–). Egyptian diplomat and secretary-general of the **Arab League**. Shortly after earning his law degree from **Cairo Uni-**

versity, he entered Egypt's foreign office in 1958. He became Egypt's ambassador to Switzerland and then to India (1982–86). He headed the foreign ministry's department of international organizations (1986–89) and Egypt's delegation to the **United Nations** (1989–91). He was minister of foreign affairs from 1991 to May 2001, when he succeeded **Ismat Abd al-Majid** as leader of the League of Arab States. He is widely respected by Egyptians and other Arabs, in part for his firm backing for the Palestinians. It is sometimes said that, if Egyptians had the chance to choose their next president, he is the one whom they would elect.

MUSA, SALAMA (1887–1958). Journalist, writer, and socialist. Born in Kafr al-Afi, near Zaqaq, to a **Coptic** family, he attended a Muslim *kuttab*, a Coptic school, and then a government primary school. He studied at the **Khedivial** Secondary School from 1903 to 1907, but his intellectual formation owed more to the influence of Farah Antun, a secularist writer, and to **Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid**. Drawing on a monthly pension that he had inherited from his father, he traveled in 1907 to Istanbul and then to Europe, spending a year in **France** to improve his knowledge of the French language and culture, for which he had a lifelong predilection. Musa lived in London for four years, initially studying law, and came under the influence of the Fabian Society. Returning to Egypt in 1912, he tried to found a socialist magazine, *al-Mustaqbal* (The Future), but the government ordered him to suspend publication. He spent most of **World War I** living in a village near Zagazig and observing peasant living conditions. He taught briefly and then became an editor for *al-Hilal* and *Kull shay*. In 1927 he published attacks on the Lebanese press in Egypt and later opposed **Isma'il Sidqi's** cabinet.

An avowed secularist, Musa introduced the writings of Charles Darwin, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud to Egyptian readers and scandalized public opinion by calling for writing Arabic in the Roman alphabet. He wanted Egypt to embrace European thought and civilization, espoused the theory of evolution by natural selection, and advocated an egalitarian socialism influenced to some degree by **Marxism**, although he was never an avowed **Communist**. He was imprisoned in 1946 on trumped-up charges of sabotage, but really for attacking the monarchy. He authored or translated more than 40 published books, including his autobiography, translated as *The Education of Salama Musa*.

AL-MUSAWWAR. Popular illustrated weekly magazine published by *al-Hilal* since 1924. It often features articles of political or historical significance, and its reported circulation in 1999 was 130 thousand.

MUSEUMS. Egypt possesses a great number and variety of museums, due in part to its reliance on **tourism** as a source of foreign exchange, but possibly also to a deliberate government policy. The best known and the largest are the **Egyptian Museum**, the **Islamic Museum** (formerly called the Museum of Arab Art), the **Coptic Museum** in **Cairo**, and the Greco-Roman Museum in **Alexandria**. The Coptic Museum was founded in 1910 by leading members of Egypt's Coptic Community; the other three museums were initiated by foreigners and were for a long time managed by them. All are now under the culture ministry. Additional museums, most of them founded after the **1952 Revolution**, include the Military Museum and Jawhara Palace in the **Cairo Citadel**, the Manyal Palace Museum devoted to the Egyptian royal family, the Museum of Modern Art in **Zamalek**, the Railroad Museum near Cairo's main station, the Philatelic Museum, and *Bayt al-Umma* (the home of **Sa'd Zaghlul** and his family). Many of the older museums are poorly lighted and lack adequate signs on their exhibits, but a handsome new one is the **Luxor Museum**. Differential admission prices now encourage Egyptians to visit museums and learn about their heritage, whereas formerly it was assumed that only foreigners cared about them. At present, seven more museums are under construction in Egypt.

MUSIC. Egyptians have always produced, enjoyed, and talked about singing and about instrumental music. Pharaonic melodies were preserved in the liturgy of the **Coptic Church** and in the work songs of *fellahin* and manual laborers. Despite the belief of some Muslims that the Prophet Muhammad, and hence **Islam**, prohibit music, the recitation of the Quran, the call to ritual prayer, and the observance of **Sufism** all have musical qualities. Royal courts and armies have long demanded music, and a rich tradition of classical Arabic music grew up during the first millennium of Islamic history. In early modern times, secular musical activities in Egypt included performances (usually including **dance**) at weddings and other celebrations, recitations of **poetry** set to music, military marches, vendors' street cries, and work songs. During the 19th century the influx of Europeans

and the Westernizing reforms of **Muhammad Ali** and **Isma'il** provided new opportunities for Egyptian musicians and dancers. The introduction of the **Opera House** and of **theaters** generally by Europeans, **Greeks**, **Armenians**, **Jews**, and especially **Syrians** in late 19th century **Cairo** and **Alexandria** led to the creation of plays, theatrical troupes, and musical concerts for mainly Egyptian audiences.

The sound recording industry in Egypt dates back to 1903, and wealthy Egyptians provided a market for recorded Arabic music even before **World War I**. **British** troops introduced the portable Decca phonograph during the war, and their demand for nightclub entertainment stimulated a desire among male Egyptians for comparable musical and theatrical entertainment. The introduction of the **radio** and proliferation of **cinema** in the 1920s also enhanced the people's interest in music. Only a few Egyptians took any interest in European classical music, but some forms of Western popular singing and dance music have strongly influenced Egyptian popular taste. At the same time, such singers as **Umm Kulthum**, **Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab**, and **Farid al-Atrash** have developed musical styles that preserve the essential authenticity of Egyptian music.

In recent years, **television**, transistor radios, personal stereos, DVD players, and the Internet have all served as means for spreading Egyptian vocal and instrumental music to all parts of the Arab world and other places where Egyptians have gone. The Egyptian government has established a *Conservatoire* for both European and Egyptian music and folklore, as well as troupes of singers and dancers who perform throughout Egypt and in many foreign countries. Some young Egyptians form rock bands to perform American and European popular songs.

Musical instruments played in Egypt include both those of the classical Arabic heritage, such as the *'ud* (lute), *rebaba* (one-stringed fiddle), *nay* (an end-blown reed flute), *qanun* (zither), and *tabla* (drum), and those introduced by Europeans, especially the violin. Arabic music has distinctive rhythmic modes (*iqa'at*) and melodic scales (*maqamat*), as well as a tradition of improvisation (*taqasim*). Modern Egypt's vocal and instrumental music is a distinctive blend of both classical Arabic and Western musical traditions.

MUSLIM BROTHERS, SOCIETY OF. Political movement, founded in **Ismailia** by **Hasan al-Banna** in 1928 and moved to **Cairo** in

1932, especially strong in Egypt between 1936 and 1954 and later revived during **Anwar al-Sadat's** presidency, which called for an **Islamic** political and social system in place of the secular constitution. Many Egyptians, especially lower- and middle-class city-dwellers, joined the Society, which is believed to have had about 500 thousand members and an equal number of sympathizers at its apogee in 1948–49. It contained a secret wing, *al-Jihaz al-Sirri*, which was often accused of using **terrorist** methods against its enemies (see **Jeep Case**) and of assassinating political leaders such as **Nuqrashi** in 1948. After Banna was killed by government agents in February 1949, **Hasan al-Hudaybi** was chosen to succeed him as supreme guide. Some **Free Officers** had ties with the Society, which remained influential just after the **1952 Revolution**, but its support for **Muhammad Najib** in 1954 estranged it from **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**. Its secret wing's attempt to kill him in November 1954 led to its suppression. Some of its leaders were put to death, and many served long prison terms at hard labor. Nasir briefly eased his persecution of the Society in 1964, only to revert to more arrests, trials, jail sentences, and executions, notably of **Sayyid Qutb**.

The Society revived after Sadat turned against **Arab socialism**. Led by **Umar al-Tilmisani**, it was able to resume publishing its weekly journal, *al-Da'wa*, and to contest student elections in the national universities. Suppression resumed, however, when Sadat arrested his political opponents in September 1981. Although the Society has stressed its peaceful character and desire to work within the system, distancing itself from the more violent *jama'at*, it has been severely restrained by **Husni Mubarak's** government. For example, publication of *al-Da'wa*, banned in 1981, has never been allowed to resume. It ran candidates for the **1984 elections** to the **Popular Assembly** in conjunction with the **New Wafd**, and in 1987 in a coalition with the **Liberal** and **Socialist Labor** parties, called the "**Islamic Alliance**," winning 60 seats. It boycotted the **1990 elections**. Its supporters won control of the major professional syndicates in their 1992 elections, but new government rules have blunted their power. Finally, its supporters (running as "independents") won 17 seats in the **2000 elections**. It remains influential in Egyptian public life, whereas the violence of such groups as *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* has made them increasingly unpopular.

Its female affiliate, the Muslim **Women's** Association, taught lessons on **Islam** to women, ran an orphanage, offered assistance to poor families, and helped to reconcile estranged couples. From 1936 to 1965 it was led by Zaynab al-Ghazali, Egypt's best-known woman **Islamist**. The Society's youth group, the **Rover Scouts**, often accused of **terrorism**, has never been revived.

– N –

NADIM, ABDALLAH (1845–96). Nationalist editor, poet and speaker, sometimes called “the Orator of the [Urabi] Revolution.” Born and educated in **Alexandria**, he worked as a telegraph clerk in Banha and at al-Qasr al-Ali Palace in **Cairo**, as a tutor and farmer in Badawa (Daqahliyya), and as a shopkeeper in Mansura. He drifted into journalism, writing articles for the **newspapers** *al-Mahrusa* and *al-Asr al-jadid*, and for *Misr* and *al-Tijara*, published by Adib Ishaq, one of **Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's** disciples. In 1881 he began publishing his own weekly paper, *al-Tankit wa al-tabkit*, followed shortly by *al-Taif*, in which he first proclaimed his nationalist struggle. He was one of the leading proponents of Ahmad Urabi and his movement. After the British occupied Egypt, Nadim went into hiding for nine years. Once discovered and arrested, he was expelled from Egypt, so he lived in Jaffa for a year until he was invited to return by **Abbas Hilmi II**. He published *al-Ustadh*, a Cairo weekly, in 1892–93, thus becoming one of the few links between the Urabist movement and **Mustafa Kamil**, then a law student editing his own journal, *al-Madrasa*. Exiled again from Egypt in 1893, Nadim went to Istanbul, where the **Ottoman** government employed him in its education department and then as an inspector for printed matter, and he died there. He was an inspiring, often humorous, speaker and writer. His son published some of his writings as *Sulafat al-Nadim*.

AL-NAHHAS, MUSTAFA (1879–1965). Judge, politician, **cabinet** minister, five-time premier, and **Wafd Party** leader. Born to a poor family in Samanud (Gharbiyya), he graduated from the government **Law School** in 1900, practiced law in Mansura, and in 1914 was appointed a judge in the **Tanta National Court**. He was dismissed in 1919 when he joined the Wafd to represent the **National Party**, which he had quietly backed. Exiled with **Sa'd Zaghlul** to the Sey-

chelles from 1921 to 1923, Nahhas was chosen upon his repatriation to represent Samanud in the first Chamber of Deputies elected under the **1923 Constitution**. He became communications minister in 1924. Reelected to the 1926 Chamber as a deputy from Abu Sir Banna (Gharbiyya) and barred by the British from a cabinet post, he was elected one of its two vice presidents and, in the following year, its president.

After Sa'd Zaghul died in August 1927, he defeated Sa'd's nephew in the contest to lead the Wafd Party. Nahhas would become prime minister on five different occasions: 1928, 1930, 1936–37, 1942–44, and 1950–52. In most of these cabinets he was also the interior minister; in 1942–44 he was foreign minister. He headed the Egyptian delegation to the talks with **Britain** that produced the 1936 **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty**. The popularly elected Nahhas government of 1936–37 also negotiated at **Montreux** to end the **Capitulations** and the **Mixed Courts**. His government also persuaded the **Suez Canal Company** to admit two Egyptians to its governing board, set up Egypt's military schools for aviators and mechanics, and expanded the **Military Academy** by opening it to secondary school graduates who passed a competitive examination, thus admitting many of the future **Free Officers**. However, Nahhas's hastily formed youth group, the "**Blue Shirts**," broke into the **Sa'dist Party** clubhouse to intimidate its members and staged a noisy demonstration in front of **Abdin Palace**, alienating King **Faruq** and giving him a pretext to dismiss the Wafdist cabinet. The king installed a caretaker coalition government of the rival parties and called an election, held in 1938, that was boycotted by the Wafd.

World War II drove Nahhas into an alliance with his erstwhile foes, the British, who made Faruq appoint Nahhas at the head of an all-Wafdist cabinet (*see* **4 February Incident**). Soon after this incident, which tarnished his nationalist credentials for many Egyptians, Nahhas was further discredited by the defection of the Wafdist secretary-general, **Makram Ubayd**, who denounced his policies and exposed his corruption in his **Black Book**. Nahhas's wartime cabinet addressed several social issues by raising the farm workers' minimum daily wage, abolishing fees for the government elementary schools, lowering the taxes on small landowners, and legalizing labor **unions**. His greatest accomplishment, however, was to initiate the **Arab League** by convoking the Arab leaders' conference that produced the **Alexandria Protocol**. On the day after it was signed,

Faruq asked Nahhas to resign. Nahhas played a major role, therefore, in committing Egypt to **Arab nationalism**.

By the time Nahhas resumed the leadership of Egypt's politics, the country's ties to the Arab world had been confirmed by its involvement in the **Palestine War**. Its defeat had discredited both the king and the constitutional system generally, but the old order made a final bid for popularity by calling a general election for January 1950. The Wafd won most of the parliamentary seats (although less than half of the total votes cast), and Nahhas managed to form a Wafdist cabinet that lasted for almost two years. It passed new laws to benefit poor people, notably one that distributed a million acres to landless peasants; but his main aim was to get Britain to renounce its 1936 Treaty, leave its **Suez Canal** base, and hand the **Sudan** over to Egypt. He failed.

After 19 months of fruitless talks, Nahhas unilaterally abrogated the treaty that he had signed on Egypt's behalf in 1936 and also the 1899 **Sudan Convention**. The British troops did not leave, but 100 thousand Egyptians stopped working for them in the Canal Zone, the remaining British civil servants and teachers in Egypt were summarily dismissed, and extremist youths, or *fidaiyin*, began harassing British forces. A shooting incident on 25 January 1952 led to the death of more than 50 Egyptian auxiliary policemen in **Ismailia**, setting off protest demonstrations that led the next day to the burning of much of downtown **Cairo** (see **Black Saturday**). Faruq gave Nahhas emergency powers to quell the riots, but dismissed him the next day for failing to maintain order.

The fires of Black Saturday illumined the breakdown of Egypt's political institutions, and six months later the **Free Officers** seized control of the government. Nahhas, vacationing in Europe, hastened back to Egypt, expecting to be invited to head a new cabinet. **Muhammad Najib** and **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** met with him at length before deciding that the powers that he sought for the Wafd were more than they cared to give. In September 1952 the officers ordered all parties to purge themselves of their leaders. Nahhas defied the order, but the officers managed to split the Wafd. In January 1953 they abolished all political parties and seized their assets. The officers arrested Nahhas and, assuming that his wife had taken control of the party, took her into custody as well. Both were put on trial. He was censured for condoning corruption and she was fined for rigging the **Alexandria cotton** market. Both were deprived of their political and

civil rights from 1954 to 1960 and confined to their Cairo villa, where they lived in relative obscurity. Nahhas's death in 1965 occasioned a larger funeral than Nasir's government had wanted. Personally honest but easily influenced by less scrupulous colleagues, sometimes jealous of people richer or better connected than himself, and principled to the point of obstinacy, Nahhas remained popular because of his solicitude for the poor and his unflinching patriotism.

NAJI, MUHAMMAD (1888–1956). Painter. Born in **Alexandria** and educated at the University of Lyons, he worked briefly in the foreign service. Always drawn to an artistic career, he resigned in 1930. The Mexican muralists, who stressed art's social mission, influenced him. His best known work, "The Renaissance of Egypt," graces the wall of the *Majlis al-Shura* meeting room.

NAJIB, MUHAMMAD (1901–84). Officer, politician, and titular leader of the **1952 Revolution**. He was born in Khartoum and educated at Gordon College and the **Military Academy**, which commissioned him as an artillery officer in 1921. He rose through the ranks slowly, becoming a brigade commander in the **Palestine War**. He later commanded the Frontier Force in 1950 and became director general of the Infantry Corps in 1951. Admired by other officers for his integrity and his opposition to corruption, the **Free Officers** wanted to elect him president of the Officers' Club early in 1952. King **Faruq** rigged the vote against him, occasioning a political crisis. The Free Officers made him nominal leader of their revolution against Faruq (although Najib insisted in his memoirs that he had actually been given control earlier). He became premier, war and naval minister, commander-in-chief of the army, and governor-general of Egypt from 1952 to 1953. He was its president from 1953 to 1954, but with diminishing power, because **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** used his control over the army and organized labor to counter Najib's backing from the **Wafd**, **Muslim Brothers**, **Communists**, and many liberal Egyptians. He was placed under house arrest from 1954 to 1971, and his supporters were purged.

Released by **Anwar al-Sadat**, he attacked Nasir in subsequent articles and interviews and backed his benefactor, but was never given an influential government post. His publications include *Egypt's Destiny* (1955), *Kalimati li al-tarikh* (My Word to History) in 1975 and *Kuntu raisan: mudhakkirat Muhammad Najib* (I Was

President: The Memoirs of Muhammad Najib) in 1984. Modest and gentle, Najib was more a father figure than a revolutionary leader.

NAPOLÉON BONAPARTE (1769–1821). Conqueror of Egypt and Emperor of the **French**. Napoléone Buonaparte (his original name) was born in Corsica, the son of a lawyer with aristocratic connections. He was sent to learn French at a preparatory school in Autun and then to boarding school in Brienne, followed by the Paris Military Academy. By 1797 Napoléon had risen to command the Army of Italy, capturing most of the peninsula. The Directory wanted him to conquer England, but later ordered him to strike at **Britain's** Levant trade and possibly its hold on India by occupying Egypt. He easily defeated the **Mamluks** at **Alexandria** and in the Battle of Imbaba, but the British landed at **Abu-Qir** and destroyed many of his ships. Napoléon launched an invasion of **Palestine** in 1799, but failed to capture Acre, whence the **Anglo-Ottoman** alliance and the bubonic plague forced him to retreat. He decided to return to France, where he soon seized power.

His greatest achievement in Egypt was his introduction of a large corps of scientists and artists who recorded and illustrated the condition of the country (see *Description de l'Égypte*). His claim to be a Muslim and his support for the **ulama** against the Mamluks earned him no local backing. Instead, popular resistance was fierce and could only be quelled by force. His conquest of Egypt and his reforms profoundly disrupted its politics and society, accelerating changes that would lead to the rise of **Muhammad Ali** and his Westernization program. See also **French Occupation**.

NAQIB AL-ASHRAF. Leader, or marshal, of the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad's grandson, Hasan, commonly called *ashraf*. This position in Egypt was regularized during the **Ottoman** period and enjoyed great prestige by the time of the **French occupation**, because the *naqib* was authorized to check the credentials of claimants to descent from Muhammad and to discipline those accused of crimes against the **Shari'a**. One of the best-known *naqibs* was **Umar Makram**, who held the post in the early reign of **Muhammad Ali**, who later curtailed the powers of the *ashraf* by depriving them of their judicial authority and their private *awqaf* and tax farms (see **Landownership**). During the 19th century the position became

hereditary within the Bakri family, often overlapped with that of *Shaykh al-Sadat*, and was tied closely with Egypt's **Sufi** orders. As the privileges of the *ashraf* declined in the 20th century, the position of *naqib* has fallen into desuetude.

NASIF, MALAK HIFNI (1886–1918). **Woman** poet, writer, and orator, often called *Bahithat al-Badiya* (Searcher in the Desert). Born in **Cairo**, she was educated at home and in Egyptian government schools. She taught at the **Khedivial** School for Girls, then married Abd al-Sattar Basil, a **bedouin** tribal leader. Her many articles for *al-Jarida* were collected into a two-volume book, *al-Nisaiyat*, of which only the first was printed. She was the only woman to speak at the 1911 **Egyptian Congress** and was writing a book on **women's** rights at the time of her death. *See also* **Feminism**.

NASIM, MUHAMMAD TAWFIQ (1875–1938). Politician, **cabinet** minister, and premier. Of Anatolian Turkish origin, he was born and educated in **Cairo**, graduating from the government **Law School**. He served as minister of *awqaf*, then **finance**, and twice held the post of premier under King **Fuad I**. He also served as director of his office and speaker of the Senate. Calm by nature, he loved **literature**.

AL-NASIR, JAMAL ABD (1918–70) (English: GAMAL ABDEL NASSER). Army officer, leader of the **1952 Revolution**, premier, and president of Egypt. Born in **Alexandria**, the son of a postal clerk with family roots in Bani Murr, near **Asyut**, he was educated at al-Nahda Secondary School in **Cairo**, **Cairo University's** Faculty of Law, and the **Military Academy**. After being commissioned in 1938, he served in the **Sudan**. From 1941 he taught at the Academy, also receiving advanced training at the Staff College. In the **Palestine War** he commanded a battalion that was besieged for six months at **Faluja**, earning respect from both **Israelis** and Egyptians for its steadfastness. Promoted to colonel in 1951, he became a lecturer at the Staff College. Much of his energy went into organizing the **Free Officers'** group that plotted to oust King **Faruq** and the other leaders, whom it believed had led Egypt to defeat in **Palestine** and fostered the country's corruption and backwardness.

They executed a successful coup on the night of 22–23 July and took power, forming a 12-member **RCC** headed by General **Muhammad Najib**. After the officers decided that they could not relin-

quish control to civilian politicians, Nasir began a power struggle with Najib, who wanted to restore the multiparty, parliamentary government. Nasir, who favored a one-party regime led by the army, prevailed, and in January 1953 the RCC abolished all political parties, except the **Muslim Brothers**, and set up a single organization, the **Liberation Rally**. Nasir also became deputy secretary-general of the RCC and in May 1953 deputy premier and interior minister. He had many leaders of the old regime put on trial and imprisoned. The power struggle with Najib came to a head in February and March 1954, when Nasir tried to use his position to oust his rival, who enjoyed the conspicuous support of the Muslim Brothers, backers of the outlawed political parties, **Communists**, and other liberals. Although Najib seemed to win at first, Nasir rallied his officers and some labor leaders and finally maneuvered him out of power. After the Muslim Brothers tried to assassinate Nasir in October, he banned their Society, executed or jailed its leaders, ousted Najib, and put him under house arrest.

During the early Nasir era, the revolutionary officers made major gains in domestic and **foreign policy**, **land reform**, expansion of **educational** and health services, and elimination of much government corruption. They relinquished Egypt's claims on the **Sudan** and signed the 1954 **Anglo-Egyptian agreement**, providing for the **evacuation** of **Britain's** forces from the **Suez Canal**. Nasir even put out clandestine peace feelers to **Israel**, but they were negated by secret Israeli attempts to sabotage **U.S.-Egyptian** relations (see **Lavon Affair**). His evenhanded execution of both Muslim Brothers implicated in the attempt on his life and Egyptian **Jews** in the Lavon Affair was meant to placate domestic opinion, but antagonized Israel. In February 1955 Israel raided the Egyptian-administered **Gaza Strip**, causing many casualties and revealing the Egyptian army's weakness. Nasir sought additional arms from the West, but his refusal to join the British-sponsored **Baghdad Pact** caused Britain and the United States to block any sales, invoking their **tripartite declaration**. Influenced by Indian Premier Jawaharlal Nehru, Nasir attended the **Bandung Conference**, where he was persuaded to seek arms from Communist countries. As a consequence, Egypt concluded the **Czech Arms Deal** in September 1955.

Anxious to prevent Egypt from falling to Communism, the United States and Britain, together with the World Bank, offered aid to help finance construction of the **Aswan High Dam**, one of

the regime's desiderata. Once Egypt accepted their terms, however, U.S. Secretary of State **John Foster Dulles** retracted the offer in July 1956. In retaliation, Nasir nationalized the **Suez Canal Company**, a risky move that won widespread support in Egypt and the Arab world. The West's failure to restore international control over the Canal, either by diplomacy or by the **Suez War**, enhanced Nasir's prestige. When Egypt promulgated its **1956 Constitution**, he was elected president for a six-year term without opposition.

As Nasir's leadership became entrenched, he began promoting state-managed economic development, including the nationalization of public utilities and basic industries, a policy that he called **Arab socialism**. Nasir took up a conspicuous role in inter-Arab politics, generally backing **Syria** and **Saudi Arabia** against the Hashimite kingdoms of Jordan and **Iraq**. His idea of **Arab nationalism**, appealing to the people against their rulers, became a *leitmotif* of Egyptian foreign policy, as did his policy of **positive neutrality**, by which Egypt avoided forming Cold War alliances while seeking military and economic aid from both sides. Nasir opposed both the Baghdad Pact and the **Eisenhower Doctrine** and appealed to workers and students (and, at times, Palestinian refugees) to undercut pro-Western regimes. In 1958, at **Syria's** behest, Nasir agreed to an organic union of Egypt and Syria, to be called the **UAR**, which they hoped other Arab countries would eventually join. Egypt also hosted a nongovernmental **Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity** Conference in 1957 and in 1961 formed an alliance of nonaligned African states called the Casablanca Bloc (*see* **Pan-Africanism**) and attended a neutralist summit in Belgrade (*see* **Nonalignment**).

Iraq's refusal, after its July 1958 revolution, to join the UAR was a setback, and several other Arab countries that sympathized with Nasir's neutralism also remained aloof. In 1961, after he promulgated the **July Laws**, Syria seceded from the UAR. Although chagrined, Nasir cultivated new allies, especially Algeria, and strongly backed Yemen's 1962 military coup, precipitating the costly **Yemen Civil War**. At home Nasir convoked the **National Congress of Popular Forces**, drew up the **National Charter**, and established the ASU as the new single political party. The appointment of **Ali Sabri** as prime minister of a **cabinet** that for the first time included a worker and a female member, signaled Nasir's leftward drift. Although he continued to preach Arab nationalism and rejoiced when Ba'thist officers overthrew hostile regimes in Iraq and Syria in 1963,

leading to new Arab unity talks, his regime was acquiescing in the continuation of separate Arab states. Responding to the draining of the Arabs' fresh water supply by Israel's irrigation projects in the Jordan River valley, Egypt convened two Arab summit meetings in 1964, proclaiming plans to divert the sources of the Jordan and creating the **PLO**. His aim was to satisfy Arab demands to harm Israel; the result was to postpone armed confrontation with the Jewish state.

In 1966, however, a radical Ba'thist regime took power in Syria and began provoking Israel by backing raids by Palestinian *fidaiyin*. The **Egyptian-Syrian joint defense agreement** failed to restrain Syria, which lost six fighter planes in a dogfight with Israel in April 1967. Advised by the **Soviets** that Israel was massing troops to invade Syria, Nasir cast off all caution to build up Egypt's forces in the **Sinai Peninsula**. He demanded the withdrawal of **UNEF** and then blockaded the **Tiran Straits** against Israeli shipping in the **Gulf of Aqaba**. Egypt's press, **radio**, and **television** competed with the mass media of other Arab states in issuing anti-Israel threats. Israeli jet fighters attacked Egypt and other Arab powers, starting the **June War**. Within six days Israel tripled the land area under its control, including the **Gaza Strip** and the Sinai, and Nasir had to accept a cease-fire. He addressed the nation on television, took responsibility for the defeat (although he accused the United States of aiding Israel), and offered to resign. Mass demonstrations, seemingly spontaneous but probably officially orchestrated, persuaded him to withdraw his resignation.

Nasir became more cautious after the war. At the **Khartoum summit**, the Arab leaders rejected negotiating with Israel, but Nasir made peace with Saudi Arabia and withdrew his troops from Yemen in return for Saudi financial support. He later accepted **Security Council Resolution 242**, but waged a costly **War of Attrition** against Israel, only to end it abruptly by accepting the **Rogers Peace Plan** in July 1970. He seemed to be moving toward peace with Israel when he suddenly died in September 1970, just after he had mediated a Jordanian-Palestinian civil war.

His successor, **Anwar al-Sadat**, changed many policies, enabling Egyptians to assail Nasir's oppressive rule and the failure of his economic policies. Nevertheless, his personal integrity, commitment to Arab unity, concern for the welfare of poor workers and peasants, and ability to stand up to the West are honored by many Egyptians. When Sadat's policies worked, Nasir's reputation suf-

ferred, but to the degree that Sadat, too, failed, Nasir's memory has continued to be revered by many Egyptians and other Arabs.

NASIRISM. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** political philosophy and program, which included nationalism, neutralism, and **Arab socialism**. After his death, this term was applied to the political views of Egyptians and other Arabs who opposed **Anwar al-Sadat's** policies.

NASIRIST PARTY, *see* **ARAB DEMOCRATIC NASIRIST PARTY.**

NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL, *see* **AL-NASIR, JAMAL ABD.**

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. Term used for Egypt's short-lived representative assembly under the **1882 Constitution**, the larger Parliament set up under the **1956 Constitution**, and the representative body, having restricted legislative powers, set up under the **1964 Constitution** and initially limited to **ASU** members. The **1971 Constitution** renamed it *Majlis al-Sha'b*, or **People's Assembly**, and expanded its power to initiate and vote on legislation. Under **Anwar al-Sadat**, it held spirited debates on many issues, even though it could not determine defense or **foreign policy**, nor could it revise the government's budget. It served as a sounding board for the Egyptian bourgeoisie, **Sadat's** natural constituency, and as a place for politicians temporarily out of power. It sometimes blocked government initiatives, such as a tax on fruit trees, or checked abuses of power, as in attempts to build a resort on the lands surrounding the Pyramids. In 1976 its members were allowed to form alternative pulpits (*manabir*) to express dissident viewpoints and, from 1978, separate political parties. **Sadat** bypassed the Assembly by resort to plebiscites, e.g., in obtaining popular assent for the **Law of Shame**. **Husni Mubarak** has not continued this practice, but the electoral laws have so far ensured that most Assembly members come from the **NDP**, which supports the government's policies. *See also* **Elections**.

NATIONAL BANK OF EGYPT. Privately owned bank, founded by Sir Ernest Cassel, Raphael Suarès, and C. M. Salvago, in 1898. It was an Egyptian company, founded in Egypt by a **khedivial** decree and having its board meetings in **Cairo**, and its purposes were to serve as the government bank and the bank of issue for Egypt's **currency**. The timing of its creation was partly due to the concurrent

need to finance the building of the **Aswan Dam** and the barrage at **Asyut** at a cost of £E2 million and also to sell the state domain (*daira saniyya*) lands to Egyptian buyers. In another sense, it was foreign, in that half the shares were subscribed in the City of London and that the London directors for many years had special rights. The Egyptian government was represented by two controllers paid by the bank. It soon established as subsidiaries the Agricultural Bank of Egypt and the Bank of Abyssinia. It helped other banks and businesses to weather the 1907 panic, the removal of the gold cover from banknotes during **World War I**, and the 1929–39 Depression.

During **World War II** the National Bank played a crucial role in retiring and refunding the existing government debt and in administering exchange controls. Upon the renewal of the bank's charter in 1940, its role as a bank of issue was further defined and provisions were made for the further Egyptianization of its board of directors, but its conversion to the status of Egypt's central bank was postponed due to the war. Nationalized by the **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** government in 1960, its national bank functions were turned over to the newly created Central Bank of Egypt. In 1971 it became the primary bank for financing Egypt's foreign **trade**. It remains the largest Egyptian bank, with £E87.1 billion in its total balance sheet as of 30 June 2001. It held £E67 billion in deposits as of that date, had £E 54.5 billion in loans, and £E18 billion in **investments**.

NATIONAL CHARTER (1962), *see* **CHARTER, NATIONAL**.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF WORKERS AND STUDENTS (NCWS). Coalition of leftist organizations set up after the **Abbas Bridge Incident** to oppose **Isma'il Sidqi's** government. Joined by members of **Iskra**, the **EMNL**, and the **Wafdist Vanguard**, the NCWS organized the **Cairo** demonstration by students and workers of 21 February 1946. Orderly at first, it turned violent in Midan Ismailia (now **Liberation Square**) because of aggressive behavior by **British** troops, leading first to small fights and then to massive violence as demonstrators attacked foreign shops, clubs, and the **British Qasr al-Nil Barracks**. The reported toll was 23 dead and 121 wounded. The NCWS declared 4 March as a day of mourning. It became a general strike, provoking clashes in **Alexandria** between demonstrators and police, causing 28 deaths and 342 injuries. Brit-

ain's announcement four days later that it was evacuating its barracks in Cairo, Alexandria, and the Delta was interpreted as an NCWS victory. The group was loosely organized, though, and Sidqi's **cabinet** managed to crush it in July 1946 as part of its general suppression of leftist organizations.

NATIONAL CONGRESS OF POPULAR FORCES (1962). Assembly made up of 1,500 popularly elected delegates, representing intellectuals, workers, peasants, national capitalists, and soldiers, and an appointed preparatory committee of 250 delegates charged by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government with debating and approving the **National Charter**.

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR WOMEN. Government-sponsored **women's** organization. In response to concerns about the condition of Egyptian women expressed by President **Husni Mubarak**, a group of women leaders formed the Council in February 2000, with his wife, **Suzanne Mubarak**, as its leader. The group held general conferences in March 2000 and 2001 and focused forums in May and July 2000. It also attended the conference, "Beijing Plus Five: Women in 2000," sponsored by the **United Nations** General Assembly, and hosted the first Arab Women's Summit. Working with various UN agencies and other affiliated groups, the Council provides assistance to female heads of households, encourages women to vote and to run for public office, watches the media for anti-female stereotypes, sponsors a training center in **Cairo** for future women leaders, serves as an ombudsman for dealing with the government **bureaucracy**, provides a database for Egyptian women's studies, plans a national strategy for promoting women's rights, has created an auxiliary group called "Friends of the National Council for Women," and monitors laws, job opportunities, and actions of a discriminatory nature harmful to women. Its secretaries-general have been Ambassador Marvat Tallawi and Professor Farkhunda Muhammad Hasan, of **AUC**. *See also* **Feminism**.

NATIONAL COURTS. The tribunals set up in 1883 to try civil and criminal cases involving Egyptian nationals. The procedures and many of the laws originally reflected those already incorporated into the **Mixed Courts** and were mainly influenced by the Code Napoléon, but also included some features of Egypt's existing adminis-

trative (*see* **Council of Justice**) and **Shari'a Courts**. Because of Egypt's political and historical evolution during the 20th century, the national tribunals have absorbed the Mixed Courts and those of the Muslims and other religious communities. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government sapped the independence of the judiciary, but under **Anwar al-Sadat** and **Husni Mubarak** the National Courts have occasionally resisted government attempts to violate civil liberties and to manipulate parliamentary **elections**.

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT. Coalition of **Muslim Brothers**, **Wafdists**, **Communists**, and other Egyptian political groups that backed **Muhammad Najib** in 1953–54 against **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** efforts to ban all parties other than the government-sanctioned **Liberation Rally**. Highly articulate in their condemnation of military dictatorship, the National Democratic Front's leaders were divided on their methods and goals. They failed to persuade enough Egyptians to support democratic government, which many believed had failed to benefit them between 1923 and 1952. The army crushed the front in April 1954, and hundreds of its members were sentenced to penal servitude as Nasir took power.

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP). Political organization founded by **Anwar al-Sadat** in 1978 to replace the ASU. The drive to create this party began within the **People's Assembly** in 1976, when Mahmud Abu Wafia assumed the leadership of the ASU's central platform (*minbar*) and called it the Arab Socialist Party of Egypt, often abbreviated to *Misr* Party, and was led by the prime minister, **Mamduh Salim**. In 1978 Sadat abolished the ASU and designated the *Misr* Party as the official organization, renamed it the National Democratic Party, and made himself its president. In 1980 he turned the leadership over to **Husni Mubarak**.

The party's stated policies, such as the preservation of the Arab socialist gains made under **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**, the defense of the Arab cause, and **positive neutrality**, were generally the opposite of the government ones that it supported in fact. It served more as an instrument of indoctrination from above than of recruitment from below. The NDP was heavily subservient to Sadat's person and policies during his lifetime. Mubarak sought a middle ground between identifying with the party and distancing himself from it. The government has appointed its leaders; only in 1986 did the NDP finally

hold a congress. Party membership is viewed as necessary for holding public office, but does not necessarily imply active involvement, and the interior ministry often intervenes to decide who runs for the People's Assembly as an NDP candidate.

Egypt's people care little about the party and its candidates; candidates enter—and leave—NDP election lists often. Opposition parties stir greater public interest, but the electoral system ensures that NDP candidates will remain the majority. The interests articulated by the NDP are those of the **bureaucracy** and the bourgeoisie, rather than the workers and peasants of the ASU under Nasir. In the past five **elections**, all of which have been contested by other parties, it has won a majority of the seats: 303 in 1984, 390 in 1987, 448 in 1990, 410 in 1995, and 388 seats in 2000.

NATIONAL FRONT (1935). Coalition of political parties and associations formed to oppose the Palace-dominated government and to restore the **1923 Constitution**.

NATIONAL ISLAMIC PARTY, *see MISR AL-FATAT*.

NATIONAL PARTY. Name generally applied by Egyptians and foreigners to several political organizations involved in the movement, led by Colonel **Ahmad Urabi**, opposing foreign control of Egypt in 1881–82. It also denotes the political organization founded initially in 1895 as a secret society under **Khedive Abbas Hilmi II**, later as a public movement led by **Mustafa Kamil**, and open to all Egyptians desiring the **evacuation** of **British** troops from Egypt and the **Sudan**. The National Party also called on the khedive to grant a constitution that would introduce parliamentary government and ministerial responsibility to Egypt.

After Mustafa's death in 1908, **Muhammad Farid** led the party in a more radical direction, espousing **pan-Islam** and far-reaching economic and social reforms. However, British repressive measures such as the **1909 Press Law** and later the **Exceptional Laws**, and internal divisions weakened the Nationalists in Egypt. The assassination of Prime Minister **Butros Ghali** by a Nationalist alienated many moderate backers of the movement. Most Nationalist leaders sought refuge in Europe, where they aided the **Ottoman Empire** and Germany during **World War I**. After the armistice, the National Party in Egypt helped the **Wafd** in organizing what

became the **1919 Revolution**, but gradually lost most of its members to **Sa'd Zaghlul**. Led by **Hafiz Ramadan**, the party survived until 1952, when it voluntarily disbanded to support the revolutionary **Free Officers**.

NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE UNIONIST PARTY (NPUP). Leftist offshoot of the ASU. Headed by **Khalid Muhyi al-Din**, the NPUP, often called the *Tajammu'* (Coalition) Party in Arabic, sought to preserve the **socialist** gains of the **1952 Revolution**. Feared by **Anwar al-Sadat** as a **Nasirite** front, he tried to weaken it by instigating the formation of the **SLP** in 1978. The NPUP has survived, however, because of Khalid's political acumen and its appeal to the groups that had benefited from **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** reforms. **Marxists** and journalists are strong within the party; there are few army officers, bureaucrats, or ASU operatives, except for backers of the **Vanguard** organization once led by **Ali Sabri**. It claimed 150 thousand members in 1978, and its mouthpiece, *al-Ahali*, attracted 100 thousand readers before it was suppressed, at the time when Sadat tried, unsuccessfully, to disband the NPUP in May 1978. It won five parliamentary seats in 1976 and fared poorly in subsequent elections, due to government harassment and to the exclusion of parties earning less than 8 percent of the popular vote from representation in the **People's Assembly**. In 1990 the Supreme Constitutional Court voided the amendments to the 1972 election law, which discriminated against small parties and independent candidates. In the **1995 election** for the People's Assembly, the NPUP received 1.8 percent of the vote and won six seats, which it retained in 2000. It currently claims 160 thousand members.

NATIONAL SERVICE PROJECT ORGANIZATION (NSPO).

Group created in 1978 by the government to manage the Egyptian **armed forces'** enterprises that produce goods for military and civilian use. In 1985 NSPO production included £E488 million in **agriculture**, £E347 million in nonmilitary manufactured goods, £E174 million in construction, and £E144 million in other goods and services. The military accounted for 18 percent of Egypt's total food production in that year. Egyptians disagree on the desirability of the military's involvement in competition against private enterprise and the diversion of its energies from national defense. Its activities were more restricted after **Abd al-Halim Abu-Ghazala** was dismissed as

defense minister in 1989. In 1994 it comprised 16 factories employing 75 thousand workers.

NATIONAL UNION. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** organization, formed under the **1956 Constitution**, to mobilize the Egyptians to support his regime, replacing the **Liberation Rally**. Its executive committee, containing three members of the abolished **RCC**, screened 2,500 candidates for the **National Assembly**, approving 1,188 for the 1957 election. The National Union had a comprehensive pyramidal structure based on villages, quarters, district centers, provincial capitals, and a national congress, with an executive committee at the top. Established local elites soon took control of the rural committees, and Nasir came to view the National Union as a haven for reactionaries. When the **UAR** was formed in 1958, membership was extended to Syrians as well, but the National Union did not adapt well to the UAR. After **Syria's** secession, Nasir abolished the National Union in October 1961 during his crackdown on the bourgeoisie and replaced it in 1962 by the **ASU**. The government never involved National Union members in debating any policy issues; its role was limited to rallying the people behind the regime.

NAVARINO, BATTLE OF (1827). Defeat and destruction of the **Ottoman** and Egyptian fleets by **Britain, France, and Russia**, during the Greek War of Independence.

NDP, see NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

NELSON, Sir HORATIO (1758–1805). British admiral and victor over **Napoléon Bonaparte** in Egypt. In 1770 he entered the navy and served in the West Indies, the North Sea, Canada, and **France**. In 1797 he defeated the Spanish fleet, for which he was knighted and promoted to the rank of rear admiral, and the next summer he pursued Napoléon's fleet across the Mediterranean, reaching **Alexandria** on 1 August. He attacked the 13 French ships moored in **Abu-Qir Bay**, overcame their greater size and numbers with superior strategy and tactics, and scored a devastating victory. Although he could not drive the French from Egypt, Nelson's victory assured **Britain** of mastery in the Mediterranean. He continued to fight the French and their allies until his death at Cape Trafalgar.

NEUTRALISM, *see* **NONALIGNMENT**, **POSITIVE NEUTRALITY**.

NEW DAWN. Informal association of leftist intellectuals who published a magazine by that name, also called *al-Fajr al-Jadid*. It cooperated with the **Wafdist Vanguard** in opposing British imperialism and local conservatism. It had ties with the Workers' Committee for National Liberation, which was influential among the textile workers of Shubra al-Khayma and Mahalla al-Kubra. After **Isma'il Sidqi's** government cracked down on the Left in July 1946, it formed an underground party called *al-Tali'a al-Sha'biyya li al-Taharrur* (Popular Vanguard for Liberation), which helped to radicalize some labor **union** leaders and promote **women's** liberation. Although it had few members, its journalistic activities rendered it influential. It merged with *Hadeto* and the Egyptian **Communist Party** in 1958.

NEWSPAPERS, *see* **PRESS**.

NEW TOWNS. Satellite cities established by the **Anwar al-Sadat** and **Husni Mubarak** governments to ease **population** pressure on **Cairo** and **Alexandria**. In 1956 the government published its first master plan for Cairo's development, estimating that by 2000 it would have approximately 5.5 million inhabitants, a figure that was exceeded during the 1980s. A second master plan was released in 1971, calling for the construction of "New Cities" in lands reclaimed from the desert in order to decentralize Cairo's burgeoning population. Among the new towns founded during the 1970s were Tenth of Ramadan City located 60 km from Cairo toward **Ismailia**, Sadat City located 75 km from Cairo on the Desert Road to Alexandria, and New Amiriyya City located 55 km southwest of Alexandria. These were originally planned to have a half-million inhabitants apiece, a figure later cut in half, and construction costs were estimated in 1982 at £E3.5 billion for a 20-year period. By 2017 the government will have spent £E142 billion on the cities.

Hoping to promote the growth of the desert cities, the government offered doubled salaries for its employees, rent subsidies for both industrial and residential units, and ten-year tax exemptions for new industries. However, it has been hard to persuade families to relocate to these cities. In addition, Cairo has new satellite suburbs, called Sixth of October City and Fifteenth of May

City, which have been made relatively attractive by accessible public transportation. Most recent development has been directed toward New Cairo, located in the desert heights about 25 km south-east of Cairo. Golf courses, residential communities and international schools were already built there by 2001 in anticipation of future development. In addition, AUC expects to relocate its entire campus to a 260 **feddan** site in New Cairo by 2007.

NEW WAFD PARTY, *see* **WAFD PARTY, NEW**.

NEZIB, BATTLE OF (1839). Triumph of Egypt's forces commanded by **Ibrahim**, over the **Ottoman** army. If **Muhammad Ali** had not ordered Ibrahim to refrain from pursuing them, his forces probably could have crossed the Taurus Mountains, traversed Anatolia, and seized control of Istanbul.

NILE, BATTLE OF THE, *see* **ABU-QIR, BATTLE OF**.

NILE RIVER. Longest river in Africa, second longest in the world, and the dominant natural feature of northeastern Africa. Measured from its most remote source in Tanzania to the Mediterranean Sea, the Nile River is 6,600 km long and its waters serve a basin of more than 2.6 million square km. For Egypt, it is almost the sole source of drinking water and **irrigation**, and Egyptians have always been concerned about how its waters are used. About 12 billion cubic meters of water flow through the Nile annually. Most of this water comes from the Ethiopian highlands, but some comes from the central African lakes. Much of the rainfall in southern **Sudan** is absorbed by its swamps; some is also lost to evaporation. The water entering Egypt from Central Africa, via the White Nile, is relatively constant throughout the year, but that coming from Ethiopia, via the Atbara and the Blue Nile, fluctuates, increasing when the mountain snows melt. Consequently, the Nile rises in the summertime and reaches its peak in Egypt in September.

Ever since human beings have tried to raise crops in order to control their food supply, they have made efforts to channel the Nile flood, using methods of **basin irrigation** or, more recently, **perennial irrigation** made possible by building such large-scale public works as the **Delta Barrages**, the **Aswan Dam**, and the **Aswan High Dam**. The Nile Valley's soaring **population** in modern times

has created problems of pollution, waterborne diseases such as **bilharzia**, and depletion of animal life. Egypt has an agreement with Sudan for the sharing of Nile waters, but not with any other country on the river.

NILE WATERS AGREEMENT (1959). Agreement between Egypt and **Sudan** defining how the **Nile River** waters would be shared. Superseding the 1929 Treaty between the two countries, it opened the way for the construction of the **Aswan High Dam**. Components of the new agreement, to last for 100 years, include obtaining Sudanese consent to the construction of the High Dam; earmarking one-third of the Nile's total flow for Sudan; making payment by the Egyptian government of £E15 million, in hard currency, to compensate the displaced inhabitants of Wadi Halfa; and ensuring cooperation between the two countries on a series of projects and leasing agreements. With the agreement nearing its halfway point, several parties have called for renegotiating the agreement on both **economic** and **environmental** grounds.

NILESAT. Launched in April 1998, Nilesat 101 was the first satellite owned by a single Arab country. Championed from its inception in 1993 by information minister Safwat Sharif, Nilesat became a private company with 40 percent ownership by the Egyptian **Radio and Television** Union. This first **communications** satellite was built by the Matra Marconi Space Company and launched on an Ariane 4 rocket by the European Space Agency. A second satellite, Nilesat 102, was launched in August 2000. It covers the area from Morocco to the Arabian (Persian) Gulf.

NIYABA. The institution of Egypt's legal system that represents the state's interests and that investigates cases and prepares them for trial. Often called the *parquet*, it resembles that institution within the French legal system and has some of the functions of the prosecution or the attorney general's office in English-speaking countries. Egypt's *Niyaba* is subject to the interior ministry, whereas the judges are under the justice ministry. It guards its independence and its reputation for impartiality.

NIZAM-I-JEDID. **Ottoman** military and political reform program promulgated by Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807). Although stifled in

Istanbul by a Janissary revolt in 1807, it served as the initial basis for **Muhammad Ali's** reforms in Egypt.

NONALIGNMENT. Preferred term for “neutrality” or the policy that **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** called **positive neutrality**, meaning abstention by governments from military pacts sponsored by **Communist** or Western countries. Egypt became interested in nonalignment in reaction to pressures from the **U.S.** government in the early 1950s to join an anti-Soviet Middle East Defense Organization and as a result of the personal influence on Nasir of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito. Although not billed as such, the **Bandung Conference** marked the rise of nonalignment as a basis for relations between governments. It took concrete form in September 1961 with the Belgrade Nonaligned Summit, for which the three leaders held a preparatory conference in **Cairo** three months earlier. The nonaligned leaders reached the understanding that they would not abstain from all military alliances (in Egypt’s case, the **Arab League** Collective Security Pact of 1950), but only those related to the Cold War between the **USSR** and the West. Cairo hosted the 1964 Nonaligned Summit. Under **Anwar al-Sadat** Egypt’s rapprochement with the West strained—but did not sunder—its ties with the nonaligned movement.

NORTHBROOK MISSION (1884). Unsuccessful British government initiative to reform Egypt’s finances at a time when tax revenues were falling, due in part to the low **Nile River** flood and the **cholera** epidemic of 1883, and disbursements were rising, due to military expenses, the **Sudan** campaigns, and indemnities awarded in compensation for damages resulting from the **Alexandria** massacre and fire. Seeking to relieve Egypt’s treasury, Northbrook advised its government to defy the 1880 **Law of Liquidation** by paying the treasury some of the money earmarked for the service of the debt, causing the *Caisse de la Dette Publique* to sue the Egyptian government in the **Mixed Courts**. In 1885 **Britain** convened a conference that modified some parts of the Liquidation Law, in return for admitting German and Russian commissioners to the *Caisse*. Egypt was permitted to float an internationally guaranteed loan for £E9 million to cover the Alexandria indemnities and to rehabilitate some of its **irrigation** works. The principle of international control over

Egyptian finance was upheld, to protect the foreign bondholders, at some cost to the Egyptian taxpayer.

NUBAR NUBARIAN (1825–99). **Armenian** official, legal reformer, **cabinet** minister, and three-time premier. Educated in **France** and Switzerland, he was brought to Egypt by an uncle, Boghos Yusufyan, who was **Muhammad Ali**'s chief translator. He worked at his uncle's side for some time and, after his death in 1844, was employed by his successor, Khusrev Bey. He soon became translator and unofficial adviser to **Ibrahim**. He married into a rich Istanbul Armenian family, whose **Ottoman** connections would later enable him to serve his patrons, notably **Khedive Isma'il**. **Abbas Hilmi I** used Nubar as his chief negotiator with the **British** to build Egypt's first **railway**. Having lived in Europe as a boy, he spoke 11 foreign languages, had read widely in Western **literature**, and knew how to charm Europeans. After seeking permission to leave the government service in 1853, he nevertheless acceded to Abbas's request to be his *chargé d'affaires* in Vienna. Recalled by **Sa'id** when he closed Egypt's agencies abroad, Nubar organized the growing transit traffic between **Cairo** and Suez, was named secretary to his cabinet, and in 1858 became director of the communications and railways department. He was dismissed 15 months later, ostensibly because of the delayed delivery of two guns ordered by the viceroy but due in fact to Nubar's dependence on the British consul general, one of several occasions when Nubar sought British backing.

Isma'il sent Nubar to Istanbul and to Paris to represent his views on the **Suez Canal** concession. In 1864 he took nearly total control of public works and railways, leading Europeans to assume that he masterminded Egypt's administration, but Isma'il's suspicion that Nubar was abusing his powers led in 1866 to his transfer to foreign affairs. Meanwhile, his rapid accumulation of land and money was making him one of the richest men in Egypt. He helped obtain loans for Isma'il, negotiated with the Ottoman government for the decrees that increased Egypt's autonomy, and labored to create the **Mixed Courts**. Nubar directed the commerce department from 1875 to 1878. When Isma'il agreed in August 1878 to turn his powers over to a cabinet modeled after those of Europe, Nubar became his prime minister. This "European cabinet," which included an Englishman as finance minister and a French public works minister, was dismissed by Isma'il in March 1879, following an officers' mutiny.

Nubar returned to power in 1884, when Egypt was being pressed to evacuate the **Sudan**, and served until 1888, a period when the power of the **British occupation** was expanding. He served as premier a third time in 1894–95, following the **Frontiers Incident**. Adaptable, clever, and diplomatic, he is remembered by Egyptians for using his foreign connections to enrich himself at their expense. Mirrit Boutros Ghali annotated and published his *Mémoires de Nubar Pacha* in Beirut.

NUBIANS. Dark-skinned inhabitants of the **Nile** Valley between the First Cataract and the northern **Sudan**. Until the 1960s most Nubians lived in small, almost isolated, villages strung out along the banks of the upper Nile River. The men often migrated to **Cairo** or other cities to take jobs as household or hotel servants, leaving their wives behind. Often the sons of these servants would become educated and advance to middle-class status. Because the Nubians have been **Muslim** since the 17th century, there has been no barrier to their intermarriage with other Muslim Egyptians. The Nubians who lived in Upper Egypt were displaced by the various Nile River **irrigation** projects, especially the **Aswan High Dam** in 1962–65. Energetic and adaptable, they are assimilating to Egyptian ways and speaking Arabic instead of their vernacular languages. The estimated Nubian population in 2000 was 260 thousand.

NUCLEAR ENERGY. Egypt acquired its first nuclear equipment, a 2-megawatt research reactor, in 1961 as a gift from the **USSR**. It considered developing nuclear weapons in competition with **Israel** during the 1960s, an idea subsequently abandoned because of the cost. It signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 but did not actually ratify it until 1981, a delay that hindered Egypt's efforts to buy nuclear technology from the **United States**, Canada, **Britain**, and even the **USSR** during the 1970s. Soon after the Egyptian government ratified the treaty, however, it signed an agreement with the United States to build two nuclear power stations, but no action has ensued. In 1984, working initially with **France**, the Italian government began feasibility studies for a nuclear power station west of **Alexandria**. Concerned about generating electric power, the Egyptian government has proposed to build eight (later reduced to three) 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plants by 2005, but financial problems have delayed implementation of this program. Egypt reportedly

has deposits of uranium in the Western Desert 500 km southwest of **Cairo** in the **Sinai Peninsula**, and in phosphate rock found among the beach sands of the **Nile Delta**. It has also signed (but not ratified) the Treaty of Pelindaba, making the African continent a zone free of nuclear weapons.

AL-NUQRASHI, MAHMUD FAHMI (1888–1948). Educator, politician, and **cabinet** minister. Born in **Alexandria**, he received his higher education in Nottingham (England). Upon returning to Egypt, he taught school, then rose in the administration until he became director of public instruction for **Asyut**. A supporter of the **Wafd**, he became the vice governor of **Cairo** and then deputy interior minister under **Sa'd Zaghul**. Implicated in the murder of Sir **Lee Stack**, Nuqrashi was imprisoned briefly but then cleared. He held ministerial posts in the Wafdist cabinets of 1930 and 1936 but broke with **Mustafa al-Nahhas** in 1937. Together with **Ahmad Mahir**, he formed the **Sa'dist Party**, which joined several Palace-led coalition cabinets. After Ahmad Mahir was assassinated in 1945, he became the party leader and headed cabinets in 1945–46 and 1947–48. He led the 1947 Egyptian delegation to the **UN Security Council** to demand that **Britain** withdraw from the **Sudan** and allow it to unite with Egypt, but did not gain its support. When fighting broke out between Jews and Arabs in **Palestine**, Nuqrashi delayed committing Egyptian troops, but was overridden by King **Faruq** in May 1948. As defeats in Palestine stirred up Egyptian discontent, he tried to ban the **Muslim Brothers** and was assassinated by a student on 28 December 1948. Conscientious and patriotic, he was neither as charismatic as his rival Nahhas nor as flamboyant as his royal patron.

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OASES. Egypt's Western (or Libyan) desert contains five geological depressions that, being watered by underground springs and inhabited, are regarded as oases: Dakhila, Kharija, Farafira, Bahriyya, and Siwa. Dakhila and Kharija constitute one Arabic-speaking cultural group; Farafira and Bahriyya another; and Siwa is viewed as unique, because it is larger, below sea level, and some of its inhabitants speak a Berber dialect instead of, or in addition to, Arabic. Oases inhabitants live in villages; **Bedouin** may at times pass through the

oases, but they do not live there. Fayyum, which is near the **Nile River**, is sometimes considered a sixth Egyptian oasis.

Dakhila, located in the New Valley governorate, has about 70 thousand inhabitants and 30 thousand feddans under cultivation. Kharija, the largest oasis in the New Valley in area, has a population of 60 thousand and contains the capital of the New Valley governorate. Both Dakhila and Kharija will be connected to the canal that is being built as part of the **Toshka Project** and are likely to grow significantly in population and arable land area. Farafira, roughly equidistant between Egypt's border with **Libya** and the Nile, prospered in ancient and early Islamic times. It has, however, suffered from raids by the Bedouin of Egypt and Cyrenaica and is now the least populated of the oases. Bahriyya is actually a group of oases in Matruh governorate known for their dates and raisins and their mineral hot springs. The area has been inhabited since Roman times and has proven to be a treasure house for **archaeology**. **Iron** ore has been found nearby, and its estimated population of 3 thousand is likely to grow as **mining** develops. Siwa (population: 23 thousand) is being developed for **tourism**.

OCTOBER PAPER. Programmatic statement issued by **Anwar al-Sadat** in April 1974. Seemingly, it reaffirmed **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**'s commitments to strengthen Egypt, confront **Israel**, unite the Arabs, and lead the movement for nonalignment. It paid lip service to maintaining **socialism** and the public-sector industries. In reality, the document muted these goals and stressed Egypt's need for foreign resources and, more specifically, Arab and Western **investment** capital and Western technology. As Egypt reverted to a market **economy**, the October Paper came to be seen as Sadat's first statement of his *infitah* policy.

OCTOBER WAR (1973). Large-scale war started by Egypt and **Syria** to regain lands occupied by **Israel** since 1967, also called the Yom Kippur War or Ramadan War. Concerted planning began in 1971, following the breakdown in the indirect Egyptian-Israeli negotiations conducted under the **Rogers Peace Plan**. Israel's rejection of a peace proposal involving an interim pullback from the **Suez Canal** and an eventual settlement based on **Security Council Resolution 242** convinced **Anwar al-Sadat** that only by fighting could Egypt regain the lands it had lost in the **June War**. He opened secret talks

with **Syria's** President Hafiz al-Asad under the aegis of the proposed **Federation of Arab Republics**, and both leaders agreed that a two-front war would be needed to defeat Israel. They decided to exclude **Libya's** leader, Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, from their planning, even though his oil wealth was helping to pay for their rearmament, but Jordan's King Husayn and **Saudi Arabia's** King Faysal were informed. Sadat's ousting of the **Soviet** advisers from Egypt in July 1972 seemed to weaken his war-making potential, but actually it accelerated arms deliveries from the **USSR** to Egypt, and not all advisers actually left. By November 1972, Sadat felt that Egypt was ready militarily to go to war, but rearmament, training, and diplomatic efforts went on for most of 1973, leading Israel and the **United States** to disregard Sadat's public warnings of a renewed Arab war.

The coordinated Egyptian and Syrian attacks, code-named **Operation Badr**, began at 2:05 PM on 6 October, which was the Jewish Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur) and the 10th of Ramadan. Using rubber dinghies, ferries, and hastily erected bridges, Egypt managed to get 90 thousand officers and men across the Suez Canal within 18 hours. Their high-pressure hoses scoured 60 breaks in the earthen embankments of the **Bar Lev Line**. Egyptian artillery and missiles also downed dozens of Israeli airplanes and destroyed hundreds of tanks. Israel's forces had to retreat from the Canal, letting Egypt establish defensive beachheads along its east bank. But Egypt did not use its victory to capture the **Gidi** and **Mitla Passes** and cross the **Sinai Peninsula**, enabling Israel to shift men and matériel to its northern front against **Syria**. Finally, at Syria's insistence, Sadat ignored his generals' advice and ordered an offensive to capture the strategic passes, leading to the fiercest tank battle since **World War II**. On 15 October an Israeli unit pierced a gap in Egypt's defenses, crossing the Suez Canal under heavy fire. After two days of bitter fighting, larger numbers of Israeli men and tanks poured across the Canal and drove southward toward Suez City, placing Egypt in grave danger.

As Arabs and Israelis were receiving immense arms shipments from the **USSR** and the **United States**, respectively, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger flew to Moscow to confer with the Soviet government about drafting a cease-fire resolution that could be accepted by the **United Nations**. The draft became **Security Council Resolution 338**, which Sadat promptly accepted, to Syria's dismay. Syria hoped to regain some of the lands it had lost during the Israeli

counteroffensive, and Israel also did not want the cease-fire to take effect until it had encircled Suez City. The fighting went on for two more days before it stopped, with the Israelis surrounding Suez City and Egypt's Third Army cut off from relief supplies.

Egypt wanted the superpowers to intervene by sending a joint peacekeeping force to police the cease-fire, a move so threatening to the Nixon administration that it put U.S. forces on red alert. Richard Nixon's drastic response may also have been due to an unconfirmed report that the Soviets were shipping **nuclear**-tipped missiles to Egypt through the Dardanelles. Fearing a confrontation, Moscow withdrew its peacekeeping proposal, and the danger of a superpower war receded. Egypt's losses included 1,100 tanks, 450 armored personnel carriers, 44 jet fighters and 223 helicopters, 42 warships, and about 7,500 men killed, 12 thousand injured, and 8,031 taken prisoner or missing.

The postwar resolution included visits by Kissinger and the Soviet leaders to the area, the **Kilometer 101 talks**, the **Geneva Peace Conference**, **shuttle diplomacy**, and **Separation of Forces agreements** between the belligerents. The October War shattered the myths of Israeli invincibility and Arab military incompetence, proved that the Arabs could unsheathe their oil weapon against the West, enabled Sadat to restore Egypt's political and economic ties with the United States, and prepared the way for later steps toward peace: the **Egyptian-Israeli agreement**, Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, the **Camp David Accords**, and the **Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty**.

OIL, *see* **PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS**.

OMEGA PLAN. **United States** scheme to destabilize **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** regime after its earlier **Alpha Plan** had failed. Proposed in March 1956, it proposed covert political and economic actions to weaken Egypt's economy and reduce Nasir's influence in the Arab World. Some even envisaged overthrowing him, after the pattern of Iran's Mohammad Musaddiq in 1953. This plan was a model for later American efforts to destabilize regimes opposing its policies.

OPERA HOUSE. Large theater in central **Cairo** built in five months during 1869 for the **Suez Canal** inaugural ceremonies. It was the scene of major speeches, ceremonies, and other public events for the

following century. Destroyed by a fire in 1971, it was replaced by a new opera house built in **Zamalek** by a Japanese construction firm.

ORGANIC LAW (1883). Based on the report of the **Dufferin Mission**, this document provided for the limited participation of some Egyptians in their government during the early years of the **British occupation**. It set up two quasi-parliamentary institutions having restricted powers. One was the Legislative Council (*Majlis Shura al-Qawanin*) having 30 members, of whom 14 permanent ones, including the president and one of the vice presidents, were to be nominated by the **khedive** and his cabinet. The remaining 16, including the second vice president, were to be elected for six-year terms by the provincial councils and by elector-delegates from **Cairo** and **Alexandria**. It was to meet five times a year to discuss legislation and the state budget. The government could spurn its advice but only with justification, and Council members could question the ministers about their policies. The other was the General Assembly (*al-Jam'iyya al-Umumiyya*) with 82 members, including the ministers, the Legislative Council members, and 46 delegates chosen for six-year terms by electors throughout Egypt. Its members had to be over 30, literate, and paying at least £E50 in annual taxes. It was to meet at least once every other year and had mainly advisory powers. The government had to seek its advice on public loans, building of canals and railways, and classification of lands. If it rejected the Assembly's advice, it had to give reasons for doing so. The General Assembly was free to discuss any topic and to offer advice thereon. All members were remunerated for travel and for the cost of living in Cairo. The president of the Legislative Council also chaired meetings of the General Assembly.

As of 1883, less than one-seventh of Egypt's population could vote for representatives, and only a small percentage of those eligible commonly exercised their franchise. Timid at first, the members of the two bodies gradually learned parliamentary procedure and methods of opposing unpopular policies, such as expenditures on the **British army of occupation** and the neglect of **education**. **Muhammad Abduh**, appointed to the Legislative Council in 1899, played an influential role in its proceedings up to his death in 1905. The General Assembly was enlivened in 1909–10 by the decision of **Butros Ghali's** cabinet to let it vote on the **Suez Canal Company's** concession extension agreement. Rising Egyptian demands for pop-

ular participation in the country's affairs inspired much debate about enlarging the role of these bodies, and a formal committee went to London in 1908 to present its demands to the British government. Sir **Herbert Kitchener**, sensitive to these demands and hoping to divert nationalist attacks from the British onto **Abbas Hilmi II**, called for revising the 1883 Organic Law in 1913 to widen the powers of Egypt's representative bodies.

ORGANIC LAW (1913). Statutes promulgated by the Egyptian government, under Sir **Herbert Kitchener**'s supervision, that provided for a **Legislative Assembly**, to be elected in two stages, with limited lawmaking powers. This Assembly included the ministers, 17 other members nominated by the government, and 66 elected members. Nomination of some members ensured a minimum representation of the communities and the professions: four members for the **Copts**, three **bedouins**, two merchants, two physicians, one **engineer**, two representing educational groups, and one representing municipal interests. The government appointed the Assembly president and senior vice president. It could not promulgate any new laws without an Assembly debate, and no tax could be imposed without its prior approval. It could express its opinion on governmental measures, formulate its own projects, and could accept, amend, or reject any government proposal. If the government and the legislature differed, the matter was to be postponed for 15 days, and if no agreement could be reached in that interim, the government might either prorogue the Legislative Assembly or publish its law, provided that it explained its reasons for doing so. Excluded from debate were the civil list, the tribute to the **Ottoman Empire**, the public debt, and all obligations toward foreign powers. The 1913 Organic Law fell short of the **National Party**'s constitutional demands but did lead to elections late in 1913 for the Legislative Assembly. The Organic Law and Assembly were suspended during **World War I**.

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU). Association of sovereign African states (including Egypt), formed at Addis Ababa in 1963 to concert their policies (*see* **Pan-Africanism**). The organization lost some credibility because its northern members, including Egypt, used it to mobilize Africans against **Israel**. Egypt and the other Arab countries of North Africa did play a positive role within the OAU, hosting meetings, and working for the liberation of all

African countries from foreign or white domination. Once this liberation was achieved, however, the OAU lost its main purpose and came to be viewed by many Africans as a barrier to unity. It was formally dissolved in July 2002 and replaced by the African Union.

OTTOMAN EMPIRE. A multinational Islamic state that began in northwestern Anatolia in 1299 and spread across the Balkans, most of southwestern Asia, and the North African coast, including Egypt from 1517 to 1798. Following the **French occupation**, formal Ottoman suzerainty was reestablished, but with the emergence of **Muhammad Ali**, Egypt became increasingly independent de facto. Muhammad Ali's son **Ibrahim** invaded Ottoman **Syria** in 1831. Forced by the European powers to withdraw in 1840, the viceroy of Egypt received from the **Convention of London** the right to bequeath his position to his heirs, subject to an Ottoman *firman*.

During **Isma'il**'s reign, his envoys negotiated with the Ottoman government to change the succession to the viceroyalty to a system based on primogeniture, to give the viceroy the title, already in current use, of **khedive**, and to empower Egypt to contract foreign loans without prior consent from Istanbul. Each of these privileges accorded to Egypt increased the annual tribute that it had to pay to the Ottoman Empire, a figure that would reach £E500 million by 1914. The Ottoman sultan issued the *firman* deposing Isma'il in 1879 and replacing him with **Tawfiq**. The investiture *firman* for Tawfiq's successor, **Abbas Hilmi II**, caused a brief Anglo-Ottoman crisis in 1892 because it seemed to deny Egypt's control over the **Sinai Peninsula**, an issue also raised by the 1906 **Taba Incident**.

Egypt remained de jure an Ottoman province until **Britain** severed its ties with the Empire in December 1914. During **World War I**, the Ottoman government aided the deposed Khedive Abbas and the exiled Egyptian Nationalists, invaded the Sinai, and reached the **Suez Canal** in February 1915, but its forces were repulsed. Late in 1916 the British-officered **Egyptian Expeditionary Force** led a counterattack that advanced into **Palestine** in 1917. Aided by Arab forces from the **Hijaz**, the British drove the Ottomans from what now are Syria and Lebanon. Surrendering at Mudros in late 1918, the Ottoman government gave up its claims to Egypt in the 1920 Sèvres Treaty and again at Lausanne in 1923.

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PALESTINE. Because Egypt and the **Sinai Peninsula** have been invaded more often from the east than from any other direction, defense from southern **Syria**, which only since **World War I** has generally been called Palestine, is a vital Egyptian interest. **Trade** and migration between Egypt and Palestine have occurred throughout history. Some Palestinian surnames, such as Misri, indicate an Egyptian origin, and there have long been Palestinian merchants in **Cairo**, the hometown of such Palestinians as Yasir Arafat and Edward Said. During the British Mandate of Palestine (1922–48), Egypt had diplomatic representation in Jerusalem.

Although many Egyptians then viewed their national struggle as limited to the **Nile Valley**, a growing number grew concerned over the Palestine Question and especially the interests of its Arab population against the influx of Jewish settlers and the rise of **Zionism**. The Egyptian government sent troops to fight in the disastrous **Palestine War**. Popular scandals about their defective arms contributed to discrediting King **Faruq**, the rise of the **Free Officers**, and the **1952 Revolution**. Egypt took on the administration of the **Gaza Strip**, signed an armistice with **Israel** at the **Rhodes Proximity Talks**, but did not make peace with Israel or absorb more than a few thousand Palestinian refugees. Cairo became the headquarters for some Palestinian groups demanding the right to return to their homes, and both **Muhammad Najib** and **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** made public statements supporting their demands and calling for a second round of fighting with Israel. Secretly, however, they made peace overtures to the Jewish state through European and American intermediaries. These overtures ended after Israel's raid on Gaza in February 1955 and Egypt's decision to arm Palestinian refugees as *fidaiyin* to stage raids against Israeli border towns.

After the **Suez War**, Egypt's interest in Palestine was subsumed under the effort to promote **Arab nationalism**. After the breakup of the **UAR** and the subsequent failure of unity talks with **Syria** and **Iraq**, Egypt adopted a policy of supporting a separate Palestinian movement. At their first summit meeting in January 1964, the Arab heads of state agreed to set up the **PLO**. In its early days Egypt was its main political and military sponsor, but after

the **Rogers Peace Plan** and Nasir's death, Egyptian official and popular interest in Palestine waned. **Anwar al-Sadat's** peace with Israel estranged Egypt from the Palestinians. Egyptian support for the PLO has revived under **Husni Mubarak**, who has at times been the intermediary between Israel's supporters, especially the **United States**, and the Palestinians, especially Arafat. The Egyptian people have backed the Palestinians during their uprisings of 1987–93 and since 2000.

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). Group set up in 1964 by the Arab heads of state to serve the needs of Palestinian Arabs and, in principle, to work for **Israel's** replacement by a secular state of **Palestine**. It became the umbrella for most Palestinian military, political, economic, and social organizations and has, since 1969, been led by Yasir Arafat. Its relations with Egypt were close under **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** and increasingly bitter under **Anwar al-Sadat**, especially when he made peace with Israel. In 1983 Arafat made peace with **Husni Mubarak** after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and military defeat of Palestinian forces under his control, but PLO–Egyptian relations worsened during the **Gulf War**. Since then the PLO has made peace with Egypt and sought negotiations with, and territorial concessions from, Israel. In 1992–93 its representatives negotiated secretly in Norway with Israel's foreign minister, leading to a Declaration of Principles signed in Washington on 13 September 1993 and subsequent negotiations, often held in Cairo, intended to create a PLO self-governing authority in the **Gaza Strip** and Jericho, eventually including the entire West Bank. This shift in PLO policy would have vindicated Sadat's peace policies, but the breakdown of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians in 2000 led to renewed fighting and Egyptian hostility to Israel.

PALESTINE WAR (1948–49). Arab name for the war in which the armies of Egypt, **Syria**, Lebanon, Jordan, and **Iraq** were defeated by the newly proclaimed state of **Israel**, the end result of the Arab–Jewish struggle for control over the British mandate of **Palestine**. The withdrawal of **Britain's** last high commissioner for Palestine and the Jewish Agency's declaration of Israel's independence on 14 May 1948 marked the start of the Palestine War for Egypt and the other Arab countries, as their armies attacked the new Jewish state on the 15th. Egypt's forces crossed the **Sinai** and occupied most of

the Negev desert, but Israel's army stalled their drive on Tel Aviv for six days. All the combatants accepted a cease-fire proposed by UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in late May. Israel used the respite to acquire more weapons from abroad; the Arab armies failed to do likewise. They lacked a unified command or even a common strategy. When Bernadotte's mediation efforts broke down and the fighting resumed, Israel drove back the Arabs on all fronts. Another cease-fire followed, one broken by both Israel and Egypt in October 1948, but Israel succeeded in isolating the Egyptians from their Arab allies and drove them out of the Negev Desert, even briefly crossing the international boundary in the Sinai. Only Britain's threat to defend Egypt under the 1936 **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty** ended this Israeli invasion, and Egypt, embarrassed at possibly using a British protection it was trying to end, agreed to indirect armistice negotiations and an armistice with Israel (*see* **Rhodes Proximity Talks**).

The Palestine War affected Egypt in various ways: it severed its overland connections with the eastern Arab countries, it took the lives of at least 2,000 soldiers, it revealed the corruption and incompetence of King **Faruq**'s regime and thus helped spark the **1952 Revolution**, it gave Egypt stewardship over the **Gaza Strip**, and it committed Egypt's leaders to advancing the claims of the Palestinian refugees and to seeking revenge against Israel. *See also* **Suez War**.

PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY TALKS, *see* **AUTONOMY TALKS**, **PALESTINIAN**.

PAN-AFRICANISM. Movement calling for political unification, economic cooperation, or cultural unity of all Africans, often including persons of African descent. African Americans and West Indians initiated the ideas and organization of pan-Africanism in the early 20th century. One little-known advocate, Duse Muhammad Ali (1866–1945), son of an Egyptian father and a Sudanese mother, edited *The African Times and Orient Review*, the first pan-African monthly, in London from 1912 to 1914. He opened its pages to **Muhammad Farid** and other Egyptians and also wrote *In the Land of the Pharaohs* (1910), supporting their independence struggle.

Historically, Egypt's interests in Africa were limited to trading with the peoples of the Sahara and the western Sudan and to claiming control over the Nile **Sudan**. After the **1952 Revolution**, these interests broadened. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** included Africa among the

three spheres of Egyptian activity in his *Philosophy of the Revolution* (1954). After taking part in the 1955 **Bandung Conference**, which confirmed his anti-imperialism, Nasir set up a committee of high-ranking government officials to develop Egypt's political, economic, social, and cultural policy toward sub-Saharan Africa and later created an African Association to lead the struggle to liberate the continent from Western imperialism. A more visible step was the convening in **Cairo** of the first **Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference** in December 1957, followed by an Afro-Asian Youth Conference in January 1959. Angered at the West's manipulation of the Congo's independence from Belgium in 1960, Egypt joined in 1961 with Ghana, Guinea, and other radical and neutralist African states to form what came to be called the Casablanca Bloc, opposing the more moderate Monrovia group of mainly French-speaking African states. When Egypt hosted the third All-Africa Peoples' Conference in March 1961, Nasir addressed the opening session and affirmed his government's "principles and responsibility" to promote the liberation of Africa. The division between the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs troubled most African leaders, including Nasir. On reexamining his policy, he decided that the radical demand, pressed by Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, for an immediate political federation of all African states was impractical; economic cooperation must come first. Egypt also muted its demand that other African states end their ties with **Israel**, a concession welcomed by those countries in which Israel had a flourishing technical assistance program.

Egypt joined with the other African countries in the Addis Ababa conference that established the **OAU** in May 1963. Since then Egypt has offered scholarships to African students, promoted economic and cultural cooperation, denounced white settler regimes and other forms of colonialism, opposed racism, and generally cooperated with existing African states. Egypt is a member of the Common Market for Southern and Eastern Africa. However, the ideal of political unification has been largely abandoned. Egypt and most other African countries signed the 1996 Pelindaba Treaty, declaring Africa a **nuclear-free zone**, and in July 2002 replaced the OAU with the African Union.

PAN-ARABISM, *see* **ARAB NATIONALISM**.

PAN-ISLAM. Movement calling for the political unity of all Muslims, popularized by **Jamal al-Din al-Afghani** and promoted by the **Ottoman Empire** during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. At times, the term has also been applied to patriotic or nationalist movements in individual Muslim countries ruled by non-Muslims, especially if they sought the support of outside Muslim governments, groups, or individuals. Although Europeans suspected **Ahmad Urabi** of pan-Islamic inspiration, recent findings show that the Ottoman government tried to use **Islam** to make him more obedient to the sultan's viceroy, **Khedive Tawfiq**. Early in his nationalist career, **Mustafa Kamil** sought ties to Sultan Abdulhamid II and used pan-Islamic appeals in his speeches and writings. Many Egyptians, including **Abbas Hilmi II** and **Ali Yusuf** joined him in backing Ottoman claims to the **Sinai Peninsula** in the 1906 **Taba Incident**, even at Egypt's expense. Mustafa's successor, **Muhammad Farid**, sought support from the sultan and the Young Turks against the **British occupation**, taking refuge in Istanbul in 1912. In January 1913 he founded a pan-Islamic society in Geneva; it published a monthly bulletin detailing conditions of Muslims under the rule of the **World War I** Allies. **Abd al-Aziz Jawish**, former editor of *al-Liwa* and other Egyptian nationalist newspapers, wrote a pan-Islamic manifesto for the Ottoman government when it entered the war and later edited a monthly magazine, *al-Alam al-islami*, also published as *Die islamische Welt*, in Berlin from 1916 to 1918. The work of these exiled **National Party** leaders did not greatly affect Egypt because of **Britain's** strict **ensorship**.

After the war, Egyptian nationalism promoted unity between Muslims and **Copts** during the **1919 Revolution** and within the **Wafd Party**, consciously rejecting pan-Islam. **Rashid Rida** expressed fear about the effect of the Turkish abolition of the **caliphate** on Muslims, and there was some debate among Egyptians, notably **Ali Abd al-Raziq** and **Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri**, about the caliphate, but neither of these liberals favored pan-Islam. **Hasan al-Banna**, the supreme guide of the **Muslim Brothers**, favored an association of Muslim nations, effectively advocating both nationalism and Islamic unity. Other Egyptian groups, such as *al-Shubban al-Muslimin* and the **Society of Islamic Guidance** espoused pan-Islam. Individual Egyptians organized or took part in international Muslim conferences held in Jerusalem (1931) and Geneva (1935).

Although Egypt's leadership role in **Arab nationalism** after **World War II** eclipsed pan-Islam, some Egyptians, such as **Sayyid Qutb**, continued to advocate it, and **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** founded the **Islamic Congress** in 1954. Egypt opposed the Muslim World League, organized by **Saudi Arabia** and other countries in 1962, but has taken part in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, established after the 1969 Muslim Summit at Rabat. Although it was expelled after the **Egyptian-Israeli Treaty**, Egypt was reinstated in 1984 and is now active in the organization. Official pan-Islam now stresses social and cultural cooperation among Muslim peoples rather than unity. Some of the *jama'at* are, however, striving for Islamic unity under a revived caliphate.

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE (1919). Meeting of the victorious countries after **World War I** to restore peace in Europe and the Middle East. Egyptians led by **Sa'd Zaghul** formed a delegation or *wafd* to attend the conference and to advocate Egypt's independence, but it was not admitted. **Britain** persuaded its allies, notably President Wilson, not to raise the Egyptian question, thus prolonging the **1919 Revolution**.

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS (POSTREVOLUTIONARY).

Egypt has elected 12 parliaments since the **1952 Revolution**. The first five (1957, 1958, 1964, 1969, and 1971) were single-party assemblies of the **National Union** or its successor, the ASU. The 1976 **People's Assembly** election took place under **Anwar al-Sadat's Party Reforms**, leading to the formation of the Egyptian Arab Socialist Union (which later evolved into the **NDP**), **NPUP**, and the **Liberal Party**. Under **Husni Mubarak** additional political parties, such as the **New Wafd**, have been formed, but the electoral laws virtually ensure that the majority of the delegates elected will be NDP members. Popular pressure has mounted during recent elections for democratization of the electoral system. *See also* **1984 Elections, 1987 Elections, 1990 Elections, 1995 Elections, 2000 Elections**.

PARTITION PLAN FOR PALESTINE. The **United Nations** General Assembly's proposed division of **Britain's Palestine** mandate into Jewish and Arab states, with an international zone for Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The plan was approved by a two-thirds majority in November 1947, despite the opposition of Egypt and the other Arab

states. The proposed Jewish area (which constituted about 54 percent of Palestine's land area) became the basis for the State of **Israel**, which expanded its territory as a result of the 1948 **Palestine War** and the 1967 **June War**.

PARTY REFORMS. Anwar al-Sadat's policy of forming *manabir* (pulpits or platforms) within the dominant ASU, a step toward Egypt's democratization. Many Egyptians felt that the ASU did not adequately provide for political participation or the articulation of popular needs. The ASU role in the **Centers of Power** opposing Sadat in 1971 and the inauguration of the *infitah* in 1974 turned him against one-party socialism. In that year a parliamentary committee studied a return to multiparty politics, but the popular organizations representing workers, peasants, and other ASU-empowered groups feared that such a change would subvert the achievements of the **1952 Revolution**. Sadat and the **People's Assembly** agreed to put off debate, reopening the issue in January 1976 and suggesting that left, center, and right "platforms" be set up within the ASU by October for the Assembly elections. **Khalid Muhyi al-Din** headed the left, Premier **Mamduh Salim** the center, and Mustafa Kamil Murad the right, winning 2, 280, and 12 seats, respectively. A law legalizing political parties was passed in May 1977. The left *minbar* evolved into the **NPUP**. The center became the Egyptian Arab Socialist Union, or *Misr* platform, later the **NDP**. The right later called itself the Socialist Liberal Organization and eventually the **Liberal Party**. **Muslim Brothers** and **Communists** were not allowed to participate, and the debates among the legal parties were restricted to domestic policies. Although unforeseen by Sadat, the party reforms also inspired the rise of the **New Wafd** and of extralegal parties. State controls limit differences among the parties and their ability to articulate popular needs, but these reforms did invigorate the **press** and elections under Sadat and **Husni Mubarak**.

PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY (MAJLIS AL-SHA'B). Since 1971 the official name for the lower house of Egypt's Parliament, formerly called the **National Assembly**.

PERENNIAL IRRIGATION. System for distributing Nile **River** waters to the Valley and Delta in modern times, replacing **basin irrigation**. The basic distinction is that smaller quantities of water are

applied to the land at two- to three-week intervals throughout the year, using larger canals deep enough to take in water from a low Nile. These canals need extensive dredging, formerly supplied by **corvée** labor, to keep them clear. To raise the level of the Nile, **Muhammad Ali** ordered the construction of the **Delta Barrages**. Consequently, three channels were cut to irrigate the Delta: the Buhayra, Minufiyya, and Tawfiqiyya canals. In addition, the **Ismailia** canal, built under **Ferdinand de Lesseps's** supervision, carried Nile waters from **Cairo** to the **Suez Canal**. During the 20th century British and Egyptian **engineers** extended perennial irrigation into Middle Egypt by constructing barrages at **Asyut** (1902), Zifta (1903), Isna (1909), Naj' Hammadi (1930), and Edfina (1951), and by enlarging the **Aswan Dam**. **Soviet** and Egyptian engineers extended perennial irrigation to the rest of Upper Egypt by building the **Aswan High Dam**.

Perennial irrigation has made it possible to grow three crops a year on some irrigated land and has facilitated the cultivation of rice, which requires large quantities of water. Most Egyptian **cotton** is raised on land under perennial irrigation. However, this system has caused additional problems, such as the buildup of mineral deposits, which must be drained or flushed away; the loss of fertile alluvium that must be replaced by applying artificial fertilizers; and the spread of waterborne diseases, especially **bilharzia**, that afflict workers who stand in stagnant waters.

PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS. Exploration for petroleum oil in Egypt began during the reign of **Khedive Isma'il**, earlier than anywhere else in the Middle East. However, production only began in 1911 in the **Sinai Peninsula** and near Suez. The Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields Company was set up to manage oil production in 1912 and continued to do so until after the **1952 Revolution**, when the Egyptian government formed the state-run General Petroleum Company, although private concerns and joint ventures were allowed to continue work. Exploration in the Western Desert began in the 1950s, but the first discoveries, by the Western Desert Petroleum Operating Company, jointly run by Phillips Petroleum and the Egyptian government, were not made until 1966. **Israel** captured the Sinai oil fields in the **June War** and exploited them up to their retrocession under the **1975 Egyptian-Israeli agreement**. In 1976 Egypt had a surplus of oil exports over imports for the first time, but nearly three-quarters of Egypt's oil output came from the Sinai and Suez area.

During the oil crisis engendered by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, more than 30 companies began exploring for petroleum in Egypt's deserts, and output rose from 400 thousand barrels (2.5 million metric tons) per day in 1977 to 925 thousand (6 million metric tons) in 1990, of which about one-fifth was exported. Crude oil production peaked at 922 thousand barrels per day in 1996 and declined to an average of 639 thousand during the first ten months of 2001. Reserves are not abundant and domestic consumption rose to an estimated 585 thousand barrels per day in 2001, so Egypt is likely to resume being a net importer by 2010, unless new discoveries are made. Exploration is continuing in existing fields and offshore in the Mediterranean. A private company named Setcore specializes in small-scale oil extraction as the large companies are cutting back their activity in Egypt.

Meanwhile, natural gas production and exports are rising. The first natural gas project at Abu Madi (in the Gulf of Suez) went on line in 1974, and further discoveries have been made there and in the Nile Delta and Western Desert regions. The International Egyptian Oil Company, a subsidiary of Italy's ENI-Agip group, is Egypt's leading natural gas producer. As of September 2001, Egypt's proven reserves amounted to 1.56 trillion cubic meters, with a daily capacity of 84.9 million cubic meters. A liquified natural gasification terminal is under construction at Damietta and is scheduled for completion in 2004, and other terminals are also planned.

Egypt's nine oil refineries, concentrated around Suez City, had a combined daily output of 726,250 barrels in 2001. The petroleum ministry plans to build five new refineries and petrochemical plants valued at \$2.5 billion. Petroleum products and natural gas are now Egypt's leading foreign exchange earners.

PHARAONISM. Idea tracing Egypt's main identity to its own ancient civilization, as opposed to stressing its ties to **Arab nationalism** or **pan-Islam**. Pharaonism was the prevalent expression of Egyptian nationalism during the 1920s and has retained support among many **Copts** up to now. It found expression in some architectural works, such as the campus of **Cairo University** and the tomb of **Sa'd Zaghlul**, and its ideas have sometimes been adopted by Egyptians wishing to oppose the **Muslim Brothers**, the **Arab nationalism** espoused by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**, or ties with other Arab countries when **Anwar al-Sadat** sought peace with **Israel** in 1978–79. For

most Egyptians, however, ties with the Arabs and **Islam** are too vital for them to identify with a long-dead, pagan civilization.

PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY. Egypt is the largest producer of pharmaceuticals in the Middle East and also the largest consumer, though not on a per capita basis. The manufacture of medicines in Egypt began in 1939, under the auspices of **Bank Misr**. In 1940 a rival firm, Memphis Pharmaceuticals, was formed. Foreign firms, notably Pfizer, also entered the Egyptian market. Most pharmaceutical companies were nationalized during the 1960s, but private companies and multinationals have become more active in the Egyptian market. Since 1991 the Egyptian government has allowed the transfer of ownership of its 11 public sector firms to a private corporation, the Holding Company for Pharmaceuticals. Public sector companies tend to produce some proprietary drugs and copies of medicines whose patents have expired. Owing to their inefficiency, low expenditures on research and development, overstaffing, and weak sales efforts, the public sector firms have lost much of their market share to the 14 private sector companies and to the eight multinationals, which include Pfizer, Aventis (formerly Hoechst Marion Roussel), and Novartis. Total 1999 production was valued at £E4.5 billion, of which about £E200 million is exported; imported pharmaceuticals amounted to £E400 million. Egypt, which is protesting the high price of imported drugs, is currently having a dispute with the multinationals, which seek stable prices and stronger patent protection for their products sold in the country.

PLANNING, GOVERNMENT. Although the Egyptian government always influenced the national **economy** by investing in **irrigation**, it rarely intervened in **industry**, except during the reforms of **Muhammad Ali**, until after **World War II**. Price controls, a few labor laws, the development of public transport, and a few **munitions industries** were the limit of government involvement in Egypt's economy before the **1952 Revolution**. The 1956 nationalization of the **Suez Canal Company**, other British and French enterprises in Egypt, and foreign banks led to the expansion of the government's economic role, and the first Industrial Plan was promulgated for 1957–60. It called for a total **investment** of £E114 million (of which the government's share was to be £E24 million) in some 115 projects, especially in engineering, metals, machinery, **transport**

equipment, and chemicals. The largest growth was, however, in **textiles**, and the government's overall share in investment outlays probably exceeded 30 percent.

The government assumed the main share of investment under its First Five-Year General Plan (1960–65). A newly formed National Planning Committee proposed investing in chemicals, rubber, paper, **petroleum**, and basic metals. Although impressive gains were made, the government's political needs and especially **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** claimed objective of doubling Egypt's national income within 10 years often undermined rational economic decision making. Showcase projects, such as factories for assembling automobiles, jet aircraft, and rockets, often were favored over others better suited to Egypt's natural and human resources. The first plan also stressed land reclamation (*see* **Liberation Province**). A second plan, to cover 1965–72, was effectively annulled by Egypt's **June War** defeat. Emphasis shifted to rationalizing existing industries and offering incentives to improve performance.

Although less interested in economic management than Nasir, **Anwar al-Sadat** offered a 10-year plan (1971–80), soon replaced by an 18-month transitional plan. A new Five-Year Plan for 1976–80, which envisaged spending £E12 billion, was postponed in 1976 due to financial problems and hence was rescheduled to cover 1978–82. It was replaced by his 1980–84 "Peace Plan," with a planned investment of £E25 billion.

In a speech delivered on 20 February 1982, **Husni Mubarak** proposed a more rational economic policy, featuring another First Five-Year Plan for 1982–86, emphasizing heavy industry and electrification, with £E27 billion in public and £E8 billion in private investment, but it fell short of its goals, due in part to the cost of servicing Egypt's large external debt. A new Second Five-Year Plan (1987–92) called on the private sector to play a larger role in industrialization (39 percent of the targeted investment, up from 23 percent in the earlier plan), mainly in electricity and power, industry, public utilities, irrigation and land reclamation. Specifically, it called for the reclamation of 627 thousand **feddans**, mainly east and west of the Delta, at an estimated cost of £E2.5 to £E5 thousand per feddan, mainly at state expense.

The plan for 1992–97 called for a total investment of £E154 billion, of which 58 percent was to come from the private sector. It also hoped to raise Egypt's gross domestic product by 5.8 percent

annually, a goal that it failed to meet. Certain government policies, such as paying subsidies to hold down prices of wheat, cooking oil, **sugar**, kerosene, and electric power, have distorted supply and demand, hampering any rational economic planning. Such external events as wars and falling oil prices have also disrupted Egypt's economic development. The plan for 2001–02 called for a total investment of £E90 billion, of which 70 percent was to come from the private sector, aiming at a 6 percent annual growth rate.

POETRY. In Arab culture, the ability to compose and recite metrical and rhymed verses is highly esteemed. Up to modern times every ruler had his court poet to write poems in praise of his regime. Arabic-speaking peoples, even if they are illiterate, enjoy listening to and sometimes memorizing or even improvising verses. Before the spread of **radio** and **cinema** in Egypt, poetry provided the main means for the entertainment of **bedouin**, peasants, and city-dwellers. Elaborate rules existed for meter, rhyme, imagery, and suitable topics, derived mainly from the odes of pre-Islamic Arabia, the cadences of court poets, or the ecstatic utterances of **Sufis**. Classical poetry was still being composed in Egypt by **Mahmud Sami al-Barudi** and later by **Ahmad Shawqi** and **Hafiz Ibrahim** during the 19th century and the era of the **British occupation**.

After the **1919 Revolution**, some young poets, such as **Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqad**, began experimenting with new styles and topics, giving greater leeway to individualism and romanticism. Egypt's experiences during **World War II**, the **Palestine War** and other conflicts with **Israel**, and the revolutionary changes under **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** and his successors have tended to make Egyptian Arabic poetry more political and less bound by traditional rules of prosody. Although poets continued to write in Classical Arabic, the colloquial dialect of **Cairo** (or, less often, other parts of Egypt) has become the vehicle for a growing body of poetry. There have also been poets in Egypt who write and publish in French, English, Greek, and Armenian. *See also* **Literature**.

POLITIQUE D'ENTENTE. Policy instituted in 1907 by Sir **Eldon Gorst**, promoting closer ties between the **British Agency** and **Abbas Hilmi II**, in an effort to win him away from the **National Party**. Although the policy succeeded, it aborted a possible alliance between the British and the more moderate **Umma Party**, thus

delaying the process by which **Britain** conferred more authority on such qualified Egyptians as **Sa'd Zaghul**.

POPULATION. In the 18th and 19th centuries Egypt's population was well below the optimum level for the size of the country, and measures were taken to encourage large families. There was immigration from other parts of the Arab world as well as from Europe. Overpopulation did not become acute until the 1930s, and efforts by the Egyptian government, foreign governments, private groups, and individuals to solve the problem date only from the 1950s (*see* **Family Planning**). One cause of the problem is that the death rate for infants fell from 183 per thousand births in 1960 to 85 in 1988 and for children aged 1 to 5 from 155 to 42 in the same period. The overall death rate dropped from 10.5 in 1978 to 7.7 in 2001. Although the birth rate, too, has fallen, due in part to the later age of marriage and the spread of contraception, it was still 25 per thousand in 2001. Egypt's population is relatively young; 45 percent of the population in 2001 was under 15. The number reaching marriageable age annually will probably augment its population faster than the number that the land can support. Egypt's estimated annual growth rate was 1.69 percent in 2001 and its total population reached 70 million in 2003.

PORT SAID. Egyptian city, founded in 1869, located where the **Suez Canal** meets the Mediterranean, hence a major entrepôt. Invaded by **British** and **French** troops during the 1956 **Suez War**, it became for Egyptians a symbol of popular resistance to Western imperialism. Under the *infitah* policy, it became a free **trade** zone. Its 2001 population was 472,335.

POSITIVE NEUTRALITY. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** policy of not bringing Egypt into alliances with either the **Communists** or the West. *See also* **Nonalignment**.

PRESS. Although some Muslims resisted the introduction of the printing press, Arabic printed materials have entered Egypt since the 17th century, due in part to the development of Arabic presses in Europe for the propagation of Christianity. The **French occupation** fostered local printing in Arabic and French. **Muhammad Ali** founded a government press in **Bulaq** in 1822; it began translating European technical and military books into Turkish and Arabic. Later, it reis-

sued works of the classical Arabic heritage. Egypt long led the Arab world in printing and publishing.

Egypt has had a periodical press since **Napoléon Bonaparte** founded *Le Courrier de l'Égypte* and *La Décade égyptienne* in 1798. The official journal, *al-Waqa'i al-Misriyya*, began publication in 1828. The first privately published Arabic **newspaper** was Abdallah Abu al-Su'ud's *Wadi al-Nil* (1866). Many daily, weekly, and monthly journals, both in Arabic and in European languages, followed, and reached an early peak during **Ahmad Urabi's** movement. The **British occupation** briefly halted the growth of the press, but by 1890 Arabic newspapers and magazines were burgeoning. **Mustafa Kamil** showed that journalism could inspire nationalism (see *al-Liwa*), and periodicals also appeared that espoused the spread of science (see *al-Hilal* and *al-Muqtataf*), **feminism**, moderate reform (see *al-Jarida*), and support for the **khedive** (see *al-Muayyad*) and for **Britain** (see *al-Muqattam*). Martial law in **World War I** closed many periodicals. After **ensorship** ended in 1919 journalistic activity resumed, aided in part by the introduction of the linotype typesetter and wireless telegraphy. Political parties played a major role in the growth of newspapers, with *al-Akhbar* and later *al-Misri* serving as organs for the **Wafd Party** and *al-Siyasa* for the **Liberal Constitutionalists**.

After the **1952 Revolution**, **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** regime promoted the press as a means of educating or indoctrinating the people, both through mass-circulation newspapers and magazines and by publishing inexpensive editions of books. Some partisan dailies were closed down when their sponsors were outlawed, but *al-Akhbar* and then *al-Ahram* expanded their circulation, despite the restraints of state censorship and of part ownership by the **National Union** in 1960–62 and of the **ASU** in 1962–77. These controls were relaxed under **Anwar al-Sadat**, especially after the **party reforms**, but new limitations were introduced in the **Law of Shame** and during the emergency declared after Sadat's assassination. **Communist** and **Islamist** papers have less freedom than the rest of the press under **Husni Mubarak**. Due to these press controls in Egypt, much printing and publishing have recently shifted from **Cairo** to other Arab capitals or to London and Paris.

PRESS LAW (1881). Government statute permitting the suppression of an Egyptian **newspaper** or periodical "in the interests of order,

morality, and **religion**" on the interior minister's orders after two previous reprimands or on a decision by the **cabinet** without any prior warning, in which case the offending paper could also be fined £E5 to £E20. The law was rigorously enforced at first, but newspapers discovered that foreign owners or editors could claim immunity from the law under the **Capitulations**, and so the government stopped trying to enforce it in 1894. Its revival in 1909, directed against the excesses of the nationalist press, occasioned protests by Egyptians and foreigners, who again utilized the Capitulations to impede its enforcement. The cabinet passed a stiffer press law as part of the **Exceptional Laws** after the assassination of **Butros Ghali** in 1910. Severe limitations on press freedom were established during the martial law in **World War I** and moderated after the **1919 Revolution**. The Press Law was reactivated by **Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat** in 1922, by **Sa'd Zaghlul** in 1924, and by **Muhammad Mahmud** in 1929, often in an effort to curb press criticism from rival parties. *See also* **Censorship**.

PRISONS. Penal institutions have always existed in Egypt, especially when the central government was strong. The **French occupation** exiled or jailed Muslim resistance leaders (*see* **Umar Makram**), and **Muhammad Ali** often executed or locked up opponents of his reform policies, using the **Cairo Citadel** or the rock quarries at Tura and Abu-Za'bal. Egypt's colonization of the **Sudan** afforded Muhammad Ali and his successors new means of getting rid of criminals and political foes. With the establishment of the **Mixed Courts** and the reformed **National Courts**, Egypt needed a more orderly penal system. The prisons were placed under the interior ministry and administered by the provincial *mudirs*, and hence were separated from the justice ministry and the *Niyaba*.

In the early days of the **British occupation**, budgetary stringencies blocked any reforms: overcrowding and disease were rife, food rations inadequate (relatives were expected to bring food to the prisoners), and clothing nonexistent. Many prisoners died. Criminals and delinquents were housed together, and suspects awaiting trial were often not separated from convicts. The public works ministry (especially public health) tended to regard jails as its dominion. With the appointment of a British inspector general of prisons in 1897, major reforms, notably in the quantity and quality of prisons constructed, were implemented. The provision of

food, clothing, and better living and working conditions so improved the prisons that many Egyptians called them hotels. Special provisions were made for juvenile and adult reformatories. A system of national, provincial, district, and village prisons was developed and remains essentially intact.

After the **1952 Revolution**, the regime added hospitals to some of the prisons and built separate **women's** facilities. More emphasis was placed on rehabilitation and on reform schools for juveniles. Regrettably, prison overcrowding has led to wretched conditions, at times exacerbated by vindictive actions by the government, the judicial system, or prison wardens. It was reported in 1988 that six new prisons were under construction in nonresidential areas, with space available for farming and dairying by convict laborers. Human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, have reported cases of physical and mental torture, prolonged confinement, and inhuman treatment, especially of political prisoners, who in recent years have been mainly **Islamists** or **Communists**. Egyptian prison conditions are described in the writings of **Anwar al-Sadat**, **Sayyid Qutb**, **Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal**, and **Nawal al-Sa'dawi**.

PRIVATIZATION. Policy or process of selling state-owned enterprises to individuals or firms, either domestic or foreign. A privatization program became official Egyptian policy in 1974 as part of **Anwar al-Sadat's infitah**, but in fact few enterprises nationalized under **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's Arab socialism** were restored to private ownership during the 1970s and 1980s, in part due to the fears of many employees in the state-owned enterprises that they would lose their jobs. The process has accelerated, however, during **Husni Mubarak's** presidency and especially since the promulgation of **ERSAP** in 1991. In the following decade 158 Egyptian companies were privatized in part or in full, generating an income of \$3.6 billion dollars for the Egyptian government, while 32 other state companies were closed down. *See also* **Banking, Beverages, Motor Transport, Pharmaceuticals, Textiles.**

PRIVY COUNCIL. Founded in January 1847, this Council (Arabic: *Majlis Khususi*) was Egypt's most important conclave until the creation of the **Council of Ministers** in 1878. Except during the two times when **Sa'id** abolished it, it outranked the **Council of Justice** and dealt with problems arising within the administration of Egypt.

It began with five high-ranking officials, mainly members of **Muhammad Ali's** family, and expanded to 12 by 1849. **Khedive Isma'il** regularized it, decreeing that it should meet at least once weekly, with the directors of the **finance** and war departments, the head of his office, the governor of **Cairo**, the president of the Council of Justice, and one of his close friends. New members were added during the 1870s, including the directors of foreign affairs and interior. They were expected both to advise the khedive and to make laws, even sometimes to serve as a supreme court, and they occasionally advised him against policies he wished to adopt. The growing complexity of Egypt's administration and finances placed heavy burdens on the Privy Council, and the 1876–82 economic crisis led to the adoption of a **cabinet** system of government.

PROGRÈS ÉGYPTIEN, LE. Egypt's sole remaining French-language daily **newspaper**. It began in 1890, one of the many French journals published in Egypt. Owned by the Egyptian government since 1956, its reported circulation in 1972 was 14,500, increasing to 60 thousand in 1999.

PROTECTORATE. The system of quasi-colonial government imposed on Egypt by the British government in December 1914, following the entry of the **Ottoman Empire**, Egypt's nominal suzerain, into **World War I** on the side of the Central Powers. Always resented by most Egyptians, it was modified by **Britain's** unilateral declaration of Egypt's independence in 1922 but was not formally terminated until the 1936 **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty**.

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT. For provincial and local administration, Egypt is currently divided into 27 governorates (Arabic: *muhafazat*), most of which are further subdivided into *marakiz* (singular: *markaz*). At the time of the **French occupation**, *Description de l'Égypte* records the following *wilayat* (provinces), listed south to north: 1) Thebes (**Luxor**), Jirja, **Asyut**, **Minya**, Bani Suwayf, al-Fayyum, Iftih, and Giza; and 2) Qalyub, al-Sharqiyya, al-Mansura, Damietta (Dumyat), al-Gharbiyya, Minuf, Rosetta (Rashid), and al-Buhayra. **Muhammad Ali** divided the provinces into *khutts* (districts), each consisting of several villages under a local governor. In 1826 he replaced the term *wilaya* with *mamuriyya* (district governed by a police superintendent) and in 1833 with *mudiriyya*, with 14 in

Lower and 10 in Upper Egypt, as had been done under the pre-**Ottoman** rulers. The term *markaz* was revived in 1871, under **Khedive Isma'il**. In 1890 the capital of each *mudiriyya* was separated into a city that was administratively independent of the smaller towns and villages.

Jamal Abd al-Nasir's regime promulgated extensive reforms in provincial and local government in 1960. Since then the term *muhafaza*, initially used for **Alexandria** and **Cairo**, has replaced the term *mudiriyya*. As of 2003 the *muhafazat*, or governorates, numbered 27 of which five were city governorates: Alexandria, Cairo, Luxor, **Port Said**, and Suez City; nine were in the Nile Delta or Lower Egypt: **Ismailia**, Buhayra, Dumyat, Kafr al-Shaykh, Gharbiyya, Daqahliyya, Sharqiyya, Minufiyya, and Qalyubiyya; eight were in Upper Egypt: Giza, Fayyum, Bani Suwayf, Minya, Asyut, **Suhaj**, Qina, and **Aswan**; and five were frontier governorates: Red Sea, New Valley, Matruh, North **Sinai**, and South Sinai. Under the monarchy and Nasir, the provincial and local units were subordinated to the central government, but **Anwar al-Sadat** and **Husni Mubarak** have tried to increase their autonomy.

PYRAMIDS, BATTLE OF THE, *see* **IMBABA**.

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AL-QA'IDA (**English: AL QAEDA**). International **terrorist** umbrella organization formed about 1988 by Usama Bin Ladin of **Saudi Arabia** and Muhammad Atif, an Egyptian citizen, to oppose Middle Eastern governments deemed un-Islamic and to free the Muslim world from military intervention by outside powers. *Al-Qa'ida* is connected with **al-Jihad** and *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* in Egypt as well as **Islamist** groups in other countries, especially ones that fought against the **Soviet** occupation of Afghanistan. In February 1998 *al-Qa'ida* proclaimed a "World Islamic Front for **Jihad** against **Jews** and Crusaders" and declared its intention to kill Americans, civilians as well as soldiers, anywhere in the world. It helped train the tribal opponents of the 1993 **UN** intervention in Somalia, detonated the bombs that destroyed the **U.S.** embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, attacked an American naval ship in Aden in 2000,

and organized the airplane attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Some experts think that this last attack was planned by **Ayman al-Zawahiri**, an Egyptian who has been in exile since 1984. **Sudan** hosted *al-Qa'ida's* headquarters until 1996, when it moved to Afghanistan. It may have been dispersed by U.S. military intervention in that country since October 2001, but branches exist in at least 60 other countries. Inasmuch as 2,000 Egyptian volunteers fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, *al-Qa'ida* enjoys widespread but largely clandestine support in Egypt.

QASR AL-DUBARA. Square in **Cairo's Garden City** near the location of the **British Embassy**, hence formerly the term often used to denote the British Agency. or **Residency**. The name was taken from a palace originally built nearby for **Muhammad Ali's** harem.

QASR AL-NIL BARRACKS. Originally built by the Egyptian government during **Sa'id's** reign to house his troops, these buildings became the site of **Ahmad Urabi's** rebellion against **Uthman Rifqi** in February 1881. During the **British occupation**, they were the main headquarters for the British army in central **Cairo**, adjacent to Midan Ismailia, now **Liberation Square**. They were razed after the **British League** now occupy the site. Both the barracks and the nearby bridge took their name from a nearby palace used by **Ibrahim, Sa'id, and Isma'il**, but later demolished.

AL-QAYSUNI, ABD AL-MUN'IM (1916–87). Egyptian economist. Educated at **Cairo University** and the London School of Economics, he worked for Barclay's Bank in England from 1942 to 1943, was a lecturer and assistant professor of economics at Cairo University from 1944 to 1946, directed the Middle East department of the **IMF** in Washington from 1946 to 1950, and served in the **National Bank of Egypt** in 1950–54. He was **finance minister** in 1954–66 and again in 1968, also serving for part of that time as deputy prime minister, and helped to formulate **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** economic policies. He chaired the Arab International Bank in 1971–76 and again in 1978, but also returned to the Egyptian government as minister for economic and financial affairs in 1976–78, because of which he was criticized for the 1977 **Food Riots**. He served also as

minister of **planning** in 1977–78 and later served as adviser to the finance ministry under **Husni Mubarak**. A patriotic technocrat, his economic views were conservative for the era of **Arab socialism**, but well suited to **Anwar al-Sadat**'s policy of *infitah*.

QUTB, SAYYID (1903–66). Muslim thinker and writer. Born in Musha (near **Asyut**), the son of a respected farmer who belonged to the **National Party**, he was educated at his village *kuttab*, where he memorized the Quran by the age of 10; at a **Cairo** secondary school; and at **Dar al-Ulum**, where he fell under the influence of **Aqqad** and became interested in English **literature**. After graduating in 1934, he worked for *al-Ahram*, wrote literary articles for *al-Risala* and *al-Thaqafa*, taught Arabic, and served as an **education** inspector in Qina. He was sent to study educational administration in the **United States** from 1948 to 1951, during which time he grew disenchanted with the West as he observed the moral corruption of American society, its racial prejudice, and its strong anti-Arab bias caused by the **Palestine War**.

Upon returning, he criticized Egypt's educational programs for their British influence and called for a more Islamic curriculum. He developed close ties to some of the **Free Officers**, notably **Kamal al-Din Husayn**, who wanted to make him education minister, and he served as the first secretary-general of the **Liberation Rally**. He resigned from the government in 1953 and joined the **Muslim Brothers**, taking charge of their instructional program and editing their **newspaper**. Imprisoned with the others after their failed attempt to assassinate **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**, he began writing books that were smuggled out of Egypt and published abroad, notably *al-Adala al-ijtima'iyya fi al-Islam* (translated into English as *Social Justice in Islam*), *Fi zalal al-Quran* (translated as *In the Shade of the Quran*), and *Ma'alim fi al-tariq* (Signposts along the Way).

Qutb became bitterly disillusioned with the Nasir government and argued that every person is an arena in the battle between godly and satanic forces. He called for a small community of good people to expel evil and establish righteousness in the world. Drawing on Quranic passages, he taught that **Jews** and **Christians** will always be implacably opposed to **Islam** and that Muslims must be prepared to combat **Zionism**, "Crusaderism," and **Communism** to protect their community and its values. His 30-volume interpretation of the Quran has become a standard reference work

in mosques and homes throughout the Muslim world. Released in 1964, he was imprisoned again in 1965 and vilified by the press before being hanged for treason in August 1966. Since his death his ideas have inspired many Muslim individuals and groups, notably *al-Takfir wa al-Hijra* and *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* in Egypt and abroad. *See also* **Islamism**.

– R –

RABAT CONFERENCE. Inconclusive summit meeting of Arab heads of state, held in December 1969, which withheld aid sought by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** for the **War of Attrition**. During this meeting the **United States** announced a hitherto secret Arab–Israeli peace proposal. It should be distinguished from the Islamic summit held in the same city three months earlier. *See also* **Rogers Peace Plan**.

RABAT SUMMIT (1974). Meeting of 20 Arab heads of state, who unanimously designated the **PLO** as the “sole legitimate representative for the Palestinian people.” This statement delayed Egypt’s progress toward a reconciliation with **Israel**, which refused to negotiate with the PLO as a precondition for a comprehensive settlement.

RADIO. Wireless telegraphy was introduced into Egypt by the **British** armed forces during **World War I**. By the late 1920s, some private citizens in **Alexandria** and **Cairo** had radio receivers and even transmitters, but the government closed all private stations in 1931 and in 1932 chartered its own system. In 1934 the Cairo studios of the Egyptian Broadcasting Service, built by the Marconi Company with the British Broadcasting Company’s help, were formally opened. Because foreigners owned a large percentage of the radio receivers in Egypt, the initial formula of 70 percent Arabic and 30 percent foreign-language programs did not work well, and special stations were set aside for European broadcasts. The early Arabic broadcasting stressed Quran reading and Arab **music**, European shows were mainly BBC relays, and all programs were kept free from politics and advertising. By 1937 Egyptian broadcasts could be heard in **Palestine, Syria, and Iraq**.

The Egyptian government took over the ownership and management of the service in 1947. By 1950 Egyptian State Broadcast-

ing was transmitting programs in Arabic, English, Greek, and Italian, and the country had 260 thousand radios. This number increased by 1975 to 4.9 million radio sets and to an estimated 21 million in 1999. In 1982 Egypt's home service was broadcasting in Arabic, English, French, Armenian, German, Greek, Italian, and Hebrew; its foreign service included broadcasts in 28 languages, 32 in 1991. Egyptian state radio was well known during **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** presidency for its tendentious broadcasts, inspiring Arabs in other countries to oppose their own governments. Although radio retains some of this propaganda function, the government stations now broadcast mainly Arabic music, some situation comedies, informational programs, and hourly news. There are regional programs designed for specific areas of the country. Egypt also has a new commercial radio service provided by the *Société Égyptienne de Publicité*. Egypt had 39 AM and 6 FM stations in 2000.

RAFAH. Border village divided between the **Gaza Strip** and Egypt.

AL-RAFI'I, ABD AL-RAHMAN (1889–1966). Lawyer, deputy, minister, and leading historian of Egypt's nationalist movement. He was born in **Cairo** to a family originally from Tripoli (now in Lebanon) and educated in the government **Law School**, from which he graduated in 1907. He practiced law for a time in **Tanta** and then in Cairo. He sometimes worked with his brother, Amin al-Rafi'i, a leading journalist. He wrote articles regularly for the **National Party press** and served on its administrative board from 1911. He was arrested and his papers seized at the outbreak of **World War I**. He played an important role in the early organization of the **1919 Revolution** but did not join the **Wafd**. Elected as a Nationalist to many sessions of the Chamber of Deputies and in 1939 to the Senate, he led a coalition of young Nationalists who objected to **Hafiz Ramadan's** joining the **cabinet**, arguing that party members should abstain from participation in any government as long as the **British occupation** continued, but he later served as minister of supply in the caretaker government of **Husayn Sirri** in 1949. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government appointed him to head the **Egyptian Bar Association** in 1954. He was a prolific chronicler of Egypt's political history, with books on the **Mamluks**, **French occupation**, **Muhammad Ali**, **Isma'il**, the **Urabi Revolution**, **Mustafa Kamil**, **Muhammad Farid**,

Farid, the 1919 Revolution, its aftermath, and the 1952 Revolution. He also wrote his memoirs, *Mudhakkirati* (1949).

RAILROADS. Rail lines and steam-driven land **transport** were introduced into Egypt soon after the death of **Muhammad Ali**, when **Abbas I** gave an English company headed by Robert Stephenson a concession to construct a railroad between **Cairo** and **Alexandria** in 1851. This line, the first built on the African continent, was opened in stages between 1853 and 1856, and the Cairo–Suez line was built in 1856–57, but it took several years to reduce freight-carrying costs to those of **river transport**. Branch lines to Samanud and Zagazig were opened before 1860, and the booming demand for Egyptian **cotton** caused by the American Civil War accelerated the growth of rail transport. Additional lines had to be laid down, at government expense, to facilitate building the **Suez Canal**. **Khedive Isma'il** invested at least £E10 million in railroads during his reign. Especially noteworthy was the rail line from Bulaq al-Dakrur, across the **Nile River** from Cairo, to Upper Egypt, reaching **Asyut** and **Fayyum** in 1874 and **Aswan** by 1877, when Egyptian standard-gauge railways amounted to 1,519 km.

During the **British occupation** the government let various foreign and Egyptian companies build light agricultural railways in the Delta, and **investment** in railroad construction and improvement peaked in 1906–8. In 1913 total trackage amounted to 2,953 km of standard gauge and 1,376 km of light railways. Including its canal network, Egypt's transport system at the time equaled that of many European countries.

During **World War I** a military railroad was built across the **Sinai Peninsula** and Egypt's network was later linked to that of **Palestine**, but few other additions were made until **World War II**. The Egyptian state railways grew from 5,766 km in 1939 to 7,102 in 1949, not counting 1,400 km of light railways. Portions of the system were destroyed during the **June War** and others have fallen into disuse, but in 2000 4,955 km of standard gauge track were in use, covering the Nile Valley and Delta and the coastal regions. A new line is being constructed from **Ismailia** to **Rafah**, across the **Sinai Peninsula**. Managed by the Egyptian National Railways at a loss, the rail system is subsidized by the government, but no funds are available to upgrade the system. Problems include the deterioration of some rolling stock, roadbeds, signaling equipment, passenger and

freight depots, and passenger cars. A catastrophic railroad carriage fire near Ayyat in February 2002 cost 373 lives. Egypt still depends on rail transport of both passengers and goods; in 2000 its railroads carried a billion passengers. Almost all locomotives are diesel-powered, but the government has announced projects to convert some lines to electric power.

RAMADAN, MUHAMMAD HAFIZ (1879–1955). Lawyer, successor to **Muhammad Farid** as president of the **National Party**, deputy, and cabinet minister. Born and educated in **Cairo**, he had a successful law practice, was elected to almost every session of Parliament, and served in several anti-**Wafd** coalition governments, but his party leadership was challenged in 1940 by younger Nationalists who objected to his participation in governing Egypt during the **British occupation** of the country. He wrote a memoir, *Qala li Abu al-Hawl* (The Sphinx Told Me).

RAMADAN WAR (1973), *see* **OCTOBER WAR.**

RAS AL-TIN PALACE. The main summer residence of Egypt's rulers in **Alexandria** and the site of King **Faruq**'s abdication on 26 July 1952. Ras al-Tin Palace has since been a **museum**.

RELIGION. For most Egyptians, religion is the main badge of their identity and social status as well as a system of beliefs and moral laws. Egypt's state religion is **Islam**, and some 62 million Egyptians are Sunni Muslims, observing mainly the Shafi'i and Maliki rites of **Shari'a** jurisprudence. The number of "orthodox" **Copts** in Egypt is disputed: the 1996 census reported 6 million, but the Copts themselves claim a figure closer to 9 million. There also were in 1996 400 thousand Greek Orthodox, about 250 thousand Catholics (mainly Copts, but also some **Armenians**, Chaldeans, Latins, Maronites, Melkites, and **Syrians** in communion with Rome), 10 thousand Armenians, 200 thousand Protestants (mainly of the Coptic Evangelical Church), and a dwindling number of **Jews** (1,631 were counted in 1976, but the 2001 number may have been as low as 100). Usually, Egyptians of differing religions have enjoyed good relations, but the upsurge of **fundamentalism** in recent years has frayed the ties between Copts and Muslims. Efforts by the **United**

States to investigate discrimination against Egyptian Christians has also angered Muslims and embarrassed some Copts.

RESIDENCY. The office of **Britain's high commissioner** for Egypt and the **Sudan** from the proclamation of the **Protectorate** until the signing of the 1936 **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty**. Prior to 1914, it was called the British Agency. *See also* **Garden City, Qasr al-Dubara**.

REVOLUTION (1919). Nationwide movement of popular resistance, sometimes violent, directed against **Britain's Protectorate** and supporting the Egyptian *wafd* (delegation) that proposed to attend the **Paris Peace Conference**. When **Sa'd Zaghlul** warned Sultan **Fuad I** against helping the British by forming a new **cabinet**, **Milne Cheetham** called for his arrest. Two days later he and three of his associates, **Isma'il Sidqi, Muhammad Mahmud**, and **bedouin** leader Hamad al-Basil, were deported to Malta. Far from daunting the Egyptians, this action ignited nationalist passions. Students, transport workers, Azharites, lawyers, and even judges and bureaucrats went out on strike, and violence escalated. By mid-March 1919 all telephone, telegraph, and **rail** lines between **Cairo** and the rest of Egypt had been cut. Contemporary observers noted the participation of all classes of Egyptian society, of **Copts** as well as Muslims, and of **women** as well as men, in the popular demonstrations. The revolution continued with the nationwide boycott in 1919–20 of the **Milner Mission** and resumed in 1921 in opposition to the **Adli-Curzon Talks**. Most Egyptian intellectuals regard the 1919 Revolution as the most truly nationwide uprising in their country's modern history, but some believe that it should have proposed a program of economic and social reform to benefit the Egyptian masses and complement Zaghlul's demand for Egypt's complete independence from Britain.

REVOLUTION (1952). The 22–23 July military coup that overthrew King **Faruq** and brought the **Free Officers** to power. Initially led by General **Muhammad Najib**, the revolutionaries hoped to purge the government of corruption and turn power over to civilian politicians, but the Free Officers formed the **RCC** to effect the reforms they believed to be necessary and took over the **Council of Ministers**. In popular usage, the term often connotes the transition from a heredi-

tary monarchy dominated by the landowning aristocracy to a populist republic, headed by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** and instituting far-reaching political, economic, and social reforms. *See also Arab Socialism, Aswan High Dam, Land Reform.*

REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL (RCC). The governing board for Egypt set up by the **Free Officers** after they seized power in July 1952, although some say that it was called the "Supreme Command Council" at first and was reorganized in January 1953. The officers, meeting secretly after the **1952 Revolution**, decided to let King **Faruq** go into exile, retained his infant son as the king under a regency, and asked **Ali Mahir** to become prime minister. The RCC, although strongly patriotic, had no fixed program for governing Egypt, and would have gladly let a civilian **cabinet** reestablish order under the **1923 Constitution**, if it could find a strong and dedicated leader. Some considered restoring the **Wafd Party** to power; others favored collaboration with the **Muslim Brothers**. Some leaders, including **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**, who directed the RCC behind the facade of the popular **Muhammad Najib**, had been influenced by *Hadeto*. The August **Kafr al-Dawwar Incident**, however, alienated the **Communists** from the RCC.

On the other hand, the officers' commitment to **land reform** estranged Ali Mahir, who would not accept a limit of less than 500 **feddans** per landowner. In September 1952 the RCC named Najib as the new premier but retained a predominantly civilian cabinet (with officers serving as "advisers" behind the scenes). The RCC called on the political parties to purge their dishonest politicians, as a prerequisite to new **parliamentary elections**. When the Wafd and other parties failed to comply, the RCC dissolved them and confiscated their property and funds. Many pre-revolutionary politicians were arrested and tried for corruption; most of those convicted were fined, confined to prison or house arrest, and deprived of their political rights, but none was executed.

RCC members gradually took charge of the major cabinet posts; in June 1953 Nasir became deputy prime minister and also interior minister, a key post in any Egyptian government because of its control over the police and local government. During 1953 the RCC, while disclaiming any desire to establish a dictatorship, maneuvered both the Communist groups and the Muslim Brothers out of positions of power within the Egyptian government. In 1954

the RCC became the main arena for the power struggle between Najib, who enjoyed support from the Muslim Brothers and the outlawed political parties, and Nasir, backed by his security forces and some labor groups within the **Liberation Rally**.

When Nasir emerged victorious and assumed the premiership of the Egyptian government and the presidency of the RCC in April 1954, the importance of the latter group started to wane. Although debates continued within the RCC in 1954–55 over policy issues, such as the suppression of the Muslim Brothers, the **Anglo-Egyptian agreement**, and the restoration of parliamentary government, Nasir increasingly bypassed the Council. After he unilaterally named the committee that drafted the **1956 Constitution**, which was approved by a popular referendum, the RCC was quietly terminated.

RHODES PROXIMITY TALKS (1949). Negotiations, mainly indirect and mediated by UN envoy Ralph Bunche, leading to an armistice between Egypt and **Israel** on 25 February 1949, and subsequently between other Arab states and **Israel**, held in a hotel on the island of Rhodes. The armistice lines accepted there remained Israel's boundaries up to June 1967, except during the **Suez War** and its aftermath, but the state of war between the Arab states and Israel remained in effect. Later UN efforts to convene a general Arab–Israeli peace conference at Lausanne failed. The Rhodes Talks were favored by Israel's backers as a model for negotiations because they prevented the Arab states from acting in unison, but Egypt's governments have preferred general peace conferences.

RIDA, MUHAMMAD RASHID (1865–1935). Writer, editor, and Muslim reformer. Baghdad-born but of **Syrian** extraction, educated in *kuttabs* and **Ottoman** government schools, Rida became the chief disciple of the Islamic scholar, **Muhammad Abduh**, continuing and developing his reformist teachings. They founded an influential Arabic monthly, *al-Manar*, which disseminated their ideas throughout the Muslim world. He also wrote a commentary on the Quran and a three-volume biography of Abduh. From 1912 to 1914 he directed a school for the training of Muslim preachers. His reformism was influenced by **Wahhabi** puritanism, calling for a return to the pristine **Islam** of Muhammad and his associates, hence its name, *Salafiyya* (way of the righteous ancestors).

Rida was also one of the founders of the Decentralization Party, which advocated loyalty to the Ottoman sultanate within a loose state that would extend greater freedom to the Arabs, the nation that he saw as the core of the Islamic community. He was actively involved during **World War I** with the Arab nationalists in **Cairo** who worked for future independence. He chaired the first Syrian Arab Congress in 1920 and served on a Syrian-Palestinian delegation in Geneva. He opposed both **Zionism** in **Palestine** and French colonialism in **Syria**. Hoping to revive the **caliphate**, he took part in Islamic conferences in Mecca in 1926 and Jerusalem in 1931. Unattached to specific political parties and movements, Rida wielded much moral influence in his later years but was basically a marginal figure in the history of **Arab nationalism** and increasingly outside the mainstream of **Islamism** in Egypt.

RIFQI, UTHMAN (1839–86). War minister from 1879 to 1881, his alleged favoritism to **Turco–Circassians** over native Egyptians in the army officer corps sparked a mutiny led by **Ahmad Urabi** in February 1881. He was dismissed by **Mustafa Riyad** but later commanded Egypt's forces in the eastern **Sudan** under General **Charles Gordon**.

RIVER TRANSPORT. From the dawn of history to the inception of the **railroad**, the **Nile River** was the main avenue of transport for people and goods in Egypt. Early travelers and shippers between Europe and Asia often used a navigation route that included the Nile Delta and River to **Bulaq** and across the desert, sometimes by canal to Suez City, or even to Qina and then overland to Qusayr on the Red Sea. African **trade** also entered the Nile by way of the river ports of **Asyut** and Isna, but river transport was often hindered by piracy, which weak governments could not prevent. The **French occupation** was too brief to affect Nile river transport.

In the early 19th century, **Muhammad Ali** enhanced river navigation between **Alexandria** and Bulaq by ordering the construction of the **Mahmudiyya Canal** between 1817 and 1820. Other navigation canals were built in the Delta region, turning Rosetta and Bulaq into boat-building centers. Steam navigation facilitated travel and transport not only to Egypt but also within its riverways and canals; by 1841 steam tugs were being used to draw passenger barges. Muhammad Ali set up the Egyptian Transit Administration in 1844

to control and ensure the transit of passengers and goods across Egypt, making it a major center of international trade even before the **Suez Canal** was built. The rise of **cotton** cultivation greatly expanded river transport up to the 1870s, when railroads became extensive and more economical for bulk freight movement. Under **Khedive Isma'il** 14 thousand km of canals were constructed and many existing ones dredged. During the **British occupation**, state policy favored the extension of railroads and later the development of motor roads over river transport. Consequently, its importance declined.

In 1958 Egypt had altogether 3,100 km of navigable waterways, including the Nile River and its Rosetta branch, with a river fleet of 12 thousand units, including barges, passenger steamers, and the traditional sailboats called feluccas (Arabic: *faluka*). The average annual volume of freight carried between 1948 and 1956 was 5.1 million metric tons, and passenger traffic per year averaged 12.4 million in 1947–56. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government promoted Nile use by improving navigation canals, river harbors, and loading facilities, and by slightly lengthening inland waterways. The **Aswan High Dam** spurred the use of ferries and freight ships on Lake Nasir, linking Aswan with **Sudan**.

One aspect of river transport familiar to generations of European and North American travelers was the Nile boat tour. Intrepid foreigners had sailed up the Nile earlier in the 19th century, but Thomas Cook organized his first guided tour of Egypt, which included a Nile boat journey, in 1869. By 1871 his company ran regular Nile tours, using steamers that it owned, facilitating the development of **tourism** in Egypt. So impressed was Isma'il by the enterprise that he authorized Cook's ships to carry the Egyptian mails to Upper Egypt, starting in 1875. Cook's boats helped to evacuate wounded British soldiers during the 1882 campaign against **Ahmad Urabi** and transported the abortive **Charles Gordon** rescue expedition in 1884–85. Cook's Nile tours remained popular for generations and have been immortalized in countless travel memoirs and works of fiction, notably Agatha Christie's *Death on the Nile*. Other firms, including one owned by **Bank Misr**, have also run Nile boat tours, as did the Egyptian government in the early 1960s. Cook's Egyptian tours were suspended due to the **Suez War**, but were revived on a grand scale in 1989.

RIYAD, MAHMUD (1917–92). Officer, diplomat, and Arab League secretary-general. He graduated from the **Military Academy** in 1939 and later from the Staff College. He represented Egypt on the Egyptian–Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission from 1949 to 1952 and then served from 1954 to 1955 as director of the Arab affairs department within the Egyptian foreign ministry. He served as ambassador to **Syria** from 1955 up to the creation of the **UAR** in February 1958, whereupon he became a presidential adviser on foreign affairs. In 1961 he was named deputy head of Egypt’s permanent mission to the **United Nations** and became its head in the following year. Riyad was foreign minister from 1964 to 1972, also holding the rank of deputy premier from 1970. **Anwar al-Sadat** removed him from his **cabinet** in January 1972 and gave him the honorific title of special adviser to the president. In 1974 he became secretary-general of the Arab League and held that position until April 1979, when Egypt’s membership in that organization was suspended as a result of its separate treaty with **Israel**, a policy that Riyad opposed. After his resignation from the Arab League he retired from politics. His political memoirs include *The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East* (1981) and *Mudhakkirat Mahmud Riyad* (1986). He was more a diplomat-technician than a shaper of Egypt’s foreign policies.

RIYAD, MUSTAFA (1834–1911). Government official, agronomist, **cabinet** minister, and three-time premier. His origins are obscure; he spoke Turkish as his first language but was widely believed to have really been a **Jew** from Smyrna. He began his career as a clerk in the **finance** ministry and then joined the officer corps of the Egyptian army as a clerk and then as a musician. Around 1850 Riyad became an aide-de-camp to **Abbas I**, who in 1851 promoted him in rank; he then became governor of Giza province in 1853–56. **Sa’id** made him administrative chief of Fayyum and then governor of Qina province. **Isma’il** promoted him upon his accession, named him keeper of the seal, admitted him to the **Council of Justice**, and, in 1864, put him in charge of the **khedive**’s private estates. A personal clash with Isma’il led to his sudden dismissal from all his posts in 1868.

Riyad was soon recalled as Isma’il’s chief treasurer, perhaps because the khedive needed an honest official who knew both Arabic and Turkish. In 1872 he was named adviser to the crown prince, **Tawfiq**. From 1873 to 1874 he was director of **education**, building on the foundations laid by **Ali Mubarak**. He was responsible for

bringing **Jamal al-Din al-Afghani** and the founders of *al-Muqtataf* to Egypt. He endowed the revenue from some 1,800 acres of Delta land to support the newly created *Dar al-Kutub*. After serving briefly in 1874 as adviser to the director of interior, he held the portfolios for foreign affairs (1874–75), **agriculture** (1875, 1877–78), justice (1875–76 and 1877), education again (1876–77), and commerce (1877–78). Riyad headed the 1878 commission of inquiry empowered to look into Egypt's financial situation, collaborating with the European creditors against Isma'il. He was minister of both interior and justice in Prince Tawfiq's short-lived cabinet of March 1879, but did not serve in the "Egyptian" (i.e., pro-Isma'il) cabinet of **Sharif**, but went abroad until he was recalled by Tawfiq after his accession in July to serve as his interior minister.

A month later the new khedive asked Riyad to head a cabinet, in which he also held portfolios for interior and **finance**. His main efforts were directed at reorganizing Egyptian government finances, which were close to bankruptcy. This he achieved, working with the European commissioners, with the 1880 **Law of Liquidation**. He ignored the Assembly of Delegates, neutralized most of his opponents, including **Nubar** and **Muhammad Sharif**, and co-opted Afghani's remaining supporters by naming his disciple, Muhammad Abduh, editor of *al-Waqa'i al-Misriyya*. He underestimated the Egyptian army officers, however, ignoring their petition for the dismissal of **Uthman Rifqi** as war minister until they mutinied and he had to accede to their demands in February 1881. Riyad then tried to improve the officers' conditions, but they made further demands on the government in August. Finally they massed at **Abdin Palace** on 9 September, demanding that Tawfiq convoke the Assembly of Delegates, enlarge his army, and dismiss Riyad. He stayed in Europe for as long as **Ahmad Urabi** was in power.

During the early years of the **British occupation**, many nationalists noted his opposition. He backed the creation of *al-Muayyad* in 1889 as a Muslim-owned daily **newspaper** to compete against the **Syrian**-owned *al-Muqattam* and *al-Ahram*. Riyad served as premier from 1888 to 1891 and again in 1893–94, resigning after having failed to back **Abbas Hilmi II** in the **Frontiers Incident**. He played no further role in the Egyptian government. In 1911 he chaired the **Egyptian Congress** that was convened to oppose the demands of the **Coptic Congress**, held earlier that year in **Asyut**. Capable but often tactless, he favored the introduction of European science and

technology but resisted Europe's growing power over Egyptian finance, justice, and government.

ROGERS PEACE PLAN. U.S. proposal, first announced by Secretary of State William Rogers in December 1969, to end the **War of Attrition**. The plan coupled a nearly full Israeli withdrawal from the lands it had taken in the **June War** in return for a binding peace treaty signed by the Arabs. In this form, the plan was rejected immediately by **Israel** and then by the **USSR**; Egypt's response was cool but not categorically negative. The timing of Rogers's announcement may have reflected bureaucratic infighting in Washington, but it also coincided with **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** disappointment with the **Rabat Conference**, which denied Egypt the Arab backing it needed for its war against **Israel**. Rogers was stating publicly proposals that the U.S. had already discussed privately with the **USSR**, **Egypt**, and **Israel**. The 9 December plan addressed an Israeli–Egyptian settlement; a parallel proposal for an Israeli–Jordanian peace was made nine days later. The plan failed because the **USSR** refused to pressure its Arab allies, the White House staff—notably **Kissinger**—had no part in its formulation, and **Israel** could resist U.S. diplomatic pressure.

The War of Attrition escalated early in 1970, as the **USSR** introduced new surface-to-air missiles, accompanied by more than 10 thousand military advisers, into **Egypt**. **Israel's** deep-penetration bombing attacks near **Cairo** seemed aimed at overthrowing **Nasir**. The U.S. government decided to delay selling more **Phantom** jet fighter planes to **Israel** and to send a high-ranking official to **Cairo** in **April 1970**. In a public speech on **May Day**, **Nasir** called on **Washington** to take a new political initiative. After secretly conferring with **Israel** and the **USSR**, **Rogers** announced a modified plan on **25 June**, calling for a 90-day cease-fire tied to **Israel's** withdrawal from lands taken in 1967. **Israel** rejected this plan, too, but **Nasir** accepted the cease-fire on **23 July**, followed by **Jordan**. **Israel** halted its attacks upon receiving **President Nixon's** assurances of political and economic support, and the cease-fire took effect on **7 August**. Its terms differed from those of the **Rogers Plan**, in that **Israel** made no prior commitment to withdraw. When **Egypt** moved its missiles closer to the **Suez Canal** in violation of the cease-fire, the talks proposed by the U.S. government were canceled. After civil war broke out in **Jordan**, the **Rogers Peace Plan** was shelved.

ROSETTA, BATTLE OF (1807). Muhammad Ali's defeat of a 7 thousand man **British** expeditionary force sent to capture Egypt, probably to oust him in favor of the **Mamluks**. After the British occupied **Alexandria**, Muhammad Ali tried to settle with them but was rebuffed. They marched on Rosetta, apparently hoping to forestall a new French occupation, but their two attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties. After the Russian czar's treaty with **Napoléon Bonaparte** drove the **Ottoman Empire** to **Britain's** side, the invasion became pointless, and the force withdrew from Alexandria in September 1807. This Egyptian victory over the British later became a source of national pride.

ROVER SCOUTS. Paramilitary youth organization, founded by **Hasan al-Banna** while the Society of **Muslim Brothers** was still in **Ismailia** (i.e., before 1932). In 1935 the Society formally attached it to its headquarters by naming a leader to supervise and unify its local units, which were called Rovers (Arabic: *jawwala*). Unable to affiliate with the Egyptian Boy Scouts, they stressed athletic activity, physical training, community service, and (when needed) defense for the Muslim Brothers. Graduates of the Rover scouts included volunteers in the **Palestine War** and **Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi's** assassin. In 1948 the Muslim Brothers claimed to have 40 thousand Rovers; government repression of the Society reduced that number to about 7 thousand in 1953, and it was subsequently absorbed into the general Egyptian scouting movement.

RUSHDI, HUSAYN (1863–1928). Lawyer, **cabinet** minister, and four-time premier. Born in **Cairo** to a Turkish family named Topuzzadeh, he studied law in Cairo and Paris. He became justice minister in the **Butros Ghali** cabinet from 1908 to 1910, then served as foreign minister up to the resignation of **Sa'd Zaghlul** in 1912, whereupon he resumed the justice portfolio.

After **Muhammad Sa'id** resigned in April 1914, **Abbas Hilmi II** named him the new premier (and interior minister). He served as regent while the **khedive** was in Istanbul and hence was acting head of state when **World War I** began and when the **Ottoman Empire**, Egypt's nominal suzerain, declared war on **Britain**. When the **Protectorate** was declared on 19 December 1914, Rushdi agreed to remain as premier, but on the understanding that it would end after the war. Following the Armistice, he incited

Sa'd and others to speak to **High Commissioner Sir Reginald Wingate** about sending a delegation to the foreign office to discuss Egypt's future. When the British refused to receive any delegation, Rushdi resigned as premier, although he did stay on as education minister until November 1919. Serving later as deputy premier, he accompanied **Adli Yakan** to negotiate with the foreign office in 1921. Later appointed to the Senate by King **Fuad I**, he chaired that body until his death. He played a thankless role in Egyptian politics with great courage and integrity.

RUSSIA. Russian involvement with Egypt was minimal prior to 1955. A few Russian travelers, mainly Orthodox priests up to the 19th century and then some intellectuals, wrote accounts of their visits to Egypt. Russia's fleet entered the Mediterranean during its first war with the **Ottoman Empire** in 1769–74 and fought one engagement near Damietta in 1772. The viceroys of Egypt sent troops to fight against the Russians during the Greek War for Independence, the Crimean War, and the 1877–78 Russo–Turkish War. Russia was one of the creditor nations represented on the *Caisse de la Dette Publique* and played a role in 1885 during the Ottoman negotiations for the **Drummond Wolff Convention**, persuading the sultan not to ratify the agreement and thus (contrary to what Russia—and **France**—wanted) prolonging the **British occupation** of Egypt. The 1917 revolutions that brought the Bolsheviks to power led to Russian expressions of sympathy for the **Wafd** and the **1919 Revolution**, but the **Soviet** leaders generally dismissed Egyptian nationalism as a bourgeois movement, while most Egyptians rejected **Communism** as tantamount to atheism.

The Soviet government did not initially back the **1952 Revolution** and only began to take an interest in **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** after he refused to join the **Baghdad Pact**, attended the **Bandung Conference**, and sought arms from the Communist countries because of the West's refusal to sell weapons to Egypt under the **Tripartite Declaration**. The announcement in September 1955 of the **Czech Arms Deal**, under which Egypt was to sell \$200 million worth of **cotton** in exchange for Soviet bloc weapons, alarmed the West but thrilled many Arabs and greatly enhanced Soviet prestige in the Middle East. The Soviets provided strong diplomatic support for Egypt during the 1956 **Suez Affair** and issued stern military threats against **Britain, France, and Israel** during the **Suez War**.

The USSR made a modest loan offer to build the **Aswan High Dam** in 1956; the Egyptian government did not accept it but did agree to a more generous Soviet offer in 1958, leading to a major project that brought many Russian engineers and managers to Egypt between 1959 and 1971. The value of the Soviet contribution amounted to \$325 million, or 27.8 percent of the total cost of building the High Dam. Soviet economic aid also helped to develop Egypt's **iron and steel industry**, electrification, fishing, and other highly visible projects, partly for propaganda purposes.

Moscow's attitude on the **UAR** was ambivalent, as it backed **Arab nationalism** as a means of cutting Western influence in the Middle East, but not at the expense of Communism. After the 1958 Revolution in **Iraq**, Egypt and the USSR vied for influence over the new Baghdad regime, Nasir jailed many Egyptian Communists, and Egypt improved its relations with the West. Soviet military aid continued, however, rising from \$223 million in 1955–59 to \$536 million in 1960–66 and to \$1.77 billion between 1967 and 1973. In the **June War**, Soviet arms made up the bulk of Egypt's arsenal; those that were lost or destroyed in the fighting were quickly replaced after the war. In the **War of Attrition** the USSR not only gave diplomatic and economic support, but even provided some pilots to fly Egypt's **MiG** fighter jets in the aerial dogfights against Israel. It opposed the **Rogers Peace Plan** and backed Palestinian efforts to block any reconciliation with Israel. After Nasir's death, Moscow hoped that **Anwar al-Sadat** would hold power only briefly. The **Corrective Revolution**, which ousted **Ali Sabri** and other Soviet allies, shocked the Kremlin and precipitated the **Soviet–Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation**, which committed the two countries to unusually close cooperation.

Instead, Sadat became frustrated at the Soviets' reluctance to sell Egypt the offensive weapons that he felt it needed to resume hostilities against Israel. At this time Sadat was publicly seeking a **Federation of Arab Republics** with **Libya**, **Syria**, and **Sudan**. He also was coming increasingly under the influence of **Saudi Arabia**, which was fiercely anti-Communist. The fear also existed that the USSR, in order to improve its relations with the **United States**, might allow its Jewish nationals to immigrate to Israel. In July 1972, after repeated efforts to buy arms from Moscow, Sadat announced that he was expelling most of the Soviet military advisers from Egypt. The USSR did, however, provide additional weapons

and diplomatic support to Egypt during the **October War**, despite its ambivalent feelings about Sadat's policies. Its reported shipment of **nuclear** missiles to **Alexandria** led to the U.S. Nuclear Red Alert just after the war. The Soviet government did, however, join with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in drafting **Security Council Resolution 338** and in the peace efforts leading up to the **Geneva Conference**. The USSR was shut out of Kissinger's **shuttle diplomacy** in 1974–75. Meanwhile, Sadat drastically realigned Egypt's policies, denounced the Friendship Treaty, suspended repayment of Soviet loans to Egypt in 1976, and cut off cotton sales to Communist bloc countries in 1977. He expelled Moscow's ambassador from Egypt in September 1981.

After Sadat was assassinated, the USSR attempted to rebuild ties with **Husni Mubarak**. The two countries resumed exchanging ambassadors in June 1984. The USSR joined the U.S. in chairing the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, and Moscow was the host city for some of the ensuing multilateral negotiations. Egypt, like most Arab countries, expressed occasional unease during the 1990s about large-scale emigration to Israel of Jews from the former USSR. In 1999 it was reported that the annual value of Russian–Egyptian **trade** was \$500 million, a figure that both sides have lately tried to increase. In April 2001 Mubarak made a two-day state visit to Russia, holding cordial talks with Vladimir Putin about many Middle Eastern issues, but the two leaders differed on the Muslim Chechens who are seeking to break away from Russian control.

RUZ AL-YUSUF. Popular weekly magazine, anti-**Wafdist** in the time of the monarchy, pro-**Najib** in 1954, and turned over to the **National Union** in 1960. From a leftist perspective, it criticized **Anwar al-Sadat** during the student demonstrations of the early 1970s and following the 1977 **Food Riots**. Its name was taken from that of its founder, the Egyptian actress Ruz al-Yusuf; it was later edited by her son **Ihsan Abd al-Quddus**. Its circulation in 2000 was 35 thousand.

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SABRI, ALI (1920–91). Officer, politician, **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**'s most pro-**Communist** associate, and premier. He graduated from the **Military Academy** in 1939. Although not one of the original **Free**

Officers, Sabri was close to them and served as their liaison with the U.S. embassy before the **1952 Revolution**. Soon afterwards he visited Washington and was disillusioned by the cool response he got to a request for American arms. He served as director of the president's office from 1957 up to the formation of the **UAR** in 1958, when he became minister for presidential affairs. Nasir appointed him prime minister and a member of the presidential council in 1962. He was then vice president until 1967 and chairman of the **ASU**, which he tried to pattern after the **Soviet** Communist Party, in 1965–69, although his influence diminished when Egypt lost the **June War**.

Upon Nasir's death in 1970, the **USSR** hoped that Sabri would succeed him. He did become one of **Anwar al-Sadat's** two vice presidents and a leader of the so-called **Centers of Power**. As one of the **Nasirist** politicians whom Sadat accused of plotting against his regime, Sabri was ousted from all his posts in the 1971 **Corrective Revolution**. Tried and condemned to death, his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Eventually he was pardoned and released by Sadat in May 1981. Sabri's reputation for favoring the **USSR** (the abrupt change from his earlier U.S. ties was probably due to American insensitivity) aided his rise to power in the early 1960s, but Egyptians were aware of his ties to several landowning families. The more conservative Arab regimes, on which Egypt came to depend after the June War, disliked him and may have turned Sadat against him. His memoirs, *Ali Sabri yatadhakkir* (Ali Sabri Remembers), were published in Beirut in 1988.

SABRI, HASAN (1875–1940). Politician, **cabinet** minister, and premier. He was trained at the Teachers College and the government **Law School** and then was appointed headmaster of the **Muhammad Ali School** in **Cairo**. He later taught mathematics, history, and geography at **al-Azhar**. He was elected to represent Shirbin (Gharbiyya) in the Chamber of Deputies in 1926 and in the Senate in 1931, later becoming the vice president of this body. In 1933 **Abd al-Fattah Yahya** appointed him **finance** minister. In 1934 he became Egypt's last minister to London before its legation was raised to embassy status. Upon returning to Egypt he became **Ali Mahir's** commerce and **communications** minister and later served in that post and then as war minister under **Muhammad Mahmud**. Upon taking charge of the cabinet in 1940, Sabri took the office of foreign minister and later added the interior portfolio. His sudden death while reading the annual speech from the throne before Parliament

annual speech from the throne before Parliament on 14 November was never fully explained. A non-partisan technocrat, he was committed to carrying out the letter of the **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty**.

AL-SADAT, [MUHAMMAD] ANWAR (1918–81). Officer, writer, minister, and president. Born in Mit Abu al-Kum (Minufiyya) to an Egyptian father, who was an army clerk, and a Sudanese mother, he was reared in **Cairo** and trained at the **Military Academy**, graduating in 1938. He backed *Misr al-Fatat* and the **Muslim Brothers** in his youth and made secret contacts with German agents early in **World War II**. Expelled from the army, he was jailed but managed to escape in 1944. He was arrested again in 1946 on suspicion of conspiring to assassinate **Amin Uthman** and **Mustafa al-Nahhas**. Imprisoned during the two-year trial, he was acquitted and released in 1948. After working for a year as a journalist and truck driver, he managed to regain his military commission. He joined the **Free Officers**, playing a major role in the **1952 Revolution**.

Close to **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**, Sadat joined the **RCC**, serving as its liaison with the Muslim Brothers and other right-wing groups. He was minister of state from 1954 to 1956, edited the government newspaper, *al-Jumhuriyya*, wrote books about Nasir and the revolution, chaired the **National Assembly**, and served as secretary-general of the **Islamic Congress**. Nasir named him vice president in 1969 to halt the rise of **Ali Sabri's** left wing within his ruling circle, but Nasir allegedly planned to replace him. Upon Nasir's death, Sadat was chosen as his successor as Egypt's president and chairman of the **ASU**. Egypt's leaders hoped by choosing him to avert a power struggle between the right wing, led by **Zakariyya Muhyi al-Din**, and the leftists, although the latter group expected Sadat to fall from power, enabling them to take control of Egypt.

Sadat proved to have his own policies and powerful backers. In May 1971 he quashed a leftist conspiracy by his **Corrective Revolution**, purging Sabri and his allies. While signing the **Soviet-Egyptian Treaty** in May 1971 and visiting Moscow in October 1971 and May 1972, he actually moved closer to the conservative Arab states, notably **Saudi Arabia**. He called for the **Federation of Arab Republics** but resisted organic union with **Libya**. He hoped to gain U.S. support in 1972 by ousting some 20 thousand **Soviet** experts, mainly military ones, although some his-

torians argue that Moscow approved this measure and that key advisers remained to help Sadat's army before and during the **October War**. Early in his presidency, he sought peace talks with **Israel**, but demanded its prior commitment to withdraw from the **Sinai Peninsula** and settle the **Palestine** refugee problem. When Israel rejected these terms in 1971, Sadat warned that he would take military action. He and **Syria's** Hafiz al-Asad planned a joint attack on the Israeli-occupied Sinai and Golan Heights for 6 October 1973. Caught by surprise, the Israelis were driven back as the Egyptian army crossed the **Suez Canal**. Although Israel soon counterattacked against both Egypt and Syria and drove their forces back, the Arabs viewed the October War as restoring Egypt's honor and enhancing Sadat's reputation at Nasir's post-humous expense.

Sadat used his hard-won prestige to extricate Egypt from the war against Israel and to regain control of the Sinai. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's **shuttle diplomacy** helped Egypt recover portions of the Sinai, including the oil wells and the **Gidi** and **Mitla passes** in two interim agreements reached in 1974 and 1975. The peace negotiations became deadlocked, however, on the issue of Palestinian participation. Sadat broke the deadlock in November 1977 by his dramatic flight to Jerusalem. Addressing the Israeli Knesset, he offered peaceful coexistence between the Arabs and Israel, provided that Israel agreed first to withdraw from all the lands it had occupied in June 1967 and negotiated a solution to the **Palestinian** Arab problem. He tried to negotiate directly with Israeli Premier Menachem Begin, but talks soon faltered.

U.S. President Carter invited both leaders to an open-ended summit at his summer retreat, where the three men and their advisers hammered out a set of agreements known as the **Camp David Accords**, which after further negotiations led to the **Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty**. The other Arab states condemned these accords and tried with inducements and threats to persuade Sadat not to sign the treaty. When he dismissed their appeals, they broke diplomatic ties, cut off financial support, and expelled Egypt from the **Arab League**. Sadat chose greater political and economic dependence on the United States over submitting to the other Arab states' demands, but the **Autonomy Talks** that Egypt and Israel had agreed to conduct for the Palestinians stalled and were suspended in 1982.

Sadat's foreign policies, partly a reaction against Nasir's Arab and pro-Soviet orientation, also reflected Egypt's deteriorating **economy**. His solution was to downplay **Arab socialism** by gradually restoring capitalism, a policy that he called *infitah*, and luring foreigners to invest in Egyptian manufacturing industries. From 1974 to 1978 the oil-rich Arab states invested heavily, notably in the **GODE**, but American and European investment fell short of Sadat's expectations. The reopening of the Suez Canal, revival of **tourism**, and rising remittances from Egyptians working abroad (mainly in other Arab countries) helped Egypt's economy. Regrettably, investors preferred Egyptian real estate, consumer goods, and luxury hotels to manufacturing firms. The state-owned industries developed under Nasir languished, as did state-provided services in **health care, education, welfare, and transport**. Income inequalities widened. The 1977 **Food Riots** expressed the discontent felt by many Egyptians, and Sadat used his Israeli peace initiative to distract the public. When attacks on his policies intensified, he censored the **press**, passed the **Law of Shame**, and in September 1981 jailed more than 1,600 of his suspected opponents.

Sadat gradually gave up his simple lifestyle, moved into palaces, befriended rich and powerful Egyptians and foreigners, and let some of his friends and relatives use their connections for personal gain. **Islamist** opposition, which he had at first used to fight **communism** and Nasirism, then tried to curb, attacked his abuse of power. His peace with Israel, economic and social issues, his opulent lifestyle, and his perceived opposition to **Islam** all helped cause his assassination in 1981 while reviewing a parade on the anniversary of the October War. Many foreign leaders, including three former U.S. presidents and Menachem Begin, flew to Cairo to attend his funeral, but most Egyptians were barred from the procession, and few mourned his death. A superb actor and a shrewd diplomat, often highly patriotic, he lost his popular touch and tied Egypt's position too closely to American policies. Two of his books, *Revolt on the Nile* (1957) and *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* (1978), serve as partial memoirs; portions of his diaries have been published as *The Public Diaries of Anwar al-Sadat*.

AL-SADAT, JIHAN (1933–). Second wife of **Anwar al-Sadat**, organizer of a private charitable organization to teach **women** marketable skills, and prominent **feminist**. Her role was evident in the 1979

divorce legislation called "Jihan's Law," which required the husband to register his divorce and to inform his wife and gave the wife a claim to larger alimony and child support payments, also lengthening the period when she may retain custody of her children. Although polygyny (which is rare in Egypt) was not outlawed, the first wife's consent was made a prerequisite for a man's taking a second wife. Many Muslims opposed these changes as contrary to the **Shari'a**, and parts of the 1979 legislation were changed in 1985. Conservative Muslims often criticized her for playing too prominent a role in Egypt's public life during her husband's presidency, and since his assassination she has spent much of her time outside the country. She published her memoirs, *A Woman of Egypt*, in 1986.

AL-SA'DAWI, NAWAL (1930–). Physician, author, and **feminist**. Born in the Delta village of Kafr Tahla, she was trained at **Cairo University's** Medical Faculty and Columbia University Medical School and began her practice in 1955. Two years later she published in *Ruz al-Yusuf* a memoir, based on her early life and training, part of which appears in her *Memoirs of a Woman Doctor*. She taught for some years in the medical faculty and became the editor of *al-Sihha* (Health) magazine and the director of education in the health ministry but was dismissed in 1972 for publishing *Women and Sex*. She later was a consultant for the **United Nations** and published in 1980 an exposé of **women's** conditions in the Arab world, *The Hidden Face of Eve*. Arrested by **Anwar al-Sadat** for alleged "crimes against the state" in 1981, Sa'dawi later described her experiences in *Memoirs from the Women's Prison*, published in English in 1988. She has also written many novels, some of which have been translated. In 1982 she founded the Arab Women's Solidarity Organization, which was barred by the Egyptian government in 1991, but later allowed to resume its activities. She has lately divided her time between writing in Egypt and lecturing abroad. Because some **Islamists** accused her of apostasy, a Cairo court tried in April 2001 to compel her husband to divorce her, but the case was dropped in July.

SA'DIST PARTY. Breakaway faction from the **Wafd Party** in 1937–38, led by **Ahmad Mahir** and **Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi**. Claiming to be the true heir to **Sa'd Zaghlul's** principles, it ran candidates in the 1938 elections, which the Wafd boycotted, and joined

in **Muhammad Mahmud's** coalition government. It led anti-Wafdist coalition governments between 1944 and 1949. Its constituency was heavily upper and middle class and was well represented in the **Federation of Egyptian Industries**. After the **1952 Revolution**, it was dissolved. It never attained the popularity of the Wafd.

SA'ID (1822–63). Egypt's viceroy from 1854 to 1863. The fourth surviving son of **Muhammad Ali**, he was educated by Palace tutors. A bright pupil but painfully shy, perhaps because he was overweight, Muhammad Ali required him to make daily calls on the various European consuls and address them in French. Thus he overcame his shyness, became fluent in French, and was befriended by the young French consul, **Ferdinand de Lesseps**, with fateful consequences for Egypt's later history. He became an ensign in the Egyptian navy when he was 13, and Muhammad Ali made him its commander, a position that he retained through the reign of **Abbas I**, despite the bad relations between them.

Upon succeeding him as Egypt's governor, Sa'id quickly improved ties with **France** and with some of the Turks and Egyptians whom Abbas had exiled. Most historical accounts commend Sa'id's reign for granting the concession to build the **Suez Canal**, his friendly relations with Europeans, his promulgation of the 1855 Land Law (*see* **Landownership**), phasing out remnants of Muhammad Ali's monopolies, admitting peasants to the officer corps of the Egyptian army, and improving the systems of **irrigation**, **transport**, and **communications**. His reign led to massive European immigration, foreign indebtedness, and political interference by Western consuls. Egypt's deindustrialization, popularly ascribed to Abbas but really due to the changing policies of Muhammad Ali after 1841, continued under Sa'id. He also granted more power to the rural notables and their sons in the administration and the army, but the emergence of ethnic Egyptians into political prominence occurred only after his death. Sa'id was a weak ruler and his reign was an era of quiescence in Egypt's modernization, yet also a portent of the future changes under **Khedive Isma'il** and the **British occupation**.

SA'ID, MAHMUD (1897–1964). Artist and lawyer. Originally from **Alexandria**, he attended **Victoria College**, spent six months at a **Jesuit** school, and went to the Hilmiyya and Abbasiyya Secondary

Schools in **Cairo**. He received his legal training at the government **Law School** in Cairo and in **France**. He also took painting lessons from an **Italian** artist in Alexandria and studied fine arts at the Académie Julien in Paris. He began work in the *Niyaba* of the **Mixed Courts** in 1922, heading the public prosecutor's office in Mansura, Alexandria, and Cairo, later becoming a judge and finally chancellor of the Alexandria Court of Appeals. He resigned in 1947 to devote his full time to painting. Especially famous are his brightly colored oil paintings depicting peasant life. The **Museum** of Modern Art in Cairo features his work, including many of his portraits. He served for two years on the Supreme Council for the Arts. He displayed his work at the Venice Biennale and in the Louvre. The maternal uncle of Queen Farida, he painted her portrait and nurtured her own artistic talent, which blossomed only after she had been divorced by King **Faruq**.

SA'ID, MUHAMMAD (1863–1928). Politician, **cabinet** minister, and two-time premier. Born in **Alexandria** to a family of Turkish origin, he was educated at the government **Law School** and rose up through the judiciary, becoming interior minister under **Butros Ghali** in 1908–10. He succeeded him as premier upon his assassination. Although widely assumed to be a Nationalist, he opposed the **National Party** while in power. He resigned in 1914 and held no government post during **World War I**, but during the **1919 Revolution** he chaired the cabinet again and also held the interior portfolio. Elected to the first and second sessions of the Chamber of Deputies, he served as **education** and justice minister in **Sa'd Zaghlul's** cabinets and briefly held the **agriculture** portfolio after his resignation. He was viewed in his lifetime as a manipulator without fixed principles.

SA'IDIS. Inhabitants of Upper Egypt, popularly assumed to be physically stronger but less clever than other Egyptians. Until the **Aswan High Dam** was built, they were less apt to suffer from waterborne diseases such as **bilharzia** than Delta peasants. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** was of Sa'idi extraction, which may have made him more sensitive to criticism and more secretive. Upper Egypt has 60 percent of the country's land area but contains only 17 percent of its population.

SAINT-SIMON, CLAUDE-HENRI (1760–1825). French Utopian **socialist**. He was one of the first advocates of a maritime canal con-

necting the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. Some of his supporters tried unsuccessfully to gain **Muhammad Ali's** support for such a project, which later inspired building the **Suez Canal**.

SALAFIYYA. Movement for gradual Islamic reform, advocated by **Muhammad Abduh** and **Rashid Rida**, especially in *al-Manar*.

SALIM, JAMAL (1918–68). Early member of the **Free Officers**, he became a member of the **RCC**. He was the brother of **Salah Salim** and **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** classmate at the **Military Academy**. An intellectual and early advocate of **land** reform, he supported Nasir in his power struggle with **Muhammad Najib**. He was deputy premier and minister of **transport** in 1955–56, but held no cabinet posts later. Within the councils of the Free Officers, he had a domineering personality and a sharp temper. He tended to oppose both democracy and **socialism**.

SALIM, MAMDUH MUHAMMAD (1918–88). Police general, administrator, and premier. Born in **Alexandria**, he was educated at the Police Academy. He served as commander of the Alexandria police from 1964 to 1968, governor of **Asyut** province in 1968–70, and governor of Alexandria in 1970–71. Joining **Anwar al-Sadat's cabinet** following the **Corrective Revolution**, he was interior minister and deputy premier in 1971–75, then prime minister from 1975 to 1978 (also serving briefly as interior minister in 1977). He headed the **ASU** during those years. He was named special assistant to Sadat in October 1978, after his foreign minister resigned in protest against his signing the **Camp David Accords**, and continued to serve in this capacity under **Husni Mubarak**. He was also a member of the Higher Council for **Nuclear Energy**. He played an important role in modernizing Egypt's security forces, abolishing exit visas for Egyptians, and instituting democratic reforms within the government.

SALIM, SALAH (1920–62). Founding member of the **Free Officers**, he was the younger brother of **Jamal Salim**. A 1940 graduate of the **Military Academy**, he fought in the **Palestine War**. He later took part in the **1952 Revolution** and became a member of the **RCC**. Sent to the **Sudan** in 1954 to seek popular support for its union with Egypt, he was accused of bribing politicians and accordingly resigned from the **RCC**. He served as editor of *al-Sha'b* from 1956 to

1959 and later headed Tahrir Publishing and Printing and also the Press Syndicate. He died of cancer. The elevated highway that links Sayyida Zaynab to Abbasiyya is named after him.

AL-SANHURI, ABD AL-RAZZAQ (1895–1971). Legal expert. Born in **Alexandria**, he began his official life by working in its custom-house. He graduated from the government **Law School** in 1917 and was sent on an educational mission to **France**, earning his doctorate in political economy and law under the supervision of Édouard Lambert, former Law School director. Sanhuri joined the *Niyaba* upon his return and was appointed deputy public prosecutor in 1926. He also became a professor of civil law at **Cairo University**, represented Egypt at the Congress of Comparative Law held in Paris in 1932, and was appointed dean of the Law Faculty in 1936, a position that he soon lost because of his political and personal hostility to **Mustafa al-Nahhas**. A judge in the **Mixed Courts**, he drafted revisions to Egypt's civil code during intervals when the **Wafd Party** was out of power. He served as **education** minister in 1939 and 1945 and justice minister in 1944. In 1946 he was elected to membership in the **Arabic Language Academy** and in 1949 to the presidency of the Council of State, an advisory judicial body, where he directed the revision of Egypt's civil code. Because Sanhuri backed **Muhammad Najib** in 1954, he was attacked by a mob and **Nasir** forced him into early retirement. He then helped revise the civil codes of **Syria**, **Iraq**, and **Libya**, and also Kuwait's commercial code. In 1970 Egypt awarded him the state prize for social sciences.

SANNU', YA'QUB "ABU NADDARA" (1839–1912). Humorous writer, journalist, playwright, and early Egyptian nationalist. Born in **Cairo** to a **Jewish** family of **Italian** origin, Sannu' was taught the rudiments of **Islam** as well as of Judaism and in 1852 was sent to Leghorn to study at the expense of a generous nephew of **Muhammad Ali**. He spent three years studying political economy, international law, natural science, and the fine arts, also gaining exposure to the theater and to nascent Italian nationalism. He returned to the court of **Sa'id**, whom he admired, and worked as a tutor, then began teaching in the Cairo polytechnic school in 1862. His classroom duties were outweighed by his extracurricular meetings with students who would later become supporters of **Ahmad Urabi's** movement.

Because **Khedive Isma'il** included among his reforms the opening of an **opera house** and a comic **theater** in Cairo, Egyptians, among them Sannu', came to know European drama. He began writing and producing comic plays, using Cairo colloquial Arabic, for Egyptian audiences. He was the first director to put **women** actors on the Egyptian stage. After meeting **Jamal al-Din al-Afghani** in 1871, he also began composing political satires. His first plays were performed in a small theater in Cairo's old city, but he soon moved to one near the **Ezbekiyya Gardens** and eventually to **Qasr al-Nil** Palace, where he performed before the khedive, who called him "Egypt's Molière." As his Arabic plays and his adaptation of French plays became better known, his satires grew bolder, and the **British** convinced Isma'il that Sannu's influence was subversive. The khedive forbade him to write or produce further plays. Sannu' formed two secret literary societies, both noteworthy for including members from all the major religions, but they were closed in 1875; he would later claim them to have been precursors of the first **National Party**.

Sannu' made peace with Isma'il in 1876 and was named court poet, but they soon quarreled again. He became involved in **Freemasonry** and lampooned the court and its hangers-on ever more stridently. Afghani and **Abduh** encouraged him to publish a comic **newspaper**, partly written in colloquial Arabic, called *Abu Nad-dara Zarqa* (The Wearer of Blue Spectacles), in which he satirized both the khedive and the sultan, but hailed Prince **Abd al-Halim** as Egypt's potential savior. This newspaper was the first in Egypt to print cartoons. Threats against the editor and even his printer did not deter him, so Isma'il banished him from Egypt in 1878. He went to Paris, where he met many other Middle Eastern émigrés and continued to publish papers attacking Isma'il and his successors, gleaning financial support from various sources, possibly including Prince Halim. A pioneer of both drama and journalism in Egypt, Sannu' now stands out for having been at the same time a Jew and an Egyptian nationalist, but in his own time he was hailed for his witty comedies and his satires against native and foreign rulers.

SAUDI ARABIA. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia came into being under King Abd al-Aziz, usually known as "Ibn Sa'ud," between 1902 and 1926 and has existed under its present name only since 1932. Before

Americans discovered oil in its eastern province in 1938, it was one of the world's poorest countries, and its rise to prominence as an economic power has occurred since **World War II**. Prior to that time, other countries, including the **United States** and Japan, used to accredit their **Cairo** envoys as ambassadors to Saudi Arabia as well. Egyptians and other Arabs often served as ministers in the Saudi royal cabinet. During the 1940s, Egypt was aligned with Saudi Arabia and **Syria** against the Hashimite kingdoms of Transjordan and **Iraq**, for example, in creating the **Arab League** as opposed to the union of Fertile Crescent countries favored by the Hashimites.

During the era of **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**, Egypt's ties with Saudi Arabia deteriorated owing to Egypt's adherence to **Arab nationalism** and **positive neutrality**. When Egypt intervened to back the republican revolutionaries in the **Yemen Civil War**, it was widely thought that one of Nasir's aims was to gain control over the oil of Saudi Arabia, which backed Yemen's imamate. Egypt and Saudi Arabia settled their differences at the **Khartoum summit**, after which the Saudi government increasingly supported the reconstruction of Egypt's **armed forces**. The Saudis also promoted policies of **Islamism** (as opposed to Arab nationalism), opposition to **Communism**, and reconciliation with the United States. Within Egypt, Saudi financial aid led to the growth of Islamist groups such as **al-Jihad** and *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya*, at the expense of the ASU and other Nasirite groups. Although the Saudis encouraged Egypt's early attempts to reduce tensions with **Israel** through Henry Kissinger's **shuttle diplomacy**, they did not endorse **Anwar al-Sadat's** Jerusalem trip in 1977, the subsequent peace talks, the **Camp David Accords**, or the **Egyptian-Israel Peace Treaty**. In 1979 the Saudi government broke diplomatic relations with Sadat's government and suspended all economic aid to Egypt.

Diplomatic ties were restored in 1987, and Saudi Arabia has gradually resumed its former role as the largest supplier of foreign aid to Egypt. In addition, Saudi Arabia has continued to be a major importer of Egyptian professionals and manual laborers, whose remittances to Egypt now amount to about \$3 billion annually. In recent politics, despite a traditional Saudi aversion to **Zionism**, Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah privately and publicly called in 2002 for a peace agreement with Israel, without the explicit concurrence of **Husni Mubarak's** government.

AL-SAYYID, AHMAD LUTFI (1872–1963). Writer, editor, and educational leader, often called *Ustadh al-jil* (Professor of the Generation) because of his influence on younger men. Born to an Egyptian landowning family, he was supposed to study at **al-Azhar**, but instead attended the government **Law School**. While studying there, he founded a law review called *al-Tashri'* (Legislation), together with **Abd al-Aziz Fahmi** and **Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat**. After graduating in 1894, he worked as a deputy public prosecutor. In 1896 he joined the secret society that became the basis for the **National Party** and was advised by **Abbas Hilmi II** to live in Switzerland for a year in order to acquire its nationality, so that he could edit a nationalist **newspaper**, protected by the **Capitulations** from prosecution under the 1881 **Press Law**. While there, Lutfi came under the influence of **Muhammad Abduh** and decided to distance himself from the **khedive**. Returning to Egypt, he worked in the *Ni-yaba*, but his growing estrangement from the British led him to resign in 1905. He opened his own law firm and represented the accused peasants in the **Dinshaway** trial.

Early in 1907, a group of Egyptian liberals established *al-Jarida* and named Lutfi as its editor, a post he held from 1907 to 1914. Its shareholders formed the **Umma Party** as a middle force between the khedive and the Nationalists. Because Lutfi believed strongly in individual rights and constitutional liberties, his editorials opposed Abbas's autocratic pretensions and rejected ties with the **Ottoman Empire** and **pan-Islam**. He focused on promoting a sound Egyptian patriotism based on **education** and a sense of self-worth. Although he opposed the National Party's extremism, he admired **Mustafa Kamil** personally and cooperated with **Muhammad Farid** during **Britain's politique d'entente** with Abbas. After Britain declared the **Protectorate**, *al-Jarida* ceased publication.

In 1919 Lutfi was one of the first to join the **Wafd**, but he gradually distanced himself from party politics. From 1923 to 1941 he was the rector of **Cairo University**. He translated Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* and other writings into Arabic. Some of his *al-Jarida* editorials were reprinted in 1937 and 1949 as *al-Muntakhabat* (Selected Passages), *Safahat matwiya min tarikh al-haraka al-istiqlaliyya fi Misr* (Unwritten Pages from the History of the Independence Movement in Egypt) in 1946, and *Taammulat fi al-falsafa wa al-adab wa al-siyasa wa al-ijtima'* (Meditations in Philosophy, **Literature**, Politics, and Society) in 1946 and reprinted in

1965. His memoirs, published in *al-Musawwar* in 1950, were reissued in book form as *Qissat hayati* (The Story of My Life) in 1963. An advocate of reason who preferred a life of scholarship to a political career, he could not inspire the Egyptian masses, but his influence on Egypt's intellectuals was immense.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 (1967). UN statement of principles for achieving peace between the Arab states and **Israel**, adopted by the Security Council on 22 November 1967. The resolution called for a just and lasting peace so that every state in the Middle East would have the right "to live in peace within secure and recognized borders." It called on Israel to withdraw its troops from "territories occupied in the recent conflict." Egypt and the other Arab countries interpreted this passage to mean withdrawal from *all* occupied lands, including the **Sinai Peninsula** and **Gaza Strip**; Israel argued that it meant *some* territories. It also called for freedom of navigation through international waterways in the Middle East, a just solution to the refugee problem, and measures including demilitarized zones to guarantee the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area. Resolution 242 was accepted in 1967 by Egypt and Israel (but with differing interpretations) and has since been often reaffirmed (but not implemented) as a basis for Arab-Israeli peace.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (1973). UN resolution, prepared by the **United States** and the **USSR**, calling for a cease-fire between **Israel** and the Arab states involved in the **October War**, prompt implementation of **Security Council Resolution 242** in all of its parts, and immediate negotiations, concurrent with the cease-fire, among the parties concerned under appropriate auspices to establish a just and durable peace in the Middle East. It was followed by Resolutions 339, asking the secretary-general to send UN observers to supervise the cease-fire, and 340, demanding that all parties return to the positions that they occupied on 22 October 1973, implying Israel's withdrawal from its position surrounding Suez. It is often cited as a basis for Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.

SEPARATION OF FORCES (1974). Term used by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for the realignment of Egyptian and Israeli troops near the **Suez Canal**, culminating in the first Egyptian-Israeli

agreement, signed on 18 January 1974. **Israel** agreed to withdraw its troops from the west side of the Canal, and Egypt reduced its forces east of it. Both sides agreed to meet again at **Kilometer 101** to work out the details to implement the troop movements. The signatories stated that this agreement was the first step toward a final, just, and durable peace under the provisions of **Security Council Resolution 338** and within the framework of the **Geneva Conference**. Kissinger later mediated an Israeli–**Syrian** Separation of Forces accord.

SÈVE, OCTAVE-JOSEPH-ANTHELME, “SULAYMAN PASHA” (1787–1860). French army officer in Egyptian service. Born in Lyons, he showed strong aptitude for a military profession and excelled in the study of mathematics as an aspiring naval officer, but his early involvement in a duel made him quit the French navy. Joining **Napoléon Bonaparte**’s army, he saw action in Italy, in **Russia**, and in the hundred-day attempt to regain power. His career derailed by the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy, he left **France** in 1816 for Persia. On reaching Egypt, **Muhammad Ali** offered to make him an instructor in his new army. Sève managed to assert his authority over a corps of young Georgian and **Circassian Mamluks** by arresting some of their cadets who had tried to shoot him during their target practice. He even taught European military techniques to **Ibrahim**, just back from his war against the **Wahhabis** in Arabia.

In a few years he managed to weld a polyglot group of Turks, Circassians, and Arabs, to which were added Egyptian peasants, into a 130 thousand man army that could be doubled, in case of need, by **bedouin** irregulars, auxiliaries, and cadets. Sève married into Muhammad Ali’s family; converted to **Islam**, taking the name Sulayman; and was promoted to the rank of colonel. He aided Ibrahim in the Morean war against the **Greeks** and later in Egypt’s **Syrian** campaign against the **Ottoman Empire**. Although his role was diminished by the **Convention of London**, he remained in the Egyptian army, helping it to take part in the Crimean War.

SHA’B PARTY. Small clique organized in November 1930 by **Isma’il Sidqi** as a counterpoise to King **Fuad I**’s **Ittihad Party**, so that he would not depend wholly on Palace support. In the May–June 1931 parliamentary elections, which were boycotted by the **Wafd** and the **Constitutional Liberals**, 83 Sha’b deputies were elected. When Sidqi turned his premiership over to **Abd al-Fattah Yahya** in 1933,

the latter also assumed the presidency of the Sha'b Party. Dominated by large landowners, with a scattering of urban middle-class backers, it declined after 1936. It merged in 1938 with the Ittihad Party. Both played marginal roles in Egyptian politics.

SHABAB MUHAMMAD. Revolutionary Muslim youth movement, formed in 1939 as a splinter group from the Society of the **Muslim Brothers**, active in the **Palestine War** and the anti-British struggle in the **Suez Canal Zone** in 1951, implicated in **Black Saturday**, and later banned by the **RCC**. Later, one of its members, Hafiz Salama, formed the **Society of Islamic Guidance**.

AL-SHADHILI (SHAZLY), SA'D AL-DIN (1922–). Army officer, diplomat, and writer. Born in **Cairo**, he was educated in government schools, **Cairo University**, the **Military Academy**, and several schools in the **USSR**. After five years' service in the Guards Regiment, he was a platoon commander in the **Palestine War**. He was commander of the Parachute School from 1954 to 1956, of a parachute battalion from 1956 to 1958, and of the **UAR** contingent of the **UN** forces in the Congo in 1960–61. He served as defense attaché of the Egyptian Embassy in London from 1961 to 1963. He then became brigadier commander of the Egyptian forces in the **Yemen Civil War** from 1965 to 1966, of the Shadhili Group in the **June War**, of the Special Forces in 1967–69, and of the Red Sea district from 1970 to 1971. Shadhili was commander-in-chief of the Egyptian armed forces from 1971 to 1973 and is generally credited with having led the Egyptians' successful crossing of the **Suez Canal in Operation Badr**. He later quarreled with **Anwar al-Sadat** and was sent as Egypt's ambassador to **Britain** in 1974–75, then Portugal in 1975–78. An expatriate critic of Sadat's policies, he founded the Egyptian National Front in 1980 and began publishing *al-Jabha* magazine. He also wrote books on the **October War**, notably *The Crossing of the Suez* in 1980 and *The Arab Military Option* in 1986.

AL-SHAFI'I, HUSAYN (1918–). Officer and politician. A **Military Academy** graduate, he was one of the **Free Officers** who carried out the **1952 Revolution**, after which he joined the **RCC**. Shafi'i became minister of war and marine briefly in 1954, then minister for social affairs up to 1958. During the union with **Syria**, he served as minister of labor and social affairs and briefly held one of the vice

presidential positions. Following the breakup of the **UAR**, he was minister of social affairs with the rank of deputy premier. In 1962 he joined the Presidential Council and was a vice president in 1964–67. He again became minister of social affairs and *awqaf* in 1967–68, and during that time he also chaired the revolutionary court that tried 55 officers accused of plotting against **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**.

He served again as vice president under **Anwar al-Sadat** from 1970 to 1975. He opposed Sadat's peace initiative and denounced the **Camp David Accords** in October 1978. Since then Shafi'i has not been active in politics, although he still gives press interviews.

SHAHIN, YUSUF (1926–). Cinema producer. Born in **Alexandria**, he attended a Catholic primary school, **Victoria College**, the University of California at Berkeley, and the Pasadena Playhouse, which awarded him a master's degree in 1950. He sometimes used film to comment on his own life experiences. His earliest production, *Baba Amin* (1950), expressed his feelings toward his father, and his marriage to a Frenchwoman inspired his *Iskandariyya leh?* (Why Alexandria?). He discovered **Omar Sharif** and gave him a starring role in his 1954 film *Sira' fi al-Wadi* (The Blazing Sun). Later productions include *Bab al-Hadid* (The Railway Station) in 1958, *al-Nasir Salah al-Din* (The Victor Saladin) in 1963, *al-Ikhtiyar* (The Choice) in 1970, *al-Asfur* (The Swallow) in 1973, and *al-Wida', ya Bunabart* (Farewell, Bonaparte) in 1985. He received a life achievement award at the 1997 Cannes Film Festival.

SHAME, LAW OF (1980). Authoritarian decree by **Anwar al-Sadat**, approved by 98 percent of all Egyptian voters in a national plebiscite, that severely restricted public criticism of his person and policies. Also punishable were "advocating any doctrine that implies negation of divine teaching," "causing children or youth to go astray by advocating the repudiation of popular, religious, moral, or national values or by setting a bad example in a public place," and "broadcasting gross or scurrilous words or pictures that could offend public sensibilities or undermine the dignity of the state." Offenders could be barred from public life, conducting business, managing their own property, living in their own homes, or leaving Egypt. Although many lawyers and journalists have criticized the Law of Shame, it has not been repealed.

SHAMM AL-NASIM. Egyptian spring holiday, coinciding with **Coptic** Easter Monday, celebrated by most Muslims as well as Christians by dyeing boiled eggs and enjoying a picnic outing.

SHARAF, SAMI (1929--). Intelligence operative and close associate of **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**, especially following the **June War**. A 1949 graduate of the **Military Academy**, he was commissioned in the Artillery Corps. He became Nasir's secretary in 1955 and helped to set up the *Mukhabarat*. He was the cousin of General **Muhammad Fawzi**, whom he urged Nasir to appoint as his defense minister. Sharaf later served as minister of presidential affairs under both Nasir and **Anwar al-Sadat**, who purged him in the **Corrective Revolution** despite his personal friendship with the commander of the presidential guard. Convicted of plotting against Sadat, he was given a long prison sentence, but was released in the summer of 1981. He has played no further role in politics.

SHA'RAWI, HUDA (1879–1947). Egypt's pioneer **feminist**. She was a daughter of Muhammad Sultan, a wealthy Egyptian landowner, and the wife of Ali Sha'rawi, the first treasurer of the **Wafd**. She helped to set up *Mubarrat Muhammad Ali*, a **women's** social service organization, in 1909 and the Union of Educated Egyptian Ladies in 1914, which was also the first time she traveled to Europe. She took part in the first women's street demonstration during the **1919 Revolution** and was elected president of the Wafdist Women's Central Committee. In 1923 Sha'rawi founded and became the first president of the **EFU**, which sent her to an international feminist meeting in Rome. Upon her return, she took off her face veil in public for the first time, causing a sensation. Under her leadership Egyptian women picketed the opening of Parliament in January 1924 and submitted a list of nationalist and feminist demands. She resigned later from the Wafdist Women's Central Committee but continued to lead the EFU until her death and helped form an Arab feminist organization in 1944. Her memoirs of her secluded early life have been translated into English and published as *Harem Years: The Memoirs of an Egyptian Feminist*; regrettably, they do not cover her later years as a feminist leader.

AL-SHA'RAWI, [MUHAMMAD] MUTAWALLI (1911–98). **Islamist** preacher, writer, and **cabinet** minister. Born in Daqahliyya,

he was educated in Zaqaзиq and **al-Azhar**, from which he graduated in 1941 and received a teaching certificate two years later. He taught at its institutes in **Tanta**, Zaqaзиq, and **Alexandria**, then worked in **Saudi Arabia** in 1950–63. He later served as office director for the rector of al-Azhar and was delegated to Abd al-Aziz University in Riyadh in 1972. Returning to Egypt to become minister of *awqaf* and al-Azhar affairs in 1976, he kept close ties with the Saudi government and resisted attempts by other Islamists to form a religious party in Egypt. His many publications included an interpretation of the Quran. He spoke often on Egyptian state **television**, upholding Muslim principles without offending **Husni Mubarak**'s regime.

SHARI'A. The comprehensive code of Muslim behavior, or the rules and laws of **Islam**. The Shari'a has been derived by generations of Muslim legal experts from the Quran and the recorded sayings and acts of Muhammad, augmented by analogy, consensus of the Islamic community, and previous judicial decisions. Although the Shari'a purports to cover all aspects of Muslim behavior, for most of Islamic history it has coexisted with other legal systems, including rulers' edicts, or *qanuns*, commercial law administered by *muhtasibs* (market inspectors), and *mazalim* courts that investigated bureaucratic injustices. Learned Muslims, or **ulama**, developed and administered the Shari'a. Westernizing reforms in 19th century Egypt gradually limited the ulama's judicial authority to issues of worship and personal relationships, including marriage, divorce, and inheritance of property. With the rise of **Islamism** in the 1970s, some **National Assembly** members argued that the Shari'a should become the basis of Egypt's laws. A 1980 amendment to the **1971 Constitution** identifies the Shari'a as the main basis of Egyptian legislation. Despite rising pressure from some Islamists and aside from such token gestures as Islamic **banking**, Egypt remains a largely secular society. *See also* **Shari'a Courts**.

SHARI'A COURTS. Egypt's Muslim tribunals up to 1956. In **Ottoman** times, the judicial system included courts headed by an appointed *qadi-asker*, handling cases involving **Mamluks** or other soldiers in Egypt, and courts headed by *qadis* (judges), who heard cases involving civilian Muslims. Under **Muhammad Ali** the jurisdiction of these courts was limited by the Ottoman *Nizam-i-Jedid*. A rudimentary secular court system was set up under Muhammad Ali and

Isma'il, leading to comprehensive **National Courts** in 1883, but the Shari'a Courts continued to hear cases involving marriage, divorce, child custody, administration of family *awqaf*, and other matters most apt to affect the daily lives of most Egyptian Muslims; the **Copts**, other Christian sects, and **Jews** had similar courts.

Although most of the Shari'a Court personnel were trained by **al-Azhar**, the Egyptian government tried to bypass that conservative institution. When he was **education** minister, **Sa'd Zaghlul** founded a School for Muslim Qadis in 1907 to train clerks, judges, and even lawyers (who had played no role in traditional Muslim practice). Azharite complaints led to the closing of this school in 1928. The Shari'a lawyers established their own **bar association** in 1916, but viewed themselves as underprivileged relative to **National** and **Mixed Court** attorneys. Indeed, Shari'a court judges, lawyers, and clerks wielded less power, enjoyed less prestige, and earned lower wages than their counterparts in Egypt's other tribunals. Piecemeal reforms were made in marriage and divorce laws in the 1920s, but the *awqaf* remained subject to many abuses. **Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri**'s efforts at civil law reform did not affect the Shari'a courts. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**'s government abolished all religious courts in January 1956, and the Shari'a court judges were incorporated into the National Court system. In recent years, Egypt's **Islamists** have called for restoring the **Shari'a** as the law of the land. If they succeed, the Shari'a courts may be revived.

SHARIF, MUHAMMAD (1826–87). Army officer, minister, and three-time premier. Born in Istanbul, he accompanied his father when he was sent by the **Ottoman** sultan to be a judge in Mecca. **Muhammad Ali** saw him as a boy, took a fancy to him, and offered to rear him as one of his own sons. He was enrolled in the Princes' School (*Maktab al-Khanqa*) and accompanied them on the 1844 education mission to Paris. Sharif spent two years at St.-Cyr Military Academy and became the captain of a French regiment. He returned to **Cairo** in 1849 to become a captain under Colonel **Octave Sève** or "Sulayman Pasha," whose daughter he married, and may have been a clerk to Prince **Abd al-Halim**. He was in Istanbul during **Abbas Hilmi I**'s last year as viceroy, but returned after the accession of **Sa'id**, who promoted him to colonel with command over an infantry regiment.

Sharif entered the civil administration as director of the foreign affairs department in 1858. He mixed well with Europeans and was

scrupulously honest, but was extremely proud of his Turkish background, contemptuous toward **Armenians** and Egyptians, and somewhat lazy. He chaired the **Council of Justice** from 1861 to 1863 and later in 1867. He briefly directed **education**, then returned to foreign affairs in 1863; took charge of interior in 1866, adding public works for a time; served on four occasions as acting viceroy when **Isma'il** was away from Egypt; and headed the department of justice from 1872 to 1875, adding commerce in 1874—and again from 1876. As prime minister in 1879, then in 1881–82, and in 1882–84, Sharif gained an undeserved reputation for favoring constitutional government and **Ahmad Urabi's** movement. He was well liked by Europeans and Turco-Egyptian aristocrats and built up substantial landholdings in Egypt. Dominated by **Khedives** Isma'il and **Tawfiq**, he rarely tried to assert his convictions, except when he resigned in 1884 rather than countenance surrendering Egyptian control over the **Sudan**.

SHARIF, OMAR (1932–). **Cinema** actor. Originally named Michel Shalhub, he was educated at **Cairo's** Victoria College. He worked briefly as a salesman for a lumber export firm and began acting in films in 1953. His first film was called *The Blazing Sun*. He starred in 24 Egyptian and two French co-production films in the following five years. He began his international career with a supporting role in *Lawrence of Arabia* and has starred in other British and American movies, including *Behold a Pale Horse*, *Doctor Zhivago*, and *Funny Girl*. His autobiography, *The Eternal Male*, came out in 1978. After his career in Western cinema faded in the 1980s, he returned to Cairo and resumed acting in Egyptian films.

SHARM AL-SHAYKH. Fortified point on the shore of the **Sinai Peninsula** near the Straits of **Tiran** used by Egypt from 1949 to 1956 and in 1967 to block the passage of Israeli shipping between the **Gulf of Aqaba** and the Red Sea, on the claim that **Israel** was not entitled to use either waterway. Occupied by Israel from 1967 to 1979, it was restored to Egypt and became a center for **tourism** and the site of several high-level meetings.

AL-SHARQAWI, ABD AL-RAHMAN (1920–87). Leftist novelist and journalist. Sharqawi's first novel, *al-Ard* (translated as *Egyptian Earth*), depicted the privations of the peasants before the **1952 Revo-**

lution. He chaired the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference and directed *Ruz al-Yusuf*. He became secretary-general of the Supreme Council for the Arts and wrote a weekly column for *al-Ahram* under **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**. He broke with **Anwar al-Sadat** after he formed the Supreme Press Council in 1975. Sharqawi's manifesto, *Muhammad rasul al-hurriyya* (Muhammad, Messenger of Freedom), preached a form of Islamic socialism.

SHAWQI, AHMAD (1868–1932). Distinguished Arabic poet and playwright, often called *amir al-shu'ara* (prince of poets). He came from a wealthy family of mixed Turkish, Arab, Kurdish, and Greek origin with close connections to the **khedivial** family. Born in **Cairo**, he was educated at the Khedivial Secondary School, then the School of Languages (later the government **Law School**) in Cairo from 1885 to 1889, and studied in Montpellier and Paris in 1891–93. He was fascinated by **France** and equally impressed by the beautiful monuments and the “great commercial and industrial developments” in London, which he visited during his stay.

Upon returning to Egypt, he went to work in the court of **Abbas Hilmi II** and began writing poetry, often glorifying his patron. He read one of his poems at the 1894 International Congress of Orientalists in Geneva. He wrote poems attacking **Mustafa Riyad** for praising the **British occupation** in 1904 and Lord **Cromer** on the occasion of his departure in 1907. Shawqi mourned the deposition of **Ottoman** Sultan Abdulhamid in 1909 and would later pen an elegy to the **caliphate** after Kemal Atatürk abolished it. When Abbas was deposed in 1914, Shawqi was exiled to Barcelona, Spain. After returning to Egypt in 1919, he won public recognition as the greatest living Arabic poet. He was elected to the Senate in 1923 and was formally named “Prince of the Arab Poets” by his colleagues, including **Hafiz**, at a ceremony in Cairo in 1927. His enemies called him the “poet of Arab princes” because of his close ties with **Abdin Palace**, but his work remains a model for neoclassical Arabic **poetry**. He is still widely read and admired throughout the Arab world. His Giza mansion is now a **museum**.

SHAYKH AL-BALAD. Assistant to the *umda* as village magistrate.

SHAYKH AL-SADAT. Prestigious Egyptian leader of the descendants of Muhammad, especially via his grandson Husayn. In the 19th cen-

ture, this position became tied to the leadership of the Wafa'iyya family and **Sufi** order, then was held for a while by members of the Bakri family (see *Naqib al-Ashraf*). The marriage of journalist **Ali Yusuf** to the daughter of the *shaykh al-sadat* became a public issue in 1904. The position lost power and prestige in the 20th century.

SHEPHEARD'S HOTEL. Famous **Cairo** inn, opened in 1841 as the **British** Hotel, near what was to become the **Ezbekiyya Gardens**. It soon developed a reputation as a comfortable oasis for travelers on the arduous overland route between Europe and India. Partly destroyed by fire in 1869, it was rebuilt in time to help accommodate the crowds attending the inauguration of the **Suez Canal**. Its popularity increased with the development of Cook's Tours in the 1870s (see **River Transport**). It was enlarged in 1888 and then completely rebuilt in 1890, when it became the first hotel in the Middle East to have electric lighting. During the **World Wars** it was host to thousands of **British** Empire troops, and its Long Bar became famous for its libations. The first ball of Cairo's social season was always held at Shephard's. In part because wealthy foreigners frequented it, Shephard's was the prime target for demonstrators on **Black Saturday**, when it was totally destroyed by fire. Its name was later given to a new hotel built in another location, near the **Cairo Corniche**. The Helnan Chain now manages it.

AL-SHUBBAN AL-MUSLIMIN, JAM'IYYAT. Called the Young Men's Muslim Association (YMMA) in English, this educational society was founded in November 1927 by Abd al-Hamid Sa'id, **Abd al-Aziz Jawish**, and Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib to counter the Westernizing influence of the Young Men's Christian Association and other foreign groups. Its aims were to teach **Islamic** morals and ethics, to spread that knowledge best suited to the modern way of life, to discourage dissension and abuses among Muslims, and to utilize what is best in both Eastern and Western cultures while rejecting all that is bad in them. The Association forswore all political activity, but its leaders were involved with either the **National Party** or the **Salafiyya** movement. It was in fact a highly militant, politicized, and **pan-Islamic** group, which formed branches throughout Egypt and in other Muslim countries. It was influential under **Ali Mahir**, backed anti-imperialist movements (some of them pro-Nazi) during **World War II**, and sent volunteers to fight in the **Palestine**

War, but it never won as much popular support as the **Muslim Brothers**. It remains a respected social, educational, and religious nongovernmental organization, with branches throughout Egypt.

SHURA COUNCIL, *see* **MAJLIS AL-SHURA**.

SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's method of mediating between individual Arab countries and **Israel** during 1974–75, by which he moved frequently between Arab and Israeli leaders to forge **Separation of Forces agreements** in 1974 and the **Egyptian–Israeli agreement** in the following year. Other U.S. mediators have since imitated this method, influenced by the 1949 **Rhodes Proximity Talks**.

AL-SIBA'I, YUSUF (1917–78). Army officer, politician, journalist, and writer. Born in **Cairo**, he graduated from the **Military Academy** in 1937. In 1952 he became director of the **Military Museum**, then general-secretary of the Council for **Literature** and Art, chairman of the Writers' Association and of the **Cinema Critics' Association**, and subsequently secretary-general of **AAPSO**. He became editor of *Akhar Sa'a*, a weekly, in 1966 and later chairman of the board of directors for *Dar al-Hilal* and editor of *al-Musawwar*. Siba'i was minister of culture and information in 1973–76 and was elected chairman of the Journalists' Syndicate in 1977. The author of many novels and short stories that were popular among Egyptians, he was killed in February 1978 by **Palestinian *fidaiyin*** during an attack on an Afro–Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference meeting in Cyprus, alienating many Egyptians against the Palestinians and their cause.

SIDDIQ, ISMA'IL (1821–76). Major Egyptian official under **Khedive Isma'il**, often called the *Mufattish*. The son of a poor peasant, Siddiq's mother was the wet nurse to Isma'il, and hence the two boys grew up together. He got little schooling, spoke no language other than Arabic, and rarely dealt with Europeans, yet he became one of Egypt's richest and most powerful officials. Starting as a local inspector for the **khedivial** estates under **Abbas Hilmi I** and **Sa'id**, he eventually became their inspector general. Upon his accession, Isma'il raised his salary and made him director general of all khedivial properties. Siddiq gradually advanced in his responsibilities until he became in 1866 inspector general for all Egypt, the position

that made him famous. In 1867 he joined the Regency Council that governed Egypt while Isma'il was visiting Paris; the next year he took charge of the **finance** department. He married a freed slave of **Ibrahim**, Isma'il's father, and his son later married an adopted daughter of the khedive.

Although he had no formal training in finance, Siddiq had a flexible mind that enabled him to adapt to new situations and to understand his patron's wishes. He became adept at bargaining with Egypt's creditors, devising new stratagems to collect taxes, and supervising provincial officials. He accumulated agricultural lands, several palaces in **Cairo**, and immense sums of money. Despite his ties to Isma'il, his patron watched him closely and grew increasingly suspicious about his fortune, gained mostly by graft and extortion. Consequently, he was dismissed from all his positions in 1876. Siddiq "vanished" suddenly in November 1876; in fact, he was being pursued by the new *Caisse de la Dette Publique* and was arrested by the khedive's **Privy Council**, tried, convicted, and secretly murdered—allegedly by **Mustafa Fahmi**. In a critical era of Egypt's history, he was an official with unparalleled power, great wealth, strong patronage, few scruples, and no **education**.

SIDDIQ, YUSUF MANSUR (1910–75). Artillery officer, **Communist**, and **RCC** member. Siddiq graduated from the **Military Academy** in 1933, before it was opened to **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** and his colleagues. Although not a member of the **Free Officers**, he collaborated closely with them and was one of the leaders of the al-Arish command that carried out the 1952 coup. His premature action in seizing the general headquarters on the night of the coup was instrumental in preempting government plans to arrest some of the conspirators. He was invited to join the **RCC** in August 1952 by the original nine members.

Politically a leftist, he was a member of *Hadeto*, unlike fellow leftist **Khaled Muhyi al-Din**. He was dismissed from the **RCC** in January 1953, as part the junta's crackdown on Communists and their sympathizers, more likely due to his open dissent with their actions. He supported **Muhammad Najib** in the power struggle with Nasir and was placed under arrest. He died of cancer.

SIDQI, ATIF (1930–). Lawyer, professor, **cabinet** minister, and premier. Educated in **Cairo University's** Law Faculty and the Sor-

bonne, he taught general **finance** at Cairo University (1958–72). He served as cultural attaché at the Egyptian Embassy in Paris (1972–83), president of the Government Advisory Council of the Commission on Economic and Financial Affairs (1980–85) and of the **Central Auditing Agency** (1985–90), minister of international cooperation (1987–91), and prime minister (1991–96). He later headed the Société Égyptienne d'Économie Politique, de Statistiques et de Législation. An attempt was made on his life in 1993.

SIDQI, AZIZ (1920–). Engineer, politician, cabinet minister, and premier. Educated at **Cairo University**, the University of Oregon, and Harvard, he worked as an instructor in **Alexandria University's** engineering faculty and as a technical adviser to the prime minister. In 1953 he became director of the **Liberation Province** project. He served as minister of **industry** from 1956 to 1963, then deputy prime minister for industry and mineral wealth in 1964–65, later becoming adviser to **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** for production in 1966–67, and finally minister of industry, **petroleum**, and **mineral** wealth from 1968 to 1971. After **Anwar al-Sadat** succeeded Nasir, he became a deputy prime minister in 1971 and prime minister in 1972–73. When Sadat took charge of the cabinet shortly before the **October War**, Sidqi became a special assistant to the president. He later represented Egypt at many international conferences on industrial affairs.

SIDQI, ISMA'IL (1875–1950). Lawyer, cabinet minister, and two-time premier. Born in **Alexandria**, he was educated at the **Collège des Frères** and the government **Law School**. Sidqi advanced rapidly through the judiciary and became **agriculture** minister from 1914 to 1917, when he resigned because of a compromising scandal. A member of the original **Wafd** in 1918, he was interned in Malta with **Sa'd Zaghlul** in March 1919. Sidqi later broke with Sa'd and helped to establish the **Constitutional Liberal Party** in 1922. He served as interior minister in 1924–25, worked closely with King **Fuad I** and founded the **Sha'b Party**, to back his campaign for the post of prime minister under the **1930 Constitution**. He headed a strong cabinet in 1930–33, but Fuad dismissed him for being too powerful in his own right. He served on the Egyptian delegation that negotiated for the 1936 **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty**. He chaired another cabinet from February to December 1946, concluding the abortive **Bevin-Sidqi Treaty**. He returned to the Senate and opposed Egypt's involvement

in the **Palestine War**. Sidqi was one of the cleverest politicians of his time, devoted to the monarchy, and resented by nationalists. His memoirs, *Mudhakkirati*, were published in 1950.

SINAI CAMPAIGN, *see* **SUEZ WAR**.

SINAI PENINSULA. Mountainous Egyptian territory between the **Suez Canal** and the Israeli border, invaded by **Israel** in 1949, 1956, and 1967, then occupied by Israel continuously until 1973, when Egyptian forces retook portions nearest the Canal during the **October War**. Israel relinquished portions of the Sinai to Egypt as part of the first **Disengagement of Forces agreement** of 1974, the **1975 Egyptian–Israeli agreement**, and the **1979 Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty**. The rest of the Sinai was restored in April 1982, except for **Taba**, which was awarded to Egypt following international arbitration in 1989. The government plans to develop the peninsula by building new motor roads and **railroads** across it. An **irrigation canal** will carry water from the **Nile River** Delta to irrigate 160 thousand hectares. The Sinai Technology Valley was founded in 1998.

SIRAJ AL-DIN, FUAD (1910–2000). Landowning politician, lawyer, and leader of the old and **New Wafd Party**. Born in Kafr al-Garayda (Gharbiyya), possibly as early as 1906, his father and grandfather were *umdas* and landowners. His mother came from the Badrawi Ashur landowning family, into which Fuad later married. He attended the government **Law School**, graduating in 1931. He worked in the *Niyaba* until his father died in 1934, then went home to manage the family estates, but ran successfully in the 1936 parliamentary elections as a **Wafd Party** candidate, partly due to his prior ties with **Makram Ubayd**. He soon came to know **Mustafa al-Nahhas** and became a financial adviser to his young wife. When Nahhas returned to power in February 1942, he named Fuad, despite his youth, his **agriculture** minister. He remained loyal to Nahhas when Makram left the Wafd, becoming interior minister in 1943.

After the fall of the Wafd cabinet, Fuad went back to managing his estates and serving on several corporate boards, including the Egyptian Coca-Cola Company. Although he won a Senate seat in 1946, he strove to become his party's secretary-general, a post that he gained in 1948 and used to maneuver the left-wing Wafdists out of powerful positions. In 1949 he joined **Husayn Sirri**'s coalition

cabinet as **communications** minister. He campaigned in the general elections that led to the Wafd's return to power in 1950 and assumed the portfolio for interior, later adding those of finance and even, for a while, **education**.

He and other members of his faction used their positions to engage in questionable business deals on the side. The aging Premier Nahhas became suspicious of Fuad, who also faced a rival clique loyal to **Ahmad Najib al-Hilali**. He tried to both co-opt and coerce the leftists, and resisted attempts to limit maximum landholdings; significantly, one of the 1951 peasant revolts was against his Badrawi relatives. The high-living Wafdists were moving closer to King **Faruq**, but the rumors of manipulating the **Alexandria cotton** market, buying titles, and European sprees served to discredit both sides. He ordered a poorly armed police force in **Ismailia** to resist the British, leading to heavy casualties and to **Black Saturday**. The Wafd cabinet was dismissed the next day, and he was briefly detained for smuggling arms.

Abroad when the **1952 Revolution** occurred, he hastened back, hoping to be appointed by the **Free Officers**, but he balked at their **land reform** program. Fuad resigned from the Wafd, but was arrested twice and released each time. Tried for rigging the cotton market, granting favors to the king, inadequately planning the abrogation of the **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty**, and negligence during the burning of **Cairo**, he received a 15-year prison sentence. Quietly released later, he remained under house arrest. Only in 1975 was his family able to regain some of its confiscated lands. In 1977 he revived the Wafd Party as a vehicle for regaining power at the expense of **Anwar al-Sadat**, who promptly banned it. Although jailed on Sadat's orders in 1981, he was freed and allowed to resume his political activities under **Husni Mubarak**. His New Wafd, allied with the Society of the **Muslim Brothers**, finished second to the **NDP** in the **1984 elections**. A master politician, he survived for many years on the Egyptian political stage.

SIRRI, HUSAYN (1892–1961). **Engineer, cabinet** minister, and three-time premier. Born in **Cairo**, his father was Isma'il Sirri, also an engineer, who served as public works minister for many years. Husayn Sirri studied engineering in Cairo and then earned a diploma at the École Centrale in Paris during **World War I**. Upon returning to Egypt, he worked for the public works ministry and developed a

reputation as an expert on **irrigation**, publishing treatises on the **Nile River** defense works, irrigation, the Qattara Depression, water policy, and state **finances**. In 1937 he was appointed to the Senate and also became undersecretary of state for public works. After the **Wafd** government fell, he became public works minister, serving in three cabinets until 1939, when he assumed the portfolio for war and marine. He was **finance** minister in 1939–40, public works minister again in 1940, and **communications** later in that year.

After the sudden death of **Hasan Sabri**, Sirri became premier and interior minister from November 1940 to 1942 (serving also as foreign minister for part of that time), but resigned just before the **4 February Incident** and went into business for several years. He was again called on to serve as premier and interior and foreign minister in 1949–50, until free elections restored the Wafd to power. He then served as director of the royal office, but resigned after a year, intimating disapproval of some of King **Faruq's** policies. He headed a short-lived cabinet, with portfolios for foreign affairs and war and marine, in July 1952, just before the **1952 Revolution**. A nonpartisan politician, Sirri was a reputable administrator.

SIRRI, JADHIBIYYA (1925–). Popular painter, commonly called Gazbia Sirry. Born in **Cairo**, she graduated from the Higher Institute for Fine Arts in 1948. Her work ranges from large abstractions to modest depictions of people's everyday lives. Some of her paintings are exhibited at the Cairo **Museum** of Modern Art, the Science Museum, the **Opera House**, and the main building of *al-Ahram*. In 1970 she became a professor at Helwan University and received a state prize for her artistic achievements.

SIRRY, GAZBIA, *see* **SIRRI, JADHIBIYYA**.

AL-SIYASA. Organ for the **Liberal Constitutionalist Party** from 1922 to 1951, founded by **Muhammad Husayn Haykal** and Mahmud Abd al-Raziq. It also had a weekly magazine, *al-Siyasa al-Ushbu'iyya*, from 1926 to 1949. Contributors included Mahmud Azmi, **Taha Husayn**, Mustafa Abd al-Raziq, Ibrahim Naji, Ali Mahmud Taha, **Salama Musa**, and **Ibrahim Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini**, making it the leading Arabic literary review of its day.

Never financially viable, the daily and weekly **newspapers** were subsidized by the Abd al-Raziq family and **Muhammad Mahmud**.

SOCIALISM. Ideas of collective property ownership have influenced some Egyptians since **Claude-Henri Saint-Simon**'s disciples visited **Muhammad Ali**. A **Syrian** Christian physician, Shibli Shumayyil (1860–1917), wrote in favor of socialism in the Egyptian press before **World War I**. An Egyptian teacher named Mustafa Hasanayn al-Mansuri tried to establish a socialist party in 1909 and in 1915 published a study of socialism, drawing on translations from European **literature**. He was arrested, denounced by **al-Azhar**, and later dismissed as a teacher. Niqula Haddad (1878–1954), a Syrian who had lived for a while in New York, wrote many articles and books to popularize socialist ideas in Egypt. The best-known pioneer of Egyptian socialism, however, was **Salama Musa**, who founded the first socialist magazine, *al-Mustaqbil*, which was promptly banned by the Egyptian government in 1914.

The 1917 Bolshevik revolution and the formation of the Third International in 1919 made socialism better known in Egypt. In 1921 an Egyptian **Jew**, Joseph Rosenthal, founded an Egyptian socialist party, including Salama Musa among its charter members. Its political program opposed imperialism, militarism, dictatorship, the arms race, offensive wars, and secret treaties. It advocated an end to capitalist exploitation, integration of natural resources into the public means of production, and just distribution of the products of labor. It called for universal **education**, higher wages, better working conditions, and the liberation of "Eastern **women**." The party proposed to form syndicates for peasants, workers, and consumers, to run socialist deputies for Parliament, and to disseminate its program by publications and speeches (*see* **Communism**).

A non-Communist "Socialist Party" was founded by **Ahmad Husayn** in 1946; it was actually the renamed *Misr al-Fatat*. The ASU, a mobilization movement that replaced the **National Union** in 1962, espoused socialist principles but adhered closely to the policies of **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** and later **Anwar al-Sadat**. When the 1976 **Party Reforms** opened the ASU to competing pulpits (*manabir*), the leftist group, made up of **Nasirists** and Marxists opposed to the regime's move toward capitalism and rapprochement with the West, became the **NPUP**, now Egypt's leading socialist party.

Some socialist ideas, such as state ownership of major **industries** and better working conditions, became generally accepted in Egypt, but democratic socialist parties failed to develop ideologically rigorous programs that most Egyptians could embrace.

SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY (SLP). Loyalist opposition group set up in 1978, at **Anwar al-Sadat's** behest, to weaken the **NPUP**. Led by Ibrahim Shukri, formerly of *Misr al-Fatat* and an early advocate of **land reform**, its founders tended to be upper- and middle-class educated people, much like members of the dominant **NDP**. The SLP claimed 180 thousand members in 1980 and its weekly **newspaper**, *al-Sha'b*, had a circulation of 60 thousand. Initially hesitant to criticize Sadat's *infitah* and peace policies, it later assailed government corruption and Sadat's proposal to channel **Nile River** water to **Israel's** Negev Desert. Some of its leaders were jailed when Sadat arrested his opponents in September 1981. Under **Husni Mubarak**, the SLP worked closely with the **Muslim Brothers**, and the two groups joined with the **Liberal Party** in a coalition for the **1987 elections**, winning 1.1 million votes. The SLP boycotted the **1990** and **1995 elections**. Thanks to its leader, the SLP is the heir to Egypt's national-socialist tradition, but few voters know what it stands for. The government suspended the party and its newspaper in 2000, preventing its participation in the **2000 Elections**.

SOCIALIST PARTY, *see MISR AL-FATAT*.

SOVIET, *see RUSSIA*.

SOVIET-EGYPTIAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION (1971). Pact pledging eternal friendship between the **USSR** and Egypt, signed in **Cairo** on 28 May 1971, shortly after **Anwar al-Sadat's** **Corrective Revolution**. This event apparently alarmed Moscow, since his purge included **Ali Sabri** and other leaders friendly to the **Soviets**. The pact pledged the two parties to concert their international policies and "to regularly consult . . . at different levels on all important questions affecting the interests of both sides." This wording was stronger than that used by Soviet treaties with other non-**Communist** states and implied heavier commitment of Soviet military support to Egypt against **Israel**, in the wake of the failed **Rogers Peace Plan**. Actually, Sadat's government was disap-

pointed at the quantity and quality of arms that it was able to buy from the USSR, which seemed more intent on promoting détente with the West than liberation of Israeli-occupied Arab lands. A year later Sadat asked most Soviet military advisers to leave Egypt. Some remained, however, and during the **October War**, Moscow resupplied arms—even, it was rumored, nuclear-tipped missiles—to Egypt as well as **Syria** on a massive scale. Sadat later aligned Egypt with the **United States** to regain control of the **Sinai Peninsula**. He ceased buying weapons from the USSR, annulled Egypt's \$6 billion debt to Moscow, and renounced the treaty.

SPORTS AND GAMES. Egypt's most popular spectator sport is football (soccer), which is played by men in professional clubs, as well as by boys in schools and by men in universities and private clubs. Male athletic activities also include basketball, cricket, rowing, squash, and weightlifting. Both sexes enjoy (separately) horseback riding, pingpong, swimming, tennis, and volleyball. More sedentary amusements include backgammon, chess, and card games.

STACK, Sir LEE (1868–1924). British commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Army and governor-general of the **Sudan** from 1919 to November 1924. His assassination by **terrorists** (possibly allied to the **Wafd Party**) led Lord **Edmund Allenby** to issue an extremely strong ultimatum to the Egyptian government, causing **Zaghlul's** resignation.

STUDENTS' DAY. Annual holiday commemorating the students' (and workers') 21 February 1946 uprising against the **British occupation**.

SUDAN. The country south of Egypt that corresponds approximately to the areas of the Upper **Nile** Valley captured by Turco-Egyptian forces during the reigns of **Muhammad Ali** and **Isma'il**. Inspired by the **Mahdi** between 1881 and 1885, the Sudanese Muslims rebelled against Egyptian rule and established an independent state, which **British** and Egyptian forces failed to subdue in 1884–85. Under the leadership of the British commander of the Egyptian army, Sir **Herbert Kitchener**, British and Egyptian forces defeated the Sudanese rebels between 1896 and 1898 and restored control over the former Egyptian provinces. Following the **Sudan Convention**, it came

under joint Anglo–Egyptian control. In reality, Egyptian officials and officers were subordinate to the British, even though the Egyptian government bore most of the occupation costs, £E19 million from 1899 to 1940. After Sir **Lee Stack** was murdered in 1924, **Britain** expelled Egyptian troops and officials from the country and also increased use of Nile River waters to irrigate the Sudanese *jazira* to raise **cotton** in competition with Egypt. Egypt's growing **population** and independence from Britain led to more strident claims to rule the Sudan, in part because all Egypt's **irrigation** water comes from that country, but also because of its ties with some northern Sudanese Muslims. The British stirred up separatist feelings among the Sudanese, especially the Mahdi's descendants and the Christians and animists in the south.

The Sudan issue was shelved during the negotiations for the 1936 **Anglo–Egyptian Treaty** but revived after **World War II**. The 1946 **Bevin–Sidqi Treaty** was popularly believed in Egypt to ensure Egyptian rule over the Sudan, but the British denied any such concession. Egypt brought its claims to the Sudan before the UN Security Council in 1947, but failed to win its case. When **Mustafa al-Nahas** abrogated the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty in 1951, he proclaimed **Faruq** king of Egypt and the Sudan, and in the last days of the monarchy much Egyptian agitation centered on the issue of Nile Valley unity. After the **1952 Revolution**, **Muhammad Najib** and the **Free Officers** signed the **Anglo–Egyptian agreement**, which let the Sudanese vote on whether they wanted to join with Egypt after independence from Britain, hoping that they would. The 1954 plebiscite went against Egypt, however, and Sudan became fully independent in 1956.

Egypt's relations with independent Sudan have varied. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**'s government disputed its border with Sudan in 1958, and the two states had to reach agreement on sharing the Nile waters before construction of the **Aswan High Dam** could begin. Ja'far al-Numayri's government, initially socialist and revolutionary but later pro-Western, was on good terms with Egypt under **Anwar al-Sadat** and **Husni Mubarak**. After a 1985 coup led by Sudanese army officers, the government in Khartum turned against Egypt and became committed to **Islamism** and close ties with Iran. It may have instigated the attempt on Mubarak's life in Addis Ababa in 1995 and provided the headquarters for *al-Qa'ida* until 1996, when the Suda-

nese government renounced **terrorism**. Egypt and Sudan resumed normal diplomatic relations in December 1999.

SUDAN CONVENTION (1899). Agreement signed by **Butros Ghali** for the Egyptian government and Lord **Cromer** on behalf of **Britain**, setting up a condominium over the **Sudan**, which had been reconquered between 1896 and 1898 by a joint Anglo–Egyptian force. The convention defined the Sudan’s borders; provided for the joint use of the two countries’ flags; vested military and civil authority in the governor-general of the Sudan, a British official who was to be appointed by the **khedive** on the British government’s recommendation; gave legislative authority for the Sudan to the governor-general; excluded privileges under the **Capitulations** and the jurisdiction of the **Mixed Courts** for foreign residents in the Sudan; provided for customs duties on imports into the Sudan from countries other than Egypt; and barred the importation of slaves into the Sudan. Egyptian nationalists attacked the resulting Anglo–Egyptian condominium for giving too much power to Britain, even though the cost of conquering and administering the Sudan was largely borne by Egyptian taxpayers, and Butros Ghali was also attacked for having assented to the convention.

SUEZ AFFAIR (1956). Political dispute precipitated by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**’s unilateral nationalization of the **Suez Canal Company** on 26 July 1956, an act decried by **Britain** and **France** because of their shareholders’ interest in the company and their strategic concern for safe passage of Western shipping, especially oil, through that waterway. Egypt claimed the right to nationalize the canal, as it had repeatedly been recognized as an Egyptian waterway and the Suez Canal Company had been chartered as an Egyptian corporation. It promised to pay compensation to owners based on the value of their shares on the Paris *Bourse* (financial market) as of 26 July 1956. Many Arabs hailed Nasir’s audacious act as a blow to Western imperialism and a first step toward a war of revenge against **Israel**, and his popularity soared throughout the Arab world.

Western countries feared that Egypt would not be able to manage the canal, especially after most of the foreign pilots quit their jobs. To their surprise, Egyptian pilots kept it open. The West also feared that Egypt might close the international waterway to black-

mail oil-importing nations, although Nasir's public vow to build the **Aswan High Dam** from the proceeds of the canal tolls shows that Egypt needed to keep it open. **Zionists** protested the ban on Israeli ships and cargoes from transiting the canal, but this practice had preceded its nationalization.

At the insistence of the Western countries, an international conference met in London in August 1956, and deputized Australia's Premier Menzies to talk to Nasir about a plan to place the canal under international control. Nasir rejected the plan, as well as a **U.S.** proposal for a Suez Canal Users Association. Although the Egyptian people adamantly backed Nasir, Egyptian diplomats were conciliatory in the **UN Security Council** and agreed to meet with American, British, and French diplomats in Geneva in October 1956 to devise a compromise. But **Israel** had already joined Britain and France in planning the attack that would become the **Suez War**, and the Geneva meetings were aborted.

SUEZ CANAL. Human-made, 195 km channel, initially nine meters deep and 30 meters wide, built in 1856–59 by the Universal Maritime **Suez Canal Company** to connect the Mediterranean and Red Seas. The construction costs, estimated at more than 450 million francs (approximately \$100 million at that time) were borne mainly by the Egyptian government, not to mention the unpaid thousands of Egyptian peasants who had to do the manual labor until the European powers and the **Ottoman** government enjoined the Company and the Egyptian government to end the **corvée**. It is said that 20 thousand peasants died while constructing the Canal. After its formal inauguration in 1869, the Company administered it until it was nationalized by the Egyptian government in 1956. Since then it has been managed by the Egyptian-owned Suez Canal Authority. It was closed in 1956–57 and 1967–75 due to Arab–Israeli fighting. It has been enlarged since 1975 to a depth of 17 meters in order to accommodate larger oil tankers and was being widened in 2000 at an estimated cost of \$500 million. Egypt plans to spend \$1 billion on building a new container terminal at **Port Said**. In 2000 14,141 ships transited the canal, with almost 439 million tons net displacement. Total revenues were \$1.868 billion.

SUEZ CANAL COMPANY. Limited-liability corporation, organized by French entrepreneur **Ferdinand de Lesseps** and chartered by the

Egyptian government in 1854, that constructed the **Suez Canal** between 1856 and 1869 and managed it under a 99-year concession, which would have expired in 1968. **Nasir** nationalized the Company on 26 July 1956, setting off the **Suez Crisis**.

SUEZ, GULF OF. Maritime inlet separating Egypt from the **Sinai Peninsula**. This gulf is shallower than the **Gulf of Aqaba** or the Red Sea and is rich in oil deposits (*see* **Petroleum and Natural Gas**).

SUEZ WAR (1956). The coordinated attack by **Israel, Britain, and France**, against Egypt in October–November 1956, also called the “Tripartite Aggression” in Egypt and the “Sinai Campaign” in Israel. Military planning by Britain and France began soon after **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** nationalized the **Suez Canal Company** on 26 July, threatening their interests as its owners and major users. The **United States** government would not countenance an attack and called for a negotiated settlement, but President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State **John Foster Dulles** did not state clearly whether they would block military action. Israel, hoping to stop border raids by Palestinian *fidaiyin* trained by Egypt, initiated secret talks with Britain and France. Israel agreed to invade the **Gaza Strip** and the **Sinai Peninsula**, seemingly threatening the canal. Invoking the 1954 **Anglo-Egyptian agreement**, Britain would then invade and reoccupy the military bases that it had only recently evacuated.

The Israel Defense Force attacked on 29 October, invading the Gaza Strip and dropping paratroops near the **Mitla Pass**. The joint Anglo-French ultimatum of the next day called on the Israelis and Egyptians to withdraw to positions 10 miles away from the canal, even though the fighting between Egypt and Israel was mainly in the Sinai. If Egypt had obeyed the ultimatum, it would have withdrawn its 30 thousand troops who were fighting in the peninsula. Nasir refused, therefore, although he did order his forces to pull back to protect the Canal in case Britain and France attacked. As British and French air forces bombed Egyptian air bases on 31 October, destroying many of Egypt’s fighter planes, the Egyptians evacuated the Sinai, which the Israelis managed to capture by 5 November.

On that day Anglo-French ground troops occupied **Port Said** and portions of the canal, but stiff civilian resistance delayed their advance. Heavy UN pressure, led by the United States and the **USSR**, was placed on Britain, France, and Israel to stop their

attack on Egypt. Britain accepted the UN cease-fire resolution on 6–7 November; France and Israel soon followed suit. Britain and France evacuated Egypt on 23 December. Only Israel achieved its military aims; although its forces also had to evacuate the Sinai and Gaza Strip, it was protected from border raids and empowered to send ships through the **Gulf of Aqaba**. Egypt's losses included 1,650 troops killed, approximately 5,000 wounded, and 6,000 missing or taken prisoner. The war, a military defeat but a political victory for Nasir, ended British and French influence in Egypt for many years and weakened their ties with other Arab states.

SUFISM. Organized mysticism in **Islam**. Sufi organizations (*turuq*), often associated with particular saints and shrines, played a large role in the daily lives of most Egyptian Muslims in the 19th century. In an effort to curb some of the excesses of the Sufis, **khedivial** decrees regulating their behavior were promulgated in 1895 and in 1903. The spread of **education** and Western culture eclipsed some of the Sufi orders, but many still survive.

SUGAR. Sugarcane, probably introduced in early Islamic times, has long been cultivated in Egypt, especially since the development of **perennial irrigation**. It is now a major summer crop, one that is likely to increase because of its high government price supports and despite its heavy water requirements. Total sugarcane production amounted to 1.29 million metric tons in 2000, but with domestic consumption estimated at 2 million and a recent increase in the government tariff on imported sugar, Egypt will need to make up the difference by increasing its output of beet sugar, which costs less to produce and needs less water. Cane sugar is critical to Upper Egypt's economy; beet sugar is raised mainly in the Delta. A paper mill in the upper Egyptian city of Qina began in April 2001 to manufacture paper from *bagasse*, a byproduct of sugar cane.

SUHAJ. Upper Egyptian trading and manufacturing center and capital of Suhaj (often called "Sohag") Province, formerly known as Jirja. **Cotton**, grains, dates, and **sugar** are traded there, and its industries include cotton ginning, dairy products, and pottery. Its population was estimated in 1999 at 170 thousand.

SULAYMAN, [MUHAMMAD] SIDQI (1919–). Engineer, cabinet minister, and premier. He graduated from **Cairo University**'s Engineering Faculty and the **Military Academy**. He served in the Egyptian officer corps as a military engineer, rising to the rank of colonel. He took charge of the Public Sector Organization just after the nationalization of the **Suez Canal Company** in 1956 and supervised the construction of the Aswan High Dam in the early 1960s. He became minister for the High Dam in 1965 and served as prime minister from September 1966 until just after the **June War**. Sulayman then served as deputy premier and minister of **industry**, hydraulic affairs, electricity, and the High Dam (1967–68). A member of the ASU Central Committee in 1968, he later led the Egyptian-Soviet Friendship Association.

SULAYMAN PASHA, *see* **SÈVE**.

SUMED PIPELINE. Oil pipeline linking Ayn Sukhna on the **Gulf of Suez** to Sidi Khayr, a Mediterranean coastal village 30 km west of **Alexandria**. Although the Bechtel Corporation had contracted shortly before the **October War** to build it, the company could not raise the necessary capital. The pipeline was built instead by Italian contractors between 1974 and 1977 at a cost of \$348 million, financed by the Arab Company for Oil Pipelines–SUMED. Egypt owns 50 percent of its shares; the other half is owned by **Saudi Arabia**, Kuwait, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi. It was linked to offshore facilities for supertankers in 1981. Contracts were signed in 1991 to raise its annual carrying capacity from 80 to 120 million tons, at an estimated cost of \$120 million. Its daily throughput in 2001 averaged 2.2 million barrels.

SYRIA. The Republic of Syria has existed since the end of the French mandate in 1946. In earlier usage, "Syria" often denoted all the lands east of the Mediterranean from Alexandretta to the **Sinai Peninsula**. Partly due to commercial ties and the settlement of Syrians in Egypt, partly for reasons of military strategy, Egypt's government has often invaded Syria or tried to control or influence it. Under the **Mamluks** Syria and Egypt were generally united. Both were conquered by the **Ottoman Empire**. Egypt's reforming rulers, including **Ali Bey** in the 18th century and **Muhammad Ali** in the 19th, sought to conquer

it. In its early years of independence, Syria's politicians were divided between those who favored close ties with Egypt and **Saudi Arabia**, usually because of their opposition to rule by the Hashimites who controlled **Iraq** and Jordan and to those whose commercial interest in the latter two countries led them to espouse pro-Hashimite views.

In 1955 both Syria and Egypt began to purchase **Soviet** arms (see **Czech Arms Deal**) and to seek closer ties with the **Communist** countries. The **Suez Affair** and their common opposition to the subsequent **Eisenhower Doctrine** drew the two states closer together. In February 1958 they formed the **UAR**, an organic union that put Syria under direct Egyptian administration. Many Syrian merchants came to view Egyptian control as oppressive. After the **July Laws** they persuaded units some Syrian army units to mutiny, and in September 1961 Syria seceded from the UAR.

After a period of hostile relations between the two governments, the Ba'th Party, which was committed to **socialism** and **Arab nationalism**, took control of Syria in March 1963. Iraqi and Syrian leaders entered into negotiations with **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** to create a new Arab union, but the talks foundered on the Egyptian leader's opposition to the Ba'th. When a group of extremist Ba'thist officers took control of Syria in 1966, Nasir's government sought to moderate their policy on the liberation of **Palestine** by negotiating the **Egyptian-Syrian joint defense agreement**. Rather than restraining Syria, this pact drew Egypt more into confrontation with **Israel**, eventuating in the **June War**. After their defeat, both countries adopted policies of strengthening the **PLO**, but Egypt was somewhat more willing than Syria to work for a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, accepting **Security Council Resolution 242** and the **Rogers Peace Plan**. Whereas Syria directly backed the Palestinians against Jordan in September 1970, Egypt worked to reconcile all Arab countries and to go on trying to reach a settlement with Israel.

When these efforts failed, however, **Anwar al-Sadat** began a policy of publicly seeking an Arab federation with Syria and privately planning a joint attack against Israel, leading to the **October War**. Their armies scored initial successes against Israel, but were later driven back and obliged to accept a cease-fire under **Security Council Resolution 338**. Egypt took part more openly than Syria in the postwar efforts to reach a political settlement, but in fact **U.S.** Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's **shuttle diplomacy** enabled both countries to deal with Israel to regain some of their lost

lands. Syria opposed Sadat's efforts to make peace with Israel through his visit to Jerusalem and the subsequent **Camp David Accords** and **Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty**. Syria was among the leaders of the Arab rejectionists, but during the 1980s was pre-occupied with its occupation of Lebanon and its support for Iran against Iraq, becoming estranged from most other Arab countries, which in 1987 began to resume diplomatic ties with Egypt.

Syria has continued to resist any political settlement with Israel, but resumed diplomatic ties with Egypt in December 1989, when **Husni Mubarak** visited Damascus. Egypt's relations with Syria have grown closer since the death of Syria's long-term leader, Hafiz al-Asad, and the succession of his son, Bashar, in 2000. Mubarak assisted in the efforts, which ultimately failed, to reach a peace between Syria and Israel. The second Palestinian Intifada against Israel has drawn Egypt, Syria, and most other Arab governments together. Syria publicly backed Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah's peace plan of March 2002; Egypt did so tacitly.

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TABA DISPUTE (1981–89). Diplomatic quarrel between Egypt and **Israel** for possession of 2.5 km² of the **Sinai Peninsula** at Taba. Egypt argued that the 1906 international boundary had placed Taba within its territory and that the Israelis had removed the markers when they occupied the Sinai between 1967 and 1982. Israel claimed that the original border had not been clearly drawn and that it had commissioned the construction in Taba of a resort hotel patronized mainly by Israelis. After years of fruitless debate, Israel agreed in 1986 to submit the dispute to binding arbitration. Taba was awarded to Egypt in 1989. It frequently serves as a meeting place for Egyptian–Israeli negotiations.

TABA INCIDENT (1906). Diplomatic dispute between **Britain**, acting in Egypt's behalf, and the **Ottoman Empire** over the demarcation of the Turco–Egyptian border in the **Sinai Peninsula**. The issue grew out of the vague definition of Egypt's borders in the original 1841 *firman* from Sultan Abdulmejid to **Muhammad Ali**, referring to a map that was lost because of a fire in the Egyptian archives and long mislaid in their Ottoman counterpart. From 1841 to 1892, Egypt

administered not only the Sinai's southern coast but also the eastern shores of the **Gulf of Aqaba** and the Red Sea as part of the pilgrimage route to Mecca. In 1892 a dispute arose over the wording of the *firman* of investiture to **Khedive Abbas Hilmi II**; it was resolved, after some British pressure, by maintaining the vague definition, although the khedive did cede control of the Arabian coast between Aqaba and Yanbu' to the sultan.

The subsequent Ottoman effort to strengthen control over its territory and especially the building of the **Hijaz Railway** collided with Britain's defense of the **Suez Canal**, and a dispute arose in 1906 at the border outpost of Taba, near Aqaba, between British-officered Egyptians and Ottoman troops. The British government threatened to attack the Ottoman Empire and did actually augment its troops in Egypt. The Ottoman government, which claimed the right to control the Sinai as far west as Suez, gave in to British pressure and agreed to a joint Turco-Egyptian demarcation commission, which drew up the international boundary in October 1906. This border, seemingly favorable to Egypt, did place several crucial tribal watering holes on the Ottoman side. Although Britain seemed to be upholding Egyptian geopolitical interests, Khedive Abbas and the **National Party** supported the Ottoman claims, a policy construed by contemporaries to tie Egyptian nationalism to **pan-Islam**.

AL-TAHTAWI, RIFA'A RAFI' (1801–73). Writer, translator, and **educational** reformer. Originally from a family of **ulama**, Tahtawi was educated at **al-Azhar** and in Paris, to which he was sent as the imam for the first student mission in 1826. His experiences and observations there were published as *Takhliis al-ibriz fi talkhis Bariz* (Extraction of Pure Gold in the Summary of Paris). He became a translator for the School of Medicine in 1832 and director of the new School of Languages set up in 1836. In 1841 he headed **Muhammad Ali's** translation bureau, which was closed in 1851. Exiled to the **Sudan** under **Abbas Hilmi I**, he became director of the Egyptian School of Khartum. Under **Sa'id** he was deputy director of the **Military Academy**. Tahtawi then directed the revived translation bureau under **Isma'il** from 1863 to 1873, expanded the **Bulaq** press, and edited an educational journal.

Tahtawi wrote several original works, including two volumes of a projected history of Egypt, a book on education entitled

al-Murshid al-amin li al-banat wa al-banin (The Honest Guide for Training Girls and Boys), and a general work on Egypt's political and social development called *Manahij al-albab al-misriyya fi mabahij al-adab al-asriyya* (Courses for Egyptian Minds in the Joys of Contemporary Manners). This work advocated benevolent autocracy, limited by the **Shari'a** but modified to involve all citizens and to promote modernity, stressing agricultural development, the education of girls as well as boys, and the development of a national community (*watan*, or homeland). Tahtawi's ideas facilitated the growth of Egyptian nationalism and the harmonization of European social concepts with the precepts of **Islam**.

TAJAMMU' PARTY, *see* **NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE UNIONIST PARTY**.

AL-TAKFIR WA AL-HIJRA. Journalistic name for *Jama'at al-Muslimin*, a popular **Islamist** organization that opposed Western influence in Egypt. It was founded about 1967 by a group of already imprisoned **Muslim Brothers** who had mutinied after the execution of **Sayyid Qutb**. Led by Shukri Mustafa (1942–77), it called for the purification of Muslims as individuals, just as Muhammad and his associates had moved away from the evil of pagan Meccan society in the original *Hijra*. Their transformation was to lead to a revolutionary purification of Egypt's government and society. In 1971 Shukri was released from prison and began spreading his doctrines in **Asyut** and other Egyptian cities. The group was accused of kidnapping and assassinating a former minister of *awqaf* in 1977 (for which Shukri was tried, convicted, and executed) and of complicity in **Anwar al-Sadat's** murder in 1981. Subjected to severe repression during the state of emergency under **Husni Mubarak**, most of its members have been imprisoned, left Egypt, or joined *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya*. Its journalistic title can best be translated as "Identifying Unbelief and Shunning Evil." *See also* **Umar Abd al-Rahman, Fundamentalism, Islamism, Jama'at, Religion**.

TANTA. Major Delta city, the fifth largest in Egypt. Capital of Gharbiyya Province, its population was estimated in 1992 at 380 thousand. The city has had a university since 1972 and also a small **museum**. It is famed for its eight-day celebration of the *mulid* of Sayyid

Ahmad al-Badawi, a **Sufi** leader of the 13th century. It is a center for the **textile**, processed food, and **tobacco** industries.

TANZIMAT. Reforms instituted by the **Ottoman Empire** in 1839–76 and partially applied to Egypt up to the reign of **Khedive Isma'il**.

TARBUSH. Maroon cylindrical head covering, also called a fez, having a distinctive black tassel, worn by Egyptian male officials, officers, and students before the **1952 Revolution**.

TARIFFS. As long as Egypt was an **Ottoman** province, its import duties were set by Istanbul. Under the 1838 Anglo–Ottoman Tariff Treaty, duties on goods imported from abroad were limited to 8 percent *ad valorem*. Once this agreement was applied to Egypt, following the 1840 **London Convention**, the Egyptian government could not use tariff policies to protect the infant **industries** founded by **Muhammad Ali**, and nearly all of them succumbed to European competition. **Khedive Isma'il**, too, was hampered in nurturing his infant industries, although a new tariff convention had been reached in 1861–62. During the **British occupation**, tariff and excise taxes were set in ways that blocked industrialization. Even **agricultural** products were subjected to a 1 percent export tax (except for alcohol, **sugar**, timber, **petroleum**, and live animals, which were subjected to a higher rate). Any attempt to raise tariff imposts had to be approved by the Western powers under the **Capitulations**.

Only in 1930 did Egypt gain the right to set its own tariffs. In an effort to encourage industrialization, **Isma'il Sidqi's** government raised rates to 4 percent for raw materials, 6–10 percent for semi-manufactured goods, and 15 percent for most manufactures. Higher tariffs were imposed on countries that subsidized exports, such as Japan and China, and there were additional wharfage and *ad valorem* duties on products other than **tobacco**. The government enacted further tariff protection for sugar, coarse yarns, low-grade textiles, rubber shoes, and cast-iron products in the late 1930s. All specific duties were multiplied by a factor of 1.5 in October 1941, increased to 1.75, and later to 2.0 during **World War II**. An additional *ad valorem* tax was imposed on luxury goods in 1949.

Import licensing fees were imposed on most foreign products following the **1952 Revolution**. Tariff protection increased further during the industrialization drive by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** gov-

ernment. From 1961 to 1974, a state-owned company managed all imports, partly to promote the growth of national **industries**. Tariffs were especially high for wearing apparel, including leather shoes, electrical appliances and machinery, rubber, and basic metals; they were lower for food, wood, furniture, petroleum, and tobacco. Although import restrictions were relaxed during the *in-fitah*, **Husni Mubarak** has tended to raise tariff rates.

TAWFIQ (1852–92). **Khedive** of Egypt from 1879 to 1892. The eldest son of **Isma'il**, he was born and educated in **Cairo**, studying in Manyal and then at the Tajhiziyya School. Unlike most members of his dynasty, he never studied outside Egypt. Starting at age 19, he held various administrative posts under his father, including the presidency of his **Privy Council**, director of the interior and of public works, and president of the **Council of Ministers** in 1879. Pressured by Egypt's European creditors, the **Ottoman** government named Tawfiq to succeed his father in June 1879, and he took steps to placate the Europeans, exiling **Jamal al-Din al-Afghani** and enforcing the financial stringencies caused by the 1880 **Law of Liquidation**. These measures alienated many army officers and civil officials, leading to mutinies against War Minister **Uthman Rifqi** in February 1881 and Premier **Mustafa Riyad** in September of that year. Historians differ as to whether Tawfiq himself encouraged the rebels; it is certain, though, that by 1882 **Ahmad Urabi's** followers had taken over the cabinet and were plotting to depose him. Following the **Alexandria** riots in June 1882, when **Britain** threatened to bombard the port's fortifications, Tawfiq turned against the Egyptian cabinet, and Urabi's movement was defeated by a British invasion.

He believed for the rest of his life that he owed his throne to this intervention, which led to Urabi's defeat, the dismissal of his government, the dissolution of the army, and the **British occupation** of Egypt. He accordingly accepted "advice" tendered by **Britain's** diplomatic representatives, Sir **Edward Malet** and especially Sir Evelyn Baring, who later became Lord **Cromer**. Among the reforms instituted later in Tawfiq's reign were the reorganization of the **National Courts**, the establishment of the Legislative Council and General Assembly under the **Organic Law**, various **irrigation** projects, the improvement of mosques and other religious buildings, and the reform of the benevolent *awqaf*. He died unexpectedly in **Helwan** in January 1892. Although a modest man who was

reputedly devoted to the people's welfare, most Egyptians recall him as a weak viceroy who acquiesced in the British occupation and the loss of the **Sudan**.

TAX FARMING. System, called *iltizam*, of collecting government imposts that allows the collector to pocket a share of the proceeds, common in Egypt up to the 19th century, when **Muhammad Ali** abolished the practice. *See also Landownership*.

TAYMUR, MAHMUD (1894–1973). Writer of essays, plays, and short stories. Born in **Cairo**, he was a son of Ahmad Taymur, a well-known writer and scholar, and the younger brother of Muhammad, a playwright. He studied in Egyptian schools and in Switzerland, where he went for his health. His first stories, published in 1919, were written in the colloquial dialect, but he later advocated using classical Arabic. He was invited to conferences in Beirut, the University of Peshawar, and Damascus. In 1947 he was awarded the first prize for fiction by the **Arabic Language Academy**, of which he became a member in 1949. He wrote many stories, plays, and research articles. Some of his work has been translated, such as *Hakamat al-Mahkama* (The Court Rules) in Ali al-Manzalawi's *Arabic Writing Today: Drama*.

TEL EL-KEBIR, BATTLE OF (1882). Decisive defeat of the Egyptian army under **Ahmad Urabi** by a British expeditionary force, leading to the **British occupation**.

TELEGRAMS INCIDENT (1896). Courtroom episode in which **Muhammad Farid**, a lawyer for the *Niyaba*, openly hailed the acquittal of **Ali Yusuf**, the editor of *al-Muayyad*, accused of printing a stolen telegram from **Kitchener** describing a **cholera** outbreak among Egyptian soldiers during the **Sudan** campaign. Obligated to resign from his post, Farid opened his own law office and became more involved in the **National Party** under **Mustafa Kamil**, whom he would later succeed as its president.

TELEVISION. In 1960 Egypt became the third Arab country to begin television broadcasting. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** used television as well as **radio** to appeal directly to the people. The culture ministry installed public television receivers in cities and villages, although

Egyptians flocked to buy private sets as soon as they became available. It is estimated that 550 thousand television receivers were in use in 1970, 1.1 million in 1978, and 7.7 million in 1998. In 2002, the Egyptian television system provided three main (Cairo) channels, six regional channels, as well as Nile TV International, and broadcasted in Arabic, English, French, and Hebrew over the airwaves as well as via the **Nilesat** telecommunications satellites. Altogether, the 10 channels present over 150 hours of programming daily. News, **music**, educational programs, serial dramas, and situation comedies (American as well as Egyptian) predominate, but religious programs are growing more popular. State-owned television faces competition from videocassettes and from rooftop dishes capable of receiving transmissions from other countries, especially al-Jazeera TV, but has maintained a strong presence through its expanded programming.

TERRORISM. Doctrine or practice of using force to achieve political ends, or, to quote the definition by the Central Intelligence Agency, the threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to, established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to shock or intimidate a large group wider than the immediate victims. In Egypt, nationalists resorted to terrorism in opposing the **British occupation** and its collaborators, notably in the assassination of **Butros Ghali** and Sir **Lee Stack**. **Zionists** in Egypt resorted to terrorism in killing Lord Moyne in 1944 and in attempting to disrupt U.S.–Egyptian ties in 1954 (see **Lavon Affair**). The *fidaiyin* who opposed the British troops in the **Suez Canal Zone** in 1951–52 and the **Israelis** in 1955–56 might be viewed as terrorists, as were the secret societies tied to the **Wafd Party** and the **Muslim Brothers**. More recently **al-Jihad** and *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* have engaged in terrorism of behalf of the **Islamist** movement. Acting in cooperation with the United States, Egypt's government has firmly suppressed terrorists and their activities. See also *al-Qa'ida*.

TEXTILE INDUSTRY. Egypt has been a leader in spinning, weaving, and sewing textiles throughout its history. In the 18th century, textile manufacturing was mainly a domestic handicraft **industry**. At the time of the **French occupation**, Upper Egypt was the center for **cotton** spinning and weaving, using short-staple cotton grown around

Isna or imported from **Syria**. Linen was woven in Fayyum and the Delta; silk in Damietta, Mahalla, and **Cairo**; and wool in all of Egypt's towns and villages. Weaving was a male occupation, but **women** did the spinning in their homes. Textile handicrafts continued through the 19th century, but **cotton** gained at the expense of wool. The silk cloth of Damietta retained a high prestige in the Egyptian market, enjoyed some foreign demand, and was featured at **trade** expositions. As late as 1930, it was estimated that Egypt had 20 thousand hand looms, capable of producing each year 30 million square meters of cloth, but textile handicrafts could not compete against the cheap manufactured imports from Japan, Italy, and India during the 1930s.

Mechanized textile manufacturing began under **Muhammad Ali**, who imported European **engineers** and machinery for the spinning and weaving of wool, silk, and cotton. The first factories were opened in 1820, and by 1830–31 the income from their production was sufficiently important for Muhammad Ali to ban all handicraft textile production. The textile monopoly reached its height in 1837, but the costs of the Syrian campaign, followed by the application of the 1838 Anglo–Ottoman Tariff Treaty to Egypt following the **Convention of London**, destroyed its first mechanized textile industry. Cheap imported textiles from **Britain** and later from other European countries, even with an 8 percent **tariff ad valorem**, easily undercut the Egyptian products, except a few special handicrafts. Despite his modernization drive, **Khedive Isma'il** did not help Egypt to compete in textile manufacturing.

Although Egyptian cotton output soared during the 19th century, few entrepreneurs set up spinning and weaving factories. In the 1890s two foreign residents founded joint-stock companies for textile manufacture, but Lord **Cromer**, fearful of creating competition for British manufacturers, advised the Egyptian government to impose an 8 percent excise on domestic textiles. A more successful venture was the *Filature Nationale d'Égypte*, which bought the factory and machinery of one of the earlier textile companies. It expanded its spinning and weaving operations during **World War I**, which cut Egypt off from former suppliers. In the 1920s high capitalization and low labor costs enabled the company to provide cheap textiles for the domestic market. **Bank Misr** entered the textile industry with its Misr Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company, founded at Mahalla al-Kubra in 1926. The rise of these domestic

industries was aided by Egypt's higher protective tariff after 1930. The Calico Printers Association, a British firm, reached an agreement with *Filature Nationale* in 1934, increasing the number of its spindles, sales, and dividends to investors. Bank Misr tried to avoid affiliating with a British company, partly due to **Tal'at Harb's** commitment to Egypt's economic independence. Finally, however, Misr Cotton Spinning and Weaving signed an agreement with the Bradford Dyers Association in 1938. Total output of mechanically woven cloth in Egypt rose from 9 million square meters in 1917 to 20 million in 1931 and to 159 million in 1939.

World War II again cut Egypt off from Europe and also led to the creation of the **Middle East Supply Centre**, which accelerated the industrialization of the region. Cotton yarn output, for example, quintupled between 1938 and 1951; cloth production rose almost as rapidly. The number of cotton spindles in Egypt increased from 500 thousand in 1950 to 1.3 million in 1960; corresponding figures for weaving looms indicate a 50 percent increase during the same period. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** industrialization plans called for further growth in the Egyptian textile industry, most of which was nationalized in 1961 (see **July Laws**), but the rate of gain decelerated during the 1960s and 1970s. Textiles remain Egypt's largest manufacturing industry, but their share has declined as Egyptian industrial output has become more diversified and as foreign buyers of Egyptian textiles are increasingly manufacturing their own. The value of Egypt's textile exports in 1996–97 was £E 900 million. At that time, 90 percent of all spinning and 60 percent of the weaving industry remained publicly owned, but the private sector dominated dyeing, knitting, and finished clothing production. The trend toward **privatization** has reached textile spinning and weaving. In 2002 the government raised tariffs on many types of imported textiles and at the same time hopes, by the introduction of modern machinery, to reverse a trend toward declining textile exports to other countries.

THABIT, KARIM (1902–64). Journalist and press adviser to King **Faruq**. The son of an editor of *al-Muqattam* of Lebanese origin, he attended AUC. He worked as a reporter for *al-Siyasa*, *al-Alam*, and then *al-Dunya*, of which he became the editor when it merged with *al-Hilal*. During **World War II** he worked for *al-Muqattam*. He met Faruq in 1942 and became his press adviser, gaining influence over the king and his entourage. He is popularly believed to have influ-

enced Faruq's decision to enter the 1948 **Palestine War** as a means of reviving his popularity. Thabit wrote various biographies and histories, and his memoirs were partially serialized in *al-Jumhuriyya* in 1955 and published in 2000. He is remembered as a sycophant partly responsible for corrupting the king.

THARWAT, ABD AL-KHALIQ (1873–1928). Judge, **cabinet** minister, and two-time premier. Of Turco–Egyptian extraction, he attended the government **Law School**, where he joined **Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid** and **Abd al-Aziz Fahmi** in founding Egypt's first law review. Tharwat worked for the State Domains (*Daira Saniyya*) administration after his graduation, then for the justice ministry. He was deputy chairman of Qina's **National Court** and then became director of administration for the National Courts as a whole. In 1907 he served briefly as chancellor of the National Court of Appeals, then became governor of **Asyut** province (1907–08), head of the *Ni-yaba* (1908–14), minister of justice (1914–19), interior (1921, 1922, and 1927–28), and foreign affairs (1922 and 1926–27), deputy premier, and prime minister from 1922 to 1923 and from 1927 to 1928, when ill health forced him to retire. Tharwat was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1924 and appointed to the Senate in 1925. He served on the boards of the Islamic Benevolent Society and the Egyptian University (*see* **Cairo University**) until his death and was respected by his colleagues for his legal expertise. Some Egyptians, though, accused him of corruption and of opposing the **Wafd**.

THEATER. Drama in Muslim Egypt was long constrained by religious opposition to figural representation and to **women** performing as actors and musicians. Nevertheless, Egypt has had a long tradition of mimicry and popular farce. Shadow plays, popularly named *Karagöz*, after their best-known character, have been performed since at least **Mamluk** times. Dramatic theater entered Egypt during the **French occupation**; **Italians** living in **Alexandria** reintroduced it in the 1830s, and other European residents soon afterward began performing plays in **Cairo**. **Syrian** refugees from the **Ottoman Empire** helped to establish Arabic theater in Cairo in the 1870s, but the most successful playwright at that time was **Ya'qub Sannu'**. Theaters offering plays in Arabic or in European languages proliferated during the **British occupation**; pioneers of Egyptian drama in Arabic before 1914 included George Abyad and **Salama Hijazi**. Arabic

drama had to overcome Muslim prejudice and tried to raise the level of popular taste, which preferred musicals, farces, and burlesques in the vernacular dialect to tragedies and comedies in classical Arabic. Arabic drama in Egypt advanced farther than in other Arabic-speaking countries, and many Egyptian troupes have performed on stages elsewhere in the Arab world. Notable playwrights include **Ahmad Shawqi**, **Mahmud Taymur**, and **Tawfiq al-Hakim**. In recent years, **cinema**, **television**, and videocassettes have all made heavy inroads at the theater's expense.

THREE CIRCLES. "Egypt's Three Circles" represent the three worlds of which Egypt is a part: Africa, the Arab World, and **Islam**. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** first referred to "Egypt's Three Circles" in his *Philosophy of the Revolution* published in 1954. This concept was part of Nasir's attempt to define an international role for both Egypt and himself. While Egypt's membership in the Arab and Islamic worlds was always accepted, its role as a leader in Africa was a harder sell, in both Egypt and sub-Saharan Africa, due to differing political and cultural orientations north and south of the Sahara, and the Arabs' past involvement in the African slave trade. However, Egypt was a founder of the **OAU** in 1963. See also **Pan-Africanism**, **Pan-Islam**.

AL-TILMISANI, UMAR (1904–86). Supreme guide of the revived Society of **Muslim Brothers** and editor of its weekly magazine, *al-Da'wa*. A graduate of the government **Law School** in 1931, he joined the Society two years later. He was one of the Brothers jailed following the abortive assassination attempt on **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** in 1954, serving a 15-year term. Tilmisani began publishing *al-Da'wa* in 1976; in it he inveighed against secularism and the power of the **Jews**, even ascribing Atatürk's reforms to his alleged Jewish background, and the "Crusaders," alluding to both the predominantly Christian West and Egypt's **Copts**. He blamed the riots in **al-Zawiya al-Hamra** on a "Crusader conspiracy" against **Islam**. He was one of the 1,600 political and religious leaders whom **Anwar al-Sadat** jailed in September 1981, but **Husni Mubarak** later freed him. Tilmisani called for the gradual application of the **Shari'a** to Egypt's laws, but opposed violence and terrorism. He wrote *Dhikrayat la mudhakkirat* (Recollections, not Memoirs).

TIRAN. Straits linking the **Gulf of Aqaba** to the Red Sea. Egypt blocked them to impede Israeli shipping between 1949 and 1956 and again in May 1967, sparking the **June War**.

TOBACCO INDUSTRY. Although tobacco became one of Egypt's cash crops during the 19th century, its cultivation has been banned since 1890 in order to generate **tariff** income for the government. Cigarette manufacturing, using imported tobacco, arose in the late 19th century; it was one of the first in which the workers organized **unions** and has long been a major Egyptian industry, employing some 17 thousand Egyptians full-time in 1993, a peak year for domestic consumption (higher taxes have since reduced local demand for tobacco products). Egypt produced 39 billion cigarettes in 1994, of which 1.26 billion were exported. Domestically, about two-thirds of all tobacco is used for cigarettes and one-third for water-pipe consumption. Smoking cigars and pipes is a habit limited to a few wealthy Egyptians. It is estimated that 30 percent of adult male and 2.3 percent of female Egyptians smoke, but the latter figure may be a low estimate due to a cultural bias against **women** smokers.

TOSHKA PROJECT. Plan to expand Egypt's irrigated land in the Western Desert, also called the "New Valley" or "New Delta Project" and officially known as the National Project for Developing Upper Egypt. Although preliminary trials have been made since the 1960s, the Toshka Project was inaugurated in January 1997. Its goal is to expand the amount of Egypt's usable land from 5 to 20 percent of the country's total area and reclaim 3.4 million additional **feddans** for **agriculture** by 2017 by diverting 5.5 billion cubic meters of **Nile River** waters annually from the Toshka overflow basin along the 30-meter-wide and 360-km-long Shaykh Zayid Canal into the Toshka Depression. The Nile River waters will be supplemented by subterranean reservoirs in the desert that have been identified by satellite imagery. The government plans to build two agro-industrial centers called New Tiba and New **Aswan**, with populations of 150 and 75 thousand, respectively. The goal is to add 25 percent to Egypt's currently habitable landmass and to accommodate some 20 million Egyptians. The £E420 billion cost of the project is being funded by a combination of Shaykh Zayid of the United Arab Emirates, private investors, and the Egyptian government. By 2000 the canal was receiving 55–100 million cubic meters of water per day and new lands

were being distributed to individual farmers. The project has been criticized by Egyptians concerned about protecting the **environment** and also by the opposition **New Wafd Party**. It is strongly backed by **Husni Mubarak** and his two most recent prime ministers, **Kamal al-Janzuri** and **Atif Ubayd**. *See also Irrigation.*

TOURISM. Foreigners have traveled to Egypt since antiquity, and the first guide in English was published by Murray as early as 1836, but organized visits by groups of foreigners began in the late 1860s, following the extension of steam-driven **railroads** and **river transport**, the establishment of such hotels as **Shepherd's**, and the extension of Thomas Cook's tours from Europe to the Holy Land and the **Nile Valley**. Early tourists to Egypt were mainly upper- and middle-class Europeans who came for the winter social season, from November to May. Popular tourist sites included the Giza Pyramids and Sphinx, the Saqqara Pyramids, the **Egyptian Museum, Cairo**, and the **Pharaonic** tombs and temples near **Luxor** and **Aswan**. Many Egyptians depended economically on tourism, working for travel agencies, hotels, and restaurants, selling souvenirs, or serving as guides and translators (the dragoman, or *tarjuman* [translator], was a companion to many a foreign tourist).

Since the **1952 Revolution**, the Egyptian government has worked to stimulate tourism as a source of foreign exchange, taking control of most popular hotels, restaurants, and travel agencies, and has had a tourism ministry since the 1960s. Group tourism from Western and Eastern Europe has spurred the development of the Red Sea and Mediterranean beaches. Increasing numbers of visitors come from other Arab countries. Although foreign tourism has become one of Egypt's foreign exchange earners (Egypt reportedly earned \$4.3 billion in hard currencies in 1999–2000), it is highly sensitive to political conditions, declining during and after such crises as the **Suez War**, the **June War**, the assassination of **Anwar al-Sadat**, the **Gulf War**, and the rise of **Islamist** violence against **Copts** and foreigners in 1992–97, especially the **Luxor Incident**. It is also sensitive to **currency** fluctuations, notably in competition with Turkey. In 1999 the largest numbers of tourists came from Italy, Germany, **Israel**, and **Britain**, including Ireland.

TRADE. Owing to its central location and to its modest income level, Egyptian **agriculture** and **industry** depend heavily on income from

export of their production to other countries. Likewise, Egypt's **economy** depends on importing goods that it cannot produce in sufficient quality or quantity. During the century following the 1860s, Egypt financed most of its imports by the sale of its long-staple **cotton**. During the period of **Arab socialism** Egyptian trade relied on barter agreements with **Communist** and Afro-Asian countries. Since the beginning of the *Infitah*, Egyptian imports have risen rapidly, paid for mainly by **foreign aid** and emigrant remittances, reaching a deficit of \$12 billion in 1999, and if Egypt is to raise its GDP by 7 percent each year, it must increase its annual exports by 11 percent..

In recent years, the Egyptian government has signed bilateral free trade agreements with Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco, hoping to form an Arab free trade area by 2008. The EU accounted for 44 percent of Egypt's exports in 1999, but the trade deficit was \$4 billion; a new trade agreement was initialed by Egypt and the EU in 2001. Egypt also hopes to increase its trade with **Sudan** and Ethiopia, partly due to their shared interest in the **Nile River**, but also because they belong to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa.

In 2001 Egypt's total exports were valued at £E16.5 billion, compared with £E16.4 in the preceding year, but imports rose from £E 48.6 to £E 56.7 billion. Major exports were crude oil, raw cotton, ready-to-wear garments, aluminum, medicines, and potatoes; main imports were wheat, maize (corn), chemicals, tea, newsprint, and **tabacco**. The minister of the economy announced a plan in 2001 to raise Egyptian exports by 25 percent annually, stressing **textiles**, food processing, building materials, **iron and steel**, chemicals, and **pharmaceuticals**. Egypt's major trading partners in 2001 were the **United States**, Italy, Germany, and Japan.

TRAMWAYS. Street electric railways, introduced in 1897, long played an important part in the public transportation system of **Cairo** and **Alexandria**. The first tramway concession in Cairo was granted in December 1894 to Baron Empain, a Belgian magnate, who assigned it to a joint-stock company. The agreement called for eight tramlines, of which six were to radiate from a central terminal at Midan al-Ataba al-Khadra at the southeast corner of the **Ezbekiyya Gardens**. Nine additional lines were constructed between 1899 and 1907, including one to the Giza Pyramids, and 13 more between 1908 and 1917. Two lines were added in 1931. In 1930 bus routes

began to supplement the tramways, which continued, however, to play a primary role in determining the pattern of Cairo's expansion. Alexandria's electric tramway network began to develop between 1899 and 1907. Centered on Muhammad Ali Square, they accelerated the city's expansion both eastward and westward along the shoreline, currently running as far east as **Abu-Qir**. All trams were nationalized in 1960. Most tracks have been removed to improve traffic circulation, and buses and taxis have replaced Cairo's tramways, except in **Heliopolis**. *See also* **Motor Transport**.

TRANSPORT, *see* **AVIATION (CIVIL)**, **METRO**, **MOTOR TRANSPORT**, **RAILROADS**, **RIVER TRANSPORT**, **TRAMWAYS**.

TRIPARTITE AGGRESSION (1956), *see* **SUEZ WAR**.

TRIPARTITE DECLARATION (1950). Agreement by **Britain**, **France**, and the **United States** not to sell arms for offensive purposes to any countries involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Angered at Egypt's support for the Algerian rebels, France secretly began arming **Israel**. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** believed that Britain was secretly supplying Israel with weapons in violation of this agreement, too. His **Czech Arms Deal** effectively nullified the declaration.

TRIPARTITE TALKS (1963). **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** last attempt to create a multilateral **Arab federation**. Following Abd al-Salam Arif's overthrow of the Qasim regime in **Iraq** in February 1963 and **Syria's** military coup one month later, pro-Nasir forces took power in both countries. In a spirit of euphoria, Arab unity talks were held in early April, creating a document that outlined a new federation of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, to take effect on 1 September 1963. The agreement called for establishing a presidential council, drafting a single constitution, merging the armed forces, and linking the political parties. Further negotiations following the agreement revealed insurmountable differences, resulting in public criticism and withdrawals from the talks. After a particularly bitter dispute with Syria's Ba'th Party, Nasir abandoned the federation project.

TURCO-CIRCASSIANS. Term popularly applied to members of Egypt's military or civilian elite who descended from Turkish or

Circassian Mamluks or both, as distinct from those who descended from native Egyptians. The term became significant in 1881–82 during the movement of the Egyptian officers led by **Ahmad Urabi**, who alleged that Turks and Circassians received preferential treatment within the Egyptian army. Nearly all the Egyptian ministers during the **British occupation** up to 1914 were of Turkish or Circassian descent. Many spoke French or English better than Arabic. They have become less prominent since **World War I**, and most have now assimilated with Arabic-speaking Muslims.

TUTANKHAMON'S TOMB. The 1923 discovery of this fully intact **Pharaonic** tomb, located in the Valley of the Kings near Qurna and opposite **Luxor**, brought worldwide attention to Egypt, influencing styles in architecture, furniture, clothing, and coiffure in some Western countries at the time. It also stimulated national pride among Egyptian advocates of **Pharaonism**. *See also* **Archaeology**.

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UAR, *see* **UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC**.

UBAYD, ATIF MUHAMMAD (1932–). Economist, **cabinet** minister, and premier. Born in **Tanta**, Ubayd graduated from **Ain Shams University** Faculty of Commerce in 1952 and earned his Ph.D. from the University of Illinois in 1962. He taught in the Faculty of Commerce from 1962 to 1984. **Husni Mubarak** appointed him minister of state for administration in 1984. In 1993 he became minister of state for cabinet affairs, minister of state for administration development, and minister of the public business sector. As such, he was largely responsible for privatizing state-owned industries until he succeeded **Kamal al-Janzuri** as prime minister just after Mubarak's election to a fourth term as president in October 1999. His policies include economic liberalization, **privatization**, improved government efficiency, and more delegation of authority to other ministers.

UBAYD, [WILLIAM] MAKRAM (1889–1961). **Coptic** politician, **cabinet** minister, and longtime secretary-general of the **Wafd Party**. Born in Qina to a family originally from **Asyut**, his father developed the railway from Naj' Hammadi to **Luxor**, enabling him to buy land

from the royal estates. Makram attended the American College in Asyut and New College, Oxford, where he studied law, graduating in 1908. He then spent two years studying Egyptology in France before returning to Egypt. He married the daughter of Murqus Hanna, an early supporter of the **National Party**. After **World War I**, Makram joined the **Wafd** and became the political “son” of **Sa’d Zaghlul**, with whom he was associated until Sa’d died in 1927. He represented Qina in every Parliament in which the early Wafd Party won a majority of the seats in free elections and served as **communications** minister briefly in 1928 and as **finance** minister in the Wafdist cabinets of 1930, 1936–37, and 1942. Increasingly alarmed at the Wafd’s corruption and possibly encouraged by King **Faruq**, he left the government in 1942 and then published the *Black Book*, attacking Wafdist leader **Mustafa al-Nahhas**. Makram founded a rival party called the **Wafdist Bloc** and later served in several coalition governments from which the Wafd was excluded. Some of his speeches and writings were collected posthumously and published in 1990 as *Kalimat wa mawaqif* (Words and Positions). His other writings include a pamphlet denouncing the **Milner Mission** and various articles in *al-Hilal*.

ULAMA. Muslim learned men, now usually denoting those who have been educated in religious schools, such as **al-Azhar**, and who serve as **Shari’a** judges, mosque preachers, or teachers. In the 18th century, the ulama served as the main intermediaries between the Egyptian people and their rulers and exercised great economic power as managers of *awqaf* and sometimes as **tax farmers**. They spearheaded the opposition to the **French occupation** and to the attempts by the **Mamluks** to regain their power after the French and British left Egypt. Many were staunch supporters of **Muhammad Ali** and welcomed his destruction of the Mamluks in 1811. However, the ulama soon lost much of their economic power, as the new regime took control of many *awqaf* and abolished the tax farms. Their power and prestige were undermined by Muhammad Ali’s schools and other Westernizing reforms. Nevertheless, the ulama retained their strong hold over Egypt’s Muslims through the village *kuttabs* and mosques. Some ulama supported **Ahmad Urabi** in 1882 and many took part in later resistance movements against the **British occupation**. In the 20th century their power has diminished further, especially when **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** closed the **Shari’a Courts**.

Many have become apologists for the Egyptian government, but others have supported the **Muslim Brothers** and lately the *jama'at*.

UMDA. Chief village magistrate, responsible to the government for maintaining security and public order.

UMM KULTHUM (1904?-75). Popular female vocalist, arguably the most famous in the Arab world. Born in Tammay, a Delta village near Sinbalawin, her father was a village shaykh who called villagers to prayer, led Friday worship, and recited the Quran at *mawlid*s (birthdays of revered Muslims) and other religious occasions. Her father soon recognized her exceptional musical gifts and brought her with him to sing at *mawlid*s and public concerts. Eventually her talents came to the attention of the best-known musicians of the day, and she broadened her repertoire and began singing in **Cairo** cabarets. Because many Egyptians still did not respect female entertainers, her father continued to chaperon her, but she increasingly became her own business manager, and by the late 1920s she was earning large royalties for her songs, both religious and popular, which were among the first to be recorded in Egypt.

Umm Kulthum learned to sing secular as well as religious poems, some of which were written especially for her by well-known writers. She sang regularly on the first Thursday of each month at a small theater near the **Ezbekiyya Gardens** and later at Cinema Radio. She was invited to sing at the weddings of many notables and at the behest of King **Faruq**, later under the patronage of **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** government, and at the invitation of **Jihan al-Sadat**. Umm Kulthum's funeral in 1975 occasioned a large popular turnout almost equal to the record numbers who had followed Nasir's procession. Her singing did much to raise the status and fame of female entertainers in the Arab world. Her memoirs appear in translation in *Middle Eastern Muslim Women Speak*.

UMMA PARTY. The "People's Party," made up mainly of landowners and intelligentsia, having as its house organ the Arabic daily **newspaper al-Jarida** between 1907 and 1915. Ostensibly the rival of the **National Party**, it differed little in its devotion to political independence and parliamentary government, except that it argued that these goals could be attained only gradually, and it tended to distance itself more from **Khedive Abbas Hilmi II** and the **Ottoman**

Empire than the Nationalists. Its leaders were Hasan Abd al-Raziq and Mahmud Sulayman; **Sa'd Zaghul**, if not officially a member, was a supporter. Many Umma Party members later ran for the 1914 **Legislative Assembly** or joined the **Wafd** in 1919. Some became founders of the **Liberal Constitutionalist Party** in 1922.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (USSR), *see* **RUS-SIA**.

UNIONS, LABOR. Egypt has long had city-based artisans and apprentices, and in **Ottoman** times they were incorporated into a highly articulated system of trade guilds (*asnaf*). With the rise of capitalism in the 19th century, many of the guilds fell into desuetude, but some survived into the 20th century. For most of the new urban occupations, there were at first no organizations that enabled workers to bargain over their wages and working conditions with their employers, who often were foreign companies or individuals. Egyptian workers were slow to view themselves as a class, because many hoped to make enough money to buy plots of farmland and return to rural life. Often peasants took seasonal jobs in sugar refineries, **cotton** ginning mills, or local industries, returning to **agriculture** during the sowing and harvesting seasons. Although some strikes occurred during **Ahmad Urabi's** movement in 1882, the first example of an organized labor movement took place among the **Greek** workers in the cigarette industry in 1899. In the early 20th century, **textile** workers, **tram** operators, coal heavers, and **sugar** refinery workers formed ephemeral unions and struck against their employers for higher wages.

Most Egyptians were late to realize the need for labor organization, but the **National Party** did inspire some workers through its organization of night schools, consumer cooperatives, and the Manual Trade Workers' Union (*Niqabat Ummal al-Sanai' al-Yadawiyya*). The example set by foreign workers, most of them skilled or semiskilled, was equally instructive to the Egyptian laborers. Workers' strikes and sabotage played an important role in the **1919 Revolution**. The **Wafd's** effort to make the independence struggle a national one, obliterating distinctions of family, religion, and class, delayed the growth of a working-class consciousness.

However, Egypt's industrialization before and during **World War II** spawned new factories and workshops hiring far more

laborers than ever before. Wages were low, hours long, and working conditions poor and sometimes dangerous. Many foremen routinely abused workers physically and psychologically. Egypt's pioneer **socialists** tried to organize unions, as did the **Wafd Party**, Prince **Abbas Halim**, and even King **Faruq**. The greatest successes were the unionization of the workers in public transport, the Egyptian state **railways**, and the textile industry, but not until November 1942 did Parliament pass legislation making it legal for workers to organize. The Egyptian **Communists** organized some industrial workers after the war, especially in the textile industry. Although most Egyptians still lived in the countryside and worked in agriculture, early attempts to unionize the peasants failed.

The **1952 Revolution** raised great hopes, but the **Free Officers'** suppression of the **Kafr al-Dawwar** workers' uprising showed that the new regime did not favor organized labor. Although paying lip service to social justice and workers' rights, **Muhammad Najib** and **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** undermined the independent labor unions and subordinated them to the **Liberation Rally** and the **National Union**. The **ASU** later co-opted the labor movement. Some workers rose to powerful government posts, but most remained unorganized and alienated from the state-run factories that employed them, even though workers' representatives sat on their boards of directors. **Anwar al-Sadat's** government allowed more freedom of speech, but its *infitah* policy effectively turned ownership of state-run enterprises over to foreign-owned corporations that barred workers' representatives from their managing boards.

Their wages sapped by price inflation, some workers staged strikes (outlawed in Egypt), only to face fines and arrest, but under **Husni Mubarak** the courts have overturned jail sentences imposed against some strikers. Under current law, any firm employing more than fifty workers must allow them to form a union, but all unions (currently numbering 23) must affiliate with the Egyptian Trade Union Federation, whose membership exceeded 5 million workers in 2000. In 1995 29.6 percent of Egypt's nonagricultural workers were unionized. At no time have they been allowed to strike.

The government has tried often to regulate working conditions. Recent legislation barred **employment** of children under 14, except that 12- to 14-year-olds may do seasonal (agricultural) work. The government cannot hire enough inspectors to enforce such regula-

tions. As long as unemployment remains above 10 percent and opportunities for workers to go to the oil-exporting countries contract, Egyptian labor's ability to organize itself to raise wages and improve working conditions will be severely limited.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (UAR). Union of Egypt and **Syria** during the presidency of **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**. Widely hailed in 1958 as the first step toward the goals of **Arab nationalism**, the integration of the two countries proved harder than their leaders had foreseen. The **July Laws** alienated many Syrian capitalists and may have sparked the military mutiny that led to Syria's secession in September 1961. Although Nasir believed that conservative Arab regimes and agents of **Israel** and Western imperialism caused the union to break up, he acquiesced in Syria's secession. He continued to call Egypt the UAR, hoping to win back Syria or other Arab states. Its name was changed to the "Arab Republic of Egypt" in 1971.

UNITED NATIONS (UN). Although coined by Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt to denote the **World War II** Allied coalition that fought against the Axis powers—Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan—the term later came to be used for the United Nations Organization founded in San Francisco in 1945. In order to be represented at the founding conference, Egypt had to declare war on the Axis before 1 March 1945. Parliament voted to do so on 26 February, causing the assassination of Premier **Ahmad Mahir**. Egypt's delegation, led by Abd al-Hamid Badawi, a distinguished jurist, hoped that the UN Charter would provide for a revision of the 1936 **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty**, lest the **British occupation** be made permanent.

It sought to strengthen the authority of the General Assembly, proposed to expand the Security Council from 11 to 14 members, with a representative system of nine regional constituencies for the various parts of the world, and tried to limit use of the veto by the five permanent members. It wanted to raise the Economic and Social Council to the level of the other UN organs and to admit more members to that group. It also hoped to increase the obligations of the countries governing trust territories. Almost none of its suggestions were adopted. Egypt ratified the Charter after much parliamentary debate, hoping that the new collective security measures would dissuade Britain from stationing troops in Egypt.

Elected to membership in the first Security Council, Egypt often raised the issue of revising the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty, most notably under **Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi** in 1947, but without success. Egypt opposed the recommendation of the Special Committee on **Palestine** to partition the former British mandate between the Jews and the Arabs, who constituted two-thirds of Palestine’s population, but failed to persuade enough General Assembly members to reject its **Partition Plan** in November 1947, leading to the 1948 **Palestine War**. The UN helped end hostilities in January 1949 and sponsored the **Rhodes Proximity Talks**. Egypt became disillusioned with the UN, especially when it admitted **Israel** to full membership in May 1949, even though it had not adhered to all its existing resolutions.

Egypt remained an active participant, however, pushing for the establishment of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to benefit the Palestinian Arab refugees and for annual resolutions by the General Assembly, calling on Israel to readmit them. Egypt encouraged the extension of membership to newly independent states and called on the UN specialized agencies to promote economic development and international cooperation. Following the 1956 **Suez War**, Egypt agreed to the stationing of UNEF on its territory, despite reservations about a new foreign occupation so soon after the British **evacuation**, and it also took part in peacekeeping operations in the Congo in 1960–61. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**’s demand that the UN withdraw its forces from Egyptian territory in May 1967 led to lengthy Security Council debates and contributed to the escalation of tensions preceding the **June War**. Following its defeat, Egypt tried to encourage other member nations that supported its cause to force an Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories captured during the fighting, leading to **Security Council Resolution 242**.

The UN again served as the main debating forum during the **October War**, when Egypt and its backers tried to parlay the Arabs’ early gains into a resolution that would oblige Israel to withdraw from all occupied territories and recognize the rights of the Palestinian people. Egypt did, however, accept **Security Council Resolutions 338–340** that ended the war. It later backed General Assembly resolutions that declared the **PLO** to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people, denounced **Zionism** as “a form of racism,” and set up a committee to work for implementing the “inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.” Egypt backed the UN in condemning Israel’s invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982

and **Iraq's** 1990 invasion of Kuwait (*see* **Gulf War**). Many Egyptians have held major posts within the UN, most notably former Secretary-General **Boutros Boutros-Ghali**.

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF). International army stationed in the **Gaza Strip** and the **Sinai Peninsula** between Egypt and **Israel** in 1957–67, then withdrawn at the demand of Egypt's government, an action that led to its blockade of the **Gulf of Aqaba** and, in the opinion of many, the **June War**. A new UNEF was established, as a result of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's **shuttle diplomacy**, by the first **Separation of Forces agreement** of 1974, serving as a buffer between Egypt and Israel. Since 1979 a multinational force has served as the buffer, because of Israel's distrust of the United Nations.

UNITED STATES. Egypt has had diplomatic relations with the U.S. government since 1830, when Washington signed a treaty with the **Ottoman Empire**, but Egyptian contact with American civilians and troops began even earlier. Although the U.S. Marine Corps Hymn has its men landing on the shores of Tripoli, the actual military intervention occurred in Egypt's Western Desert, from which the Marines traveled overland to punish Tripolitania's pirates. The U.S. Consulate General was established in **Alexandria** (it was transferred to **Cairo** in the 1870s). American citizens enjoyed the protection of the **Capitulations** and were subject to the civil jurisdiction of the **Mixed Courts**, but U.S. diplomats rarely intervened in Egyptian political issues during the 19th century. The American Civil War, which included a Northern blockade of Southern shipping, led to skyrocketing European demand for Egyptian **cotton**, setting off an economic boom in 1861–65. Following that war, officers of both the Union and Confederate armies found employment in the Egyptian **armed forces**. Although some U.S. consuls-general backed **Ahmad Urabi** in 1881–82, during the subsequent **British occupation**, Washington usually sided with **Britain** against the nationalists.

American interests in Egypt remained largely religious, as Presbyterians and other denominations established missions in areas where **Copts** predominated. The mission school system educated many Egyptians and eventually culminated in the establishment in 1919 of **AUC**. Americans were among the growing wave of foreign visitors to Egypt in the 19th century. No fewer than 132 American

travel accounts for years 1830–82 have been published; many more accounts cover later dates. Famous American **tourists** include Herman Melville, Mark Twain, Ulysses S. Grant, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Andrew Carnegie, William Jennings Bryan, and Theodore Roosevelt. U.S. commercial activity was modest before 1914 but did include installing the first telephones (*see* **Communications**) and the marketing of **petroleum** products, automobiles, and sewing machines. After **World War I**, American films, recorded **music**, soft drinks (*see* **Beverages**), and other consumer goods entered the Egyptian market.

America's presence in Egypt became more visible during **World War II**, when the U.S. Army Air Force sent airplanes and other logistical support to the British forces fighting against Field Marshal Erwin Rommel in the Western Desert. Following the war, Americans began to move into positions formerly dominated by the British. Official and unofficial American support for **Zionism** harmed U.S.–Egyptian relations. The U.S. ambassador to Egypt in 1948, Pinckney Tuck, resigned from the foreign service in protest against President Harry S. Truman's decision to recognize **Israel**.

It is open to historical debate whether the United States supported the **1952 Revolution**; but Ambassador Jefferson Caffrey quickly championed the **Free Officers** after they ousted King **Faruq** (who had been pro-American). Washington played an important role in persuading the British to give up their **Suez Canal** base and to sign the 1954 **Anglo–Egyptian agreement**, and it was hoped for a time that **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** might be persuaded to join an anti-Communist military alliance, but he opted for **positive neutrality** and condemned the **Baghdad Pact**. U.S.–Egyptian relations worsened when Dwight Eisenhower's administration refused to sell arms to Egypt in 1955, leading to the **Czech Arms Deal** and growing **Communist** influence in Cairo. The U.S. offer to finance the **Aswan High Dam** was an attempt to restore good relations, but Secretary of State John Foster Dulles withdrew the offer in July 1956, leading to Egypt's nationalization of the **Suez Canal Company** and the subsequent **Suez War**, in which the United States opposed **Britain, France**, and Israel for their attack on Egypt.

America made no political gain with Nasir's government, however, because of its espousal of the **Eisenhower Doctrine**. The U.S. government was cool to the creation of the **UAR**, and its dispatch of troops to Lebanon after the July 1958 Iraqi revolution

caused Nasir to make an emergency flight to Moscow. U.S.–Egyptian relations improved slightly in 1959 when Nasir suppressed the local Communists and later when John F. Kennedy (who was known to favor Algerian independence from France) became president and appointed John Badeau (the former president of AUC) as his ambassador to Cairo. The United States sold wheat to Egypt for Egyptian pounds up to 1966, but the policy came under fire in Congress and also in the eyes of many Americans, who viewed Egypt as Israel’s major foe. During the tensions preceding the **June War**, Egyptians demonstrated against U.S. attempts to test Egypt’s blockade against Israeli-bound shipping on the **Gulf of Aqaba**. On the second day of the war, Egypt broke diplomatic relations with the United States, which it accused of flying air cover for the Israeli fighter jets that had attacked Egypt.

Although Cairo and Washington had no formal diplomatic relations from 1967 to 1973, each kept an “interests section” in the other’s capital and conducted low- and high-level talks about a possible peace settlement with Israel (*see* **Rogers Peace Plan**). After the **October War**, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger opened direct talks with **Anwar al-Sadat**, who promptly restored diplomatic relations with the United States and cooperated in his **shuttle diplomacy** and later peace moves, notably the 1975 **Egyptian–Israeli Agreement**. Although the U.S. government was not overtly involved in Sadat’s 1977 trip to Jerusalem, it did play a major role in the subsequent Egyptian–Israeli peace talks leading up to the **Camp David Accords** and the **Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty**. These diplomatic steps accompanied an increase in **AID** activity. Many Egyptians hoped that American economic and technical assistance would facilitate their development and reduce their dependence on **Russia** and the oil-exporting Arab countries, which were resented in Egypt.

Official U.S.–Egyptian cooperation has grown under **Husni Mubarak** (*see* **Operation Bright Star**) but many Egyptians view U.S. aid as a means of manipulating their country into facilitating a general Arab peace settlement with Israel and the American presence as promoting globalization and weakening Islamic morals. On the official level, diplomatic ties remain strong, but some—perhaps most—of the Egyptian people resent what they see as Washington’s pro-Israel policy. American concern about **human rights** violations in Egypt is sometimes attacked as interference, and U.S. attacks on **Iraq**—especially the 2003 war—are widely condemned.

URABI, AHMAD (1841–1911). Egyptian nationalist leader and army officer. Urabi was the son of a village shaykh of Iraqi Arab origin. He studied for two years at **al-Azhar** and then entered the **Military Academy** at Sa'id's behest in 1854–55 and soon earned his commission. He rose rapidly through the ranks under Sa'id, but his career was stalled under **Khedive Isma'il**, who favored army officers of Turkish or **Circassian** origin. After Isma'il's deposition in 1879, Urabi is said to have backed the emerging **National Party**, but his first known act was to represent a group of discontented ethnic Egyptian officers who were protesting in February 1881 against War Minister **Rifqi's** favoritism to their **Turco–Circassian** colleagues. **Tawfiq** and **Riyad** planned to cashier Urabi and his followers for insubordination, but other Egyptian officers seized control of the ministry, rescuing them. The khedive then agreed to replace Rifqi with **Mahmud Sami al-Barudi** as war minister. On 9 September, fearing a **khedivial** counterplot, the Nationalist officers surrounded **Abdin Palace**, confronted Tawfiq, and obliged him to set up a constitutional government headed by **Muhammad Sharif** and to enlarge the Egyptian army.

Britain and **France** (especially the latter), concerned about the safety of the **Suez Canal** and their investments and citizens in Egypt, became increasingly hostile to the Urabist movement, expressing their views in the **Joint Note** of January 1882. The Nationalists countered by replacing Sharif with Barudi as premier in February, making Urabi the new war minister. Still fearing a khedivial counterplot, the Nationalists took steps to weaken the Turks and Circassians within the officer corps, also stirring up popular feeling against the European powers, and in some cases threatened the Europeans living in Egypt as well. Riots broke out in **Alexandria** in June 1882, and many European residents fled for safety, sometimes to the English and French warships that were gathering near its harbor. The Western powers threatened military intervention to back the khedive and to protect their citizens, demanding that the Egyptian army dismantle its harbor fortifications. When Urabi refused, British ships bombarded them. In Alexandria fires broke out, due either to the naval bombardment (as the Egyptians claimed) or to Egyptian sabotage (according to the British).

British troops—unaided by France, which had pulled out due to a ministerial crisis in Paris—landed at Alexandria and later at

Ismailia to restore order. Urabi and the Egyptian army continued to resist the British invaders, even after the khedive had gone over to their side and declared him a rebel, but they were defeated at **Tel el-Kebir** on 13 September. Once the British entered **Cairo** the next day, Urabi surrendered, was tried for treason against the khedive, and ultimately was spared execution. He and his followers were exiled to Ceylon. **Abbas Hilmi II** let him return in 1901, but he did not join the later National Party of **Mustafa Kamil**, died in obscurity, and was scorned by most educated Egyptians up to the **1952 Revolution**. Afterward he was rehabilitated by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** and his fellow officers, whose occupations and class backgrounds paralleled his own. Egyptians view him as a patriot who resisted the British, the khedive, and the large landowners to promote constitutional government and the people's welfare.

AL-URWA AL-WUTHQA (1884). Influential Arabic fortnightly journal published in Paris by **Jamal al-Din al-Afghani** and **Muhammad Abduh**, advocating Islamic solidarity against Western imperialism.

USSR, see RUSSIA.

UTHMAN, AMIN (1900–46). Pro-**British** minister. Educated at **Victoria College** in **Alexandria** and at Brasenose College, Oxford, he was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in London and later received his *licence* and doctorate in law from Paris. Uthman taught briefly at Victoria after his return to Egypt, then worked as a lawyer within the government's legal department. Later he became a financial inspector, director of imports for the Alexandria municipality, director of the direct tax department, deputy minister of **finance**, head of the accounts council, and in 1942 finance minister in **Mustafa al-Nahhas's cabinet**. He instituted a national bond drive and set up the government employees' pension system. After the ministry fell, he went into business. He was a member of the Senate and served on the boards of many companies and banks. Although he belonged to the **Wafd Party**, in 1945 he founded a non-political movement called *Rabitat al-Nahda* (Renaissance League). Uthman was knighted by King George VI into the Order of the British Empire, had an English wife, and raised over £E100 thousand for a

memorial at **al-Alamayn**. His assassination in **Cairo** in January 1946, by **Muslim Brothers** with help from **Anwar al-Sadat**, signaled Egypt's growing anger against Britain.

UTHMAN, UTHMAN AHMAD (1916–99). Civil **engineer**, construction magnate, and **cabinet** minister. He was educated at **Cairo University** and founded the Civil Engineering Company in 1940, with its headquarters at **Ismailia**. An early member of the **Muslim Brothers**, he resented the discrimination that Egyptians suffered in that city at the hands of Europeans. In 1950 Uthman moved the main center of operations of his firm, now renamed the **Arab Contractors**, to **Saudi Arabia**, where his business flourished with the growth of the oil industry, soon moving into other Arab countries as well. Uthman did not neglect Egypt; his firm spearheaded the reconstruction of **Port Said** following the **Suez War** and won a \$48 million contract for part of the building of the **Aswan High Dam**. His enthusiasm for working with the **Soviets** palled, however, when they denied him access to one of their bases after he had won a contract to build shelters for their fighter planes.

Uthman and his relatives held most of the shares in the Engineering Company for Industries and Contracts and in many other firms, such as the Nasr Company for Pencils and Graphite Products. From 1949 to 1973 he was president of the Arab Contractors and of its Saudi, Kuwaiti, and **Libyan** affiliate organizations. An advocate of **Anwar al-Sadat's** *infitah* policy, he became minister for reconstruction in 1973 and of housing and reconstruction from 1974 to 1976. He represented **Ismailia** in the **People's Assembly** from 1976 and chaired the Engineers Syndicate, the **NDP**, the Committee for Popular Development, and the **Ismailia Football Club**. His construction projects include the High Dam, the deepening of the **Suez Canal**, the Cairo International Airport, the Dhahran Airport, the Kuwait Municipality Centre, the Benghazi sewer system, the Kirkuk Feeder Canal, dams and tunnels on Jordan's Yarmuk River, and a first-class hotel in Khartum. Under Sadat he accumulated power and wealth in ways that many people questioned, being at the same time a minister who could issue tenders for contracts and a contractor who could bid on them; his power under **Husni Mubarak** diminished. Uthman published memoirs in 1981.

- V -

VANGUARD, WAFDIST. The **Wafd Party**'s radical branch that flourished in the late 1940s, often in alliance with such pro-**Communist** groups as **New Dawn**. It published a **newspaper**, *Sawt al-Umma*, edited by Muhammad Mandur, and such journals as *al-Ba'th* and *al-Fajr al-Jadid*. Critical of traditional institutions, it demanded radical reforms. Its members, most of whom were young intellectuals, clashed with **Mustafa al-Nahhas** and **Fuad Siraj al-Din**. It closed after the **1952 Revolution**.

VANGUARD ORGANIZATION. Secret group created within the **ASU** following its 1963 elections. The group's aims were to provide an elite leadership devoted to the principles of the **1952 Revolution** and to ensure the continuation of **Nasirism**. First established in June 1963 by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**, **Ali Sabri**, **Sha'rawi Jum'a**, Ahmad Fuad, and **Sami Sharaf**, the organization had a cell structure. Secrecy was required to permit selective recruitment of members. Although members initially came from various sources, expansion efforts focused on students and on the journalists' and lawyers' syndicates. By 1971 total membership exceeded 150 thousand. Its first leader was Sabri and then Jum'a, whose role was a major concern to **Anwar al-Sadat** when he carried out his **Corrective Revolution**. The Vanguard Organization vanished soon after this event.

VICTORIA COLLEGE. Private boys' boarding school in **Alexandria**, founded in 1902, following an English curriculum, and attended by sons of wealthy Egyptian and foreign families. It was nationalized after the **Suez War** by the Egyptian government and renamed "Victory College." **Amin Uthman**, **Omar Sharif**, **Yusuf Shahin**, and Jordan's King Husayn were among its Middle Eastern students.

VIRGIN MARY, APPARITION OF THE. Many Egyptians, both Christian and Muslim, believe that the Virgin Mary appeared in February 1968 in the night sky above a **Coptic** church in Matariyya, to reassure them following their country's defeat in the **June War**.

VOICE OF THE ARABS. Influential Egyptian **radio** station that spread **Jamal Abd al-Nasir**'s policies and ideology during the

1960s, notably among **Palestinians** and Arabs living in countries deemed by Egypt to be unsympathetic to **Arab nationalism**.

– W –

WAFD. Egypt's unofficial delegation to the 1919 **Paris Peace Conference**. The idea of sending Egyptian representatives to the postwar talks arose during **World War I** and may have originated with King **Fuad I**. The charter members were **Sa'd Zaghlul**, Ali Sha'rawi, **Abd al-Aziz Fahmi**, **Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid**, Abd al-Latif al-Makabbati, Muhammad Ali Alluba, Hamad al-Basil, and Sinut Hanna. Their first overt action was a visit by Zaghlul, Fahmi, and Sha'rawi to Sir **Reginald Wingate** at the **Residency** on 13 November 1918, two days after the armistice, expressing their desire to go to London to negotiate with the foreign office for an end to the **British Protectorate**. A similar request was made the same day by Premier **Husayn Rushdi** and **Adli Yakan**. Wingate wired home for instructions, but was advised that the foreign office was too busy preparing for the conference to meet even an official Egyptian delegation, let alone Sa'd, who was convening meetings of **Legislative Assembly** members, demanding Egypt's complete independence, and proposing to lead a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference.

When the British government questioned the credentials of Sa'd and his friends to represent Egypt, his followers set up a central committee to gather financial contributions and circulate petitions on which Egyptians could sign their names (or press their seal rings), authorizing Sa'd and his *wafd* (delegation) to speak on their behalf. Wingate tried to impede these meetings, and the interior ministry confiscated some of the petitions. But even Rushdi and Adli resigned from the **cabinet** when the foreign office refused to receive them. Sa'd kept on writing memoranda to Clemenceau as president of the Peace Conference, President Woodrow Wilson, the representatives of the Western powers in Egypt, and foreign residents.

Although the Wafd's main aim was to achieve Egypt's complete independence by peaceful means, the British failure to perceive the depth of popular support for the Wafd led to repressive measures in March, including the internment in Malta of Sa'd and three of his associates, causing the nationwide **1919 Revolution**. The violence

subsided only after the British government appointed a war hero, General **Edmund Allenby**, as **high commissioner** and authorized him to take whatever measures he deemed necessary to restore order. Allenby firmly suppressed the violence but also declared Sa'd free to go to Paris. The other Wafdists drew up a covenant that listed the Wafd's founding members and pledged them to secrecy. They chose a president to direct the Wafd and supervise the work of its committees and the other officers, a secretary to control its written communications and archives, and a treasurer to keep its accounts and take responsibility for its funds.

Members of the Wafd were required to have the president's permission to negotiate in its name with persons of political standing. They had to report their conversations to the president in writing. Formally organized like a European political party, the Wafd delegated many powers to its president, Sa'd Zaghlul. Once he was free to go to the Peace Conference, the other 17 members of the Egyptian delegation still in Egypt met before their departure to form the Central Committee, whose vital function was to gather funds and information on the situation in Egypt. It soon became the nerve center of Egyptian resistance to British rule. When **Britain** dispatched the **Milner Mission** to Egypt, it was the Central Committee that organized the boycott and demonstrations against it, the main focus of the 1919 Revolution after Sa'd's release from Malta.

The Wafd's hopes of presenting its case to the Conference were dashed when, on the day Sa'd reached Paris, the U.S. government announced that it recognized the British Protectorate over Egypt. The Wafd was never invited to address the Conference, and its members spent their time issuing manifestos and making informal contacts with members of the other delegations, hoping to win support for Egypt's independence. Some members resigned, and others joined. In 1920 Lord Milner and Sa'd Zaghlul held informal talks about the Egyptian question without reaching an agreement. New disturbances broke out in 1921 in protest against the **Adli-Curzon Negotiations**, and many of the Wafd's leaders, including Sa'd, were exiled. Some of the estranged Wafdists helped create the **Liberal Constitutionalist Party** and took part in drafting the **1923 Constitution**. Once the new constitution took effect, the Wafd, which had insisted that only an elected constituent assembly could write it, voted to reconstitute itself as a party in order to run candidates in the parliamentary elections. From 1918 to 1923, the Wafd had viewed

itself not as a distinct party, but as spokesman to the world for the whole Egyptian nation, which in 1919 it practically was.

WAFD PARTY. Egypt's main nationalist political party from 1923 until after the **1952 Revolution**. From the start it considered itself to be the representative of the Egyptian people, while at the same time conferring much power on its leader, **Sa'd Zaghlul**, until his death in 1927, and then **Mustafa al-Nahhas** until 1952. Although the Wafd contended that a nationally chosen constituent assembly should have drafted the **1923 Constitution**, it voted to reconstitute itself as a party to run candidates for both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Its central leadership in 1923 was made up of large and medium-size landowners, with a few members of the urban middle class, but it sought to reach all social classes. Wafdists ran for all Chamber of Deputies seats during the 1923 elections, winning 183 against 27 for all the other parties; in the Senate it fared less well because it was harder to find qualified candidates to run for its constituencies. Wafdist voters included the medium and small landowners, urban professionals, merchants and industrialists, shopkeepers, workers, and peasants.

The Wafd Party also won in the 1925 elections, after Sir **Lee Stack**'s assassination, but by a smaller margin due to massive Palace interference. Investigation of the Stack murder also uncovered a "secret apparatus" within the Wafd, led by **Ahmad Mahir** and **Mustafa Fahmi al-Nuqrashi**, both relative newcomers to the party. Although the Wafd continued to dominate the Chamber of Deputies, which Sa'd chaired in 1926–27, it could not form a **cabinet** because King **Fuad I** used his power under the 1923 Constitution to appoint non-Wafdist ministries. In the 1929 elections, the Wafd Party won 205 seats, and Nahhas briefly headed a government.

At this time the party was strongly organized at the constituency and provincial as well as the national level, but its central committee tended to take power away from the local groups, especially after the formation in 1924 of the Wafdist Parliamentary Organization, which required Wafdist deputies to obey the decisions of the central executive committee and became the connecting link between local committees and the central leadership. Its leaders were not popularly chosen, but picked by Sa'd or Nahhas. However, the Wafd Party usually secured the consent of the Parliamentary Organization for its major decisions. Its program stressed

Egypt's attainment of complete independence from **Britain**, but also encouraged local industry and **Bank Misr**, public **education**, and **agriculture**, as well as the formation of **cooperatives** and labor **unions**.

The Great Depression and the repressive policies of the Palace and **Isma'il Sidqi** hamstrung the Wafd Party. It opposed the prorogation of the 1929 Parliament and the imposition of the **1930 Constitution**, some factions even resorting to **terrorism**. Divisions hampered the Wafd in combating Fuad's policies, and the British opposed restoring the 1923 Constitution, which they believed would ensure the Wafd's return to power. All parties except the Wafd met in November 1935 to demand that **Tawfiq Nasim** restore the 1923 Constitution. Massive demonstrations, resulting in several deaths and arrests, dramatized popular opposition to the 1930 Constitution, and finally Nahhas agreed to join a **National Front** with all the other parties to petition the king to restore the 1923 Constitution and the high commissioner to reopen Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. While the Wafd continued to appeal to its traditional constituencies, it adopted confrontational tactics such as boycotting foreign manufactures and organizing industrial workers. In 1935 the Wafd held a national congress that showed its ongoing mass support, including villagers, **women**, and youth. After Nasim restored the earlier constitution, the Wafd decided not to join a coalition cabinet, but rather to accept a caretaker government that would hold free elections in which it could take part.

In the 1936 elections, the Wafd won 179 of the 232 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 65 out of 79 elected Senate seats. Nahhas formed an all-Wafdist cabinet. Hoping to increase Parliament's power, he appointed members as undersecretaries of state for health, interior, justice, and foreign affairs. That summer Egypt successfully concluded the **Anglo-Egyptian Treaty**, laying the groundwork for the **Montreux Convention**. The Party became distracted by its power struggle with King **Faruq** and internal divisions, as Nuqrashi left the cabinet and then the Wafd's high command. Ahmad Mahir followed him in January 1938; together they formed the **Sa'dist Party**. By this time, Faruq had dissolved the government, after an escalating quarrel with Nahhas and a crescendo of demonstrations by the **Green Shirts** (*see Misr al-Fatat*) for the king and the **Blue Shirts** for the Wafd, replacing it with an anti-Wafd coalition.

They decided to dissolve Parliament and hold new elections. The government used pressure tactics to help its candidates and to prevent known Wafdists from voting. The result was a victory for the Sa'dists and **Liberal Constitutionalists**; the Wafd won only 12 seats. Out of power, the Wafd gained support among university students and government employees. The ministers were united only by their desire to keep the Wafd out of power. A series of weak cabinets that were either ultranationalist or subservient to Faruq persuaded the British to reinstate the Wafd to ensure Egypt's cooperation with the Allies in **World War II**. This policy led to the **4 February Incident**, which restored Nahhas to power with an all-Wafdist cabinet.

This incident marked the beginning of the Wafd's downfall, for it had attained power neither by popular election, nor with Parliamentary support, nor upon a royal command, but by the power of British tanks. Leading Wafdists began amassing fortunes from their public offices and especially from war profiteering. **Makram Ubayd**, the Wafd's secretary-general, resigned as finance minister and was expelled in July 1942 from the party. He proceeded to document Wafdist corruption in his **Black Book** and formed his own splinter group. Youth groups became alienated from the party leaders, the leadership atrophied, and Nahhas fell under the influence of **Fuad Siraj al-Din**. As soon as Allied victory in **World War II** seemed certain, the British let Faruq replace Nahhas with another non-Wafdist coalition.

Only after the **Palestine War**, when the king became reconciled with Nahhas, united by their shared fear of a revolution by the outlawed **Muslim Brothers**, did Faruq call new elections. The Wafd returned to power in 1950, winning less than half the votes cast but a viable majority of deputies elected. The last Wafdist cabinet, made up mainly of party leaders but including such respected figures as **Ahmad Husayn** in social affairs and **Taha Husayn** in education, proposed an ambitious social reform program, which was eclipsed by the inconclusive negotiations with Britain over the **Sudan** and the **evacuation** of the **Suez Canal**. Nahhas made a dramatic gesture by unilaterally abrogating the 1936 Treaty in October 1951, causing street demonstrations and the dispatch of *fidaiyin* to attack the British troops in the Canal Zone. The climax was **Black Saturday**, when fires destroyed much of central **Cairo**, and the Wafdist cabinet was dismissed.

The Wafd never again held power. After six months of fitful efforts by Faruq to solve Egypt's political and social problems, using four different appointed cabinets, he was ousted from power by the **1952 Revolution**. The army officers who took over the government talked with Nahhas about forming a cabinet, but concluded that the Wafd was more the cause of Egypt's problems than a solution. In January 1953 the officers ordered all political parties to surrender their assets and dissolve themselves. Many Wafdist leaders were tried and some received long prison sentences, notably Fuad Siraj al-Din, who survived to found the **New Wafd** in 1977. The Wafd was a popular movement as much as a political party. It fared best when it strove to free Egypt from British domination, but poorly when it had to coexist with politicians and policies that it could not control.

WAFD PARTY, NEW. The revived **Wafd Party**, initially led by **Fuad Siraj al-Din**, with Ibrahim Faraj as its secretary-general. Its basis lay in **Anwar al-Sadat's 1976 Party Reforms** within the **People's Assembly**. Under the new law, parties needed only 20 members of Parliament to become legal. Muhammad Hilmi Murad managed to form a 25-member Wafdist Parliamentary group. The Wafd quickly revived its Central Command with 35 members, soon to become 50. **Women's** and students' committees followed, as did branch committees in the provinces and the towns. Siraj al-Din formally proclaimed the New Wafd in August 1977 at the **Egyptian Bar Association**. It appealed especially to landowners and middle-class voters who were disenchanted with **Arab socialism**.

Formally reestablished in February 1978, it was disbanded in June, when Sadat issued a new internal security law that barred anyone who had held a ministerial post before 1952 from taking part in politics. The Egyptian courts invalidated this law in 1983, legalizing the New Wafd in time to contest the **1984 elections**. Running in coalition with the **Muslim Brothers**, it won 58 seats with 15 percent of the total popular vote. It ran independently in 1987, winning 30 seats. It boycotted the **1990 elections**, protesting the government's unfair electoral laws, but did contest the **1995 elections**. Lately, it has identified with secularists against the *jama'at* and with private enterprise capitalists against **Husni Mubarak's** policy of retaining state-owned industries. It won seven seats in the People's Assembly in the 2000 elections. After Siraj al-Din died, his brother, Yasin, contested the succession with

Nu'man Jum'a, the eventual victor. Its daily **newspaper**, *al-Wafd*, had a circulation of 360 thousand in 1999.

WAFDIST BLOC. Small faction formed by **Makram Ubayd** when he left the **Wafd Party** in 1942. It later joined several anti-Wafdist coalition cabinets.

WAGHORN, THOMAS (1800–50). Promoter of the overland route to India. Born in Rochester, England, he entered the Royal Navy at the age of 12. Unable to find naval employment after the Napoleonic Wars, he became a merchantman and realized that **Britain** could cut the time and cost of transport between Europe and India by using the Egyptian overland route. In 1827 Waghorn made a test voyage to carry messages from London to Bombay and to return with a reply within three months. Overcoming great hardships, his mission succeeded. After living for some years among the Egyptian **bedouin**, he developed a regular system of caravans, secure from nomadic raids, with eight halting points between **Cairo** and Suez. By 1840 he provided a service of English carriages, vans, and horses to convey travelers. Waghorn's achievement was a step toward building the first **railroad** linking **Alexandria** to Cairo and ultimately toward cutting the **Suez Canal**.

WAHBA, YUSUF (1859–1934). Leading **Copt**, judge, **cabinet** minister, and premier from 1919 to 1920. Born in **Cairo**, he was educated at **Cyril IV's** Coptic college, where he became fluent in French and English. He helped to translate the Code Napoléon into Arabic and to develop the **National Courts**. He also helped to revive the Coptic Council (*majlis milli*) against the wishes of Patriarch **Cyril V** and was a founder of the **Tawfiq** Benevolent Society. He later became a chancellor in the **Mixed Court** of Appeals in **Alexandria**. When **Muhammad Sa'id** and his successor resigned from the premiership, Wahba became the Coptic member of the cabinet with the portfolio for foreign affairs. He became **finance** minister in the first **Husayn Rushdi** ministry in 1914 and continued to serve in the cabinet during the war and the **1919 Revolution**. He agreed to head the government in November 1919 despite massive protest demonstrations by leading Copts, backed by many Muslims, and narrowly escaped assassination in **Sulayman Pasha** (now **Tal'at Harb**) Square. He

later served in the Senate, where he generously arranged for his erstwhile assailant to find employment as a clerk.

WAHHABI. Ultraconservative, puritanical Muslim movement founded in Najd by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1787) and now dominant in **Saudi Arabia**. The Wahhabis, who call themselves *mutawahhidun* (unitarians), originally preached that Muslims had abandoned their faith in one God and distorted **Islam** by their innovations. They based the **Shari'a** solely on the Quran and on the sayings and acts of the prophets, rejecting all later interpretations in Islamic law and theology. They rejected **Sufism** and veneration of saints and tombs, prohibited the decoration of mosques, and banned all luxury. At the behest of the **Ottoman** sultan, **Muhammad Ali** sent his troops to drive the Wahhabis out of the **Hijaz** in 1811–19. They regained power under Abd al-Aziz (Ibn Sa'ud), who built up the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the early 20th century. Wahhabi ideas have influenced the *Salafiyya* movement in Egypt and in other Muslim countries, as well as modern **Islamism**.

AL-WAQAI' AL-MISRIYYA. Egypt's official journal since 1828.

WAQF. Religious endowment of land or other property, designated for a pious or beneficent purpose, called a *waqf khayri*, usually by and for Muslims, but in Egypt also by and for **Copts**. Another type of endowment, the *waqf ahli*, was sometimes used in Egypt before the 1952 **land reform** to protect estates from excessive division under Muslim inheritance laws. Originally managed by the **ulama**, the Muslim *awqaf* came under Palace control under **Muhammad Ali**. Later, when **Abbas Hilmi II** abused his control over the *awqaf*, the Egyptian government set up a ministry to manage them. Coptic *awqaf* were administered by the clergy up to the land reforms. Some were nationalized by **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** regime but later restored to the Copts under **Anwar al-Sadat**.

WINGATE, Sir [FRANCIS] REGINALD (1861–1953). **British** army general and **high commissioner**. Born in Scotland, he was educated at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, and commissioned in 1880 in the Royal Artillery. Although posted to India, he was sent to Aden, where he learned Arabic, and joined the Egyptian army in

1883, becoming an aide-de-camp to its commander-in-chief, Sir Evelyn Wood. Wingate took part in the **Gordon** relief expedition, but saw no more active service. He was named assistant military secretary, then assistant adjutant general, and in 1889 director of military intelligence, with special responsibility for the **Sudan**, about which he wrote *Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan* (1891). He also translated accounts by Father Ohrwalder and R. C. Slatin of their experiences as prisoners of the **Mahdi**. He accompanied Sir **Herbert Kitchener** during the 1896–98 Sudan campaign and succeeded him as commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army from 1899 to 1916 and concurrently governor-general of the Sudan. Wingate restored order, established British rule, and introduced **cotton** production in the *Jazira*. He brought Darfur under Anglo–Egyptian control in 1916.

In January 1917 Wingate succeeded Sir **Henry McMahon** as Egypt's high commissioner. This office proved challenging, because of the large influx of British Empire troops during **World War I**, the shortage of foodstuffs and animals, and rising opposition to British rule among the Egyptian people. Wingate's warnings to the British government were ignored. In November 1918 he received a formal visit at the **Residency** from **Sa'd Zaghlul** and two of his friends, who asked to send a delegation to negotiate with the foreign office in London for an end to the **Protectorate** that **Britain** had proclaimed in 1914. However, Foreign Secretary Curzon refused to accept Sa'd's demands or even Wingate's advice that the British government negotiate with the Egyptian ministers. When the **1919 Revolution** proved that Wingate had better grasped the situation than the foreign office had, the British government quickly replaced him with General **Edmund Allenby**, who was to implement a more conciliatory policy in **Cairo**. Wingate never again held a responsible government position, although he served on the boards of various local organizations and of Gordon College in Khartum. His services to the British Empire as a military commander and civil administrator have not been widely recognized. His papers are in Durham University's Sudan Archive.

WISA-WASIF, RAMSES (1911–74). Noted patron of Egyptian peasant artists, especially young children, whom he encouraged to weave tapestries representing scenes from village life, using their own creative styles. A trained architect, he also designed the **Coptic** cathedrals in **Zamalek** and **Heliopolis**, the **Mahmud Mukhtar Museum**,

and the stained glass windows in the ASU headquarters. He collaborated with **Hasan Fathi** on the New Gurna Project. His studio in Harraniyya, near the Giza Pyramids, remains a center of creativity in the **visual arts**.

WOLSELEY, Sir GARNET (1833–1913). **British** army officer, imperial administrator, and leader of the 1882 expedition that occupied Egypt. Born in Dublin to a small landowning family, he eventually attained a commission in the British Infantry, serving in various overseas posts in the years prior to 1882. Wolseley was dispatched by the British government to take charge of its forces in Egypt after the bombardment of **Alexandria** in July and masterminded the successful invasion of the **Suez Canal** and **Ismailia** that enabled his troops to defeat the Egyptian army at **Tel el-Kebir**. He was promoted to general, appointed a baronet, and voted a £3 thousand grant by Parliament, but soon returned to Egypt to organize the 1884 **Gordon** relief expedition. Some ascribe its failure to his controversial decision to advance up the **Nile River** rather than overland from the Red Sea, but the **Mahdi**'s forces would probably have taken Khartum no matter what the rescue mission did. Wolseley returned to the task of reorganizing Britain's army, preparing for its role in **World War I**, which he did not live to see.

WOMEN. In Egyptian society, the **Coptic Church** and **Islam** have set strict norms for the behavior of both men and women. Although both **religions** claim to support women's rights, the clerics and **ulama** who have interpreted their laws have created societal expectations restricting women to essentially domestic activities. Islam in particular has given men authority and power over their wives or female relatives, charging men with supporting women financially, but empowering them to use force against them, to limit their freedom of movement, and to initiate divorce proceedings. Both men and women may inherit property under the **Shari'a**, but male relatives receive twice the portion allotted to women. The legal testimony of two women is considered equal to that of one man, and traditionally women seldom appeared in the **Shari'a Courts** or indeed in most other public places. Upper-class women covered their hair, and often their faces, outside their homes. In Upper Egypt, genital mutilation, often called "female circumcision," was and still is practiced by most Muslims and Copts, although it is now illegal.

Many of these disabilities diminished during the era of Egypt's Westernization. Egyptian **feminism** challenges surviving patriarchal customs, but the rise of **Islamism** in Egypt since the 1970s has caused some men and women to revive them. The state has tried to make laws protecting women laborers and ensuring women's rights to property, choice of a marriage partner, and child custody. The **People's Assembly** allowed women in 2000 to sue for divorce. Popular custom, however, has limited most women's ability (or willingness) to take advantage of these laws. Within these constraints, many women did rise to high positions or make valued contributions in Egypt's national life. It is hoped that the **National Council for Women**, the efforts of various feminist groups, rising female participation in the labor force, and improved access to **education** will increasingly empower Egyptian women. *See also* **Inji Aflatun, Egyptian Feminist Union, Suzanne Mubarak, Jihan al-Sadat, Nawal al-Sa'dawi, Huda Sha'rawi, Umm Kulthum.**

WORLD WAR I (1914–18). When **Britain** declared war on Germany in August 1914, it proclaimed Egypt's neutrality but also arranged for the expulsion of German and Austrian nationals from the country. Once Egypt's legitimate suzerain, the **Ottoman Empire**, entered World War I on the German side, Britain had to decide whether to annex Egypt or to devise some legal stratagem to go on stationing its forces in this strategically vital country. The British cabinet decided against annexation, for fear of inflaming Muslim opinion elsewhere in its empire, but severed Egypt from its formal Ottoman ties, declared a **Protectorate**, and replaced **Khedive Abbas Hilmi II** with **Husayn Kamil**, giving him the title of sultan. Egypt was placed under martial law for the duration of the war and soon became the headquarters for most British military operations in the Middle East. Guarding the **Suez Canal** was their paramount concern, but the British also wanted to drive the Ottomans out of the war by invading the Dardanelles in the 1915 Gallipoli campaign or by occupying Alexandria (Iskenderun); eventually it succeeded in organizing an Arab revolt and sending the **EEF** to fight against them in the **Hijaz, Palestine, and Syria.**

Egyptians had been told that they would not have to contribute to the British war effort, but many in fact did so, often under

compulsion, as farm animals were commandeered, young men were conscripted as EEF auxiliaries, and donations in cash and kind were solicited for the Allied cause. Egyptians also suffered from price inflation, government limits on the land area to be used for raising **cotton**, and the rowdy behavior of Australian soldiers in **Cairo** and **Alexandria**. German bombing raids on Cairo and Ottoman attempts to capture the **Sinai Peninsula** had little effect on civilians. Egyptians assumed that the Protectorate was strictly a wartime measure. When the Armistice did not lead to immediate troop reductions, popular disillusionment fueled the **1919 Revolution**.

WORLD WAR II (1939–45). When **Britain** and **France** declared war on Germany in September 1939, the Egyptian government upheld the 1936 **Anglo–Egyptian Treaty** by allowing the British additional base facilities and by expelling German nationals. It did not, however, declare war on Germany and remained officially neutral. The fall of France in June 1940 shocked Egypt's government and people, leading many to think that Britain would be defeated and that Germany and Italy would soon liberate their country. Britain took strong measures to suppress pro-Axis sentiment and to reinforce its control of the **Suez Canal**, airports, **radio** stations, and other vital facilities. British Empire forces in Egypt numbered 80 to 100 thousand when the war began; by November 1941 there were 140 thousand just in **Cairo** and its vicinity. **Italian** and German forces invaded the Western Desert and seemed likely to reach the **Nile River**, but were repulsed in the **Battle of al-Alamayn**. The Axis also bombed **Alexandria**, causing many civilian casualties.

Some Egyptians saw military service in World War II, and their army was required to turn over most of its weapons to the Allies. The Egyptian government estimated the country's wartime casualties at 1,278 civilians and 201 soldiers killed. Egypt's other problems included British interference in its internal politics (see **4 February Incident**) price inflation and urban crowding, restrictions on **cotton** cultivation, and disorderly behavior by British, Australian, and American soldiers. As a result, popular demand grew for the **evacuation** of all foreign forces from Egypt after the war, contributing eventually to the **1952 Revolution**.

YAHYA, ABD AL-FATTAH (1885–1951). Politician, **cabinet** minister, and premier. He was justice minister in 1921 and again in 1930, then held the portfolio for foreign affairs from 1930 to 1934, also serving as premier at the behest of King **Fuad I** after **Isma'il Sidqi's** fall from power, and again in several coalition cabinets from 1937 to 1939. He lacked the ability or the personality to lead the government at a time when public opinion was turning against the king and his regime, and **Tawfiq Nasim** soon replaced him. Elected a senator in 1936, he chaired the Senate, a role for which he was better suited than that of premier. He served on the delegation that negotiated the 1936 **Anglo–Egyptian Treaty** and helped to represent Egypt at the San Francisco Conference that created the **United Nations**.

YAKAN, ADLI (1864–1933). Politician, **cabinet** minister, and three-time premier. The great-grandson of **Muhammad Ali's** sister, Adli descended from one of Egypt's main landowning families. Elected to the **Legislative Assembly** in 1913, he also served as foreign minister in the 1914 **Husayn Rushdi** cabinet up to the declaration of the **Protectorate**, then held the portfolio for public instruction in 1917–19 and for interior in 1919. Adli became prime minister for the first time in 1921 and took part in negotiations with Lord Curzon that were eventually stymied by the **Wafd's** obstructionism. He was a founder of the **Liberal Constitutionalist Party** in 1922. He was interior and prime minister in 1926–27 and 1929–30. His policies served the interests of Egypt's landowners, especially those of King **Fuad I**; he was never as popular as **Sa'd Zaghlul**.

YEMEN CIVIL WAR (1962–67). Struggle between royalist tribes backed by **Saudi Arabia** and Egyptian-supported republican revolutionaries in north Yemen, or what came to be called the Yemen Arab Republic. Neither side emerged as the clear winner. **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** decision in September 1962 to commit large numbers of troops to the conflict proved costly to Egypt, financially and militarily. Allegations that Egypt used chemical weapons against the Saudi-backed Yemeni tribesmen were often raised, but never proven or refuted. Egypt pulled its forces out after the **Khartoum summit**, and a Yemeni coalition cabinet, excluding any member of Yemen's former royal family, was formed in 1970.

YOM KIPPUR WAR, *see* **OCTOBER WAR**.

YOUNG EGYPT, *see* **MISR AL-FATAT**.

YOUNG EGYPT CONGRESS. Name applied to a series of Egyptian conferences held between 1908 and 1910 in Geneva under the direction of Muhammad Fahmi, a privat-docent at the University of Geneva's Faculty of Law. The best known of these congresses was the one held in September 1909 and attended by leaders of the **National, Umma**, and **Constitutional Reform Parties**, as well as by the leader of **Britain's** Labour Party, Keir Hardie. The Young Egypt Congress had a permanent organization, quite separate from the National Party, in Geneva. Its 1909 congress helped to acquaint European liberals and **socialists** with the Egyptian cause.

YOUNG MEN'S MUSLIM ASSOCIATION (YMMA), *see* **AL-SHUBBAN AL-MUSLIMIN**.

YOUTH ORGANIZATION. Organized in 1963 in conjunction with the **Vanguard Organization**, under the leadership of **Zakariyya Muhyi al-Din**. This group was created to recruit youths from diverse ideologies and to channel their energies into backing **Nasirist** ideals. Initially an elite corps, **Ali Sabri** turned it into a mass organization when he took charge of the ASU in 1965, setting up training camps in all Egyptian governorates. The group atrophied after the **June War**, however, and came to be seen by students as a nest of government spies. In the early years of **Anwar al-Sadat's** presidency it gradually turned toward **Islamism**.

YUNUS, MAHMUD (1912–76). **Engineer**, army officer, and first director of the **Suez Canal** Authority. Born in **Cairo**, he was trained by the Engineering Faculty of **Cairo University** and the Staff Officers College. He began his career in the mechanical and electrical department of the works ministry and became an army engineer in 1937. He took charge of the general headquarters of the army's technical affairs office in 1952. Two years later he became chairman and managing director of the General Petroleum Authority and counselor to the ministry of commerce, industry, and mineral wealth.

After **Jamal Abd al-Nasir** nationalized the **Suez Canal Company** in 1956, Yunus became its first managing director. His

efficient operation of the Canal, despite the walkout by most of the foreign pilots, belied predictions by some Western experts that Egypt would never be able to manage the waterway. Yunus chaired the Suez Canal Authority in 1957–65, then served from 1965 to 1967 as deputy minister for transport and communications and in 1967 as minister of oil transport. He also led the engineers' syndicate in 1954–65 and was elected in 1964 to the **National Assembly**. In 1968 he became a consultant to the Italian State Oil Company and then a private consulting engineer in Cairo and Beirut.

YUSUF, ALI (1863–1913). Pioneer journalist who founded the influential Arabic daily newspaper *al-Muayyad*. Born in Balasfura, a village near Jirja in Upper Egypt, Ali was educated at **al-Azhar**. He began his literary career as a poet, then co-edited a weekly magazine, *al-Adab*. Backed financially and politically by Prime Minister **Mustafa Riyad**, he began editing *al-Muayyad*, the first Muslim paper to challenge and eventually surpass in popularity the dominant **Syrian** dailies, *al-Ahram* and *al-Muqattam*. Under **Khedive Abbas Hilmi II**, *al-Muayyad* became the Palace organ, often publishing articles by **Mustafa Kamil** and other Muslim Egyptians hostile to the **British occupation**. He later broke with the **National Party**, as the khedive became reconciled with the British. His marriage in 1904 to the daughter of the *Shaykh al-Sadat*, against the shaykh's wishes, was controversial and was opposed by many Muslims because of his lowly background. He became estranged from the nationalist movement. As Abbas drew closer to Sir **Eldon Gorst**, he reversed his earlier policy by advocating collaboration with the British occupation.

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ZAGHLUL, SA'D (1859?–1927). Lawyer, politician, and leader of the **Wafd**. Born to a prosperous peasant family in Ibyana, he studied at **al-Azhar**. He served as a judge for several years in the **National Courts** before a wealthy patron financed his legal studies in **Cairo** and Paris. An intellectual disciple of **Muhammad Abduh**, he later backed the **Umma Party**. In response to the nationalist upsurge caused by the 1906 **Dinshaway Incident**, Sa'd became **education** minister. He clashed openly with his **British** adviser but won popu-

lar support for his insistence on Arabic as the medium of instruction in government elementary schools. He served as justice minister in 1910–12. In 1913 he was elected to the new **Legislative Assembly**, where he became the elected vice president and leader of the opposition. When the Assembly was prorogued during **World War I**, he retired, reportedly to study German, and was considered for a **cabinet** post when **Fuad I** became sultan in 1917, but was rejected.

After the Armistice, he and two of his colleagues asked Britain's **high commissioner** if they could go to London to discuss Egypt's postwar status, but the foreign office refused to see these politicians. Sa'd proposed to lead an Egyptian delegation, or *wafd*, to the **Paris Peace Conference** and circulated petitions throughout the country to gain popular support, but the British blocked that idea as well. The Egyptian ministers resigned, and riots broke out in Cairo and the provinces in March 1919. Sa'd and three of his friends were arrested by the British and interned in Malta, but the disturbances intensified. A new high commissioner, General **Edmund Allenby**, suppressed the riots, but let the Wafdist leaders go to Paris, where they stayed for a year without gaining a hearing at the Conference. Sa'd talked with Lord **Milner** in 1920, but the two men could not agree on Egypt's future status. His return to Egypt caused new disturbances, and he was exiled to Aden, the Seychelles, and Gibraltar. He did not return until the **1923 Constitution** had been written, but he converted his delegation into the **Wafd Party**, which won the parliamentary elections held late in that year.

In January 1924 King Fuad I invited him to form a Wafdist government. Sa'd's cabinet hoped to reach an agreement on Egypt's status with the new Labour Party government in Britain. He narrowly escaped an attempt on his life in June of that year. His Wafdist ministry fell after the assassination in Cairo of the commander of the Egyptian army, Sir **Lee Stack**, in November. High Commissioner Allenby handed Sa'd an ultimatum with conditions that were viewed as extreme and humiliating. He resigned in protest, and the king named a caretaker government from which the Wafd was excluded. In new elections held in February 1925 the Wafd won a partial victory and Sa'd was elected president of the Chamber of Deputies, but the king ordered Parliament closed. In the 1926 elections Zaghul led the Wafd again to victory, but declined to form a government and was reelected president of the Chamber. He died in August 1927 and was mourned throughout Egypt. Hailed as the "father of Egypt's

political independence,” he was popular and patriotic, but often vain and stubborn. He did more to arouse the masses than to remove the British from Egypt. His memoirs are being published by the Center for the Study and Documentation of Egypt’s Contemporary History. By 1996, eight volumes, covering up to May 1918, had appeared.

ZAMALEK. Fashionable residential district of **Cairo** located on the northern half of Gezira Island close to the city’s center and often dubbed by Americans the “Georgetown of Cairo” because of its many embassies. Until the **Nile River** flood was brought under control, the island was marshy and uninhabited, although **Muhammad Ali** built a retreat there in 1830. Other palaces came later, most notably Gezirah Palace, which was built in 1866 by Khedive **Ismail** and used by France’s Empress Eugénie during the **Suez Canal** opening in 1869. It now serves as the main lobby of the Marriott Hotel. Active development did not start until after the **Bulaq Bridge**, designed by William Scherzer, was opened in 1911. The bridge linked Gezira Island to Bulaq. Its road, which bisected the island, was called Avenue Zamalek, then Avenue **Fuad**, and after the **1952 Revolution** became 26th of July Street.

The earliest development was by a British syndicate on 100 **feddans** purchased in 1903; additional subdivisions were developed by the Baehler Society in 1905–7. A number of villas were built for high-ranking British officials, various minorities, and a few wealthy Egyptians. Development escalated rapidly after **World War I**. The most important colonial residence was the *Sirdariyya* (the residence of the British Commander of the Egyptian Army), which is still located on the southern side of 26th of July Street. In addition to being the residence of Lord **Kitchener** and Sir **Reginald Wingate**, it was also the site of Sir **Lee Stack**’s assassination in 1924.

AL-ZAWAHIRI, AYMAN (1951–). Close associate of *al-Qa’ida* leader Usama Bin Ladin. Born to an upper-class Egyptian family in **Ma’adi**, he is related to a former rector of **al-Azhar** and also to **Abd al-Rahman Azzam**. He joined the Society of the **Muslim Brothers** as a boy and was first arrested in 1966. Trained at **Cairo University**’s Faculty of Medicine, he became a pediatrician, but his main interest was in **Islamist** politics. A leader of **al-Jihad**, he was one of the 300 members arrested following **Anwar al-Sadat**’s assassination

and served a three-year prison term. He left Egypt in 1984 and went to Peshawar (Pakistan), where he became involved in the Muslim struggle to drive the Soviets from Afghanistan and was one of the founders of *al-Qa'ida*. He probably masterminded the bombing of Egypt's embassy in Pakistan in 1995 and the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, as well as the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. He has previously been tried *in absentia* and convicted in both American and Egyptian courts.

ZAWAIL, AHMED (1946–). Nobel laureate in Chemistry in 1999. Born in a village near Damanhur, he earned his B.S. in 1967 followed by an M.S. from the Faculty of Science at **Alexandria University**. He obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania in 1974. His career has included appointments on the faculties of Alexandria University, Harvard, California Institute of Technology, and the University of Chicago. He has also been a visiting professor at several other institutions, including AUC. His research has centered on the study of atomic motion within the structure of a molecule. He has proved that it is possible to photograph actions taking place within one millionth of a billionth of a second. His autobiography was published in 2002.

AL-ZAWIYA AL-HAMRA. Mixed, working-class neighborhood in **Cairo**, the site of violent fighting between Muslims and **Copts** in June 1981. **Anwar al-Sadat's** loss of legitimacy, hot weather, and cuts in the water supply contributed to the fracas, but its immediate cause is unknown. Egged on by mysterious provocateurs, both sides committed murders, other atrocities, arson, and looting. Leaflets were distributed in other parts of Cairo, urging each community to take up arms. Belatedly, the police sealed off the neighborhood. The disturbances have been cited as portents of rising **fundamentalism** in Egyptian politics, leading to Sadat's mass arrests of Coptic and Muslim leaders in September, followed by his assassination.

ZAYNAB. Romantic novel glorifying Egyptian village life, written anonymously by **Muhammad Husayn Haykal** while he was studying law in Paris in 1912 and first published in 1913 without attracting much attention. It was later republished in Haykal's name in 1929 and has generally been considered the first Egyptian novel.

AL-ZAYYAT, AHMAD HASAN (1885–1968). Arabic teacher and scholar, writer, and editor of *al-Risala*, a monthly literary magazine, from 1933 to 1953. Educated at **al-Azhar** and **Cairo University**, he taught at the **École des Frères**, a Muslim school founded by **Abd al-Aziz Jawish**, and **AUC**. As a writer and editor, he helped to reorient Egyptian public opinion toward **Arab nationalism**, influenced by his sojourn in **Iraq** between 1929 and 1933. In the early years of **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** presidency, Zayyat edited al-Azhar's monthly journal. He was awarded the State Prize for **Literature** in 1962 and was elected to the **Arabic Language Academy**.

ZIONISM. Movement to create or sustain a Jewish state in **Palestine** or **Israel**. Most Egyptian **Jews** were anti-Zionist, but an Istanbul native, Joseph Marcou Baruch, who came to Egypt in 1896, formed in the following year the Bar Kochba Society. By 1901 it had 300 members, most of whom were Jews of southern or eastern European background who joined for ideological reasons or philanthropic motives. A youth group, *B'nai Tzion* (Sons of Zion), was formed in 1900, and an ephemeral Zionist school, *Bet Sefer Tzioni*, was set up in **Cairo**. The early Egyptian Zionist movement was hampered by the heterogeneity of Egypt's Jews and by the hostility of the **Syrian-dominated Arabic press**. The Jewish influx after the abortive 1905 **Russian** revolution and from Palestine during **World War I** stimulated interest in Zionism among Egyptian Jews, as did the Balfour Declaration and the postwar creation of the British mandate in Palestine. In 1921 there were five Zionist groups in Cairo and one each in **Alexandria**, **Mansura**, **Tanta**, and **Port Said**. A Zionist weekly, *Israel*, was published from 1920 to 1937 in French, Spanish, Hebrew, and English; another, *La Revue sioniste*, came out in French. Egypt had chapters of Mizrahi, the Women's International Zionist Organization, and Maccabi (the Zionist athletic club). A permanent Zionist committee was formed in Cairo in 1929; it later raised funds for the Jewish National Fund and *Keren ha-Yesod* (Palestine Foundation Fund) and established a social center, *Bet ha-Am* (The People's House), in Cairo. In Alexandria a Zionist library was opened in 1932, and a Hebrew Club sponsored weekly debates.

The Arab–Jewish contest for Palestine, combined with the rise of *al-Shubban al-Muslimin*, *Misr al-Fatat*, and the **Muslim Brothers**, turned many Egyptians against Zionism. Successive Egyptian governments tried to protect the Jewish community from attacks, but

newspapers, officials, and **cabinet** ministers became openly anti-Zionist. As Egypt took the lead in creating the **Arab League**, the government spoke out against Jewish immigration to Palestine and plans to form a Jewish state there. Egypt adhered to the Arab boycott of Zionist goods, at times applied indiscriminately against Jewish businesses not involved in Zionism. All Zionist activities were banned when Egypt entered the **Palestine War**. Clandestine efforts to smuggle Jews out of Egypt became the Zionists' main concern from 1948, although some took part in the 1954 bombing attempts in Cairo that led to trials of several Egyptian Jews—two of whom were hanged in 1955—and since have become a part of the **Lavon Affair**. In 1956, after the **Suez War**, **Jamal Abd al-Nasir's** regime enacted Law 329, which deprived all Zionists of Egyptian citizenship. The 1979 **Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty** and consequent establishment of diplomatic ties have led to a small Israeli community in Cairo, but not to any Zionist revival. A serial dramatization on Egyptian **television** of the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* in November 2002 underscored official and popular hostility to Zionism in Egypt.

ZIWAR, AHMAD (1864–1945). Lawyer, **cabinet** minister, and premier. Born in **Alexandria** to a family of **Circassian** origin, he was educated at the Azariyya College there and in the Jesuit College in Beirut and received his law degree at Aix University in **France**. Ziwar served as a judge and counselor, governor of Alexandria, minister of *awqaf* from 1917 to 1919, **education** in 1919, **communications** in 1919–21 and in 1923, foreign affairs in 1924–26, and also interior in 1925–26. The Senate's first president under the **1923 Constitution**, he succeeded **Sa'd Zaghlul** as premier after Sir **Lee Stack** was assassinated in November 1924. Following the 1925 elections, in which the **Wafd** won a majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, Ziwar formed a coalition cabinet made up of **Liberal Constitutionalists**, **Ittihad** partisans, and Independents. The elected Chamber was dissolved when it defiantly chose Sa'd as its speaker.

Backed by King **Fuad I**, Ziwar's coalition amended the electoral law to prevent the Wafd from returning to power. Ziwar's government increased controls over the Egyptian **press**, passed an associations law to curb the activities of the political parties, ceded the Jaghhub oasis to Italian-ruled **Libya**, passed an electoral law raising the financial requirements and qualifications for both voters and candidates, and muzzled "Bolshevik" propagandists. His gov-

ernment was viewed as Palace dominated and repressive. Its fall in January 1926 was ascribed to the intrigues of the **high commissioner**, Lord **George Lloyd**. Ziwar remained in the Chamber of Deputies until 1930 and served as an appointed senator from 1931 to 1934. He then became director of King Fuad's office until he resigned in 1935. Tall, stout, lazy, and affable with foreigners, he ignored nationalistic attacks on his policies.

APPENDIX 1. POLITICAL LEADERS

Khedive Isma'il

Nubar	28 August 1878
Prince Muhammad Tawfiq	1 March 1879
Prince Muhammad Tawfiq	8 April 1879

Khedive [Muhammad] Tawfiq

Muhammad Sharif	5 July 1879
Khedive Muhammad Tawfiq	12 August 1879
Mustafa Riyad	21 September 1879
Muhammad Sharif	14 September 1881
Mahmud Sami al-Barudi	4 February 1882
Isma'il Raghīb	18 June 1882
Muhammad Sharif	21 August 1882
Nubar	10 January 1884
Mustafa Riyad	9 June 1888
Mustafa Fahmi	14 May 1891

Khedive Abbas Hilmi II

Mustafa Fahmi	17 January 1892
Husayn Fakhri	15 January 1893
Mustafa Riyad	19 January 1893
Nubar	15 April 1894
Mustafa Fahmi	12 November 1895
Butros Ghali	12 November 1908
Muhammad Sa'id	23 February 1910
Husayn Rushdi	5 April 1914

Sultan Husayn Kamil

Husayn Rushdi 19 December 1914

Sultan [Ahmad] Fuad I

Husayn Rushdi 10 October 1917
 Husayn Rushdi 9 April 1919
 Muhammad Sa'id 20 May 1919
 Yusuf Wahba 20 November 1919
 Muhammad Tawfiq Nasim 21 May 1920
 Adli Yeken 16 March 1921

King [Ahmad] Fuad I

Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat 1 March 1922
 Muhammad Tawfiq Nasim 30 November 1922
 Yahya Ibrahim 15 March 1923
 Sa'd Zaghlul 28 January 1924
 Ahmad Ziwar 24 November 1924
 Ahmad Ziwar 13 March 1925
 Adli Yakan 7 June 1926
 Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat 25 April 1927
 Mustafa al-Nahhas 16 March 1928
 Muhammad Mahmud 25 June 1928
 Adli Yakan 3 October 1929
 Mustafa al-Nahhas 1 January 1930
 Isma'il Sidqi 19 June 1930
 Isma'il Sidqi 4 January 1933
 Abd al-Fattah Yahya 27 September 1933
 Muhammad Tawfiq Nasim 14 November 1934
 Ali Mahir 30 January 1936

Regency

Mustafa al-Nahhas 9 May 1936

King Faruq

Mustafa al-Nahhas 1 August 1937

Muhammad Mahmud	30 December 1937
Muhammad Mahmud	27 April 1938
Muhammad Mahmud	24 June 1938
Ali Mahir	18 August 1939
Hasan Sabri	27 June 1940
Husayn Sirri	15 November 1940
Husayn Sirri	21 July 1941
Mustafa al-Nahhas	4 February 1942
Mustafa al-Nahhas	26 May 1942
Ahmad Mahir	8 October 1944
Ahmad Mahir	15 January 1945
Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi	24 February 1945
Isma'il Sidqi	16 February 1946
Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi	9 December 1946
Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi	28 December 1948
Husayn Sirri	25 July 1949
Husayn Sirri	3 November 1949
Mustafa al-Nahhas	12 January 1950
Ali Mahir	27 January 1952
Ahmad Najib al-Hilali	1 March 1952
Husayn Sirri	2 July 1952
Ahmad Najib al-Hilali	22 July 1952

Temporary Regency

Ali Mahir	24 July 1952
Muhammad Najib	7 September 1952

President Muhammad Najib

Muhammad Najib	18 June 1953
Jamal Abd al-Nasir	25 February 1954
Muhammad Najib	8 March 1954
Jamal Abd al-Nasir	17 April 1954

President Jamal Abd al-Nasir

Jamal Abd al-Nasir	29 June 1956
Kamal al-Din Husayn	20 September 1960
Jamal Abd al-Nasir	16 August 1961

Ali Sabri	29 September 1962
Zakariyya Muhyi al-Din	1 October 1965
Muhammad Sidqi Sulayman	10 September 1966
Jamal Abd al-Nasir	19 June 1967

President Anwar al-Sadat

Mahmud Fawzi	20 October 1970
Aziz Sidqi	17 January 1972
Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat	27 March 1973
Abd al-Aziz Hijazi	24 September 1974
Mamduh Salim	16 April 1975
Mustafa Jalal	5 October 1978
Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat	31 May 1980

President Husni Mubarak

Muhammad Husni Mubarak	31 October 1981
Ahmed Fuad Muhyi al-Din	3 January 1982
Kamal Husayn Ali	16 July 1984
Ali Lutfi	5 September 1985
Atif Sidqi	11 November 1986
Kamal al-Janzeni	4 January 1996
Atif Ubayd	5 October 1999

APPENDIX 2. WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

For scientific and most other purposes, the metric system is used in modern Egypt. Some older units of area and weight are still used, however, and may appear in this dictionary. Their English and metric equivalents are as follows:

1 feddan	1.038	acres	4,201	sq meters
1 cantar of cotton	99	lb	45	kg
1 metric cantar of cotton	110	lb	50	kg
1 ardeb of cottonseed	2.7	cantars		
1 ardeb of wheat	330	lb	150	kg*
1 ardeb of maize	305	lb	140	kg*
1 dariba of rice	2,050	lb	935	kg*
1 ugqa	2.75	lb	1.248	kg
1 rotl	0.99	lb	449	grams
1 barrel of oil	42	gallons	158.97	liters

*approximate figure

APPENDIX 3. MILITARY RANKS

Egyptian ranks followed the nineteenth-century Ottoman pattern. The titles, mainly Turkish in origin, were not changed until 1958.

Turco-Egyptian Ranks	Modern Egyptian Ranks	U.S. Army Equivalents
Mushir	Qaid amm	5-star general
Sirdar	Fariq awwal	4-star general
Fariq	Fariq	Lieutenant general
Liwa	Liwa	Major general
Amirilay	Amid	Brigadier general
Qaimaqam	Aqid	Colonel
Bimbashi	Muqaddam	Lieutenant colonel
Sagh	Raid	Major
Yuzbashi	Naqib	Captain
Mulazim awwal	Mulazim awwal	First lieutenant
Mulazim thani	Mulazim	Second lieutenant
Shawish	Raqib	Sergeant
Ombashi	Arif	Corporal
Askari	Jundi	Private

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Foreign Ministry Archives in Paris; and the U.S. National Archives in Washington, D.C. German foreign office archives for the period from 1866 to 1945 are available from University Microfilms in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

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